EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

TOGETHER WITH JOINT SESSIONS WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

(HISTORICAL SERIES)

VOLUME XIV

EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

1962

MADE PUBLIC APRIL 1986

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1986

48-688 O

48-688 O—86——1

S201-20
S381-11

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

87TH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

J.W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, *Chairman*

JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana
WAYNE MORSE, Oregon
RUSSELL B. LONG, Louisiana
ALBERT GORE, Tennessee
FRANK J. LAUCHE, Ohio
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, Iowa
GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
HOMER E. CAPEHART, Indiana
FRANK CARLSON, Kansas
JOHN J. WILLIAMS, Delaware

CARL MARCY, *Chief of Staff*

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

99TH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, *Chairman*

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas
RUDY BOSCHWITZ, Minnesota
LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska
PAUL S. TRIBLE, JR., Virginia
DANIEL J. EVANS, Washington

CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska
ALAN CRANSTON, California
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
THOMAS F. EAGLETON, Missouri
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

M. GRAEME BANNERMAN, *Staff Director*
GERYLD B. CHRISTIANSON, *Minority Staff Director*

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

87TH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia, *Chairman*

HARRY FLOOD BYRD, Virginia
JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
CLAIR ENGLE, California
E.L. (BOB) BARTLETT, Alaska
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, Massachusetts
MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine
PRESCOTT BUSH, Connecticut
J. GLENN BEALL, Maryland
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
FRANCIS CASE, South Dakota

HARRY L. WINGATE, Jr., *Chief Clerk*

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

99TH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona, *Chairman*

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
GORDON J. HUMPHREY, New Hampshire
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine
DAN QUAYLE, Indiana
JOHN P. EAST, North Carolina
PETE WILSON, California
JEREMIAH DENTON, Alabama
PHIL GRAMM, Texas
SAM NUNN, Georgia
JOHN C. STENNIS, Mississippi
GARY HART, Colorado
J. JAMES EXON, Nebraska
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
ALAN J. DIXON, Illinois
JOHN GLENN, Ohio

JAMES F. MCGOVERN, *Staff Director and Chief Counsel*
ARNOLD L. PUNARO, *Staff Director for the Minority*
ALAN R. YUSPEH, *General Counsel*
CHRISTINE C. DAUTH, *Chief Clerk*

PREFACE

The world came perilously close to nuclear confrontation in 1962, as the United States imposed a naval quarantine to prevent installation of Soviet offensive missiles on Cuba. The resolve of the United States to stand firm during those tense 13 days in October led to a Soviet retreat, avoidance of a potentially annihilating conflict, and enhancement of the prestige of American foreign and military policy.

Although Congress was not in session at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, it had devoted extensive attention to Cuba during 1962. Senators from both parties stood in the forefront in warning of the Soviet military build-up in Cuba and pressing the administration to take firm action. Included in this volume are the joint hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Services Committee which led to passage of a resolution authorizing the President to take whatever means necessary to prevent Cuba from threatening its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere.

The Cuban missile crisis cast a shadow over other concerns in 1962 which ultimately would prove more perilous and inflict more damage on the United States. Members of the Foreign Relations Committee raised early warnings about the situation in South Vietnam, and pressed administration officials on the growing U.S. involvement in that conflict. Administration officials, however, were less than forthcoming with accurate information on Vietnamese policy, and attempted to conceal the fact that U.S. advisers were engaged in combat. On the related issue of the Geneva Agreement on Laotian Neutrality, the administration attempted to avoid Congressional involvement by treating it as an executive agreement rather than submitting it to the Senate for ratification as a treaty. Despite a few private and public objections, members of the committee and the Senate gave broad bipartisan support to the administration's programs in Southeast Asia.

Enactment of the Cuba and Berlin resolutions at the end of the 87th Congress contributed indirectly to developments in Vietnam. In both cases, Congress used resolutions to demonstrate "unified national will" to resist Communist aggression, and gave advance, open-ended approval to any Presidential decision to use the armed forces against a perceived threat. Both the Cuba and Berlin resolutions would serve as precedents for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964.

The wide scope of executive session hearings that the Foreign Relations Committee conducted during the second session of the 87th Congress give testament to the troubled and tumultuous world situation in 1962. In addition to Cuba and Vietnam, the committee heard closed-door testimony on the Congo, Yugoslavia, Thailand, Laos, the Soviet Union, India, Berlin, and the United Nations. Keeping pace with efforts to understand world troublespots and exert some influence, were the regular reports on the nuclear test ban and disarmament talks being conducted in Geneva. Both hope and fear pressed the committee and the Nation toward a resolution of these problems. These transcripts offer instruction on how the executive and legislative branches approached these hazardous issues, and give new evidence on which to judge the soundness of their decisions.

The selection of transcripts for these volumes represents the editor's choice of material possessing the most usefulness and interest for the widest audience. Subheads, editorial notes, and some documents discussed in the hearings, are added to bring the events into perspective. Any material deleted (other than "off the record" references for which no transcript was made) has been noted in the appropriate places, and transcripts not included are represented by minutes of those sessions, in chronological sequence. Unpublished transcripts and other records of the committee for 1962 are deposited at the National Archives, where they are available to scholars under the access rules of that agency. Some transcripts will require further declassification procedures.

In accordance with the general policy of this series, portions of the volume were submitted to the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and participating Senators for review and comment.

The Foreign Relations Committee extends its appreciation to Senator Barry Goldwater, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, for his cooperation in approving the release of those sessions which the two committees held jointly.

This volume was prepared for publication by Donald A. Ritchie of the Senate Historical Office.

RICHARD G. LUGAR

CONTENTS

	Page
Preface	v
Minutes, January 11	1
The Situation in Yugoslavia, January 11	3
Testimony of George F. Kennan, Ambassador to Yugoslavia.	
The Situation in Vietnam, January 12	31
Testimony of Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., Ambassador to Vietnam.	
Briefing on the World Situation, January 15	65
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State.	
Minutes, January 17	110
Briefing on the Congo Situation, January 18	111
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State.	
Minutes, January 22	134
Minutes, January 23	135
Minutes, January 24	137
Minutes, January 24	138
Minutes, January 30	139
Minutes, January 31	140
Minutes, February 2	141
World Military Situation and its Relation to United States Foreign Policy, February 8	143
Testimony of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense.	
Minutes, February 13	187
The Situation in Laos and Vietnam, February 20	189
Testimony of Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.	
Minutes, February 26	214
Minutes, February 27	215
The Situation in Thailand, February 27	217
Testimony of Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.	
Minutes, March 1	245
Minutes, March 6	246
Report on the U-2 Incident, March 6	247
Testimony of John A. McCone, Director, Central Intelligence Agency.	
Minutes, March 7	281
Minutes, March 8	282
Briefing on Forthcoming Geneva Disarmament Negotiations, March 9	283
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, and William Foster, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.	
Minutes, March 13	310
Briefing by Attorney General on His Recent World Trip, March 14	311
Testimony of Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General.	
Minutes, March 19	332
Minutes, March 22	333
Minutes, March 28	334
Briefing on Discussions in Geneva, March 29	335
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State.	
Briefing on the Soviet Union, April 3	359
Testimony of Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador to the Soviet Union.	
Minutes, April 10	381
Treaty Outline on Arms Control, April 10	383
Testimony of William Foster, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.	
Minutes, April 11	404

Page

Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, April 11 405
Testimony of Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; William S. Gaud, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Near East and South East Asia, Agency for International Development; and William P. Bundy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
Minutes, April 11 415
Minutes, April 12 416
Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, April 13 417
Testimony of W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; Seymour J. Janow, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Far East, and William P. Bundy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, April 16 429
Testimony of Teodoro Moscoso, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Latin America, Agency for International Development; Edwin H. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; and Gen. William Enemark, Director, Western Hemisphere Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
Minutes, April 17 437
Minutes, April 25 438
Minutes, April 30 439
Minutes, May 1 440
Minutes, May 1 441
Minutes, May 2 442
Minutes, May 3 443
Minutes, May 10 444
Minutes, May 11 445
NATO, CENTO and SEATO, May 15 447
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State.
The Situation in Berlin, May 15 481
Testimony of Gen. Lucius Clay.
Minutes, May 21 501
Minutes, May 22 502
Minutes, May 24 503
Minutes, May 24 504
Minutes, May 25 505
The Situation in India, June 6 507
Testimony of John Kenneth Galbraith, U.S. Ambassador to India.
Minutes, June 8 524
Minutes, June 21 525
Minutes, June 22 526
Briefing on Geneva Disarmament Negotiations, June 22 527
Testimony of Ambassador Arthur Dean.
Minutes, June 26 549
State Department Policy Planning Council, June 26 551
Testimony of George Ball, Acting Secretary of State; and Walt W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department of State.
Minutes, June 29 612
The World Situation, July 3 615
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State.
Minutes, July 6 633
Minutes, July 6 634
Minutes, July 9 635
The Situation In Laos, July 13 637
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State.
Minutes, July 16 663
Minutes, July 17 664
Minutes, July 20 665
Minutes, July 24 666
Minutes, July 25 667
Minutes, August 1 668
Minutes, August 1 669
Minutes, August 2 670
Minutes, August 2 671
Minutes, August 6 672

Page

Minutes, August 9 673
Minutes, August 9 674
Minutes, August 15 676
Minutes, August 16 677
Minutes, August 27 679
The World Situation, September 5 681
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, and Maj. Gen. Marshall S. Carter and John Whitman, Central Intelligence Agency.
Minutes, September 7 733
Forthcoming Meeting of the United Nations, September 11 735
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, and Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.
Minutes, September 12 756
Situation in Cuba, September 17 757
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State.
Situation in Cuba (Mark-Up), September 19 767
Minutes, October 1 800
Minutes, October 2 801
Berlin Resolution (Mark-Up), October 10 803

APPENDICES

A. Situation in Vietnam 811
B. Situation of Thailand 819
C. Soviet Public Statements with Respect to Cuban Security 821
D. Situation in Surinam 825
E. Cuba Resolution 826
F. Berlin Resolutions 829
G. Committee on Foreign Relations Publications for 1962: Hearings, Committee Prints, Senate Documents and Reports 833
H. Volumes Published to date in the "Historical Series" 835

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:40 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Church, Symington, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

Appearing on their own behalf were William Edward Stevenson, nominated to be Ambassador to the Philippines, and William Avery Crawford, nominated to be Minister to Rumania.

The Chairman announced the next order of business as an original resolution authorizing committee expenditure of $160,000 for studies and investigations by the committee during the calendar year 1962, and until January 31, 1963. On motion by Senator Sparkman, seconded by Senator Humphrey, the resolution was approved for report without objection. (See S. Res. 246.)

The committee then considered an original resolution authorizing expenditure of $5,000 each calendar year for the reception of visiting foreign dignitaries, and to authorize the committee to employ one additional professional staff member to plan and assist in such reception. On motion by Senator Sparkman, seconded by Senator Humphrey, the resolution was unanimously approved for report. (See S. Res. 247.)

The committee concluded to consider certain nominations without the necessity of public hearings unless some one member of the committee would otherwise request.

The committee discussed a provisional staff study on the economic impact of arms control agreements.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 12 noon.]

THE SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA

THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:10 p.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building. Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Symington, Wiley, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse, and Mr. Kuhl, of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, we are very pleased to have you. I hope some of our colleagues will be here, especially those who need a little information on Yugoslavia, but in any case we will make a good record, and the floor is yours. We are delighted to have you back. All reports I have had, including Time Magazine, have been most favorable and complimentary to your regime.

Senator WILEY. You have not been reading what I read, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I read Time Magazine. [Laughter.]

Senator WILEY. A fellow with his standing is expected to get smeared and get perfumed, and he gets both. Look, he hasn't lost any of his hair since I saw him last. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. He looks extremely well. The only mystery to me is that he regarded this as a vacation from the academic world. This has puzzled me very greatly.

The next thing for you to do is to run for public office and submit yourself to the electorate.

Mr. KENNAN. Then the rest of it would go.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Ambassador. We would like very much to have you give us a fill-in of your experience and about the situation in Yugoslavia.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE F. KENNAN, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. KENNAN. May I ask, Senator Fulbright, whether we are on the record or off?

The CHAIRMAN. This is an executive session. It is on the record unless you find something that you think is especially sensitive and ask that it not be taken down. But the record is not to be published or given to the press.

Mr. KENNAN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is available, however, to other members of the committee who are not here. They often like very much to have an opportunity to read what your report has been. So I would only suggest that you request that you go entirely off the record if it is something of a very personal nature.

Senator CAPEHART. When they read it they do not take it out of the committee room.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. It is available for the other members of the committee only here in the committee room.

Mr. KENNAN. Thank you.

A UNIQUE COUNTRY

Well, sir, I have been out there now for about 8 months. It has been a very stimulating and a challenging job.

I do not know a single country in the world for which the problems of our policy are more baffling and puzzling and complex then they are for Yugoslavia. This country has a very peculiar position between the two worlds. It is unique, in fact. It stands between East and West, and in certain ways it also stands between its own past and its own future, so it is hard to know at any one point very often what you are dealing with.

It has not been an easy time in Yugoslavia, and I will try to tell you what some of the difficulties have been. I would like to say, though, that I have at all times been treated with great personal consideration and courtesy by everyone there, including those Yugoslav leaders with whom I have disagreed most violently and most frequently.

I have no complaint on that score whatsoever. I must say that the Yugoslav Government has been punctilious in observing all the proprieties in its dealings with our Government. I have no complaint of any rudeness, discourtesy toward myself or toward the United States.

NATURE OF DISAGREEMENTS

Senator WILEY. You mean your disagreement was with the big shots in the government?

Mr. KENNAN. I have disagreed with their policies and with their statements.

Senator WILEY. That is what I mean.

Mr. KENNAN. And I have told them so very frankly.

Senator WILEY. Then they are pro-Russian?

Mr. KENNAN. Their statements have been ones that I could not agree with. In many cases they have leaned toward the Soviet view. Sometimes they have been disagreeable to me for other reasons, too, and I think to people in this country. That is, it is not just a case of statements that seemed to lean toward the Soviet side.

Sometimes there have been statements about colonial problems, about relations between big countries and small countries which I have found ones that I had to take exceptions to. I have done this wherever I had what I thought was a favorable opportunity to do it.

Senator WILEY. You are talking about the officials of Yugoslavia. What about the people?

Mr. KENNAN. The people, so far as I could see, could not be more friendly toward Americans or more hospitable or more kind. I have never met with greater kindness and courtesy from any people in any country I have ever lived in. The people are touchingly well-inclined toward us.

PRO-SOVIET LEANINGS

Senator CAPEHART. In case we got into a war with Russia, whose side would they be on?

Mr. KENNAN. They would try to keep out of it if they could.

Senator CAPEHART. Could they?

Mr. KENNAN. They would be more afraid of the Russians than they would be of us, and for this reason they would try to cover that flank as well as they could, and they would do everything possible to try to keep the Russians from coming into their country, even at the cost of a very considerable appeasement.

I think that the answer generally to your question is, if it comes to a war, I would expect them to try to keep out of it, but to lean to the other side if they have to lean.

TITO'S STATEMENTS

Senator WILEY. What about Tito? [1]

Mr. KENNAN. Tito is more of a problem to us, perhaps, than the government as a whole, because he is an older man whose youth was spent in the Communist movement. It seems to me that he feels a need for proving to the people in the Communist orbit that his independence is not disadvantageous to them.

He hates to have it said about him that he has become the tool of the imperialists. He leans over backwards to make statements which are agreeable to the eastern side in order to try to prove that just because he is independent, this does not mean that they have a grievance against him. This is one of my great problems.

His statements have been more extreme than the views, I think, of the government as a whole. I think many other people have had their doubts about the wisdom of the things he said.

One of the complexities of my situation is that I have to deal with both things. I have to deal with his statements as head of state, and yet I have to remember that there are younger people coming along in this regime who do not see things entirely identical.

THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Chairman, is it all right to ask some questions?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure, go ahead.

Senator CAPEHART. Are the people fairly prosperous there? Are they 100 percent communistic in their economy?

---

[1] Marshal Tito (Josip Broz), President of Yugoslavia.

Mr. KENNAN. No. They have introduced during the last 4 or 5 years very considerable measures of liberalization of the economy, especially including the element of competition between economic enterprises.

Senator CAPEHART. What industries are not communized?

Mr. KENNAN. None of them are communized today in the sense of being under government ownership. They are theoretically and legally under the ownership of the people who work in them, that is, the entire staff, executive and workers, and not just the workers.

Senator CAPEHART. That hold the individual businesses?

Mr. KENNAN. Businesses are owned individually up to a point where they employ five people or less. If they get to employ more than five people, they cannot be individually owned. They have to be owned by the collective body of the people who work in them.

Senator CAPEHART. In other words, if there are 100 people working in that business, the 100 people would own it?

Mr. KENNAN. The 100 people would own it.

WORKERS COUNCILS

Senator CAPEHART. How do they arrive at who should be the head man over there?

Mr. KENNAN. They have what is called a workers council, a form of representation.

Senator CAPEHART. A workers council within each unit?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator CAPEHART. In other words, take these 100, for example——

Mr. KENNAN. That is right.

Senator CAPEHART [continuing]. They would elect their own head man?

Mr. KENNAN. They would elect their workers council, and this workers council would have power to dispose today of over 55 percent of the revenues, the net proceeds of the enterprise. They can decide whether to pay higher wages in certain instances or whether to put this money back into the enterprise, what they would want to do with it.

This, of course, is relative. I say these are the powers they have. These are the powers they have on paper. This is a country which is still run by a party. The party, which began as a Communist Party, still calls itself that.

LIMITS OF COUNCILS' POWERS

Senator CAPEHART. Do you mean run by a party rather than a government?

Mr. KENNAN. The party infiltrates everything, and the party members in one of these workers councils have a very powerful, influential position. Nevertheless, the councils are not completely frauds, and sometimes they develop pretty hot arguments and tests of power within these workers councils despite the part.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they divide the profits if they want to?

Mr. KENNAN. They can by raising wages.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. KENNAN. They can compete for managerial personnel, and do. That is, if a man is known to be a good factory director, he will get bids from a lot of workers councils around the country.

Senator SYMINGTON. But he cannot divide up any profits on the basis of the ownership of any stock.

Mr. KENNAN. No. They can only do it through wages, and there they have to adjust to certain general standards, labor union standards, throughout the country. I think there are limits.

LIBERAL PARTY DICTATORSHIP

Senator CAPEHART. Where do they get their capital to operate this unit of 100 workers?

Mr. KENNAN. They get it from the state investment bank, and that is the main string of control that the central government has over these enterprises. They provide the source of funds.

Senator CAPEHART. Is this state bank 100 percent communistic?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They pay interest on this?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes. They are a government show, and they are run by the party. The whole thing is really run—it is still a party dictatorship. But there is not terrorism anywhere near the degree that there is in Czechoslovakia or in Eastern Germany.

In fact, we find very little difficulty today in meeting Yugoslav people, in having them come to our homes, and we come to their homes. They have very little difficulty in traveling. Their regime is relatively liberal about letting them out.

TRANSFER OF F-86 AIRCRAFT

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Ambassador, it is always a great pleasure to see you.

When I was in the Middle East, in a country that is considered a very good friend of ours, the European edition of the New York Times had a story that we were selling, I forget how many, 125 or 175 F-86's to the Yugoslavs at less than 1 percent of the original cost. I figured that out myself, based on overall price.

These people said, "This is the plane you are giving them; we admit it is not much good, but you are giving it to them and they, in effect, are your enemies." I believe this was after the Belgrade statement.

"What is the point? Who are you for? Are you for building us up as a bulwark of the free world or are you for building up the Communists?"

What would be your answer to that?

I might say I was asked the same question and I did not have any more information about that than I did about the Congo when I went home in November. I wish what Mr. Rusk had told this committee—he said he would let the members of this committee know so that while we were home we would have had some answers.

But in any case, what would be your answer to a question of that character from people who think that they have been on our side

and done their best to support our policies and programs in the free world defense against communism?

PRUDENCE RECOMMENDED

Mr. KENNAN. Senator Symington, I cannot speak to this particular case. It has never come under my ken. Nobody has ever asked me about it, and I am not familiar with the circumstances of it.

I would say that when it is a question of selling obsolescent equipment on proper terms—terms that we would sell it to anybody else in the world and against good dollar repayment—I think we might as well do it, because if we refrain from doing it, I suspect the Yugoslavs will get it from some source anyway. I think in certain instances it is better that they get it from us than that they get if from other people.

However, if it involves training Yugoslav pilots or anything in this country, I would want to look at this very carefully and be sure that we do not do anything that bewilders or confuses our own public. I think we ought to be very careful and prudent in what we do along these lines.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand as Ambassador you were never consulted and know nothing about this kind of a deal?

Mr. KENNAN. No. It is my impression that this was all arranged during the previous administration. At any rate, I can assure you we were never consulted in any way about its continuation out there.

JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me rephrase my question again because of my great respect for your knowledge. I want to show you what a problem there is in foreign aid. For the first time in my State, last year the majority of the Congressmen voted against foreign aid per se.

Suppose you take India: Nehru [2] boasts about the fact that he is a peace-loving man, and that he is not interested in any military aspects.

He has one of the world's largest armies, and, by far, the largest air force in the Middle East. He has over one-half million men in uniform, and he is the only person out there who has anything like the 1,000 airplanes that he has in his air force.

Now, these people at the Belgrade Conference, as I remember it, sided with Mr. Khrushchev [3] on this testing business, against Mr. Kennedy.

If you are going to try to move along in the picture of foreign aid, and you come out to my State, how do you, in the discussion with people who are getting really fundamental—there is only one paper in my State that is really for this program—how do you develop the nuances of justifying heavy aid to Yugoslavia?

It is hard for me to do so on India, but I would think the harder it was for India, it would be even more hard to do it for Yugoslavia.

---

[2] Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India.
[3] Nikita S. Khrushchev, Soviet Premier.

GRANT AID SHOULD CEASE

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, I certainly agree that is a legitimate question, and not an easy one to answer. I think I would only be able to deal with it in specific terms.

I am no great friend of aid to Yugoslavia, if by aid what you mean is any sort of one-sided grant aid or concealed grant aid, for which they do not pay us, and the sooner that ends out there the better I think it will be.

This view, incidentally, is shared by the Yugoslav leaders themselves. They are a very proud people. They do not really like to take this, and it is my hope that before very long we will not have any more of this.

FOOD ASSISTANCE

At present I think about the only thing that we are still committed to giving them is the surplus food for this year. This corresponded with my own recommendations. They asked for 1 million tons, and I felt we ought to give them about half of that, and that is what we are giving them now.

The reason I felt this was that they had a harrowing drought, the worst I have ever seen anywhere in my life, from June to October this year, and they were obviously going to be badly short of food. I thought that to cut out the surplus food shipments we had been giving for years, just at this moment when the people had had it, was going to create a misimpression there that I did not want to see created. Besides that, we have a problem of disposing of this stuff.

But it is my hope that within about 3 years, not next year because the drought is going to affect next year's crop, too, but within about 3 years they ought to be able to provide for their own needs in food, and that will be done with.

LOANS TO AID INDUSTRIALIZATION

As for other forms of aid, I do not think we ought to give the Yugoslavs anything really that they do not pay for. I am inclined to think that we ought to continue to make dollar loans to them, for dollar repayment, on a reasonably liberal credit basis for their industrialization. If you are interested, I will tell you why I feel that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Sure.

Mr. KENNAN. This would not be great. This would be a matter of a few million dollars per year, and they would have to pay it back.

The reason is that they, having broken with the Kremlin, have in recent years had a rate of growth greater than that of their satellite neighbors to the east; that is, they are industrializing faster on a basis of a set of economic relationships, which is primarily with the West, than their neighbors to the east are industrializing by relying on the Soviet Union.

I want to see that continue. I do not want to see them fall behind the Rumanians in the rate of growth. For this reason I would like to see us be reasonably represented in there, perhaps only to the

tune of about 20 percent, in the financing of this type of industrialization. I do not want to see us entirely absent.

I want, in other words, to demonstrate that the door is open for these people for a profitable relationship with the West, which will permit them to move their economy along and develop their country just as well as they could do through relationships with the East.

REPAYMENT OF LOANS

I am not talking about grant aid. I am talking about loans which they would be expected to repay, and to repay in dollars.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you say liberal terms, though, then the first question is, how are you going to make them pay back?

Mr. KENNAN. You have this problem with any foreign country to whom you make loans. But I think they will pay back if they possibly can. I do not see any disposition on their part to duck out of this sort of thing.

WHY HELP A COMMUNIST COUNTRY SUCCEED?

Senator CAPEHART. First, I want to say this: I think your answers have been very refreshing in that you have been very frank, and I like that. I am kind of direct myself.

But let me ask you this question for my own information and maybe for the committee's. Why do you want to help a Communist country to succeed? By giving them these loans you are talking about, and building up their economy, is that the way to kill communism in the world? Is that the way to meet it?

I am not asking this as a facetious question; it has always bothered me.

Mr. KENNAN. It is a good question.

Senator CAPEHART. Why do we want to do anything that will help them succeed and make their system work if they are out to destroy us and, therefore, the stronger they become, industrially and otherwise, the quicker they will be able to do it? Is that a fair question?

Mr. KENNAN. It is a perfectly fair question, sir.

Senator CAPEHART. It bothers me and worries me.

Mr. KENNAN. My answer to it would be this: They are an evolving country. The direction of the evolution is away from the Stalinist typical Communist-type of controls, to something different.

Second, I have not found any evidences in Yugoslavia, I am happy to say, that they are out to destroy us. I do not think they are conducting any subversive activities in this country. I think they are willing to let well enough alone in that respect.

Now, their system is not our system. But I would violently resent anybody coming in here from their side and trying to tell us what sort of an internal system we ought to have in this country.

SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES WITH RUSSIANS

Senator CAPEHART. You are going on the premise that they are not Communists like Moscow, and that someday might get com-

pletely away from this system they have and have a private enterprise system?

Mr. KENNAN. I do not think they will have a system resembling ours, but I think they already have a system which is very significantly different from that of Russia and the other countries to the east, so different that the Russians refused to approve it. One of the great bases of differences between the Yugoslavs and the Russians today is that the Russians refuse to say it is socialism.

The CHAIRMAN. It is revisionism.

Mr. KENNAN. It is revisionism. And so long as they are that way, behave themselves properly in their relations with us and do not interfere in our own internal affairs, I am prepared to let them have any system that they find suitable there.

Senator CAPEHART. I do not quarrel with that, providing they are not getting ready and preparing to destroy us. That is the big question mark in my mind, and always has been.

I think Russia has said she will destroy us, and that is her intention. Now you distinguish between Yugoslavian communism and Russian communism.

Mr. KENNAN. This is correct. I do not want to be misunderstood in this.

YUGOSLAVS MAKE OWN DECISIONS

Senator CAPEHART. You have the same feeling toward Poland and Czechoslovakia?

Mr. KENNAN. No. Poland and Czechoslovakia are still—well, Czechoslovakia entirely, and Poland extensively—under Soviet control. They are not free to run their own affairs.

Now, this is one thing I can say about the Yugoslavs with the greatest of definiteness. They do not take orders from Moscow. They make their own decisions.

I do not agree with all those decisions. I do not agree with all their positions. I have had more bitter political arguments in the months I have been in Yugoslavia than I ever had in any other country, partly because of the disagreements, partly because these are people with whom you can argue.

I like this about them. You can take them on; you can say what you don't like, and they will reply.

I also do not want to gild the lily, and I do not want to persuade you that this is a bunch of nice people in our view. The Yugoslavs are pretty tough. They are a tough political regime, and their views, especially at the top, differ from ours very extensively.

That is why I say I do not want to see us giving them any form of unequal aid any longer than we have to. I hope that within 3 or 4 years there won't be anything like this.

PROVISION OF PLANES AND TRAINING

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to clear up one matter that surprised me, and that is, if I understand it, this program which has caused a great deal of talk domestically, and especially down in Texas, with large indignation meetings over jet planes and the training of pilots. You say that you had nothing whatever to do with advice on this; that this was set up and started before your

regime, and you have not been consulted as to whether it is wise to continue it or not; is this true?

Mr. KENNAN. This is correct. We have not even been kept informed.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not even been kept informed. Is this strictly under the direction of the Defense Department?

Mr. KENNAN. It is my understanding it is, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And it is done without our Ambassador's approval?

Mr. KENNAN. I think that today I would be consulted if a new arrangement of this sort originated at this time. But this came into existence before I became Ambassador.

WITNESS WOULD APPROVE OF PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a fair question to ask you—I do not know whether it is fair to push you and I do not know what the administration's views are—if they asked your opinion today whether this should be continued or not, would you approve it?

Maybe you ought not to answer if you do not want to be pushed into this thing.

Mr. KENNAN. My answer would be if the equipment is obsolescent equipment, if there is no question of national security or classification involved, if it does not involve any secret information or anything that we would not want to have given to another government, and if they paid dollars on the barrelhead for it, I would say sell it to them. If you don't sell it to them, they are going to get it anyway somewhere if they are willing to pay that much money; there is usually someone else.

WAS PREDECESSOR CONSULTED?

Senator CAPEHART. Who was the predecessor Ambassador?

Mr. KENNAN. Carl Rankin was my predecessor.

Senator CAPEHART. Do you think he was consulted when this idea was originated?

Mr. KENNAN. I do not know. I rather doubt it because I think this was handled as a matter of sales of military equipment, over here, under the rules laid down at that time.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That was handled in 1956 and 1957, too. Rankin was not there.

The CHAIRMAN. Riddleberger.

Mr. KENNAN. No, up to 1956 and 1957 we used to give these people military equipment. In 1957 Tito came along and said he did not want it any more as a gift. If he took any more he wanted to pay for it.

A LOT OF NONSENSE

Mr. SYMINGTON. May I make a comment on that?

That is just a lot of nonsense, because what happens is—I do not mean, of course, what he said. What happens is that the military gets over $2 billion, and then they get what they say is the price for it, depreciated, you see, and they make whatever the foreign re-

lations aspect of it, State or MAAG, or Mr. Bundy's [4] I do not know who does it, I am trying to find out—they make them pay full price for what this man paid for his planes. He says he did not want them given to them; he wanted to pay for them. He paid less for them than 1 percent of the original cost.

Mr. KENNAN. That is our fault, not his.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Following the chairman's question, you say you would rather see them get them from us than get them from anywhere else. I noticed everywhere throughout the Middle East the Soviets have covered all our friends like an umbrella with better airplanes.

We give them the F-86's. They protest, and we say it is a fine plane. The same day that I am in a country where we say it is a fine plane, and any fool knows it is not, the defense of why we did it was because it was an obsolete airplane—the Prime Minister, showed me the Times clipping.

So everybody is cheating everybody; nobody is being sincere about it. The only thing is, as an ambassador said to me this afternoon, "What's the use of our being friends with you when the people who are not your friends, what I would call pro-Soviet neutralists, get a better deal than we do?"

TRADE, NOT MILITARY EQUIPMENT, IS IMPORTANT

Mr. KENNAN. Well, I cannot give you any answer to that question. I do not see why they should myself, and I would not defend that. As a matter of fact, personally, as Ambassador out there, it is not important to me that we sell them this equipment.

If it is going to create the confusion and doubts in the minds of our own people as to the soundness of what we are doing, I would much rather skip it and tell the Yugoslavs, "You go and get it from somebody else, if you want to get it."

I do feel strongly, Senator, if I may add this, though, that outside of the field of military equipment, we ought to give them the facilities, perfectly normal facilities, for foreign trade with this country. That is, if they come into our market, have money to buy normal American goods in the normal way, we ought to let them buy them, and if they want to sell here, we ought to let them sell. This has nothing to do with aid or anything else.

Senator HUMPHREY. Don't we do that?

Mr. KENNAN. We generally have done it, but it is my understanding that there was some confusion about this after the Belgrade Conference. There is always a question of licensing for certain types of trade, and this has been sticky and difficult.

PACT WITH GREECE AND TURKEY

Senator AIKEN. Is the mutual defense pact that Yugoslavia has with Greece and Turkey still in existence?

Mr. KENNAN. It is on the books nominally, but the Yugoslavs say it is a dead letter, and nobody really cares about it very much except, perhaps, the Greeks. I think the Turks and the Yugoslavs would like to see it lapse.

---

[4] William P. Bundy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Senator AIKEN. You would call it a temporary expedient at the time it was entered into?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes; and it does not mean much, if anything today. Nobody wants to take the responsibility for denouncing it, but it just does not mean anything.

This is a thing that often happens to international pacts. They just outlive their usefulness, and they become dead letters.

Senator AIKEN. Like some of ours may be.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

ARMS GEARED TO AMERICAN AMMUNITION

Senator AIKEN. We were told 3 or 4 years ago that most of the Yugoslav arms were geared to American ammunition. Is that still true, that they use American ammunition, and that Russian ammunition would not fit these arms?

Mr. KENNAN. I would not want to risk a statement as to how much of it is. I would risk a statement that most of it is. That is why I said it is better for us to sell it to them than other people, simply because they have to come to us for spare parts then, and in some instances for ammunition and that sort of thing.

RUSSIANS ARE OLD-FASHIONED IMPERIALISTS

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuing the question the Senator from Indiana asked you—I do not know anybody who is better qualified to expatiate on this aspect of it—it has bothered me a good deal, because this comes up all the time as to the nature of our attitude toward the Communist countries.

You have said that you see no reason why we should not trade with Yugoslavia, in fact, even if it were more Communist that it is. You distinguish between them and the Russians.

Is this because you do not subscribe to the idea that this is a great moral crusade? This is the old-fashioned imperialism disguised, perhaps, to some extent by the ideology that the Russians promote. As far as you are concerned, Yugoslavia should be permitted to have its kind of government so long as it is not endeavoring to attack or undermine us or any of our friends. Is that correct?

Mr. KENNAN. This is correct, Senator Fulbright.

The CHAIRMAN. You regard this as not a great moral crusade but as just another form of imperialism, and what we really object to about Russia is not so much her communism as her avowed intention to destroy us, that is?

Mr. KENNAN. Absolutely true.

The CHAIRMAN. This is an important distinction, it seems to me.

NO RIGHT TO INTERFERE

Mr. KENNAN. I do not think we have any right to try to tell the Russians or anyone else in the world what form of economy or social system they ought to have because we would not want anybody else telling us that here, and we have to see that that goes both ways. But we would have, we do have, a legitimate complaint when people try to interfere with our life here.

The CHAIRMAN. Or our friends, as a concommitant of that.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes; and I do draw a strong distinction between the Yugoslavs and the Russians. I think I have some grounds for drawing it because I have served in both places now.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

TWO IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES

Mr. KENNAN. I had many years of service in Moscow, and in two important respects, one of which is not our business, and the other of which is, I see great differences between them.

In the first place, the Yugoslavs are not—I am convinced of this—under Russian domination.

Senator WILEY. You say they are?

The CHAIRMAN. They are not.

Mr. KENNAN. No; they follow an independent policy. Very often that policy is a lot closer to the policy of the Soviet Union than I would like to see it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KENNAN. But it is closer by their own choice and not because they have accepted any bond of discipline or principle to the people in Moscow.

The second difference is that their economy is being permitted to evolve in the direction of a liberalization, in a direction of competition and openness in its relations with the economies of the Western nations, which does distinguish it very sharply from the economy of the Soviet Union or that of other countries under Soviet control. This is something we want to encourage.

IS ALBANIA COMPARABLE?

The CHAIRMAN. That brings up the question of the case of Albania that is coming up immediately. The morning papers say they are now making feelers for trade with the West. Would you say Albania is approaching the same status as Yugoslavia?

Mr. KENNAN. In the sense that Albania is defying the Kremlin for the moment, yes. But in the other sense of having any liberalization internally, not at all.

The Albanians, if you will forgive my words—and I hope this does not look too bad on the record—are the stinkingest Stalinists in all of Eastern Europe. They are the most vicious, unreliable and nasty people that I know of in all of Eastern Europe, and that is saying a good deal when you think of some of the other characters.

Senator CAPEHART. More so than the Russian Government?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, sir. I think the Albanians are worse from our standpoint. Their views toward us, their attitude toward us is worse than that of the Soviet Union. It is comparable only to that of the Chinese Government.

Senator AIKEN. Isn't it a fact that the Albanians can go only so long without defying anybody? This time they picked a big fellow to defy.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

REACTION OF OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator SYMINGTON. What I do not quite understand is how are you going to grade these various communisms. We will call Grade A China; Albania, too. Grade B is Russia, and Grade C is Yugoslavia, and Grade D, no doubt, and so forth. All right. That is fine.

But regardless of whether the Yugoslavs would like to see us under communism or not, we know that the Russians would.

Now, we have over in this part of the world various friends, people who are, I think it is fair to say, desirous of sticking with us. Perhaps that it because they know where their bread is buttered, to some extent, but they are our friends: Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Jordan, Israel, these countries.

Then we have the less friendly countries who are treated very kindly and sweetly by the Russians, especially when it comes to getting modern military weapons, like Iraq and Afghanistan.

Our friends say, "Here are the Yugoslavs, here are all these people who are either pro-Soviet neutrals or Soviet or Communist anyway," and in the countries that I mentioned we have a great deal of instability. We are liable to lose some of these countries some morning just like that, just like overnight we thought we were in very good shape in Iraq, and we ended up in quite a mess.

WIN ARGUMENTS AND LOSE FRIENDS

What I do not see is how you can expect to get into this sort of a syllogistic development of the nature of the Communist category and, at the same time, hold your friends over there. Take Iran; for many reasons, including some very important military ones that should not be on the record, it is vital for us to have those people as our friends. We are losing all over, due to the psychological reaction to the way that we treat neutralist countries.

This I know, this is not hearsay, because it comes up again and again. For example, Ayub,[5] said, "You let Nehru con you into saying that he is a peaceful man, but you give him all the grain he wants and all the pills and all the books and all the food, and then he takes his army and puts it next to me, and he spends $400 million a year on this army, 85 percent of it against me, your friend, and 15 percent against the Chinese Communists."

If we are going to win this argument by grading communism, as I say—George, you and I have discussed this for 16 years—I do not see where we are going to end up, because we are going to win all the arguments and lose friends in this part of the world as buffer states against the Soviet. That is what I wish you would comment on.

QUITE A DIFFERENT PROBLEM

Mr. KENNAN. I will not insist on trying to grade them beyond the Yugoslavs.

All I can tell you is that the Yugoslavs represent quite a different problem from the standpoint of American foreign policy than do the people to the east.

---

[5] Ayub Kahn, President of Pakistan.

We have had a great deal of open exchange with them and discussion with them. Hundreds of Yugoslavs have been in this country. I think if you could come over there and travel in that country, talk to these people, you would realize how much closer they are, really, to us, to the West, than might appear on the surface.

A prominent Yugoslav who is in a high responsible position told me last week, "You know, it is my impression that Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union are actually much worse than appear on the surface, and our relations with the United States much better than appear on the surface.

TITO'S STATEMENTS; DJILAS

Senator SYMINGTON. Why does Tito back Khrushchev against President Kennedy?

Mr. KENNAN. He does it because he is, himself personally, an old Marxist who grew up in the Communist movement, who is sensitive to the charge that he has become a tool of the imperialists.

He is going to remain this way until the end of his days. He is going to go on making these statements. They are going to upset us; they are going to be a burden on our relations.

I have told the Yugoslavs this, and I think most of them realize it very well.

Senator CAPEHART. How old is he?

Senator AIKEN. Seventy.

Mr. KENNAN. Sixty-nine or seventy years old.

The CHAIRMAN. What has happened to Djilas? [6]

Mr. KENNAN. Djilas is at large; lives in Belgrade privately at home; is quite bitter. He walks around the streets. He receives foreign visitors, but the fellows in the party won't have much to do with him.

POLICY FORMULATION

Senator AIKEN. Who determines Yugoslav policy? For instance, who determined that Yugoslav would defy Russia in the matter of the UN Expeditionary Force, the police force in the Holy Land, last year? Yugoslavia introduced a resolution to continue that force, which was strongly opposed by Russia. Who determined that policy?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, they have a government like other governments. Tito has the strongest voice, but he is older, and he spends a good deal of time resting up on the island where he has his summer home. He does not always make these decisions personally.

I would suppose that if it was a question of disagreeing publicly with the Russians on important issues, this would not be done without Tito's approval.

This is not the only issue on which they differ from the Russians. They have not supported the Russians on the troika in the Secre-

---

[6] Milovan Djilas, former vice President of Yugoslavia, was arrested in April 1961, convicted and sentenced to 5 years in prison for revealing state secrets in his book *Conversations With Stalin.*

tariat, and there I think you could break out a large number of issues on which they disagreed with them.

Senator AIKEN. They would stand by us so many times when countries that were supposed to be close friends went over the hill.

INCIDENT AT DIPLOMATIC GATHERING

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, let me tell you something that happened the other day. I think this could go on the record.

I was a guest, as all of us diplomats were, of Tito at a hunting party, shooting party, up in the country. In the middle of the evening, he came over and fetched me and sat me down next to him at the table. A couple of his leading figures were sitting there.

As soon as all the Soviet bloc Ambassadors saw that, they crowded around because they were curious to hear what would go on between us. The Soviet Ambassador sat right across the table, and the Soviet Ambassador started in with the usual Soviet propaganda line about American militarism and how we were preparing for war.

Tito, to my surprise, said to him, in effect—we were not talking English, so I cannot give you the exact words—but he said, "You pipe down," and he said, "These people are not going to make war on you if you don't make war on them."

Senator WILEY. Tito said that?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, to the Soviet Ambassador. He took me under his protection at this moment, and this is the curious relationship we have with these people.

NOT BAD TO DEAL WITH

Now, I can only say that Tito and I have disagreed, and he said to me that same evening, "I sometimes blame myself for not having told you more frankly or more bluntly in private conversations my own views. You wouldn't have been so shocked when I said them at the Belgrade Conference."

I mean, he is not a bad man to deal with. He is not on our side in the ideological sense. He still considers himself a Socialist and a Marxian Socialist, but he is not what he is often described as being, a thug.

I have found him an acceptable person to deal with, and always courteous and nice in his capacity as a host, a man with whom you can have your differences, but whom you must respect.

Senator AIKEN. I found the Yugoslav representative on the Fifth Committee to the United Nations one of the most cooperative, cordial, and apparently one who would go along with the United States, of any of the members of that Committee.

He could not always do it, and I suppose he had instructions to vote against us. But certainly I would not ask for anybody better to work with.

WORTH WORKING ON

Mr. KENNAN. This is just it. It is my impression that the extreme Leninist-Marxist prejudice, by which this Yugoslav regime was

originally inspired, is a dying thing. This is why I want to see us be a little patient with these people.

I do not want to see us shower them with aid, and the sooner that anything that can be called aid, unequal aid, stops with that country, the happier I will be. I hope this will not be more than 3 or 4 years.

But I do want to see us continue to keep our hand in there. I want to see us continue to talk to these people, to argue with them, to point out where we think they are wrong, to point out the advantages that they could have from a really proper association with the West; in other words, I think they are are worth working on.

WEST GERMAN-YUGOSLAV TRADE

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. Speaking about trade, do the West Germans trade with the Yogoslavs?

Mr. KENNAN. They do, indeed. They are one of the two greatest trading partners the Yugoslavs have.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Ambassador, the one thing I found out in my journeys is that we are always being lectured by people about not trading with these Russians, and not trading with these Communists, and not trading with these people, and so on.

I was in Germany, and I was told by some of their leading officials and by their newspapers how we were being sort of soft on communism in the very same week that 50,000 troops were landing, the same time that the Germans were letting their draft act expire because they did not even have a government organized, at the very same time they were stepping up their trade in every conceivable way.

I am not angry about their doing it. I just feel sort of like India when Nehru lectures us on aggression. I do not like to be lectured by some of the most eminent and most active business people in the world on the subject of trade.

It just so happens I sat in Poland and woke up one morning and there were 11 new cars in front of the Bristol Hotel, brand new vehicles, seven Mercedes-Benz and two Czechs. I had only been given 2 days before a lecture on how we were being rather confused about Berlin and confused about this Communist menace and confused about communism, et cetera.

I found out in talking to the Polish officials that the West Germans were selling things over there left and right on credits, every conceivable way.

U.S. TRADE SHOULD BE STEPPED UP

We have a law called the Johnson Act that denies us the opportunity to even do business on credit in Poland, even though they paid.

Do the Yugoslavs pay the West Germans for their goods?

Mr. KENNAN. They do.

Senator HUMPHREY. They would pay us, too, wouldn't they?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes. They do pay for what they get on regular trade.

Senator HUMPHREY. Isn't it possible to step up that regular trade?

Mr. KENNAN. I hope very much that it can be stepped up. I think the answer to their problem is increased trade and not aid.

The CHAIRMAN. Not aid.

Mr. KENNAN. But I think that—well, if you like I will tell you where we stand with aid.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

LIQUIDATION OF ASSISTANCE

Mr. KENNAN. At the time I came there last spring, we were giving these people surplus food, a technical assistance program, and making loans for long-term industrial development through private agencies. We were giving school lunches to about 70 percent of the Yugoslav school children, and through another private agency we were giving food parcels to all sorts of people, to pensioners who did not get more than a certain amount of pension, and what not.

Well, today these private programs are in process of liquidation.

Senator CAPEHART. What do you mean by private?

Mr. KENNAN. Through CARE and Church World Service, the school lunch programs and this sort of thing.

I do not see any reason why we should be doing this for them. They are a socialist state. They pride themselves on their social services, and they ought perfectly well to be able to feed their schoolchildren at noon.

If they want to get another 10,000 or 20,000 tons of surplus grain to do this from us, I would rather do it that way than have us involved in it.

These programs are going to be folded up. The technical assistance is going to be only on a nominal scale this year, and I have reserved the right myself, if things go through the way I hope they will in our Government, to make a study on this to decide whether they want it any more, I am not too enthusiastic about it.

The surplus food I have, for the reasons I outlined before the committee a few moments ago, favored giving them a grant this year, and I shall probably do it next year because of the effects of the drought. I do not want to put this country in the position of exploiting a natural catastrophe and choosing a bad moment for cutting off this form of aid.

U.S. LETS OTHERS SERVE OWN PURPOSES

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Ambassador, is it not a fact that we permit every other nation in the world to tell us what we should do and what we should not do, as they please, when it serves their own purpose to do it?

Mr. KENNAN. I think I could not disagree with you on that, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley would like to ask the Ambassador a question.

APPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY

Senator WILEY. I can remember a few years ago when General [Walter Bedell] Smith—what was he, ambassador over there?

Mr. KENNAN. He was Ambassador in the Soviet Union, sir.

Senator WILEY. I asked him at that time about Tito. This was a matter I wanted to ask you.

First, I want to get your idea as to what the condition of the Soviet Union is. What is the impact of Molotov,[7] who came up with blood in his eyes, apparently going back south to handle things? What is the situation, in your judgment, in the Soviet Union?

Before you answer that, General Smith said to me that, in his opinion, it was wise that we were doing what we were doing with Tito, that Tito was boss man down there, and that he was one fellow that spoke up to the Kremlin.

I do not know anything about it. In other words, Tito was in a position geographically that, if war did come, would be a very significant piece of property that would not be in the hands of the Soviets; that through it they could dominate the Mediterranean, and so forth. I remember that distinctly.

General Smith died a few months ago, but he was a pretty level-headed fellow.

Is it your idea that what we have been doing is because in our opinion it is in the best interests of preserving the peace, and that if we do not do something that we may precipitate a war or let the balloon go up there and precipitate war?

Now, there are three or four questions in there. You can take them the way you want to.

TERRITORY KEPT FROM SOVIET HANDS

Mr. KENNAN. Well, I agree with what General Smith said. I think it has been, in general, a sound policy for us to try to keep this territory out of Soviet hands and keep it under the control of a government which, although it calls itself socialist, is at least not under Soviet domination.

Senator WILEY. Have we done it?

Mr. KENNAN. We have done it so far, and I think it is a good thing to try to see to it that Soviet-controlled arms are not in possession of this highly strategic territory. If they were in there again we would have them on the borders of Greece; we would have them on the borders of Italy. We would have them along the Adriatic Coast, and I think we are better off to have a state there which, even though it sounds——

RUSSIAN PRESENCE IN YUGOSLAVIA, OTHER NATIONS

Senator CAPEHART. Are there any Soviet troops in Yugoslavia?

Mr. KENNAN. No, sir.

Senator CAPEHART. Are there any Russians of any kind?

Mr. KENNAN. No, sir. There are far more Americans than Russians, and I am convinced that they would try to defend themselves if the Russians took after them.

---

[7] Former Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov.

There is one thing that you cannot accuse the Yugoslavs of, and that is lack of courage. They are mountaineers, and they are as tough and game a people as any that exist in Europe, and they are wonderful fighters.

Senator CAPEHART. But Russia does have troops and a lot of people in the other countries over there, like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Rumania?

Mr. KENNAN. She has garrisons in several other satellite countries, not in all of them. That is, I do not believe there are officially Russian garrisons in Czechoslovakia. They may chisel on this, and there may be some Soviet units in there under special arrangements.

Senator CAPEHART. They do not need them in there; they are just as tough as the Russians.

Mr. KENNAN. But they have troops in Hungary, Poland, and in Rumania I believe they have the right to have them.

I think they have certain air and naval facilities in Bulgaria. I am not aware that they have garrisons of land forces in Bulgaria. I would have to look this up.

ALBANIA'S BREAK WITH THE SOVIETS

Senator CAPEHART. In Albania do they have any?

Mr. KENNAN. They had a naval base in Albania. They withdrew it last April.

They had a row with the Albanians when they withdrew, over whether they could withdraw all the submarines there, and the best information I have is that the Albanians insisted on keeping two of them.

Senator HUMPHREY. But under Albanian control?

Mr. KENNAN. They still have them, under Albanian control. The base has been evacuated by the Russians.

So far as I am aware, and I made considerable efforts to run this down and find out, there are no Russians left at the base. I cannot find out, though, whether the Russians ever abandoned their legal claim to this base under the lease that they had. I cannot tell you that.

Senator SYMINGTON. A submarine base?

Mr. KENNAN. Submarine base.

Senator SPARKMAN. Albania has broken diplomatic relations.

Mr. KENNAN. They have broken with the Soviet Union very definitely.

Senator SPARKMAN. So they would not recognize the claim now.

Mr. KENNAN. It was in anticipation of this break that the Russians pulled their vessels out of there.

RUSSIAN OVERTURES TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you think Mr. Khrushchev has made any success in his recent wooing of Yugoslavs?

Mr. KENNAN. No. I think that the impediments to any overcoming of the break between the Yugoslavs and the Soviet Union cannot be overcome at the present time.

You see, there are two possibilities there. If you try to talk about overcoming this break between the two countries, it could be over-

come on Khrushchev's terms or it could be overcome on Tito's terms.

Tito's terms would be that they recognized his independence and his right to have his own path to socialism, as it is called, his own social system, which would be different from that of the Soviet Union. In my opinion, Khrushchev cannot grant this because if he did every other satellite country would want the same thing right away, and it would lead to the dissolution of the satellite area.

Now, that is what would happen if the breach were to be healed on Tito's terms.

If it were to be healed on Khrushchev's terms that is, that Yugoslavia would again accept the discipline of the bloc, why, this is something I cannot see Tito doing. The man has gone through the most tremendous risks and exertions for 14 years to establish this independence, and he has already let his system get very significantly different from that of the Soviet Union.

If he were to come back on Khrushchev's terms, he would have to change the entire economic system in Yugoslavia, re-impose the Stalinist controls, and re-impose the complete nationalization of industry. It is my judgment he could not do this except at the cost of tremendous discontent and bewilderment in his own party.

TITO'S SUCCESSION

The CHAIRMAN. Who is going to be his successor? What do you predict now?

Mr. KENNAN. He has two assistants, one of whom would be his successor. One is a man by the name of Kardelj, and the other is a man by the name of Rankovic.[8] They are both old members of the Yugoslav party.

Like Tito, they were both at one time Communist Stalinists. I think they have learned a good deal.

Kardelj is a man I have seen and talked to. He is what you might call a Marxist intellectual, but not a bad sort of a man; again, very decent and even charming in personal intercourse.

Rankovic is the man who runs the police system. He is a much harder sort of man, and no theorist, and I do not believe he will take over the state, if it is possible.

REACTION TO CUBAN SITUATION

Senator CAPEHART. Let me ask you one question: What was the reaction to the Cuban situation over there?

Mr. KENNAN. Extremely bad, that is, unfair to us, and violent.

Senator CAPEHART. In what way?

Mr. KENNAN. Violently against what we did and, I think, unjust.

I would resent it again if it were to happen today. I would have resented it had I been there at that time. I had not arrived there when this occurred.

Senator CAPEHART. The reaction was that we were all wrong?

Mr. KENNAN. The reaction was that we were all wrong.

On the other hand, since that time the Yugoslavs have been trying to get on with their Cuban friends, and I have the impres-

[8] Edvard Kardelj and Aleksandar Rankovic, vice presidents of Yugoslavia.

sion they found it pretty difficult and they are rather fed up with these people themselves. So again, sometimes it is worth waiting to see how things work out.

ATTRIBUTION OF AMERICAN ASSISTANCE

Senator AIKEN. The government does not make any effort, does it, to prevent Yugoslav people from knowing that assistance comes from the United States?

Mr. KENNAN. They have not been as forthcoming as I would have liked to have seen, and this is one reason why I am glad to see these private programs starting in the process of liquidation, which they are. Those are the private agencies like CARE and Church Service. I do not think they have given us enough credit for that.

Senator AIKEN. Twelve years ago I think they honestly told their people, "We got the help from the United States," and they were quite conspicuous for that reason among the nations that got it.

Mr. KENNAN. I must say this: Every time we sign a contract with them for surplus food, they have pictures taken of it, and they put it in the paper, and everyone in the country knows about it.

Senator AIKEN. That is what I mean.

Mr. KENNAN. And the people are well aware that a lot of their bread is coming from the United States.

Senator AIKEN. Even so, some of these private agencies are giving aid to some countries over in that general area that never reaches the people at all. I do not think Yugoslavia is one of these.

Mr. KENNAN. But I was not satisfied with the way the food was being distributed through the private agencies. I did not think we got enough credit for it. In fact, I found a lot of senior Yugoslav people who did not seem to know about it.

PURCHASE OF BRAZILIAN NEWSPAPER

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Ambassador, are you aware of the fact that the Yugoslavs have purchased a large newspaper in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil?

Mr. KENNAN. No, sir; I do not know.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, they have. I cannot remember the name. I have the name of it.

The CHAIRMAN. In Rio?

Senator HUMPHREY. In Rio.

The CHAIRMAN. The government bought it?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes; I just wondered if you have any indication of that.

Senator AIKEN. I thought Brazil does not let them——

Senator HUMPHREY. A private entrepreneur sold it to the government.

The CHAIRMAN. To the government? I never heard of that.

Mr. KENNAN. I know they have been very much interested in what is going on down there. As a matter of fact, I have had, I would say, more trouble as Ambassdor in Yugoslavia over the activities of the Yugoslavs with regard to these unaligned nations than I have over their relations with the Soviet Union.

I am quite satisfied about their relations with the Soviet Union. I know they cannot overcome this break.

Senator AIKEN. Is that over-population that is prompting interest in Brazil, for instance?

The CHAIRMAN. What is the explanation?

Senator HUMPHREY. There is a large Yugoslav population in Brazil down in the Sao Paulo area.

GREEK CONCERNS

I talked with Prime Minister Karamanlis——

Mr. KENNAN. In Greece.

Senator HUMPHREY. Right after the election, I went over to his apartment one night and spent the evening with him, and he was very much concerned about our relationship with Yugoslavia. He told me very frankly that if I were to see you or to see the Secretary of State or anybody, how terribly important it was that our relationship be maintained on a most friendly basis.

The CHAIRMAN. With Yugoslavia?

Senator HUMPHREY. With Yugoslavia. They had a lot of trouble, of course, just prior to the elections with the Bulgarians near the frontier. This helped, by the way—he could not understand why it happened—because it helped his government win an overwhelming victory and cut the Communist vote down very appreciably in Greece.

Karamanlis expressed to me, No. 1, a very deep concern over our relationships with Yugoslavia, because some of these reports had indicated, on this airplane deal and others, problems with the Congress. Second, he told me, "I hope you are watching most carefully what is happening in Turkey," and this is my question. Have you seen Ray Hare lately?

Mr. KENNAN. No, sir; I have not.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you get much information in Belgrade about what is happening in Turkey?

Mr. KENNAN. Not reliable information. We get what is in the Yugoslav press.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by this? What are you getting at?

[Discussion off the record.][9]

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. This is a little off the subject, and I know it is getting late, but you are an old hand in this field. Would you very briefly give me your assessment of the present Soviet-Chinese relations? This is not quite in your line of business, but I know you are a student on this subject.

I have asked you this before. What is your present view about it?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, the break has gotten even deeper since I was at this table last time.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KENNAN. And, in my opinion, it is going to be practically impossible to overcome it now.

---

[9] No transcript was made of "off the record" discussions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you visualize this becoming somewhat similar to the relationship between Tito and Russia?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, although it will have different aspects because these are both two great countries, and the Chinese are not the same as the Yugoslavs. But it is going to be that sort of a break, I think, eventually.

U.S. ROLE IN MATTER

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any thing we can do to encourage or promote this break?

Mr. KENNAN. I think the less we insert ourselves into this, and the more we keep our mouths shut——

The CHAIRMAN. That is good advice.

Mr. KENNAN [continuing]. The greater the break will become.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I want to know. In other words, we ought not to talk about it, say much more about it, is this right?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes. The less we crow over it——

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean.

Mr. KENNAN [continuing]. The better it will be from our standpoint.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I wanted to know, your judgment on that. But it is a serious doctrinal difference, is that right?

Mr. KENNAN. Oh, extremely serious.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, sir; and it is also a power contest in the good old-fashioned sense between two great neighboring nations who have rival ambitions throughout Asia.

Senator AIKEN. Will the time ever come when Russia might enlist our aid against the Chinese?

Mr. KENNAN. In certain ways I think they would already like to have it, but they do not know how to ask for it.

YUGOSLAVIA IS WORTH A STRUGGLE

Senator, now that I have heard these questions around the table, there is one thing I would like to say in amplification of the remarks I made just at the beginning.

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead.

Mr. KENNAN. And that is this: that the Yugoslavs are not an easy problem for us. There is a great deal there which is irritating that goes on in Yugoslavia. There are many things that happen there that are a burden on our relations, are hard for an ambassador to take.

But after 8 months there, I come away with a conviction which, I believe, was shared by every one of my predecessors there, without exception, namely, that it is worthwhile continuing the struggle for these people's respect, and I would not say for their affections because I do not believe in affection in international affairs, but the struggle for their orientation.

I do not think we can bring them entirely over to the Western side in the sense that the members of NATO are part of the Western camp. But I think that, by and large, the direction of development over the last years has been in our favor, and that for this

reason it is worth being patient, not being submissive. I do not mean that.

EXTREME STATEMENTS NO REASON TO GIVE UP

I feel that it is very essential to tell them where you disagree with them, and to hold them to their responsibilities for moderation and accuracy of statement, to keep after them in this way, and to argue with them. I believe I have done that as much as any ambassador in Belgrade since I have been there.

But I do want to emphasize we do not—we should not give up the fight. We should not resign them to the opposite camp just because they irritate us with their statements, you see.

Many Americans, if I take the temper of this country, have gotten so irritated by these statements, and fed up, that they say, "Well, let's wash our hands of them and tell them that if they want to, to go back to Moscow." I do not agree with this.

Senator AIKEN. Have those statements made by Tito been made by others than himself?

Mr. KENNAN. The statements made by other people have been much more moderate and, quite frankly, I have not talked to a single senior Yugoslav who has not tried to intimate to me that he was sorry such extreme things were said, and felt that we should not get too excited about it. So I feel we have something to hang onto.

NO COUNTRY IS IRREVOCABLY COMMUNIST

The CHAIRMAN. What you are saying is in complete accord with what the President said this morning. We should never give up.

Senator HUMPHREY. Exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. That any country is not irrevocably an enemy and a Communist, they are worth worrying about, is that not correct?

Mr. KENNAN. This is true, and the position we have there today is vastly preferable to what it would be if this were still under Soviet control. I do not think we should forfeit this by getting petulant or reacting emotionally to things.

Now, this does not mean tolerating without objection outrageous statements on their part.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KENNAN. And I do not believe this for a minute. I believe in going right back at them every time they say anything we think we can take exception to and making it a matter of record, why we think they are wrong, and keeping after this.

AID IS NOT SO IMPORTANT

But I would not give up the struggle, and I do not think aid is so important here. The Yugoslavs themselves, as proud people, do not want to take this any longer than they have to.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they getting along pretty well?

Mr. KENNAN. Fairly well. They have troubles this year by virtue mostly of the drought, but they do not want to take any, any longer than they have to.

This is a declining factor, and it is my hope before I leave that post that there will be nothing left of what you could call aid to Yugoslavia in the abnormal sense.

We will have simply normal trade and normal self-respecting relations on both sides with these people.

YUGOSLAV TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Senator HUMPHREY. They are running quite a technical assistance program in Africa, are they not? Or is it just a skeleton?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, it is a good deal, yes. They have given credits to these African countries, but not open credits, credits that the Africans can use only for purchase in Yugoslavia.

Senator HUMPHREY. I meant technical assistance.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They built a port for Ethiopia.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How much did it amount to?

Mr. KENNAN. I do not know how much it amounted to in dollars. It was a pretty good installation, and it was successful.

Senator HUMPHREY. Weren't they doing something in Lebanon?

Mr. KENNAN. They are doing something in 10 or 12 countries, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. But not aid, trade.

Senator HUMPHREY. Technical assistance.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. For which they are paying.

Mr. KENNAN. They are not dollar grants. They do not give anybody any dollars to spend in other countries.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. They get something in return, isn't that right?

FEARS ABOUT COMMON MARKET

Mr. KENNAN. They are trying to get goods in return from these African countries. They cannot get as much as they need. Their grave problem is that their natural trading partners, and the only section of the world that can solve their economic problems, is Western Europe, and today they are frightened of the Common Market, and are afraid they are going to be excluded from it.

The CHAIRMAN. They are frightened of it?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes. They are afraid they are going to be left out in the cold, and they are not going to be able to trade with Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean they are going to make an effort to join it?

Mr. KENNAN. No, I do not think they will. They are very much in the position that the Swiss and the Austrians and Swedes are in. They do not want to join it but they do not want to be left outside. There are others who are in that position.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, aren't we in that position? [Laughter.]

Senator SPARKMAN. We built it, we developed it.

Senator HUMPHREY. If we are about through, I want to ask the Ambassador a question completely off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

PUBLIC SHOULD BE COUNSELED TO BE PATIENT

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, before we leave, just for a minute, do you have any advice to us other than what you have given? I mean, in addition, do you wish to volunteer any thoughts to us as to this coming year? It is going to be a very critical year, and I hope we do not make any mistakes.

Would you like to volunteer any advice to us, as members of the Senate and this committee?

Mr. KENNAN. Senator Fulbright, it is not for me to advise you.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it is, too. I asked for it. You do not have to volunteer it. I asked you for it.

Mr. KENNAN. I was impressed with the difficulty of the problem that you have as members of this committee standing between American public opinion and its present mood, and the problems of our foreign policy.

I can well understand why our people are impatient, a great many of them, and fed up with the sort of thing they have been asked to put up with in recent years. On the other hand, I hope they will be patient just a little longer. I think that things are much worse in Mr. Khrushchev's camp than is generally understood here. It would be tragic, in my opinion, if we were to permit ourselves to provoke a general showdown with the Communist world that would be damaging to both of us at a time when what was needed was only another year or two of patience, and we would find our problem much easier.

BAD PUBLICITY FROM JET SALES

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is very sensible. Being up for election and being asked questions like this, I am very conscious about what you said about impatience, because these indignation meetings over this jet business broke out just across the border from my State and you cannot imagine the amount of publicity and the amount of letters that this generated.

It was most unfortunate not only as far as I am concerned, but for the country, that this thing broke at the time it did.

Senator HUMPHREY. What was that?

The CHAIRMAN. The jet business. It broke in Texas and the indignation meetings, attended by thousands of people, created a terrible stir in that part of the country.

Mr. KENNAN. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure I answered Senator Symington correctly, but my feeling is no damage was done by the sale of these jet planes. If they had not gotten them from us they would have gotten it from somebody else. But if it upsets people so, and if it is so hard for people to understand, then my feeling is we had better refrain from selling that kind of stuff.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

I did the best I could without any knowledge in answering these attacks. I wish I had had your backing in doing it.

Senator SPARKMAN. I might suggest that the State Department put out a very nice statement. I found it very helpful in answering.

SHOULD LOANS BE EXTENDED?

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you think we ought to extend loans through DLF?

Mr. KENNAN. I do. I think we ought to support on a reasonable basis maybe about half what we are doing; we ought to support industrial development in Yugoslavia, and I will tell you why.

First, because they make excellent use of it, probably better than any country in the world. They have been very serious and very conscientious about using it.

Second, because it is important that their rate of growth not fall behind that of the countries to the east of them.

YUGOSLAV-EAST GERMAN RELATIONS

Senator HUMPHREY. How are their relationships with East Germany?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, that is it. They have relations with East Germany.

Senator HUMPHREY. How are they not officially?

Mr. KENNAN. They hate the East German Government. They do not say so openly, but the third reason is, too, I do not want to leave this field of financing Yugoslav industrialization entirely to the East Germans and the bloc.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

We appreciate very much your time in coming here, and I agree with your estimates, as far as I know, which are very informed.

Mr. KENNAN. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

[Editor's Note.—As the civil war in Laos moved toward a negotiated settlement and a coalition government, American attention shifted toward South Vietnam, where Communist guerrilla warfare was increasing. On Oct. 11, 1961, President Kennedy sent Gen. Maxwell Taylor and National Security Council deputy Walt W. Rostow on a mission to Vietnam to review the political and military feasibility of deploying U.S. forces. The Taylor-Rostow report proposed a U.S. military commitment to Vietnam to counteract Communist insurgency and to cope with "Khrushchev's 'wars of liberation.'" At an NSC meeting on November 15, President Kennedy expressed concern about U.S. involvement in Vietnam and noted the opposition in Congress, but he approved an amended version of the Taylor-Rostow report. A cable notified U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Frederick Nolting that: "President Kennedy, after conferring with General Taylor and carefully considering his report, had decided that the Government of the United States is prepared to join the Government of Viet-Nam in a sharply increased joint effort to avoid a further deterioration in the situation in South Viet-Nam and eventually to contain and eliminate the threat to its independence." By early 1962, U.S. personnel and equipment began pouring into South Vietnam. For further reference, see Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, 1961-1964*, S. Pt. 98-185, Pt. 2 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1985).]

FRIDAY, JANUARY 12, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. Frank J. Lausche (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lausche, Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Symington, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

Also present: John P. White, Congressional Relations Office, State Department, Sterling Cattreel, Vietnamese Task Force, State Department, and Mr. Marcy, Mr. Denney, and Mr. Newhouse of the committee staff.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Nolting, we will proceed. I think we will have you give us what you think are the important items that we ought to be acquainted with, dealing with our problem in South Vietnam. Will you proceed?

STATEMENT OF HON. FREDERICK E. NOLTING, JR., U.S. AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM

Mr. NOLTING. Thank you, sir. If I bring up matters that you are not interested in, please ask me questions that you would like me to answer and I will do my best to respond.

Senator LAUSCHE. We will have you make your presentation and then the Senators will question you on the various items that they feel they want to explore.

Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, Mr. Chairman, I wonder if it might be well to explain to him our procedure so far as the recording is concerned.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes; if there are some matters that you want completely off the record, if you will so state, the reporter will not record what you say.

Senator SPARKMAN. The record taken here is not for publication. It is kept locked in our files here in the office for use of the members of the committee.

Mr. NOLTING. Then I will be just as frank as I possibly can; tell you everything I know. I haven't a prepared statement.

After 9 months I have drawn certain conclusions and I have some rather definite ideas. I think one of them is that we can help the Government of South Vietnam sufficiently, we and other free nations can help sufficiently to keep the Communists from taking it, with one major proviso, and that is that we find a way to cut down on the amount of infiltration of Communist people, arms, and agents into South Vietnam so that it does not become a case of reinfusion of strength as soon as any progress is made in South Vietnam.

To put that another way, I think we have a reasonable chance, a good chance of sustaining the independence of South Vietnam, and the uncertain factor is the degree of infiltration from the north. The country itself has determination, I think, the leadership certainly has determination to remain free, and there has been a great deal of courage in the fight to remain free.

There is some disorganization. The country is new. It is underdeveloped and it is under attack, and there are a great many problems. I don't blink at those in the least, but I am sufficiently encouraged to think that the move of the United States toward greater support and greater commitment is a wise move in our own national interest. I say this not only, I hope, because I am there in this very small country and, naturally, from that vantage point one sees things perhaps with less than complete objectivity, but because I am also absolutely sure that it is a key to the retention of other Southeast Asian countries.

I was very much impressed by the statement made by Tunku of Malaya [1] when he was recently in Saigon. We had a long talk, in fact two of them, and he said that if South Vietnam went under he felt it wouldn't be 6 months before the situation in Malaya would be out of hand again as badly as it was 10 years ago, when the long hard campaign to eliminate the Communists——

Senator LAUSCHE. Who told you that?

Mr. NOLTING. The President of Malaya.

---

[1] Y. T. M. Tunku, prime minister and minister of external affairs of Malaya.

ARE WE AT WAR IN VIETNAM?

Senator CAPEHART. Are we at war now in Vietnam? In other words, are U.S. troops killing other people or are they killing our people?

Mr. NOLTING. No, sir. I think the answer to that is no.

Senator CAPEHART. Have any American boys been killed?

Mr. NOLTING. One, Sergeant Davis of Tennessee, who was helping train communications units of the Vietnamese Army, was killed about 4 weeks ago.

Senator CAPEHART. Are our boys killing others?

Mr. NOLTING. Not as of now, sir.

Senator CAPEHART. Up until now?

Senator SPARKMAN. Sergeant Davis stepped on a mine, didn't he?

Mr. NOLTING. No, he was riding on a truck with 11 Vietnamese soldiers. The truck was blown up by a hand mine. That is one activated by hand, and they were shot. All of them were killed.

Senator CAPEHART. How many men do we have in Vietnam in uniform?

Mr. NOLTING. In uniform now, something over 2,000.

Senator CAPEHART. What are they doing?

Mr. NOLTING. The majority of them are training Vietnamese units in the Army, Air Force, Rangers, and Marine Corps. Some of them are in units which are supplying mobility to the Vietnamese forces, helicopter units, some C–123's which have just arrived. They are manned by American pilots and crews, and they are transporting Vietnamese troops to give them mobility to attack Vietnam concentrations.

Senator CAPEHART. Did you see a television show a few days ago, an hour long NBC show, in which the representative from Vietnam said that American boys were being killed and wounded?

Mr. NOLTING. I didn't see it.

Senator CAPEHART [continuing]. And that the casualty list next year, this year now, would be great, and that there was going to be another Korea in Vietnam? Did you hear about it?

Mr. NOLTING. I heard about it and I talked to Robinson, the NBC broadcaster in Saigon, before this was made.

Senator CAPEHART. Robinson is the man who made the statement?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes.

Senator CAPEHART. What he said, then, is not true?

Mr. NOLTING. I think it was greatly exaggerated. It is not true.

Senator CAPEHART. How much exaggerated?

Mr. NOLTING. I don't think there is going to be a Korean type war.

Senator CAPEHART. Will we have a lot of casualties this year?

Mr. NOLTING. I don't think anyone can say that for sure, Senator, but my guess is, and my belief is, that we will not.

I think we will have an occasional casualty, because when a helicopter is transporting Vietnamese troops to a theater of action and lands on the ground, it is likely, in some cases, that while it is on the ground the Viet Cong will fire on it and some of our people in the helicopter will probably get shot.

MORE TROOPS TO VIETNAM

Senator CAPEHART. Do we have plans for moving more troops and more equipment over there?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, sir; we have plans for another squadron of helicopters—we have two there now—and for a squadron of C-123's, which is short take-off aircraft.

Senator CAPEHART. One more quick question. Who are these guerrillas that are infiltrating? Are they from North Vietnam, are they from China, are they from Russia; where are they from?

Mr. NOLTING. They are from the armed forces of North Vietnam.

Senator CAPEHART. They are not Chinese?

Mr. NOLTING. No, sir.

Senator CAPEHART. They are, of course, supported by the Chinese and the Russians?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes.

Senator CAPEHART. So we have a situation, then, where we are technically at war. We are on the sidelines furnishing men, ammunition, and training, and they are doing the same thing in North Vietnam. Other people are doing the fighting for both the Chinese and the Russians, and the other people are doing the fighting for us?

Mr. NOLTING. This is about the situation, yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I ask one thing? Were you referring to that broadcast on NBC about New Year's Day, making predictions?

Senator CAPEHART. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. That was Cecil Brown.

Senator CAPEHART. No, it was Robinson who made the statement.

Senator SPARKMAN. I know, but in the predictions—anyhow it is the same panel.

Senator CAPEHART. It was Robinson who made the statement in substance. I just asked the Ambassador if he had heard or seen it. It was Robinson who made those predictions.

Senator SPARKMAN. There was a panel of them.

Senator CAPEHART. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. I will say this: Every one of them was quite pessimistic. That is true in the Far East generally. It is true in Southeast Asia.

Senator CAPEHART. I just tried to repeat what he said; I wasn't passing judgment. I wanted to know if the Ambassador agreed or disagreed with him.

TREMENDOUS INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH

Senator LAUSCHE. I want, if you can, to proceed in informing us of the developments that have taken place. My belief is that the last testimony given to us was that there was tremendous infiltration from the north. In the south there were jungle men who made sporadic attacks, and when it was sought to run them down, they retreated back into the swamps and jungles. The testimony was that if Laos went, that would open the west flank and there would be infiltration from the west. There was then fighting within South Vietnam.

I would like to have you report to us what has been the development since you have been there. It was bad according to the testi-

mony given here by the last witness, and I want to know now whether there has been a disintegration or an improvement, and what the causes are.

Mr. NOLTING. May I start from 9 months ago when I arrived?

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, that is fine.

Mr. NOLTING. This was in early May. For a while, perhaps several months, the military situation was going better from the point of view of our side. There were some victories, mostly in the delta area in what is known as the Plaine de Jonc, in which about four battalions of Viet Cong were hit, and hit hard, by government forces. They took heavy casualties and were broken up as fighting units. As a result of that, in the delta area, things looked up.

A great deal more intelligence information flooded in from the peasants, from the villages, because they figured that the government was winning. Rice supplies came back into Saigon in normal quantity again. Before that, there had been a shortage. We thought that things were going better.

Immediately following that, in August and September, there were large infiltrations of Viet Cong into the northern part of South Vietnam across the Laotian frontier. This was facilitated by the fact that the southern part of Laos, in what is called the panhandle, is held principally by Pathet Lao forces reinforced by North Vietnamese. It is very easy to infiltrate from that area across into the mountainous jungle area of South Vietnam in Kontum and Pleiku provinces, and this was done as a result of those infiltrations and local recruitments after they got there. The military situation in that area went badly. There were a number of civil guard posts that were overrun, and there were engagements with the regular forces which at the best were a draw. The morale dropped as a result. In an area near Saigon there was a major attack on the province seat and that was overrun and the province chief was killed, and so forth.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now we have two areas. The delta area first and now the area in which the infiltration came from, Laos.

DETERIORATING SITUATION

Mr. NOLTING. That is right, sir. The attack moved up to the north, and therefore I am trying to describe this in some detail, because when you ask how the overall situation is, you can't answer in an overall way. It is spotty and it goes from area to area. But if I can generalize, it would be that as a result of the more recent victories of the Viet Cong which I have just described, the situation deteriorated from what it was in late summer, in terms of morale, in terms of the prospects of victory by the army and in terms of the government's popularity, because that popularity depends to such a great extent on how much protection it can give the people throughout the country.

Following that situation, in the fall the President sent the Taylor mission.[2] There was a new and very detailed survey, in which our

[2] At the request of President Kennedy, Gen. Maxwell Taylor led a mission to South Vietnam in October 1961.

permanent mission there participated fully, to determine what needed to be done on our side as well as theirs to bolster this situation which seemed to be slipping.

I think you are familiar with the results. The decision was taken to extend additional help, to accelerate our training program, and to send these units of our armed forces which would fill in certain of the essential gaps in their forces, mainly in the fields of intelligence, communication, and mobility. And with one addition: a sea patrol mounted by, I believe, five U.S. vessels, minesweepers, and four or five Vietnamese vessels in cooperation to try to block off infiltration by seas. As a result of those latest moves, which are already becoming effective in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, I think the thing is moving up again. When I left there President [Ngo Dinh] Diem said to me he thought they had wind in their sails again, thanks to our effort and our cooperation, and they were moving forward again.

It is however, I might add Senator, a thin and fragile situation. It is one that could go up or down rapidly in terms of morale and in terms of actual control of territory.

As I said at the outset——

MORALE OF THE MILITARY

Senator LAUSCHE. Let me put that question. The morale of the military men of the government began to disintegrate, is that correct?

Mr. NOLTING. No, sir. If I said that, I misspoke. I meant public morale.

Senator LAUSCHE. The public morale. Now what about the morale of the military?

Mr. NOLTING. I think that has remained high. I am impressed with how these units will fight when they can find the enemy to fight, and the government morale and determination has remained absolutely high and unshaken.

LOSS OF TERRITORY TO THE COMMUNISTS

Senator LAUSCHE. What is their loss of territory to the Communist forces?

Mr. NOLTING. Loss of territory in the sense that they knocked out a civil guard post but didn't hold it. It was retaken, and when that happens the villages in that area, in that district, become more prone to do what Viet Cong tells them to do, rather than to do what the central government tells them to do.

When you speak of holding territory, it doesn't apply exactly to this situation. The Viet Cong doesn't hold any territory in a permanent sense. What they do is to exert control over areas mainly by terror and leave the administration either non-functioning or functioning as a facade which doesn't really control the people, that is to say, doesn't collect taxes; doesn't keep control of the harvest, and doesn't exercise what would normally be considered the governmental control in that district.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then let's summarize again. The military morale remains sound. The public morale began to lose confidence

in the ability of the government to continue, and the government itself became helpless because of these spasmodic attacks.

Mr. NOLTING. The governmental apparatus in some provinces and districts and villages was weakened. The central government continued and continues to function very strongly.

Senator LAUSCHE. And it reached the stage where it was concluded that unless the infiltration was stopped, Vietnam was likely to be lost to the Communists. Not quite that far?

Mr. NOLTING. I would say not quite that far. I was in that connection not speaking about the government's reaction, but giving my own views with respect to infiltration, which are that we can win provided the infiltration is not massive enough to swamp the gains that the country would otherwise make.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, now proceed on your own.

Mr. NOLTING. Perhaps the next point, if I can give my personal views again——

SOVIET AND CHINESE SUPPORT OF THE NORTH

Senator WILEY. Who are the Communists, Chinese?

Mr. NOLTING. No, sir; they are North Vietnamese under the government of Ho Chi Minh. You will remember the country was divided in 1954. The Communists took the northern half; Ho Chi Minh, the great national hero, set up the government in Hanoi.

Senator WILEY. Where do they get their arms? Who furnishes the arms to the Communists?

Mr. NOLTING. The new arms are coming mainly from Russia and Eastern Europe. Czech arms are coming in.

Senator WILEY. Are Russian officers in there?

Mr. NOLTING. No Russian military advisers in the sense that we have them in the south, that I know of. There was a Chinese military mission there for the past month. They left just before the new year. This would indicate to my mind that the Chinese are going to give them more military advice and advisers than they have had before.

Senator AIKEN. Did the North Vietnamese start their attack or infiltration for purely political reasons or was it partly economic?

Mr. NOLTING. I think partly economic also. The political reasons, the avowed intention to unify the country under Ho Chi Minh is a big compulsion, but there is also an economic factor which is that the south is the rice bowl and the north is suffering for food.

Senator AIKEN. And the North Vietnamese have been maintaining a much larger army than South Vietnam?

Mr. NOLTING. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. I bring this up because President Diem told some of us 3 years ago that if they didn't attack in 3 years, their economy would collapse because of the size of the army they were maintaining. I suppose they get outside help when they start this infiltration, just as South Vietnam gets more outside help, too.

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, I think it was undoubtedly an economic compulsion, too.

STOPPING THE INFILTRATION

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, before he leaves that infiltration subject, may I ask this? You say unless we can effectively stop, or some such statement as that, that infiltration—can we?

Mr. NOLTING. I think we have a reasonably good prospect, Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. How will it be done? Our help is to train and equip their men, isn't it?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, sir, but one of the factors, internally, in South Vietnam that will help to cut down on this if not stopped is the mounting of a very active ranger border patrol. This would be 5,000 to 6,000 Vietnamese rangers. We have trained those people.

Senator SPARKMAN. To stop them from coming across?

Mr. NOLTING. Hit them as they come in. The effectiveness of this depends on intelligence, and we are getting better organized on the intelligence side, so that we know what is coming in and where they will be at a certain time.

The third factor which we have supplied, or are in the process of supplying, is mobility to this force so that they can go from one area to the other and hit the enemy at the time we know he will be there. There are other factors, also including the settlement in Laos which would have a lot to do with it on the other side of the border.

Senator LAUSCHE. Proceed.

A LONG, DRAWN-OUT CAMPAIGN

Mr. NOLTING. Going on, sir, in my judgment this is going to be a long, drawn-out, hard campaign without prospects of dramatic victories in the military sense. I visualize it more like the Malayan campaign, which as you know lasted for about 10 years. I think it combines a whole combination of efforts, not only military but the whole range of civic actions, social actions, political actions, economic actions, information actions, as well as military. I think from our point of view if we could visualize this as a long pull we would be in a much better psychological frame of mind than if we look to short range victories, which are, I believe, not in the cards in any dramatic sense. But I do believe we can win on the long pull if we stick with it.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question there? Are your troops under the command of General [Lionel C.] McGarr at the present time? Is he the ranking military man?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, sir.

Senator CARLSON. Did he not succeed General Williams?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, sir.

Senator CARLSON. Is it not true that General Williams, who was here for many years, also carried on this same type of program of training their troops, and I think very effectively training them, and is the point reached now where we must just continue to expand it? Is that the problem we are faced with?

Mr. NOLTING. That is part of the problem, Senator. The training has been going on a long time. It originated, however, as training of Vietnamese soldiers, practically from scratch, in more of the classical pattern of warfare, individual organization, and with

equipment intended to stop a major attack from the north in divisional strength.

The transformation has been, and I think wisely, in the direction of anti-guerrilla training, smaller units, lighter equipment, more aggressiveness, more mobility, and this continues as they build up their forces. They are approaching 200,000 regular forces now, and they have about 120,000 paramilitary forces comprising the civil guard, as they call it, and the self-defense corps units.

Senator CAPEHART. You said it would be a long pull. What are you thinking of 1, 2, 5, 10, 15, 20 years?

Mr. NOLTING. I hate to put a date on it, Senator, but I am thinking in terms of 5 years or more.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a couple of questions?

Senator LAUSCHE. I think we had better get along in our regular order here. Do you have anything further you want to say generally before we begin in our order of asking questions?

Mr. NOLTING. Just one more point, if I may make it very briefly, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT DIEM

Mr. NOLTING. There is a great deal of talk and speculation as to whether we are backing the right horse, President Diem. It is my opinion after going with an open mind, and considering as many of the factors as I could on as much information as I could get, that we are. The best way to win, the best way to maintain the independence of South Vietnam is to give his government full backing, and out of the confidence which we create by that, to work toward the ameliorations in the political, social, and economic realms that we hope to achieve. I think this is the way to do it, and I think we have made some progress approaching it from this point of view.

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Symington.

SENDING FIGHTING TROOPS

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, sir.

First, Mr. Ambassador, it is a privilege to see you. I visited with you last November or whenever it was in South Vietnam. It is a privilege to have anybody grasping any subject, as in my opinion you did, and as I know General Taylor felt you did, whom I saw last night and with whom I was with out there. I would like to ask a couple of questions if I may, the premise being that I do not think we can hold a position in Asia unless we hold South Vietnam; do you agree with that?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Therefore, what we have to do is whatever is necessary in order to hold South Vietnam; do you agree to that?

Mr. NOLTING. Whatever we——

Senator SYMINGTON. We should do whatever is necessary to hold South Vietnam?

Mr. NOLTING. I think so.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you agree to that?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think that necessarily involves the sending of fighting troops?

Mr. NOLTING. I do not think it necessarily involves that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are there now any North Vietnamese troops openly billeting in Laos?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, North Vietnamese troops.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, openly billeting in Laos?

Mr. NOLTING. We know they exist there.

Senator SYMINGTON. In what strength, in what size?

Mr. NOLTING. The last rough figure that I knew of was about 2,000. They are supporting the Pathet Lao forces along the Vietnamese frontier.

Senator SYMINGTON. My final question, while waiting for my turn: Do you think we are doing enough there to hold the country at this time?

Mr. NOLTING. I think that the wisest policy, Senator, would be to see how this works, and I am quite sanguine that this is going to put their forces on the offensive in a way which will commence to turn the tide. If it does not, then I think we have to look for some other alternatives.

U.S. ADVISERS TO DIEM

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to add one further question to that. When I was there talking with Diem, there was great resistance to the desire of our Government to see changes made in his echelons and so forth, especially the military echelon, and I read about that in the paper after getting back. Is he now adjusted to working with us more than he was, and to your satisfaction?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, I think he is much better adjusted and willing to work with us, including having U.S. advisers in his military units down to battalion size and perhaps even company size. He agreed to have this. His one condition was that we do it inconspicuously and not talk too much about it, because the more we talk about it, the more this undermines his nationalist stand and gives a monopoly on nationalism to Ho Chi Minh. So if we handle this carefully, we can do it. But the more we talk about doing it, the harder it is to do it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you very much. I think the committee would be interested to know that the North Vietnamese army has more divisions than the Army of the United States. Thank you.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, do you desire to ask some questions before I call on the committee members to do the questioning?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I will defer, because I missed the first part of the story. I don't want to be repetitive. If there is anything that doesn't come out, I will ask questions.

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Sparkman.

A ONE-MAN GOVERNMENT

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think the Ambassador has answered a question that I was going to ask. The thing that has been difficult for me to understand about Vietnam is how this situ-

ation developed, because if there was any one country in all the world that we helped freely, it was this country, following the Geneva conference, and we even helped France before that time. We were pleased with the resettlement of their people in the happy way in which it seemed to work out. We have been generous in our military aid, in our economic aid, and for a long time it seemed everything was moving along well, and then all at once this thing broke on us.

I know what you said about supporting Diem, and I think you are right. Yet it seems to me that there is—and isn't this true—isn't there a considerable discontent because of his failure to, shall I say, democratize his government? Isn't it largely a one-man government?

Mr. NOLTING. There is considerable discontent. I don't think that it is a one-man government, and I think some fairly recent moves are decentralizing it more than it was a few months ago.

Senator SPARKMAN. I was going to ask you if any move was being made to that end.

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, moves are being made to that end, and I will go into them in detail if you would like. I wonder if I could answer your general question as to why or how this sort of broke upon us all at once in a rather critical situation. It seems to me that after 1954 the Communists in the north, Ho Chi Minh, thought that the south would come to them without any further struggle. They expected elections and they expected those elections to be won by the great national hero against the French, Ho Chi Minh.

Senator SPARKMAN. And under the Geneva Conference, elections were supposed to be held within a year's time.

Mr. NOLTING. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is one instance which we didn't want.

Mr. NOLTING. Neither the Diem government nor the United States signed that accord, as you know.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, that is right.

COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO DISRUPT DIEM GOVERNMENT

Mr. NOLTING. Even after the elections were postponed, the odds on Diem's success were very low everywhere, and particularly in Hanoi. He did, however, make some successes, and from 1955 to about 1957 or 1958, things were going up. They resettled almost a million refugees from the north. They did some land redistribution and reform. They got some economic progress going, and it is a rich country and they didn't have any major catastrophes like floods and so forth.

They were making progress, and the Communists decided, I think, that they weren't going to win simply by having the fruit drop from the tree. And so they stepped it up, making use of cadres that they had already left in the south against this possible eventuality. But they began to step it up rather mildly, and up to 2 years ago you could drive all around the country without being shot at. That didn't work.

They began also to create difficulties for the government by rumors, innuendoes, charges of corruption, and a lot of other things, a part of which fell on fertile ground, and was picked up

and repeated even by people who are non-Communist. However, the government continued to make progress, and about late 1959 or early 1960 they began really to pour it on in the way of infiltrations, assassinations, terror to the point that the village, district, and provincial officials were being murdered at a considerable rate.

They were trying very hard to disrupt the government before they had made the improvements, mainly in the economic sphere, which would have made the Communist take-over even more difficult. And that has been continuing with a crescendo up to the present.

They publicly announced that they were going to take the government over in 1961, and this got the public backing of Russia and China. They haven't done it. The real question in my mind is whether we can back them down from this public commitment to reunify the country. I think we can, and I think we must.

Senator SPARKMAN. I certainly agree with you, and I think it is all important that South Vietnam be sustained as an independent government. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Wiley, you are on the subcommittee.

WHAT IS THE ANSWER TO THIS MESS?

Senator WILEY. I want to say I am very glad to see Ambassador Nolting here.

What is the answer to this mess?

Mr. NOLTING. Senator, I think it is to do what we are doing and do it better and harder. I am satisfied with the degree of commitment that has been taken. I want, if possible to make that pay off in terms of reversing this situation, and as I said at the outset, I am reasonable sanguine that we can do that, but I certainly can't guarantee it.

Senator WILEY. How many American boys have we there?

Mr. NOLTING. On the military side now, around 2,000. It will go up, I think, to 4,000 or 5,000 before we are finished. These are not combat forces; they are service forces.

Senator WILEY. Why is this revolution, why is it? Is it because there is the case of the haves and the have-nots? Is it a case where some group has everything and others haven't anything? You say the Chinese aren't in there, the Russians aren't in there. It is a sort of fight between themselves, a family fight. Is that what you mean?

Mr. NOLTING. I think the compulsion for this comes from the Communist bloc as a whole. I think it is a direct demonstration of the expansionism of the Communist bloc in Asia, and I think that if it were not for that, the local discontent could fairly rapidly be cured. I think the spark plug for this is the expansionism of Communist China, exercised through Hanoi.

SUPPORT FROM AMERICA'S ALLIES

Senator WILEY. If that is the case, why is it our battle and not the battle of the Allies, or is it? Have we support from them?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, sir, we are getting increasing support from our allies.

Senator WILEY. Who?

Mr. NOLTING. Australia, Britain, China, Japan, Malaya.

Senator SPARKMAN. What about the Philippines?

Senator WILEY. That is important. Now what is that support? Is it manpower, materiel?

Mr. NOLTING. And Germany. I just named another one, excuse me.

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Mr. NOLTING. It is in various fields. Australia is helping in the agricultural field, and they have recently come in to ask what more they can do and we are coordinating something that they can do in addition. Germany has given a loan of 50 million marks, mainly for the development of the coal deposits in central Vietnam. Britain has sent a training mission of experts from Malaya headed by Mr. Thompson, who is very good indeed. The French are continuing their educational program and are backing us, so far as I can determine, in Hanoi, completely in our program to sustain the country, but they are not going to send any forces, I am sure.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Hanoi? You mean Saigon?

Mr. NOLTING. Did I say Hanoi? Excuse me, I meant Saigon.

The Japanese are building a hydroelectric dam and power line, which is a part of their reparations, but they are helping in this. The Chinese are helping to develop the textile industry. The Canadians are helping diplomatically through their representative on the ICC,[3] who is doing an excellent job on our side, but under great difficulties. The Philippines have made noises about wanting to help, but so far as I know nothing has been contributed.

I think in general that the free world, our allies, are wising up to the fact that this is a struggle that involves them, or at least in which they have an interest, and are not leaving it totally to us. But we are still very much the horse in this horse and rabbit stew.

EQUIPMENT, MONEY AND MANPOWER

Senator LAUSCHE. Then to summarize, the aid is by way of equipment and money, but not manpower.

Mr. NOLTING. And people.

Senator LAUSCHE. And people.

Mr. NOLTING. And advisers.

Senator LAUSCHE. Advisers.

Mr. NOLTING. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. No military?

Mr. NOLTING. No military.

Senator SPARKMAN. Except the group from Malaya.

Mr. NOLTING. They are advisers.

Senator SPARKMAN. Guerrilla tactics, isn't it?

Mr. NOLTING. Anti-guerrilla advisers. I also might mention that the Australians put in some military hardware, as did the Malayans, but that is small compared to what we have put in.

Senator WILEY. If the allies are spending all that effort, there ought to be, it seems to me, a military effort that could squash the so-called effort of the north.

---

[3] International Control Commission.

Mr. NOLTING. The trouble is that the enemy is very elusive. He doesn't concentrate and you can't hit him in any size. This is a termiting operation with small groups, and you can hit a lot of small groups but you don't kill very many people while you are doing it. It takes an awful lot of forces to do this.

ROLE OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE

Senator WILEY. Are the Vietnamese people themselves willing to fight? Are they organizing? Are they training? Are they forming guerrilla groups? In other words, have we gotten into a position were we are providing our allies all the help—economic, military, and everything else—and these other people are sitting back doing nothing, or what is the situation?

Mr. NOLTING. The Vietnamese people?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Mr. NOLTING. A great many of them are fighting very courageously, and they are losing about 2,000 people a month. There are areas, however, where the people are afraid to fight. I am talking about the peasants in the countryside. Because if they put up a fight, they would be killed before reinforcements could reach them. So in general I think that there is the will and determination to fight, but protection must be afforded in order to give, in certain localities, sufficient chance for this will to be exercised.

Senator WILEY. No further questions.

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Carlson.

HARNESSING VIETNAMESE RIVERS

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned this hydroelectric power project on the part of the Japanese. That is the Mekong River, is it not, that goes down through Saigon?

Mr. NOLTING. No Senator, it is a powerplant, a hydroelectric plant.

Senator CARLSON. What is the name of the river that goes into Saigon?

Mr. NOLTING. It is the Saigon River, and below that is the Mekong that comes all the way from China.

Senator CARLSON. It is further down?

Mr. NOLTING. Through Laos and Cambodia.

Senator CARLSON. I visited that section in 1958. If I remember correctly, there were several nations, including the United States, who had a commission studying the possibilities of using that river for great public service, flood protection and many other features. Is this project a part of that, do you know?

Mr. NOLTING. The Japanese project is not connected with that at all. The other is the United Nations project which is still in the planning stage.

Senator CARLSON. Still in the planning stage?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, sir. They haven't even begun construction. It is a very large project.

45

WORK OF THE TECHNICIANS

Senator CARLSON. You mentioned the technicians that we are getting from the other nations. What about our own technicians? Do we have a number of technicians in this area, a substantial number?

Mr. NOLTING. We have a very substantial number in many fields.

Senator CARLSON. What is some of the work that the technicians are doing or assisting in?

Mr. NOLTING. Engineers, road building, canal and bridge building, people putting up communication lines, public health technicians, anti-malaria spraying teams, educators for schools and so forth, training of administrators and some administration specialists, police trainers—this is all on the civil side. Then we have on the military side some others—training of police, agricultural specialists, land development specialists. Fisheries is another one. There are a great many. I am sure I haven't named them all. On the military side, if I may complete this, we have specialists, military men training in all branches of anti-guerrilla warfare.

Senator CARLSON. I share the views of the Senator from Alabama as to the importance of retaining our position in saving this country if we are to keep our interest in the Far East. I think all of us on this committee who heard General Williams, who testified here on several occasions, and with whom I had the pleasure of meeting and observing some of the fine work he did in training some of the local organization in the military program, were impressed. I gather from your statement that he conducted a training program, however, that was not the type of training program that was really needed in that area? Is that a correct assumption from what you have stated?

Mr. NOLTING. I didn't intend to imply any criticism.

Senator CARLSON. This is not a criticism, but the wrong type of program.

GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. NOLTING. I think it met what was, perhaps, the need at that time. The guerrilla activity in South Vietnam had not begun then. The great danger was an attack in force from the north by an army that was well trained and that had been fighting for 6 years against the French. Forces were developed in the south to stand off that kind of an attack, and this was to my mind sensible and necessary at the time. The Communists, however, decided to mount a different kind of attack, and this is a guerrilla attack, and so training and organization had to be tailored to that. This is what is going on now.

Senator CARLSON. If I follow your statement, then, we can expect this same type of campaign to continue and maybe expand for some time to come?

Mr. NOLTING. The guerrilla?

Senator CARLSON. Guerrilla type of warfare.

Mr. NOLTING. It depends, Senator, on how successful we are in resisting it and how costly we make it for them.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

COMPARISON OF LAOS AND VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. A year ago on February 2, Mr. Brown testified here and he said:

> I think that Laos is a very key place in Southeast Asia. As I say, both from the point of view of the physical fact that is a neutral, independent and free from Communist influence, it acts as sort of a cordon sanitaire between the Communists in the south and the Cambodians and South Vietnam.

He took the position that that was a key place. You take the position that South Vietnam is the key to the whole southeast, is that correct? Both of them are, in effect.

Senator SPARKMAN. All three.

Mr. NOLTING. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. All three. Will you answer?

Mr. NOLTING. I think that Vietnam is not exclusively the key, but I think it has been always more of a target and more valuable to the Communists than Laos has been, because it has more in it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Brown pointed out in this testimony that if Laos went, there would be the west flank exposed and there would be infiltration from Laos into South Vietnam.

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. That has occurred, hasn't it?

Mr. NOLTING. It has occurred and is occurring.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has the situation in South Vietnam deteriorated since the unstable condition developed in Laos?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. So there is a relationship between those two situations?

Mr. NOLTING. Without question.

ROLE OF SOUVANNA PHOUMA

Senator LAUSCHE. When Mr. Brown was here a year ago, I questioned him about Souvanna Phouma,[4] and I questioned him about coalition governments. This was the question:

> Senator LAUSCHE. Is that what you hear with respect to Phouma, that while he is stating that he is a neutralist, he represents a neutralist government, the end will be an absorption by the Communists in Laos?
>
> Mr. BROWN. That was our concern with Souvanna Phouma.
>
> Senator LAUSCHE. And that is why you felt that Phouma should not be allowed to continue?
>
> Mr. BROWN. That is why we did not feel that he would be a good government. That is my view.

Now I want to ask you the question. What do you know about Souvanna Phouma, who is now being put in as the head man in Laos?

Mr. NOLTING. Senator, I can honestly say that I don't know enough about him for my testimony to be of any value. I have never met him. I have never talked with him.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has he been in touch with the man in South Vietnam, with the infiltrators?

Mr. NOLTING. Not that I know of.

---

[4] Prince Souvanna Phouma, former premier of Laos who would again head a coalition government in June 1962.

Senator LAUSCHE. Had you ever heard discussions challenging the reliability of Souvanna Phouma?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Where did you hear them?

Mr. NOLTING. In many places, but I can speak principally from my experience in Vietnam.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did you speak with the Vietnamese Government?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. What did they say about Souvanna Phouma?

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is all that I want to ask at this time.

AN AMERICAN SOLDIER OF FORTUNE

Senator MORSE. I have three matters I want to raise very quickly.

Have you ever heard of a man that might be described as an American soldier of fortune operating in Southeast Asia, by the name of Colonel Stroud, who apparently is closely associated with a Chinese woman by the name of Miss Lam, who is supposed to be a member of the Sun family?

Mr. NOLTING. I don't know him, Senator Morse. I don't know of him.

Senator MORSE. I won't take any more time other than to raise this point. I would like to have someone in the State Department, also someone in the CIA, give us a rundown on this man Stroud.

Mr. NOLTING. S-t-r-o-u-d?

Senator MORSE. S-t-r-o-u-d. He is apparently an American soldier of fortune, who apparently involves himself in a good many matters involving Laos and, I think, South Vietnam. Dr. Marcy and I have some information on him, but he is in action again, and I think it is about time that this committee is informed as to what the State Department and the CIA know about him.

AMERICANS KILLED OR WOUNDED IN VIETNAM

Second, Mr. Ambassador, how many Americans have been killed or wounded thus far in the guerrilla warfare in Vietnam?

Mr. NOLTING. Since the beginning, Senator? I am not sure I could give you the number. Recently one sergeant has been killed, one kidnapped, and a USOM engineer was killed about a week ago. A MAAG trainer was shot in the leg about a month ago. He has recovered.

I think before the death of Sergeant Davis, the one who was killed recently, no military man on our side, no American, had been killed for about a year and a half.

Senator MORSE. If we have, as you have testified, some 2,000 American military personnel in South Vietnam, and if they are going to be very effective in helping the South Vietnamese in conducting military operations against the guerrillas, they are bound to come in increasingly close proximity to the line of action, aren't they?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. And we have to be prepared for and expect an increasing number of casualties, don't we?

Mr. NOLTING. I think that is true.

PUBLIC SUPPORT OF AMERICAN SACRIFICES IN VIETNAM

Senator MORSE. Now you have testified, as I understood you—and if not, correct the record or my understanding—that the other countries are not supplying military personnel. They are supplying technical assistance and economic assistance and materiel, but not blood.

You know the reaction in France. It got to the point where the French people would no longer support a policy that cost that much French blood. Do you think, as a matter of American policy, with an increasing number of flag-draped coffins coming back to our shores, that the American people are going to continue to be willing to make that sacrifice of American blood with no corresponding sacrifice on the part of the British and the French and the other countries that claim to be our allies?

Mr. NOLTING. I am sure you are a better judge of American public opinion than I am. My own judgment would be that the number of American casualties to be expected would be sustained by public opinion at home under the circumstances that you describe.

Senator MORSE. I just want to be one voice of dissent in this discussion. I just want to go on record as saying that, in my judgment, if you make this a unilateral American military action, you will be surprised how quickly American public opinion will leave you in regard to the sacrifice of American boys in Southeast Asia, because you will find a very strong feeling developing that we don't intend to take on the French burden or make the same mistake that the French made.

THE FORCE AND EFFECT OF PROPAGANDA

I have never seen it until 10 minutes ago, but what the staff has handed me, and I thought you ought to have an opportunity to reply to it—not now, but later to this committee—is what obviously is a propaganda document called "White Paper on Diem's Regime," published by the Free Democratic Party in Vietnam.

I have just scanned it, and I think I can recognize propaganda when I see it, but I also recognize the force and effect of propaganda, too. This is a pretty devastating attack on the administration that we are supporting in South Vietnam.

Senator SPARKMAN. Will the Senator yield a second?

Senator MORSE. I want to know whether or not the State Department is preparing, for the use of the committee and the country, an answer to this.

Senator SPARKMAN. I really meant to ask him if he knew anything about that organization. I believe they are headquartered in Paris.

Senator MORSE. I don't know where they are. I have just scanned it. I don't know whether this is Communist propaganda or not, but it certainly has a good many of the colorings.

My point is that this stuff is abroad, and just taking the headings—"Opposition Silence," "Concentration Camps," "Election Invalid," "Cynical Hypocrisy," "Control of the Press," "Terrorism"—this is a devastating propaganda sheet against the very government that we claim to be supporting. You have to have an answer to it.

It will do us some good to say we think this is vital to Southeast Asia. But my answer is, "sell it to the American people when the coffins start coming home."

VIETNAMESE DISSENTERS

Mr. NOLTING. If I may comment on that, I am very familiar with those publications. They come out frequently. I was devastated by them before leaving my last post, Paris, before going to Vietnam.

I know or have met some of the dissidents, both in Vietnam and abroad. The majority of them are, for one reason or another, expatriate. They are abroad.

You asked whether they were Communists or not. I think the majority of them are not. They are very bitter. They pour out a great deal of that. It is very damaging to our joint enterprise in Vietnam.

I wish something could be done about it. I would certainly like to see prepared a counter to that, and would be willing to participate in the preparation.

Senator MORSE. I think it is important.

Mr. NOLTING. This is one of the major things which makes our operation so difficult, the fact that the South Vietnamese people are not unified behind the government. Every opportunity I have to talk to one of them, I ask him what he is doing for his country in a critical situation, and I find that the majority are so embittered that they are doing nothing except tearing down; tearing down, what is more important, the support that other nations might give South Vietnam. This is a grave problem and makes it very difficult.

Senator MORSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Hickenlooper.

RUMORS OF CORRUPTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Ambassador, you are familiar, of course, with the continued rumors of massive corruption in South Vietnam in connection with the family of the President; at least, that is, some of his relatives and others close to the government. You can answer this on the record or off the record; I don't care which.

Have you gone into that subject? If you have, what have you found about the verification of these so-called rumors of mass corruptions? I am not talking about taking a box of cigars or $3 for getting somebody an office. I think maybe that is Southeast Asian procedure, but I am talking about villas in France and big deposits in foreign countries and things of that kind.

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, Senator Hickenlooper, I have heard many of them, a great many. I have tried to investigate each one.

I have found no concrete evidence of great corruption, great personal profit on the part of any Vietnamese official. And I will say that I mean by great, something that would be tangible, like a bank deposit abroad or a villa in France, to name the few you have named, which was gotten from a hand in the public till.

I wouldn't like to say, though, that there is no favoritism. By that I mean that people are appointed to jobs in some cases because of their connections with people in high places in the government.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That would not necessarily be unique to people in Vietnam. There might be that practice many places.

Senator LAUSCHE. There is great wisdom in that statement.

PRESIDENT DIEM'S FAMILY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you find evidence that, locally, people in high government places, in the President's immediate family or his relatives, have insinuated themselves into the ownership of substantial corporations or substantial operations of a similar nature, using funds or influences which they might get by virtue of their position, that is to enrich themselves personally?

Mr. NOLTING. No, sir, I have not found evidence, and I have looked for it on that score. I have found some counter evidence. Recently a cousin of President Diem was ordered by him not to take part in the development of a textile plant which we were trying to get developed, because of, what do you call it, conflict of interest.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Had you found any evidence of profiteering on the part of any of these high officials in the disposal of the rice crop or other similar crops in Vietnam?

Mr. NOLTING. I haven't, no.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I'll go a step further then and say that a couple of years or so ago I was over there for a while, a few days, and we were especially interested in that. We asked about it repeatedly and talked to officials, because of these rumors that had stirred up a great many people here, that the President's sister-in-law,[5] who is very rich, had acquired a lot of things, and his brother had been engaged in corrupt activities of various kinds, as various others had.

As much as we could find out then, our people had been unable to discover any real substance to those rumors. Petty graft, yes. I suppose it is common throughout Asia and other countries, but not of substance.

Mr. NOLTING. This is the picture that still holds.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was just wondering what your experience had been since you have been there.

Mr. NOLTING. This is the picture that still holds, and I have done everything I can to run down each one of these charges. They are very numerous indeed, coming from Vietnamese, as you know.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I came to the conclusion that the sources of information from some of our people—and we had some American nationals who were scattering these rumors—came from people who themselves had a little something in their background to be

[5] Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu.

criticized, and were mad about the fact that they had been called to account about certain of their own activities, and that they were the chief sources of these rumors which we were totally unable to tag as having any substance.

RESETTLEMENT OF THE MONTAGNARDS

What is the situation now in regard to the attempt by the government to resettle the hill tribes, the migratory tribes?

Mr. NOLTING. The so-called Montagnards?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Mr. NOLTING. That is moving better now. These people who live in the mountain areas, mostly on the Laotian border, were subject to very considerable Viet Cong pressure.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What I mean is, as I understand it, they were a little different from the mill run of the Vietnamese people. They were migratory people up in that area who would go in and slash and burn the hillsides and farm them for a year or so and then move on, and so on. They were trying to resettle them and make sort of pastoral people with permanent settlement on the area by setting up areas on which they would settle them.

Mr. NOLTING. Yes. I have been to a number of those resettlement villages where they were moved to and they seemed to be quite happy.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I received later reports that it had not been completely successful because a substantial percentage of them, I wouldn't say whether it is 20, 40 or 60 percent, but a substantial percentage would stay for a while and then they would go back. They would just pick up and leave and go back to their old habits, rather than to stay on this land that had been assigned to them for permanent villages. I wonder whether they are becoming more fixed now or whether they are still having trouble that way.

Mr. NOLTING. Some of them did move back in less than a year. They went on back to the mountains. Those that stayed, it is my general impression now, were glad that they did. Those I visited were stable communities. The children were in school there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course, the ones I visited were stable communities at the time they were there. That is the only reason they took us there. It was a show window place. I did not get to see the places where they were unhappy.

Mr. NOLTING. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This new crop, that sort of—what do you call it up there?

Mr. NOLTING. Kanab.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How is that coming? They had some hopes that it would be a money crop for these people.

Mr. NOLTING. It is. It is tiding them over until their rice fields, if they are in a rice location, or their rubber plantations—in many cases they have some rubber trees planted—will come into production. They are also raising peanuts and some other cash crops.

OLD CONFLICTS IN VIETNAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With respect to the question which Senator Morse raised a minute ago about the difference, rightly or

wrongly, of raising these criticisms, writing these papers and so on, is it still the case in Vietnam that there is a difficult situation arising from the historic background of the revolt against the French there; that is, one side was against the French, and another side was for the French, and it is hard even yet to get the two sides together because of their enmity of the past?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, this causes considerable division.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Even though those people may not be Communists, or Communist sympathizers, they have an enmity existing as a result of those old conflicts.

Mr. NOLTING. It is hard to find the homogeneity, because among others this is a considerable factor, yes; one of the decisive influences in Vietnamese society.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is there any evidence at the moment that Diem is turning over more authority in the administrative end of government to other people, more people, rather than keeping his fingers on all of the reins himself?

Mr. NOLTING. This we have been working on hard. I have been working on it, and others, and there is evidence that he is doing this gradually, and somewhat reluctantly, but he is doing it.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Fulbright.

PRESS CRITICISM OF DIEM

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Ambassador, I was just looking at this paper that the Senator from Oregon mentioned. It rather surprises me that the origin of several of these stories is our own magazines and newspapers, the New York Herald Tribune, Time Magazine, who carry these stories which are reprinted here, and I assume that is true, that are extremely critical of this government.

How do you explain that? Did you see these people? Do you know any of these reporters of Time, Life, and so on? Why would they have such a critical attitude toward the Diem government?

Mr. NOLTING. I know most of them and I have talked to, I think, all of them in Saigon.

Senator FULBRIGHT. They differ with your view about the government.

Mr. NOLTING. They do.

Senator FULBRIGHT. How do you explain that? Why should they? What motive would they have in distorting the news, if they have distorted it?

Mr. NOLTING. I think that they have a tendency to look at the hole in the doughnut, Senator Fulbright, and I think quite a few—well, I will stop there. I, too, can see some holes in the doughnut, but I also see a doughnut and part of it is pretty good.

SAIGON RUMOR FACTORY

Another factor is that they stay around Saigon an awful lot, which is the darndest rumor factory that I have even been in, and I talked to a great many people in Saigon who are critical of the regime.

It seems to be an unfortunate tendency of the Vietnamese people to analyze things brilliantly, and to generally come out with a neg-

ative conclusion about prospects and to blame other people and to find it very difficult to unite in a positive program. This is my observation of sort of a national characteristic. This is particularly true of the French-educated intelligentsia of Vietnam. These are the people that these writers mostly talk to, although not exclusively.

They do get out in the country occasionally. The principal strength that Diem has is in the countryside among the peasants. He is good at that. He talks to them with understanding. He knows their problems, and he gets a response.

He scorns Saigon, and he doesn't make any attempt really to win over the intellectuals. I think a part of this negative report from Saigon is the fact that it is the intellectuals who influence the reporters to the greatest extent. I do not deny that a lot of the criticisms are based on part fact, but it just seems to me to be out of proportion and not in perspective, if one views the whole situation.

I have done my best, both in Saigon and here, and shall continue to do so, to try to correct this, because as we move along and are trying to sustain the government with the one hand, it makes little sense for us publicly in our press to smack it with the other.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It sure doesn't. It seems very strange indeed.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I suggest that is not peculiar to overseas reporting, though, with a number of these publications.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I would not say some of these people, though, are completely without a sense of perspective. I don't know Karnow, is it?

Mr. NOLTING. Karnow of the Times, yes.[6]

Senator FULBRIGHT. And then [Walter] Lippmann, I think, bases his articles on reports from [Joseph] Alsop. There are one or two others here that I don't know, who wrote the Time article, but they are very critical indeed with regard to corruption.

LAND REFORM IN VIETNAM

You yourself mentioned that a moment ago in the early part about social reforms. What did you have in mind when you used that term "social reforms" with regard to South Vietnam? Is there a land problem there?

Mr. NOLTING. I would say the principal one is land redistribution.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is it held largely by a few families?

Mr. NOLTING. No; it is mostly the family estates which have been to a large extent redistributed to the peasants.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What kind of land reforms do you have in mind?

Mr. NOLTING. I have in mind the settlement of people in overcrowded areas on government lands, mostly in the lowland high plateaus which are mostly planted in rubber plantations now.

Senator FULBRIGHT. This is quite different from the situation we find in some Latin American countries. It isn't the case of the feudal system, with a few people owning all the land, is that true?

---

[6] Stanley Karnow, who covered Southeast Asia for Time and Life.

Mr. NOLTING. I think that is by and large true. It used to be that way, but this has changed.

Senator FULBRIGHT. This is rather an opening of new land, a resettlement problem you had in mind, is that right?

Mr. NOLTING. That is right, and the relief of overcongested people by that.

A NEW SYSTEM OF TAXATION

Senator FULBRIGHT. What about taxation? Do they have what you would call a reasonable system of taxation, internal taxation?

Mr. NOLTING. They have recently decreed a new system of internal taxation which is going to improve it very much.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What, briefly, are some of the characteristics? What is new about them?

Mr. NOLTING. It involves a more equitable system of land taxes and a better collection. They have been lagging in certain places way behind the current year, and this had been corrected by penalties.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are the taxes extremely burdensome, or would you say they are reasonable?

Mr. NOLTING. I think they are reasonable.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do they have income taxes?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do they enforce them?

Mr. NOLTING. They are establishing measures to enforce them better. One of the problems about their income tax is that the Chinese communities in Saigon particularly, which are the principal business and banking communities, have been very adept at avoiding taxes. This problem is also being attacked.

Senator FULBRIGHT. They are attacking it?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. We know of such things in this country too. They do everything in cash, I guess, and keep no records.

Mr. NOLTING. That is about it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is that true?

Mr. NOLTING. This I understand to be the case.

HOUSING PROBLEM

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is there a housing problem there?

Mr. NOLTING. In Saigon there is, or there is a slum problem.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is this critical?

Mr. NOLTING. One of the things that was recently agreed in our recent negotiations, although stricken from the record of those negotiations, was the commencement of a large-scale housing program on the outskirts of Saigon in the direction of the new road to Baria that was recently constructed.

AGRICULTURAL CREDIT

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is there a problem of credit there, particularly of agricultural credit?

Mr. NOLTING. The agricultural credit extension has done a great deal of good. This is a program that Diem put in quite a few years ago.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is it working?

Mr. NOLTING. It is working well. It ought to be extended further, but it is working very well, and repayments coming back into a revolving fund are also working well.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is it somewhat similar, say, to our agricultural credit system; production credit, for example? Are you familiar with our production credit association?

Mr. NOLTING. A little bit.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I just wondered if it was similar.

Mr. NOLTING. I don't know. I can't answer how similar it is. What this involves is simply the lending of funds at a reasonable rate for Vietnam.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What is a reasonable rate?

Mr. NOLTING. I think it is 2 percent a month on the unpaid balance, 12 percent a year.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That would be 24 percent a year, if it is 2 percent a month.

Mr. NOLTING. It is 12 percent a year, 1 percent a month on the unpaid balance.

Senator FULBRIGHT. One percent.

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, but let me say that this is my recollection of this: Mr. Cattreel, can you correct me on that?

Mr. CATTREEL. I can't confirm it accurately, no.

Mr. NOLTING. For the purpose of seed, fertilizers, and farm implements, a lot of people are using it, and they like it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It is still better than it was, but that is a long way from ours.

Mr. NOLTING. If they borrowed from the private lenders, they would pay three times as much.

AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do they use cooperatives at all there, or is there such a thing as cooperatives in the field of agriculture?

Mr. NOLTING. I think there are some. I am not too familiar with the way they work it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do we promote or seek to promote this type of activity, association, similar to our REA [7] or—well, you have already mentioned credit. Credit, I take it is financed by the government.

Mr. NOLTING. Credit is financed by the government, yes. On the cooperatives, I am not sure. What would be the substance of that? How do they work?

Senator FULBRIGHT. As just one example, a big part of the rice crop in my State is grown under the rice grower's cooperative. It is a very large organization, with hundreds or several thousand members. They grow rice, market it, and store it through this huge cooperative used in our part of the country.

---

[7] Rural Electrification Administration.

48-688 O—86——3

You will remember one of the earliest ones was the orange cooperative called Sunkist, I believe, in California years ago, for supervising the marketing of their crops. All through this country there are farm bureau cooperatives of all kinds.

In Minnesota there is the huge Land-O-Lakes cooperative for butter. All over the country you find different forms of it, but that is what I mean by cooperatives. We have a very extensive system of cooperatives covering nearly all of these things.

Mr. NOLTING. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. They have been very useful in my State, at least in farming, which is essentially agricultural. I just wondered whether you were taking any interest in this.

Mr. NOLTING. I don't think there is any system of collective cooperative harvesting and selling of the rice crop, for example. I think it is done on an individual basis.

BROADENING THE BASE OF DIEM'S GOVERNMENT

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am very glad to have your report that these reports of our own people are exaggerated, at least, if not untrue. But assuming there was some truth in their observations as carried in our own publications, written by our own representatives, it would seem to me that if this is a long term program, and if President Diem wishes to establish a broad base for his government, that some of these things might be very useful. And they don't require any enormous amount of money to get them started.

It is a matter that has been very successful in this country, and they later become self-generating. Many of our programs repay all of the original funds, the capital that is advanced by the government. This is a device—if this is a long struggle, and you anticipate our being in there a long time, and you say it is absolutely essential to our security, it seems to me we ought to be thinking about some of these things that would give a broader base to the government.

Mr. NOLTING. The farm credit thing was, I believe, promoted by us long before I got there, and I know that is going well and is increasing. I think they made an additional appropriation in calendar 1962 in a budget which we had a look at to extend this, but I don't know that we have pushed—I may be wrong in this, Senator, but I don't know that we have pushed—the cooperative in the sense that you just described, the harvesting or planting of the rice crop.

Senator FULBRIGHT. In my State these organizations—the REA Farm Bureau, the rice growers' co-op, and so on—are among, I think, the most popular and most strongly supported organizations of nearly anything down there that the government has ever done.

There are also credit associations. I recently met with the White House Credit Production Association which has about 3,000 members, and these people swear by it. They have paid back their original government financing, and it is their own money now. They manage it themselves and they are devoted to it. It has been a tremendous thing for that area.

THE ALLEGIANCE OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE

I was just wondering if our government is committed, if this is not a temporary military operation, if they are thinking about some things that will help this government or its successor government to have the support of the people. We have been deluged with information that Diem does not command the allegiance of many of the people there. I don't know whether that is true or not. You tell me it is not true, but we certainly have had that kind of information.

Mr. NOLTING. Senator, let me qualify that, if I may. What I mean is that he commands more allegiance, in my opinion, in South Vietnam than anybody else does, but the situation is not that of a popular political leader. In my opinion, the majority of people in the country in Vietnam, and this is some 80 percent of the people, are not interested in a popular political leader in our sense. They are more interested in a person who will give them protection, in whom they have respect for his, we will say, clean government, and who will mete out justice to them.

They are apathetic about popular government, so it is a somewhat different concept from ours when we say we want a democracy with a popular leader at the head of it, and it is built into the situation there. I don't want to confuse this nor to indicate that I do not agree with you.

I do agree with you that things need to be done in great numbers to make the people willing to sacrifice more for their freedom. But I don't think it is a question of a popular government so much as an efficient government and a just government.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am not arguing with you. I know very little about it. I am one of the members who have never been in Vietnam, and I am not speaking or arguing with you. I am just trying to explore it.

But if we are committed to, as you say, our man and we have to back him, as long as we are giving out large sums in the military fields, if this is a long term thing, I should think we should not neglect these rather homely undramatic things.

Mr. NOLTING. I agree.

RECONCILING THE PEOPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT

Senator FULBRIGHT. We should not neglect them at all. I think the thing that has reconciled the people in my State, at least to many of our Government activities which they don't like, is some of these they do like, and which they do profit by. There are a lot of things that our farmers and people in Arkansas don't like at all about the Federal Government, but there are enough of these other things in which they do participate that they are willing to go along, so to speak.

They are reconciled to being a part of the Union, in spite of the fact that we tried to secede once, but we are now reconciled to being associated with our Yankee friends. One of the main reasons is just these things that I have mentioned.

They have made a greater impression on the people than anything else, a succession of various kinds of activities that have given them an opportunity to help themselves. They believe the

Government is their friend, and this is the main contact with them, these various associations which the Federal Government started.

We have, of course, other programs that you have mentioned—hydroelectric projects to a small degree, road building, and so on—but the ones that have the real allegiance of the people are the other things that I mentioned.

Mr. NOLTING. Mostly in the field of agriculture?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. NOLTING. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. In the field of business, the old RFC and the present SBA [8] have a very strong support among the smaller business people. It has done a lot of good down there, and the people believe they have had their treatment from this type of assistance.

As I say, this has not involved enormous amounts of money. It is more management and direction and education on how to help themselves.

I regret to hear you say you fear we are going to be involved there for an indefinite period. I am not saying I object, nor shall I disagree with you, but if that is so, then I think you have to look to these other things to improve the situation.

It is hard for me to believe this guerrilla warfare from the north can be successful if the people really feel they have a stake in their own government. If they don't have a stake and don't care who it is, why, then the guerrillas would thrive I would think.

Mr. NOLTING. I couldn't agree with you more. I agree with you completely on it.

ATTACKS ON UNITED STATES IN SAIGON PRESS

Senator FULBRIGHT. One other question. I don't want to delay this; it is getting late. I understand there were recently some strong attacks against us in the Saigon press, is that true?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What inspired those?

Mr. NOLTING. There were the negotiations which I undertook on instructions to get a better basis of cooperation so that we could move in with great confidence and with greater support.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Did the government inspire those attacks, do you think?

Mr. NOLTING. Let me say I do not know for sure, but I think one or more of the President's advisers probably did.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Probably did?

Mr. NOLTING. I went to him about them, and he said that it couldn't have happened because he had told only three people about our proposals. I said that, in my opinion, the views expressed by one of them previously closely corresponded to the line in the press, and I wished he would do something about it, and he did. It stopped.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It stopped?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes.

---

[8] Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Small Business Administration

Senator FULBRIGHT. Has any consideration been given to any counterattacks on Viet-Minh, either by sabotage or by sending in commando raids and so on, to try to give them some of their own medicine? Has that ever been considered?

Mr. NOLTING. Can we go off the record on this one?

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator FULBRIGHT. I wish you well. I don't know of anything that I can do to help you.

Mr. NOLTING. There is a lot, Senator.

DO NOT GET DISCOURAGED

Senator FULBRIGHT. What can we do to help?

Mr. NOLTING. Keep on supporting this in the way it is going now and don't get discouraged if we don't turn the tide in 6 months. I think we can do it, but I think it is going to be long and hard, and I don't think we can afford to lose it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Carlson? Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Following what Senator Fulbright was just talking about, is the situation about the same as it was about a couple of months ago when we talked out there?

Mr. NOLTING. I think it is better, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. In what way?

Mr. NOLTING. Because the reinforcement that we have had, the new commitments——

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, we are doing more.

Mr. NOLTING. The President's move has bolstered this situation very much.

Senator SYMINGTON. In your house I met the general who later I heard was a very important fellow there.

Mr. NOLTING. Minh,[9] the fellow with only one tooth?

Senator SYMINGTON. That is right, only one tooth.

Mr. NOLTING. The Japanese pulled them all out.

Senator SYMINGTON. In torture, was that?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are they getting more of a say in the military?

Mr. NOLTING. I can't say that he is. We are working on it. He says he isn't. The President says he has complete authority, but won't exercise it. We are in that bind at the moment.

Senator SYMINGTON. How is Mr. Gardiner, getting along?

Mr. NOLTING. He is getting along fine. He was to be back here with me, but Mr. Hamilton went out there.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are you going to see Mr. Hamilton when he is there?

Mr. NOLTING. Unfortunately not. He is leaving Saigon before I get there.

---

[9] Gen. Duong Van Minh, who later led the coup that overthrew Ngo Dinh Diem.

LAOS LOOKS BAD

Senator SYMINGTON. I still feel that you have to hold this place, but Laos looks very bad, doesn't it, being frank about it, this troika business?

Mr. NOLTING. They are going to meet again in Geneva; that is all I can say.

Senator SYMINGTON. I know where they are going to meet.

Mr. NOLTING. One step at a time is enough for me.

Senator SYMINGTON. But that situation is not getting any better, is it?

Mr. NOLTING. It doesn't seem to be getting any better, no.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is going to have a tremendous effect on your situation, isn't it?

Mr. NOLTING. It has a great effect, yes. It is next door.

INFILTRATION FROM CAMBODIA

Senator SYMINGTON. I am only trying to find out. Now, Cambodia: When I was there, Thailand was very upset at Cambodia. Cambodia is where the people are infiltrating in the south, is it not?

Mr. NOLTING. I don't think there is much new infiltration from Cambodia. What is happening is that the Viet Cong units in the south sort of use the Cambodian frontier as a line to go across when they are hard pressed, and then they come back again.

Senator LAUSCHE. Back into what?

Mr. NOLTING. Into South Vietnam.

Senator SYMINGTON. They attack, as I understand it, below Saigon, and then they go into Cambodia. They are protected when they go into Cambodia, is that right?

Mr. NOLTING. I don't think they are protected; I think the Cambodians just haven't got any forces to do anything about it or don't know where they are. They would like to run them out if they could.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then the truth of the matter is you have South Vietnam, and on the north you have Laos, and on the south you have Cambodia, and these people are moving in and out of South Vietnam almost at will in attacking South Vietnam. They are moving in and out of these two other countries, is that right?

Mr. NOLTING. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think that is going to stop, based on what we have done there so far? Do you think they are going to be curtailed?

Senator LAUSCHE. What we have done in South Vietnam?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. NOLTING. I think it can be reduced, Senator. To what extent it can be reduced, I have to wait and see. It may not be enough.

ATTACKING HANOI

Senator SYMINGTON. Then let's follow the idea that Senator Fulbright had. Suppose you did that. What I want to leave on the record is your thinking about this, because there is going to be a lot of talk about it, and is already in this country: The only real thing that you could do there from the standpoint of any positive

action as Senator Fulbright was talking about, would be to hit Hanoi, would it not?

If there ever was a place you wanted to use the fleet and the marine setup and the helicopter setup, it would be there. I can visualize that, but I can't visualize doing it in Laos. I can visualize it there. That would stop this thing once and for all one way or the other, wouldn't it?

Mr. NOLTING. It would have, in my opinion, a potent effect; yes. It has some dangers to it, as you realize.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. So what your testimony is, as I see it—and I am just trying to be constructive, because I certainly was impressed with the work you were doing there—is that this will improve the situation, but it will not cure it. It would not help it.

At the same time you are improving it, they naturally are going to put more and more obstacles in your way. For example, I was amazed to find out the military strength of North Vietnam. I don't think one American in a million understands that—100,000 or something—how strong they are.

Therefore if you put more of your stack in on this thing, they are going to put more of their stack in, and at the same time you are going to have this kind of business that Senator Morse was referring to, so you are going to have an effort to overthrow the country inside steadily going on from many different quarters. At the same time, you are not going to definitely take care of the problem with the amount of increased military and other aid that we are putting in; isn't that a fair deduction?

TEST THE ENEMY'S DETERMINATION

Mr. NOLTING. It may turn out that way, Senator. My own feeling is that we should test out the determination of the enemy to take this place by the means that we are now using. If this does not deter him, if this does not make him decide that the price is too high, then we will have to seek other means.

Senator SYMINGTON. How long do you think it would be that we would have to test that out?

Mr. NOLTING. I would think 6 months.

Senator SYMINGTON. In 6 months. So in 6 months we will know whether we have to have a more major operation or get out, but that in any case what we are doing will not work. Is that right, roughly, as you see it?

Mr. NOLTING. I think roughly within 6 months we ought to be able to see a trend on this which will give us further guidance.

Senator SYMINGTON. One final approach to the problem. If we lose South Vietnam, do you think we could hold Burma and Thailand and our friends, or that anybody else could hold them indefinitely?

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Within 6 months you feel we will have much more of a feel of it?

Mr. NOLTING. I would hate to be pinned down on the date, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand. This record is never published.

Mr. NOLTING. Of course. My rough feeling is that we ought to have a good reading on this in 6 months, with our increased help, what the enemy's response to that is; whether he is beginning to lay off or he is stepping it up.

MURDER OF COLONEL LAM

Senator SYMINGTON. One final question. Did they ever find out who murdered Colonel Lam? That happened out there.

Mr. NOLTING. Yes, sir. The evidence on this has been presented to the ICC. It is undoubtedly Viet Cong, and it is being investigated by the International Control Commission now.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

VIET CONG STRENGTH

Senator LAUSCHE. I have a few questions. Can you give the estimated strength of the Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam?

Mr. NOLTING. In the regular armed forces of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam there are estimated to be between 18,000 and 20,000.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has it been increasing in number as time goes on?

Mr. NOLTING. Very considerably, yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Are they scattered, in the main?

Mr. NOLTING. They are scattered. Their largest organized units are in battalion strength, around 400 to 500.

Senator LAUSCHE. Approximately what proportion of the Viet Cong strength is recruited from among Vietnamese peasants?

Mr. NOLTING. It is awfully hard to say, but my guess is that it is a high percentage, perhaps as high as 75 percent.

Senator LAUSCHE. Of the peasants? That is, of their 20,000 there are 75 percent that are from the peasant stock?

Mr. NOLTING. This is very much of a guess, but I have thought a lot about this and tried to come up with a figure. Do you think that is high?

Mr. CATTREEL. I think there is a little confusion here. The 20,000 are hardcore infiltrees from the north, but around this hardcore they develop their peasant armies, and I think you are talking about the total number of the Viet Cong effort in South Vietnam amounts to 70 percent of them that are peasants, which are pressed into service through the various methods of coercion applied by the Viet Cong.

They are kidnapped from their villages, told that if they don't join the Viet Cong army, their father and mother will be murdered. These confessions have come out in a number of cases, which indicate that a very high percentage are pressed into the total effort from the peasantry in South Vietnam.

PEASANTS ARE ANTI-COMMUNIST

Senator LAUSCHE. What would you believe to be the general attitude of the peasant, on the whole, with respect to the incumbent government and the efforts of the Communists?

Mr. NOLTING. I estimate that by far the majority of the South Vietnamese peasants do not want to be ruled by Hanoi. They are anti-Communists in that sense.

This does not mean that they are vociferous proponents and advocates of their own government. Some of them are actively in support of their own government, but the majority of them are apathetic and many of them are complaining because they don't have protection from Saigon against the Viet Cong who raid them, so that is a plague on both your houses in many areas.

Senator LAUSCHE. Does the Viet Cong have the capability to seize a portion of the country, establish a so-called liberation government, and begin receiving airlifted supplies from the Red bloc?

Mr. NOLTING. I do not think——

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you fear that?

Mr. NOLTING. I do not think they now have the capability of seizing and holding a large area, or an area sufficiently large to proclaim an independent government and get reinforced from the Communist bloc outside.

Senator LAUSCHE. Their efforts would then be directed to this harassment and creating distress in the minds of the peasants and loss of confidence in the government?

Mr. NOLTING. I think they want to continue the undermining process for a while longer. In other words, I don't think they have reached the point where they are going to try to carve out a piece of territory, proclaim an independent government, and get outside reinforcements to that territory. I may be wrong on that, but this is my prediction.

POSSIBILITY OF A COUP

Senator LAUSCHE. I think you have already expressed your view that the present army of the incumbent government is loyal. Is there any danger that it may try and commit a coup?

Mr. NOLTING. There is always a possibility of a coup.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has there been any talk about that?

Mr. NOLTING. There is constant talk about it. There are rumors about coups all the time, but in my opinion they are insubstantial.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it talk that it is a coup in which the Communists are participating?

Mr. NOLTING. Some of it, but mostly it is talk about dissatisfaction with the progress being made, and the thought that a military regime would do it better.

But I would like to say that I do not expect a coup to be mounted. I may be surprised before I get back to Saigon, but I do not expect one to be mounted.

EFFECT OF COMMUNIST CONTROL OF LAOS

Senator LAUSCHE. What would be our situation if in Laos the neutralist Souvanna Phouma would throw his lot to the Communists and the Communists took over?

Mr. NOLTING. What would be the effect on Vietnam?

Senator LAUSCHE. What would be our chances then of saving South Vietnam?

Mr. NOLTING. I think it would add to the difficulties without question.

Senator LAUSCHE. I would like to conduct some hearings and find out what the status is of the attitude of Cambodia, Thailand, Malaya, about Souvanna Phouma.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator LAUSCHE. Thank you very much for a very fine presentation. I don't envy you, in your job.

Mr. NOLTING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is very encouraging to me to see the depth and interest that your committee takes in this. It is a hard one, and I think we can do something.

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

BRIEFING ON THE WORLD SITUATION

MONDAY, JANUARY 15, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Denney, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Tillman of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have you this morning. Everyone understands that this is an executive meeting, and I have assured the Secretary that it will be executive in order that he may be as frank and as candid as possible. In all of these cases many things and many names are mentioned, and it would be too bad for it to get into the press, because we are engaged in so many delicate negotiations these days that I think it would be very harmful to the course of these negotiations if we allowed any of these confidential discussions to become public.

Mr. Secretary, you may proceed. We are very pleased to have you.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen.

It is always a great privilege to meet with this committee, and in the circumstances of an executive session where we can go into many of our problems in great depth and with as much candor as is possible. It makes quite a difference not to have four different audiences listening in to what one says, our own people, the Sino-Soviet bloc, the neutrals, and our allies.

Necessarily, unless my remarks are to be intolerably long, I will have to do certain selection, but that does not mean that I am not at the disposal of the committee on other matters that I do not touch upon in the course of my introductory remarks.

SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

I think the first point that I would like to mention is that we have since the adjournment of the Congress been putting in a great

deal of effort to run down the range, the depth, the intensity, and the meaning of developments within the Sino-Soviet bloc.

We have been putting together a very extensive report on this subject which we expect to make available to the committee, Mr. Chairman. Much of it is based on classified information and sources. We would appreciate if it could be held in the committee as a classified document. But, on the other side, we would hope that as many members as possible would have a chance to read and study that report, because it seems quite clear that some very important things are happening behind the Iron Curtain.

There is a major dispute going on between Moscow and Peiping over Moscow's claim to have pre-eminent authority within the Communist world. That position of leadership has been severely and fundamentally challenged by Peiping, and this has caused a very considerable split, not only between the two governments, but within the Communist parties throughout the world, including those in non-Communist countries.

In an effort to sustain its position of leadership, Moscow has tried to invoke a majority rule among world Communist parties, which Peiping has rejected flatly and outright.

Their de-Stalinization program, which has been going on, has run into severe resistance in Peiping, as manifested in the Albanian case. It has led to a first class dispute in many local communist parties, for example, in such countries as India and Indonesia, where there is a very lively and bitter debate now going on these matters.

DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES

It is clear that the state-to-state relations between Moscow and Peiping have suffered some very severe tensions. Moscow's efforts to establish various degrees of military cooperation, in the field of stationing radar equipment in Red China, in the field of joint commands, in the field of technical assistance, in the field of aid—these two governments are indeed quarreling with each other in a very agitated way.

This has injected into the world Communist movement a competition not only between these two sources of power, but between those representing different basic doctrines. To oversimplify it, perhaps, the debate is between competitive coexistence on the one side, and the use of force and war as an instrument of policy by the world revolution on the other.

The Peiping attitude is that peace cannot be attainable, and no effort should be made to attain peace so long as imperialists and capitalists continue to exist. The Soviet Union, apparently feeling a stake in its own national state position, its own position of development, has become from a doctrinal point of view somewhat more conservative.

IMPACT ON ISSUES INVOLVING U.S.

We have felt that in some of our own direct contacts with the Soviet Union. For example, on the question of Laos, we have the impression that the Soviets are considerably more interested in a settlement there than is Peiping.

In the Geneva Conference discussions, there were several occasions when Pushkin [1] seemed to want to agree to a point that was important to us, such as guarantees that Laos would not be used as a channel for the infiltration of supplies, arms, agents into third countries, but where he found it difficult to tie the point up because he felt that the Chinese were standing behind him and making it very difficult for him.

I will come to that a little later when I come to the question of Laos.

But on disarmament, the Soviets, for perhaps both good and bad reasons, are very much interested in general and complete disarmament. Peiping is resisting this as a concept for the world Communist revolution.

CHINESE ARE MORE EXTREME

Russia seems to be much more interested in developing the possibilities of front organizations than is Peiping. The Russian Communist Party is moving out to try to enlist aid and alliance with other left groups, whereas Peiping tends to concentrate on the extremist possible group. Part of this is that the Soviet Union has been extending its relations into a good many different areas through economic assistance, technical assistance, measures of that sort, and they are finding their own foreign policy complicated in many of the same ways in which we find our policy complicated.

For example, in the disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia, the Soviet Union has been putting aid programs in Ethiopia. The Red Chinese in Somalia are backing that wing of the extremist group in Somalia that is demanding annexation of Ethiopian territory.

The Soviet Union does not want to be backing that point of view because, apparently, they do not wish to complicate their relations with Ethiopia.

There are many differences in approach. We are inclined to think these differences are extremely basic and far-reaching; that the question is whether they have passed the point of no return and, of course, the question is what this means for us.

POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES TO U.S.

I do not believe it is possible to suggest any final conclusions at this time, but I would suppose we ought to be careful about assuming that this split works necessarily all in our favor.

For example, if the basic issue between these two principal capitals is how best to get on with the world revolution, and Moscow believes that techniques of peaceful penetration, competitive coexistence is the better way, and Peiping believes that harsh measures, harsh pressures and military pressures and action is the better way, this competition to extend communism could give us some very serious problems.

It may make, on the one side, the Soviets more difficult as a negotiating opposite number, because they will be under great pressures to produce results by the techniques which they are recommending to the Communist bloc. On the other side, it may take

[1] Georgi M. Pushkin, Soviet representative to the Geneva Conference on Laos.

away from Peiping some of the safeguards in the use of armed forces which might be present if the Soviet Union were not involved in underwriting the violent action of Peiping.

POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES

One real advantage to us may well be in the nuclear weapons field. We have had some extremely good intelligence out of Peiping which indicates that Peiping is now, in effect, resigned to the fact that if they are in a war in the next several years, they will have to fight with the weapons that they now have.

We are very doubtful that under those circumstances the Soviet Union is interested in helping Peiping in any way in getting the most sophisticated weapons or getting nuclear weapons, but we are watching that one very closely.

I think also, however, we should not suppose that the basic power relation, seen worldwide, is changed yet in terms of this rivalry between Moscow and Peiping, because if there were an all-out confrontation with either Moscow or Peiping by the West or by the United States, it would be very doubtful that either Moscow or Peiping could afford to see the other submerged in a struggle with the United States. In other words, they have an underlying basic power interest in the existence of the other in somewhat like their present form.

Nevertheless, this debate does involve a considerable expenditure of energy and effort on competition within the Communist world. In one country after another there are signs of direct competition between the Chinese and the Russians and that, I suppose, works to our advantage.

If this break should move to the point of completion, if there should be a hostility developed between Peiping and Moscow on interstate relations, say, the position in Central Asia, or a direct clash on what to do in a particular crisis, whether in Berlin or in Southeast Asia, then it may be this split could work very dramatically to our advantage.

A POSITION OF WATCHFUL WAITING

But at the present time, we are inclined to be somewhat careful about any official statements we make on the far-reaching nature of the split because we do not wish to put pressures on Moscow and Peiping to go to extraordinary lengths to heal the break. So we are at the present time in a position of somewhat watchful waiting on the matter.

The President made a passing reference to it in the State of the Union Message, but we do not feel that this is the time yet to gloat about it or to challenge them on this point, because that might help them to ease some of their own problems.

FORTHCOMING REPORT FOR COMMITTEE

Let me repeat, we will have a full report on this for the committee within a very few days. We hope very much that members will have a chance to study it to help us think about its implications and consequences.

Turning to the North Atlantic community, I would like to comment just on three or four aspects of that at the present time.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask just one question?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Last week you submitted a document discussing the deterioration of the relationship between Peiping and Moscow. Is the report which you contemplate giving, a supplement?

Secretary RUSK. It is much more extensive than that, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

CONSULTATION WITH NATO ALLIES

Secretary RUSK. In the North Atlantic community, there are three or four things that might be worth a passing comment before we come to discussion. One is that during the past several months, we have attempted to undertake far more intensive political consultation on the world problems within the framework of NATO.

Those problems are not formally the responsibility of NATO. NATO is not the forum in which they are to be worked out and resolved, but nevertheless, it was apparent that many of these problems are there on the periphery of NATO, and were gnawing into the unity of the alliance and of the West, and rather than concentrate our discussions within NATO solely on those questions in which we could get maximum agreement, we thought it was important, at least, there be discussion within NATO of some of these other problems.

For example, there has been a quiet committee in the North Atlantic Council which has been talking about problems in Africa; others on other parts of the world.

DIFFERENCES OF OPINION

One effect of this is, I think, to increase the vigor of NATO, because it is tying into real problems and real difficulties. But another effect is that occasionally there will emerge from that discussion some impressions of differences simply because they are being discussed in that forum.

I contrast, for example, with the British Commonwealth of Nations. When we have talked to our friends in the Commonwealth about taking up within the Commonwealth some of their own disputes between members of the Commonwealth to try to settle them within a Commonwealth framework, the reply has consistently been over the years that the bonds of the Commonwealth are not strong enough to bear such discussion; therefore, if the Commonwealth is to survive, it is important that these matters be dealt with outside the Commonwealth framework.

I would not suggest that is wrong policy for the Commonwealth, but I do want to say we feel we should take the other view in NATO, because these problems which come up in, outside of Western Europe, inevitably gnaw away at the unity of NATO.

U.N. VOTING RECORD OF UNITED STATES

I think there is one point that might be of some interest and perhaps surprise to members of the committee. Before I went to the last meeting of the NATO Ministers in December, I anticipated there might be some complaints raised by other members that we ourselves were not adequately supporting our allies in NATO in such forums as the United Nations. So I had a study made of the important votes that had already, up to that point, been taken in the General Assembly of the United Nations, and there were 21 of those.

As it turned out, we and Greece were the only members of NATO who voted with the majority of NATO on all 21 issues. The score ranged from that all the way down to Portugal, who found itself apart from the majority of NATO on nine occasions.

I do not believe this discussion means that we are breaking up the unity of NATO nor building a wall between the United States and NATO. I do believe it leads to more understanding and more adjustment of policies in the interest of the Western World as a whole.

COMMON MARKET ACTIVITIES

On economic action, the Common Market of the Six has just completed its negotiations on moving into the second phase of the Common Market arrangements.

The second phase, in essence, means that there will be a further reduction of internal as well as certain external tariffs, and that decisions now will be taken in the second phase by a system of weighted voting which moves on toward the supra-national arrangements, as they are called, within the Six.

It also means that in discussions between the United Kingdom and others about joining the Common Market, the discussion will be on the basis of joining the Common Market where it is, that is, in the second phase, rather than having these other nations start back at the beginning.

U.S. NEGOTIATIONS

I am sorry that I have not been able to get a full report on those negotiations that were concluded over the weekend. We have a delegation there now, Mr. Howard Peterson and Mr. Charles Murphy, who have been there the last few days working at our own trade relations with these new adjustments in the Common Market. They will be back on Tuesday, and I would hope they could come down and brief the committee in full on the results of those discussions.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is that Mr. Murphy of Agriculture?

Secretary RUSK. That is right. Mr. Murphy of Agriculture.

What they are working on is to get the most advantageous arrangements possible with the second phase Common Market for American products, both industrial and agricultural, in the European Common Market situation.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, did I hear on the radio this morning that Mr. Peterson signed an agreement last night?

Secretary RUSK. I have not had that information, Senator, officially, so I do not think that——

Senator SPARKMAN. I heard the radio report; I heard it two different times. I did not hear his name mentioned, but it said the U.S. representatives signed——

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Peterson, representing the White House, signed it.

Senator SPARKMAN. I say, I did not hear the name.

Senator CAPEHART. They have authority to sign it?

Secretary RUSK. They had authority under the Reciprocal Trade Act to bargain for mutual reduction of tariffs.

Senator SPARKMAN. Up to 20 percent.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct; and what they were trying to do there, Senator, is to get as advantageous a settlement as possible for American products in the European market.

ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

One of the difficulties on certain points has been that although the Six apparently did reach some compromise on their own internal agricultural policy, the details of that have been put over for further negotiation and arrangement, and the European side was not in a firm enough position to be able to make specific commitments on certain aspects of it.

Senator AIKEN. The report said that they agreed on 20 percent reduction for the importation of hundreds of articles into the United States.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. I gather from the preliminary reports that we got quite favorable arrangements on many industrial products and, I gather, about 70 percent of the agricultural products where there was something specific on the other side with which to trade, but that certain agricultural items have to be put over for further negotiation. But we will have a full report. I apologize to the committee for not being up to the minute, but our official reports just have not come in.

FULL DISCUSSION FORTHCOMING

Senator SPARKMAN. I heard over the radio or read in a news article that yesterday was the deadline of some kind. What was that, was that between the first and second phase?

Secretary RUSK. I think technically December 31 was the Common Market deadline for moving into the second phase of the Common Market arrangements, but they met that by changing, stopping the clock and the calendar while they went ahead with their discussions.

Then, of course, the trade matter will be here for full and exhaustive hearings and discussion, but we do hope very much that we can be in a position to bargain extensively and hard with the Common Market to protect American markets in Western Europe.

Unless the committee wants to get into it further, I would prefer not to get into details of that particular trade program today because the message has not come down here, and the details of the legislation are not suggested.

Senator GORE. Let me ask one question.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Is this agreement, if it is yet an agreement, in consequence of negotiations at GATT [2] or is this a bilateral between the United States and the Common Market countries?

Secretary RUSK. Both types of negotiation have been involved here.

Senator GORE. OK.

ALLIES URGED TO INCREASE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Secretary RUSK. On the development assistance side, we have been trying to encourage our Western European allies to step up their development assistance to underdeveloped countries. We have urged upon them a target of not less than 1 percent of their gross national product in this field.

There has been some expansion of their effort, but we have been a little discouraged in the last 2 months, since the Congress went home, because of growing reluctance on the part of both France and the United Kingdom, because of their own fiscal and balance of payments problems, to move a long as rapidly as we had hoped. Indeed, a matter of even greater concern is some suggestion that France is going to try to reduce its commitments to many of its African and French-speaking associates. We hope very much we can prevent that.

IMF AGREEMENT

You will also have before you, Mr. Chairman, the IMF agreement with respect to reserves, which is an effort through the general discussion of the OECD and the IMF [3] to stabilize balance of payments problems in the West. Secretary Dillon will be here to make a full exposition on that.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, that was interpreted in the press as being somewhat designed to stabilize the dollar; isn't this more so the British pound?

Secretary RUSK. I think in the next few years, Senator Humphrey, we are more likely to be a borrower than a lender under these arrangements. I think it is related to the pound, but it also means that certain other countries, such as Germany, who have been building up surpluses in foreign exchanges, will be on the lending side, and we might be temporarily on the borrowing side, but it is a long term effort to stabilize all of these principal currencies. I think for the moment we expect the presence of the availability of this technique, to be a stabilizing factor both on the dollar and on the pound.

NATO NUCLEAR FORCE DISCUSSIONS

There are some very important defense matters that are under discussion within the North Atlantic community. The first of those, in terms of its complexity and difficulty, is the question of establishing some sort of a NATO nuclear force.

---

[2] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

[3] Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Monetary Fund.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to take full advantage of the freedom of limitation in our discussion today to say that we are not at all sure where such discussions can come out. We think it important that NATO make a clearer and far-reaching examination of the problems of an independent NATO nuclear capability because, among other things, it is a brake on the growth of national nuclear capability; but, on the other hand, we are not at all sure they can find a better answer in their own minds than the present arrangements.

At the present time, the very facts of the situation result in the delegation of responsibility for the final decisions in this field to the President of the United States. This came about not through any political acts of governments, but through the very nature of the growth of nuclear weapons and the circumstances under which it came about.

Now, whether it is possible in peacetime for 15 governments to agree to a delegation of responsibility in this field to somebody else as a political matter, as a political step, is a very far-reaching question. It may well be that the only answer to which they can eventually come, is that no other arrangement is likely to be workable except that the responsibility must be left where it is at the present time. On the other hand, if they themselves can agree—and there is not yet any agreement on any arrangements—if those across the Atlantic would agree on some arrangement, we would want to look at it carefully, and we would certainly be talking to the key committees of Congress about it before such arrangements were made.

CREDIBILITY, STRENGTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENT

On conventional forces, we have been urging a significant increase in the conventional forces of the NATO Alliance. I think that the essence here is the question of the credibility of the deterrent to forestall a rash move by the Soviet Union which would involve us all in nuclear war. We believe that an increase in the conventional arms capacity of NATO is a reinforcement of that credibility rather than the other way around.

We have been living for a considerable number of years, up until about 1957, under conditions of either monopoly of nuclear weapons or a relative incapacity on the part of the Soviet Union to inflict major injury on the West. The position at the present time is that Soviets have a very powerful ICBM capacity which is positioned and aimed against Western Europe. They have a far less capacity—did I say ICBM? I meant MRBM against Western Europe, and a much more limited ICBM capacity against the United States, a capacity which is still formidable in the sense that, if successful, it could inflict very substantial damage upon us, but is nothing like the overwhelming character of the attack which they could launch against Western Europe.

The United States has a powerful capacity to destroy, in all practical respects, the Soviet Union, either before or after a first strike. I might indicate, without being able to follow too far down the track, Mr. Chairman, that a considerable increase in the certainty of certain kinds of technical information about Soviet capabilities

and installations has greatly increased the nuclear power of the United States, because its targeting has been so more efficient. This has been one of the major changes in the last 2 years in that respect.

IMPORTANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES

We do believe that it is important for the West not to have to choose between a nuclear devastation, on the one side, and surrender on points which may not appear to anyone at the time to be worth a nuclear devastation. We are not at all comfortable about the notion that we rely 100 percent on a nuclear deterrent, because if that deterrent does not deter, then we are confronted with the choice of a nuclear war or the loss of a significant and important position.

We believe that it is important for the West to have some conventional forces for a forward defense in the NATO area, a general forward defense, which does not require them to pull back conventional forces substantially into West Germany, and that we be in a position to engage the Soviet Union, if need be, initially with conventional measures, in order to demonstrate to the Soviet Union if they were gambling on our not being willing to fight, they would be wrong.

This might last 5 minutes, because the decision is also in the hands of the other side. It might last longer, but we do believe it is important to be in a position to engage the state systems and responsibilities of the leadership of both sides before either side is compelled to make a decision to move immediately into nuclear war.

This does not mean that there is any lack of determination to use nuclear weapons if there is any major or devastating attack by conventional means or otherwise, or if there is almost a certainty of the use of nuclear weapons on the other side.

NO PROGRESS ON BERLIN

I might comment very briefly on Berlin, Mr. Chairman. There has been a series of contacts between the West and Moscow on this matter. More recently there have been two discussions which Ambassador [Llewellyn] Thompson has had with Mr. Gromyko [4] since the turn of the year. I cannot report any significant progress toward an agreed solution of that problem at the present time. Indeed, the second talk which Mr. Thompson had with Gromyko seemed to be retrograde, if anything, in terms of staking out the positions of the two sides.

There is full NATO agreement on the nature of our vital interests in that situation. There is one point of disagreement with General de Gaulle,[5] in which the rest of NATO takes a different view, and that is that some responsible contacts ought to be maintained with the Soviet Union to find out whatever it is possible to bring about a negotiated settlement of these problems.

Now, as we look at the alternatives ahead of us——

---

[4] Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.
[5] General Charles de Gaulle, President of France.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, when you say, Mr. Secretary, a disagreement exists, would you explain on what side de Gaulle is and what side we are.

Secretary RUSK. I beg your pardon. General de Gaulle feels that we should not enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union about Berlin under present circumstances. I think he feels, on the one side, that the very fact of talking might be interpreted as a sign of weakness, and that we should simply, in effect, say to the Soviet Union, "We are there; if you bother us, we shoot."

The others have taken the view if we are to take the measures to increase the strength of the West, and if we are to approach a first-class crisis with the Soviet Union—indeed, one which might conceivably lead to war—that it is important, in terms of the leadership of democratic peoples and the solidarity of the alliance, to try to keep responsible contact with Moscow to see whether, in effect, that crisis is controllable, inevitable, or whether in some way it can be resolved.

There is no difference between us and de Gaulle on the basic, the underlying, policy positions of the West, as far as the solution of Berlin is concerned. There is that one point of difference on the timing and nature of our discussion, negotiation.

I think, if General de Gaulle had his choice in the matter, he would prefer to move into an almost unlimited negotiation, the widest possible discussion of the entire range of world problems. That is not something to be rejected out of hand; it is not something to be discounted. But he is reluctant to start with Berlin at the present time.

I think part of his reluctance is that he is so preoccupied with Algeria that he would prefer, if possible, to gain some time on Berlin until he can redispose of some of his forces from North Africa.

We are concerned that the situation could erode faster than that, and we ought to find out whether it is possible to resolve this problem by discussion rather than by force.

POSSIBILITY OF BROAD DISCUSSION

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, just quickly, do you reject the de Gaulle position of the broader discussions?

Secretary RUSK. We do not reject this as a possibility. This is one of the alternatives. Thus far it has not proved very profitable to sit down and, in effect, try to discuss everything at one time with the Soviet Union. We have tried to chip away at it at certain points of importance to us, and without much success on particular aspects of it.

As you know, the nuclear test ban discussion did not get very far. We have a far-reaching difference with them on disarmament, which will be, I am afraid, apparent when the new disarmament committee meets on March 14.

But we do not reject out of hand that kind of far-ranging discussion. It might prove profitable if these present explorations show nothing but a dead end in a situation.

Senator MORSE. As you have already pointed out, you have tried to do it with them on Laos, and we have kept the faith.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I do not want to appear to be naive on this matter, because I am not one of that succession of people who thinks that they know how to get along with the Soviet Union. I, frankly, do not know how to get along with them. But I do think we may be coming to a point where we have to talk with them, in effect, in historical terms of where are we going with the future of man, because we are moving to a period where this is getting to be the real question.

But how you frame that, how you put that up for discussion, how you put it up for discussion against a background that is discussable with a man who is committed to a view of the world which offers little opportunity for settlement of long-range questions, I just do not, I would not want to try to be too clear on today.

CHIPPING AWAY ON BERLIN

We have been reluctant ourselves to insist upon a public conference on this Berlin question of a sort in which there would be the Soviet proposals, dramatic and far-searching proposals from the West about the unification of Germany, an all-Berlin solution, and questions of that sort, because we have felt such a conference would almost certainly end in a failure, and that the crisis itself would be heightened by the failure of such a conference.

The Soviets are talking a very firm and simple position on questions about the unification of Germany and, say, anything like an all-Berlin solution. They are saying unification is simply not negotiable; there is nothing to talk about. They say East Berlin is a part of East Germany; there is nothing to talk about, to just forget it. I mean, this is off the agenda. Their position is that what is theirs is theirs, and they want to talk about our side of it.

What we have been trying to do is to chip away on their position point by point. There has been some progress in terms of the deadline, in terms of an understanding which still exists that any arrangements will be between the Soviet Union and the three Western powers, and not between the Western powers and the East Germans.

BACK TO THE STARTING POSITION

The Soviets fully understand we are not going to agree to the stationing of their troops in West Berlin or subject access rights to the control of the East Germans. But in the last conversation they went back to their, in effect, starting position, with the exception of the deadline.

We do not know whether some of the pressures that are going on within the Sino-Soviet bloc are responsible for this or whether this is part of a rather usual kind of Soviet negotiating technique of moving from somewhat more reasonableness at one period to a very harsh and resistant position in the next meeting. We have not had our complete report from Mr. Thompson yet, but we will be taking a look at that further this week.

There could be some considerable danger if the Soviets went ahead, signed their separate peace treaty without some prior understanding on Berlin, West Berlin, and access to it. Even if they had determined in their own minds that such a peace treaty would

not itself cause the East Germans to interfere, nevertheless, their claims as to the implications of such a peace treaty, even without any de facto action on their part, could lead to a very severe heightening of the crisis.

SITUATION IN ALGERIA

I might make a brief statement on Algeria, Mr Chairman. We can expect, I think, in the next several weeks a sharp increase in the crisis situation in Algeria, a crisis almost bound to come in either of two directions, either in the case of a failure of discussions between de Gaulle and the Algerian leadership or in the event of success in those discussions.

Our impression is that these discussions have been going quite well; that most of the major points between de Gaulle and the Algerian leaders have been resolved. There are one or two questions still to be worked out; one, for example, involving the future status of French settlers in North Africa, in Algeria, as to their citizenship when they are in Algeria and when they are in France, and their status within an Algerian state. But General de Gaulle has gone a long way to get that matter settled.

One of his difficulties there has been on the Algerian side, between the moderates and the extremists, so that his opposite numbers there have not always been able to be responsible in their discussions. Then, of course, if he is completely successful with the Algerians, then he has a major crisis on this hands in dealing with his own French in Algeria itself.

It is an extremely difficult problem for him. We are trying not to say or do anything that would make it more difficult for him, and to the extent that we can find ways to be helpful, we will try to do so. But we can expect some real tension there in the next several weeks.

PORTUGAL, HER COLONIES, AND NATO

We are, however, concerned about Portugal and its position in NATO. Portugal has undoubtedly had in its mind for years that its membership in NATO gave it a claim on its NATO allies for support in its overseas policies, overseas possessions.

This time, when other NATO colonial powers, such as Britain and France, have gone a long way toward liquidating or basically adjusting their colonial system to the nationalist revolutions of the 20th century, Portugal has not been willing thus far to give its allies very much to support. They have taken a line which is simply to stand pat on the existing situation, without very much adjustment in their policy.

We have been encouraged by the reforms which they have announced with respect to Angola, rather far-reaching electoral and educational reforms. We will do our best to give them some encouragement and support on that in the forthcoming debate on Angola in the United Nations.

But Portugal is, of course, deeply disturbed by the Goan affair,[6] as you can well understand that they are, but they nevertheless are, I think, deeply disturbed by the circumstances of the 20th century as it bears on their overseas holdings. I think, on the one side, their NATO allies cannot give them strong support toward a wholly negative policy overseas and, on the other side, Portugal has not seemed willing to move to improve its own position politically.

GOOD RELATIONSHIPS ARE POSSIBLE

We have in our own system an example of a relationship which, on the one side, is close with us and, on the second, is basically solid against so-called colonial attacks, and that is the relationship with Puerto Rico.

If Portugal were in position to say about Angola that the relations between Portugal and Angola are subject to the consent of the Angolese, it would be reasonable to suppose that for a very considerable period of time to come the responsible Angolese leaders, particularly after they get their electoral system set up, might well want to continue some sort of close relationships with Portugal because of the mutual advantages there.

The relationships of the former French-speaking African states and their metropolitan country is, on the whole, a good relationship. We have had indications from Arab sources that once the Algerian question is settled, this could transform the relations between France and Arab North Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, and right across the littoral there.

But we are deeply concerned about NATO and our own relations with Portugal. The Azores base is important to us. About 85 percent of our military air traffic to Europe and to the Mediterranean area goes through the Azores base.

We cannot, I think, brush it off as being of no importance to us and, of course, it would be, I think, unfortunate if Portugal should withdraw from NATO.

REPORT ON CONDITIONS IN ANGOLA

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, have you seen the Robert Young NBC white paper on Angola?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I have, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is that true?

Secretary RUSK. I would say that it is not the whole truth, by any means. What was shown there was, I think, true, but it is much more complex than that.

Senator HUMPHREY. I sent over to Mr. Dutton[7] the report that I received on it, and I want to tell you if even 50 percent of it is true, it is subhuman.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator HUMPHREY. And I hate to be associated with such filth and degradation of humanity as has gone on. If that responsible

---

[6] In December 1961, Indian troops invaded the Portugese colony of Goa, which was incorporated into India.

[7] Fred Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

radio network has any degree of integrity to it at all, it is incredible.

Secretary RUSK. I do not think, Senator, that did justice to a lot of other things that were being done, in education, in health, in changing the status of the local inhabitants nor, of course, could it have taken into account these far-reaching changes in local government which are apparently going into effect in February.

OAS MEETING ON CUBA

On the inter-American system—and I have been running much too long, Mr. Chairman—our principal problem there is, of course, the meeting of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este beginning next Monday.

This was called by the Council of the Organization to consider the Cuban question. We have had most intensive consultation with members in advance of the meeting. The situation is approximately the following as of this morning:

There is no question that the OAS will go much further than it has done yet in declaring the application of the basic principles of the Western Hemisphere system to Cuba, and denouncing Cuba for failure to comply with its own obligations.

There is a group of, perhaps, 12, 13, possibly 14 countries, chiefly in Central America and North and South America, that would be prepared to go forward now at this meeting for a call for a break in diplomatic and commercial relations.

Our problem has been that the countries in the southern part of South America, from Brazil to Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Ecuador and, perhaps, Bolivia either do not feel sufficiently concerned about the Cuban question to feel that they want to move, or have serious domestic problems of their own which make it difficult for their governments to take a position.

POSITIONS OF MEXICO AND BRAZIL

Two of the cases of the latter type countries will be Mexico and Brazil. Mexico has what they call a juridical objection to the calling of the meeting under the present circumstances, and with the Rio Treaty in mind. But I think, more important than that, former President Cardenas [8] is there as the active leader of a group which would give the present government considerable trouble if Mexico would join in sanctions on Cuba at this point.

We believe, we know privately, if the hemispheric system itself moves with respect to sanctions that Mexico, even though abstaining or voting against, would nevertheless follow the hemisphere. They have made that clear to us privately.

In the case of Brazil, a situation which has not settled down since the governmental changes that recently occurred there, I think their government believes that whatever happens, they are in trouble. I think Brazil would prefer that there not be a meeting because if Brazil votes for sanctions against Cuba, their left will

[8] Gen. Lazaro Cardenas, former president of Mexico.

cause them great difficulty. If they do not vote for sanctions, and the rest of us do, then their right will give them very great trouble.

Brazil is a country that represents practically a third of Latin America in the sense of population, position, manpower, and so forth, and this is something that I think is a genuine worry.

IMMEDIATE SANCTIONS V. REFERRAL TO COUNCIL

The issue is likely to boil down to the question of whether the OAS at its meetings at Punta del Este actually attempts to apply sanctions at that meeting or whether they declare the basic situation and refer the question of sanctions to the Council of the OAS for further consideration and possible action.

It was the latter technique, with the exception of the break in diplomatic relations, that was used in the case of the Dominican Republic. The Council did recommend the breaking of additional trade relations with the Dominican Republic, following the meeting of San Jose last year.

Our dilemma is this, quite frankly: although we are not certain of it under present circumstances, we, perhaps, could by maximum pressure obtain 14 votes at Punta del Este for an immediate break of diplomatic relations. Thirteen countries have already done so. But that would run the risk of having Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico outside of that action.

The problem is that means 60 percent, in effect, of the people of the power, if you like, in Latin America, and it would run the risk of giving Castro a sense that he had obtained, in effect, a considerable victory down there, so this is the dilemma we are in now.

AWAIT OUTCOME OF DISCUSSIONS

The Argentine has been firming up its position recently in the course of discussions, and Brazil has been doing a bit of the same, although the Brazilian position is not yet consistent with any immediate application of sanctions.

Mr. Chairman, I would not wish today—I hope we can have a chance to speak to this later in the week after we have heard from some of the other governments about some of the later discussions. I would not wish, myself, to urge a single, final position on this point as to what our choice will be.

I must say I am concerned about an action taken just by a bare majority of 14, leaving many of these principal countries outside of the majority. If we could find a way to proceed that would conclude by getting us 17 or 18 votes rather than 14, I think we would want to give that serious consideration.

BRAZIL'S VOTING RECORD

Senator AIKEN. Is it not a fact, Mr. Secretary, that Brazil is the only country in the Western Hemisphere that has never failed us, unless they have this year? I know last year Brazil was the only country in the Western Hemisphere that invariably stood by the United States.

Senator GORE. I do not think Mexico has voted with us in the United Nations for 3 years.

Senator AIKEN. Maybe half the time. Cuba voted with us some of the time not much, but a little. Brazil never failed us, and I think it was the only country.

Secretary RUSK. At the present time I hesitate to say they are in a special crisis, because so long as I can remember, and that is quite a few years, Brazil is always in a crisis and is about to collapse. Somehow it never quite does, and it continues to grow.

But their leadership at the top is uncertain at the present time. [Joao] Goulart, as President, has constituted a moderate Cabinet, but the Cabinet is uncertain of its position, and it is exposed to considerable pressures both from the left and from the right.

To answer your question, Senator Aiken, I think Brazil would be very deeply chagrined to find itself out away from the rest of us on an issue of this sort.

Senator AIKEN. All 70 million of them?

Secretary RUSK. I am not so sure that all 70 million would be.

Senator AIKEN. But a majority.

Secretary RUSK. A very considerable majority of them, and I think that is one of the things that is in the mind of not just our own Government, but the Argentine, that we have to think about the special problems that the Brazilian Government has in the situation.

LACK OF STABILITY

Senator AIKEN. And Brazil is fighting for its stability at the present time, and is likely to——

Secretary RUSK. The present government is not fighting as hard for its stability as we hoped they would.

The economic situation there has gotten a bit out of hand. They do need to pick themselves up and get on with it.

Senator AIKEN. I did not mean monetary stability, I meant political.

Secretary RUSK. Political, that is quite right.

WHICH COURSE OF ACTION?

Senator LAUSCHE. Have you decided on what course you are going to follow as between these two, if any one?

Secretary RUSK. I think we will have to come to that a little later in the week, Senator, because we need to hear more about—as I say, there have been exchanges with these various governments on almost a daily basis for the last three weeks.

President Lleras Camargo and President Frondizi [9] are both taking an active initiative here. They are trying to work together on some of these points, and perhaps by the middle of the week we will know a little more clearly exactly what the situation is. But that is the kind of dilemma we may be faced with on this point.

---

[9] Alberto Lleras Camargo, President of Colombia, and Arturo Frondizi, President of Argentina.

RESOLUTION URGING STRONGER OAS ACTION

Senator HUMPHREY. May I ask, I noticed the Chairman had a House resolution in his hands which was brought to my attention some time ago. Is there any—what is that resolution number?

The CHAIRMAN. It is 226.

I talked to the Secretary about this, and he said he would like to have an opportunity to discuss it with the President before he advises us.

Secretary RUSK. Our general attitude on this resolution earlier in the spring was that we would like to see there—because we would like to have from the meeting at Punta del Este as strong an attitude about the Organization of American States as is possible to obtain without the kind of split in the OAS that would give Castro a victory——

Senator HUMPHREY. This is a resolution putting the House on record as urging stronger action in the OAS vis-a-vis Cuba on the question of sanctions.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is whether it would actually promote our purpose. I think we ought to be given an opportunity to discuss it.

Secretary RUSK. The point in the resolution about the Inter-American Defense Board has been taken care of. Cuba does not sit on it at the present time.

DEVELOPMENTS IN ASIA

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, are you going to proceed to Asia?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. I am afraid I have been talking too much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. No, go right ahead. It has been very interesting.

Secretary RUSK. Let me make a remark about Southeast Asia and the Congo, and then perhaps we can go to questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine.

Secretary RUSK. We have been generally encouraged by the development in the situation in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and the Republic of China.

In the case of the Republic of China, they went through a very nervous period in the General Assembly over the Chinese representation issue, but they had a very successful conclusion, and we believe that has helped greatly to settle them down and to stabilize their situation.

NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING LAOS

In Laos, we are still on the track that was initiated in January, when the United States agreed with Great Britain and France and certain others of its SEATO allies to try to find out whether a negotiated solution could be found that would avoid a war in that country.

These discussions have been protracted, they have been difficult, and have been made no less difficult because the Laotian leaders themselves, for perfectly understandable reasons, have great bitterness toward each other. They have memories which go back to pe-

riods when they were fighting each other, and any kind of negotiation for them seems to be extremely difficult.

As far as the Geneva Conference itself is concerned, the international aspects of it have moved toward a reasonably good prospect. The buttoning up of those discussions now depends upon the possibility of a coalition government in Laos itself.

There had been gain in the discussions from the point of view of the West, and one impasse.

I hesitate to use language that sounds perhaps like it is a little esoteric at this point, but these long negotiations tend to create that kind of terminology.

ATTEMPTS TO SET UP NEUTRAL GOVERNMENT

Souvanna Phouma, who was authorized by the King to attempt to find a government, started out with a formula of four members of the present government, based on Vientiane, on one side, four members of the Pathet Lao on the other side, and eight of his own neutralists in the center. We and the Laotian Government people felt this was not a promise of a genuinely neutral government, because among those that he considered in the eight in the center were some who were under very strong Pathet Lao influence and did not seem to us to suggest a possibility of neutralism.

Over a period of some weeks, Souvanna Phouma has changed that formula not to 4–8–4 but to 4–5–5–4 the two 5 being a split-up of the neutralist influence between those who are personal followers of his, on the one side, and five who have had previous experience in government in Vientiane, but who are not now associated with the present government. In other words, we call those fellows Vientiane neutrals. This is the Xiengkhouang neutrals and the Vientiane neutrals.

ALLOCATION OF PORTFOLIOS

Now, the problem is to talk the details over about the actual allocation of portfolios.

Souvanna Phouma has not gotten around to that in detail, so far as the other princes are concerned. He has given us some indication of what he has in mind and, by the large, it is not too bad in terms of getting responsible people to take the key portfolios. But the impasse is on the portfolios of defense and interior, because those are the two who will determine who have the instruments of actual power in the country.

Souvanna Phouma so far has been insisting that he be the Defense Minister, and that the Interior Minister be one of his own Xiengkhouang neutrals. The present government people, Phoumi and Bon Oum,[10] insist that both of these portfolios be given to present governmental people and, particularly, to General Phoumi.

One can understand why General Phoumi does not want to surrender his position with regard to the armed forces and, at the

---

[10] In December 1960, right-wing forces under Gen. Phoumi Nosavan deposed Souvanna Phouma and installed Boun Oum as Loatian premier. In the new coalition government created in June, 1962, Gen. Phoumi took Boun Oum's place, serving as deputy premier and finance minister. Souvanna Phouma served as premier and defense minister.

same time, understand that Souvanna Phouma is not willing to turn the Ministry of Defense over to a man who unseated him December a year ago.

But there has not been enough palaver among these people on this subject yet. There are various things that could be worked out as alternatives.

ONE POSSIBLE SCENARIO

For example, if Souvanna Phouma were to become Minister of Defense, and General Phoumi were to be Deputy Minister of Defense and commander of the army in the South, and somebody on the other side were Deputy Minister of Defense and commander of the army in the North, and Souvanna's own troops were pulled out of their present situation and brought into the center, that might form the basis for a transitional period in which you could find out whether these people could work together before the instruments of power are all turned over to any single person.

Meanwhile, during the cease-fire the government forces have continued with their training, with reequipment to a degree. Mao tribesmen have been recruited by the government in very considerable numbers and are now, during this cease-fire period, forcing the Pathet Lao to do all of their supply at any distance from Xiengkhouang from the air rather than from the ground. The position of the government forces is somewhat strengthened in the absence of any further infiltration of troops from North Vietnam.

CEASE-FIRE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED

We, at the present time, think we should maintain the cease-fire and still go through a period of palaver to find out the actual basis of handling portfolios.

We do not know if it can succeed, but if it cannot succeed, then we have the problem of a choice of letting this country go to the Pathet Lao because if they simply were left alone and fought it out themselves, that would almost certainly be the result, or putting American forces in there to fight a war in this landlocked country alongside of armed forces who have not yet demonstrated any first class capacity to fight their own battles.

This is not a pleasing prospect, and we do believe that this course of negotiation which was started in early January a year ago, should be continued for a further period.

COULD SEATO HELP BE EXPECTED?

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, in the event of the last contingency, would we have any help from SEATO countries?

Secretary RUSK. I think in the event of military action there would be no question but what there would be participation of some scale by the other SEATO countries, with the possible exception of France. I think France would almost certainly not participate militarily.

Senator SPARKMAN. Would Thailand?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, Thailand would.

Senator SPARKMAN. The reason I asked that question is a few months ago, Thailand objected to our putting troops in, was it, through Thailand, something to that effect. It is hard for me to understand——

Secretary RUSK. The question that came up at that time, sir, was not whether we could move personnel into Laos through Thailand, but whether it would be wise to have a SEATO consolidated force physically present in Thailand, at least for a period of time, whether it was a training exercise or something else, as a tangible representation of SEATO in the area. They did not think much of that second point.

THAILAND WOULD CONTRIBUTE IF NECESSARY

Senator SPARKMAN. Wouldn't you almost have to have that in order to conduct operations in Laos?

Secretary RUSK. Well, you would have to——

Senator SPARKMAN. You would have to have a staging area.

Secretary RUSK. I think if it were decided that we and other SEATO members ought, in fact, to put forces into Laos, and fight the war there, that Thailand would contribute forces, and there would be no problem of that sort. But this was a force that was not at that point to be committed to Laos.

Senator SPARKMAN. Kind of a standby force.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. Stationing of troops.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

LACK OF WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I do not want to debate it now except for 30 seconds, on that assurance, but I saw a military maneuver in Thailand, and I could beat them with half that number of American Boy Scouts. I think that kind of military support would be a great handicap to us.

Secretary RUSK. The Thais—and this is highly classified information of the sort that is generally publicly known in the area, but something we are not supposed to say publicly officially—the Thais have contributed some artillery units and some cadres to the Laotian Army. They are represented in the field in Laos at the present time.

But I think, sir, that you put your finger on a point that is very bothersome in this situation. We have not had much luck in getting the Laotians into any concerned and fighting frame of mind of their own.

We gather, if it is any comfort to anyone, that the Soviets are having their problems with their Laotians, too. [Laughter.]

It was not until last April or early May that the Laotian Government would let our own military teams go down to the front line units, to battalion level, because they did not want our men down there reporting on their own officers and their own troop units back to headquarters. The Laotians refused these artillery elements from Thailand for month after month before they would allow them to come in.

I do think it is too easy for Americans to say that the solutions of these problems of this sort are to put American troops in as gendarmes in this situation, particularly where people are not willing to put on a major effort of their own.

DIFFICULTY IN FINDING SOMETHING TO SUPPORT

Vietnam is different. The South Vietnam Armed Forces do fight. They take casualties and do inflict casualties, and they are trying to do the job themselves.

There was something to support in Korea and in Greece, but in Laos, I must confess it had not been easy to find something to support.

I got into trouble on the first 2 or 3 days of the Geneva Conference on this thing where I was trying to get the government people seated as the representatives of Laos. I was in a minority of one in that conference.

One of the things that just cut my throat diplomatically over there was that, at the time when I was arguing this, these three princes were meeting in Laos, champagne lunches, great cordiality, treating each other like old friends. The question put to me was if they can do that there, why can't they do it in Geneva, and all three of them sit down in Geneva.

CONCERN OF OTHER NATIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. Which of the nations down there are concerned about what is happening? What about Australia and New Zealand?

Secretary RUSK. Australia and New Zealand, without any question, would be prepared to take action in this situation and make their contribution, no question about it.

Senator LAUSCHE. What about the Philippines?

Secretary RUSK. The Philippines would make a small contribution by way of troops, but only a small one. I would think, as a maximum, perhaps, a battalion. The Pakistanis——

Senator SPARKMAN. At that point, may I ask you why? At the beginning of this thing, they were the most insistent.

Secretary RUSK. Well, they were very insistent at a time when their share in the plans was a company of Philippine troops. But they only have less than two divisions of troops altogether, and they have some internal security problems of their own at the present time. I am not sure we would want to urge them to make a major deployment of their forces under present circumstances.

Thailand would be a member of the party, no question about it.

THAILAND'S FEARS

Senator LAUSCHE. Which is the nation that was designated last Friday as being the one that is becoming opportunistic and is already making gestures toward Peking? The Ambassador testified that one of these countries, it was either Thailand or Cambodia——

Secretary RUSK. Thailand is the country that we are most concerned about as far as the impact of the Laotian problem is concerned.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. They want to see Thailand defended outside of Thailand, and for perfectly understandable reasons. But they are afraid that if a government under Souvanna Phouma were set up, it would not be genuinely neutral—and this is not a fanciful concern, it is a real gamble—and that Thailand would be exposed to step-up of infiltration into their own north; then South Vietnam would be exposed to further infiltration, and that the situation would deteriorate.

If they estimate that the situation of Southeast Asia will deteriorate in Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia, then I think that we can expect them to consider bending to the wind and finding out what arrangements they can make of their own. This has been their history.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did you say that Thailand does not trust Souvanna Phouma?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, so far as Sairt [11] is concerned, he does not.

EXTENT OF SUPPORT FOR SOUVANNA PHOUMA

Senator LAUSCHE. I just want to point out that Ambassador Brown a year ago said that Souvanna Phouma could not be trusted, at a meeting on February 2, and we were also told that South Vietnam does not trust Souvanna Phouma. I cannot understand how it is that we are trusting him.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we are not trusting him to that extent. We want to find out what kind of a Cabinet, what kind of portfolios, under whose direction they would come into existence here, as the alternative to this other choice, the choice of abandoning it and putting American and Western forces into it.

We are not prepared ourselves to underwrite Souvanna Phouma, but the present effort is to find out what the alternative is in the middle between these other two choices.

Senator LAUSCHE. Are there other governments that do not trust Souvanna Phouma? Now, Thailand does not, Vietnam does not. What about Cambodia?

Secretary RUSK. I think that the others in SEATO, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, want us to continue this effort through negotiation to find out what the possibilities are.

GROUND FOR DISTRUST

Senator HUMPHREY. You say you do not trust Souvanna Phouma. What do you mean, trust him on what, because these matters become somewhat of a public discussion, and is this fellow going to betray his country and put it in the hands of Communists or do you mean you do not trust him as being a sturdy ally for the West?

Secretary RUSK. No. I think the problem would be whether, in face of the events of the last 2 years, his own relations with the West have become so bad and his own relations with the Commu-

---

[11] Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat, Premier of Thailand.

nist bloc have become so close that he—as to whether he is incapable of pursuing a neutralist policy.

There are pluses and minuses on this. After all, Phoumi, with strong encouragement from the United States, December a year ago did throw him out in a military coup. So Souvanna Phouma has no particular reason to like us or to trust us, and I think there is enough reason on both sides for that distrust. Certainly one of the reasons why the Americans helped to unseat him was that they thought he was untrustworthy in terms of policy.

PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, time is getting on. I hope we will have something about the Congo, because that is very important. Can you go on to that?

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question at this point? I have some plans, and I would like to ask if we will meet this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a question of time here. I was just trying to go along.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, I saw that. We are nearing the noon hour. Are we going to proceed this afternoon?

The CHAIRMAN. We have no agreement with the Secretary. I imagine he would probably have other commitments this afternoon.

Secretary RUSK. I would do my best—I have two or three appointments.

The CHAIRMAN. So do I.

Secretary RUSK. I can clear them.

The CHAIRMAN. How late can you go? If we go into the Congo and then go into questions—I would like to hear something about the Congo. There are two particular items that are very current, one is Congo, and the other is Indonesia, if you could say something about that. Go ahead.

PROGRESS IN CONGO DISCUSSIONS

Secretary RUSK. On the Congo, I might just mention what seems to us to be the situation over the last very few days, because I think the effort not only of the United States, but of Great Britain, France, Belgium, and private interests who have been working much more closely than some of the publicity would indicate, are beginning to bear some fruit.

The object all along has been to get the Adoula [12] government and Katanga consolidated within the framework of at least a federal Congo, so that there would be a moderate axis there which would be in strong enough position to resist pressures from the left.

In the discussions that have been going on between the Adoula government and Mr. Tshombe,[13] there seems to have been very considerable progress in the last week or 10 days. The Kitona agreement of eight points laid the basis for this.

---

[12] Congo Premier Cyrille Adoula.
[13] Moise Tshombe, President of the secessionist Katanga Province.

We know that Tshombe has been working among some of his own more extreme elements to get them to go along with the Kitona agreement. We believe that he is responding to the advice, among others, of the Union Miniere and the Belgian Government, as well as the French, those who have had the closest touch with him, to sit down and negotiate with Adoula a constitutional structure for the Congo which would, on the one side, keep a central government in being for certain national purposes, and leave very considerable autonomy to the provinces and give Katanga the kind of control over its own local affairs that it seems to want.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You mean the establishment of a federal government?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, which is the only mutually tolerable result that could come out of this present situation.

ACTION AGAINST GIZENGA

Meanwhile, the central government has been moving against Gizenga, who, in a much less dramatic way, has been a secessionist of another sort over in Stanleyville.

The latest we have this morning is that Gizenga's [14] forces in Stanleyville have been scattered by Lundula's [15] forces that are loyal to the central government.

Gizenga has sent a message to Leopoldville saying he is coming back to the capital to take up his duties as vice premier, and to please prepare his office and residence. But the government meanwhile has gotten a vote of censure against him of approximately 70 to 1—I think there might have been 66 and 4 abstentions, perhaps, against Gizenga. He will not be restored to his office, and Adoula will reconstitute his government. If I can put this point off the record——

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

UNITED NATIONS BOND ISSUE

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I do want to make a comment on a matter coming down this week for your consideration, and that is the U.N. bond issue.

The essence of the problem is simply this: When we left the last session of Congress, I would suppose if we had a clear mandate coming out of our discussions in various committees, it was that we should do our best to get a broader base of financial contribution in the United Nations toward these peace and security operations in the Congo and the Middle East.

Over the last 18 months, beginning in June 1960, we have contributed either in cash or in value of services rendered, such as U.S. air transportation, something in the order of $113 million which, if you take into account services as well, is about 60 percent of the total cost of the U.N. in the Congo.

Now, there have been some of those, not just the Soviet Union, but others like France and Belgium, who have not been willing to

---

[14] Former Congo vice premier Antoine Gizenga.
[15] Maj. Gen. Victor Lundula.

contribute to the Congo operation for direct political reasons of their own, and we have not gone at them publicly on this. We have pressed them to make their contribution, but we can understand some of their own problems on that point.

The question was how do we bring this back under control, prevent the U.N. Secretariat from this business of borrowing from its own funds, running into deficits, unpaid bills, failure of collections, and much greater dependence on the United States than we, and I presume the Congress, would want.

The principal alternative that came out of the discussions was the bond issue technique, that there would be between now and June 1962 an interim budget of the normal sort, that is, to give time to get the bond issue thing laid on, but for the 18 months after that, beginning in June 1962, the financing of these peace and security operations, not only in the Congo but in the Middle East, would be handled on the basis of a bond issue which would be placed upon the ordinary, regular budget of the United Nations in which our contribution is roughly 32 percent.

PAST DUE SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS

Meanwhile, every possible effort will be made to collect the outstanding assessments that are now overdue. I think the Soviet bloc alone is over $30 million on these assessments.

The General Assembly voted to send the question to the World Court as to whether these special assessments are equally as binding under the charter as the regular assessments. We know from a number of governments if the World Court's decision on that is yes, as we expect it to be, that a number of governments that have not been paying their special assessments will, in fact, pay them.

The bond issue is not to replace the special assessments. Every effort will be made to collect these past due assessments, and they will build up a problem of voting rights in the Assembly just as would subscriptions to the regular budget of the United Nations.

We do not believe that there can be any problem of these bonds being in default while we continue to pay our regular assessments.

Senator HUMPHREY. What is the Court going to decide?

Secretary RUSK. I think the Court almost certainly——

Senator HUMPHREY. I mean, what is the issue before the Court?

Secretary RUSK. As to whether these special assessments are legal obligations under the charter. In other words, whether there is any difference between special assessments or ordinary assessments.

Senator LAUSCHE. Whether the costs in the Congo are to be borne by voluntary or by what I would call obligatory or mandatory responsibilities to the United Nations.

ASSESSMENTS WERE NOT INTENDED TO BE VOLUNTARY

Secretary RUSK. Well, the military budget, Senator, was on the basis of a General Assembly resolution which was never intended to be voluntary. It was an actual assessment, and the question is whether that kind of an assessment is equally binding along with the normal assessments under the charter.

Senator LAUSCHE. The Soviets take the position that it was not a binding obligation, but one that was dependent upon the will of those who gave.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. It takes either the position that it was not binding or, whether it was binding or not, they were not going to pay it. But we won't run into any problem about these bonds being in default .

Senator AIKEN. So long as we pay them.

Secretary RUSK. So long as there is a United Nations, and we have dues owing to the United Nations.

STATUS OF REGULAR BUDGET

Senator SPARKMAN. May I ask a brief question?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. What is the status of the regular budget? Are the countries all pretty well paid up on that? Are any of them more than 2 years in arrears?

Secretary RUSK. The record on that is not too bad. They manage to keep ahead of the sheriff, Senator, by keeping well within the 3-year rule.

Senator SPARKMAN. I believe I have seen a figure of 82 percent paid up.

Secretary RUSK. At any one time the figure can vary considerably because of fiscal years and questions of that sort, but the collections there have been pretty good over the years.

USE OF LOAN REPAYMENTS

Incidentally, we have collected on time and in full the obligations that the United Nations has owed us under the U.N. headquarters agreement on the loan that we made for the building of the structure. But we assume that the Congress—if it is good enough, as we hope it will be, to approve our taking part in this bond issue—we assume you would want the annual repayments of those loans to go into the general receipts of the Treasury. Whether or not that would be your wish on it, we would suppose that when an annual installment of these bonds becomes due they would be, in effect, used to pay that part of our annual contributions to the United Nations. We would not be in the position of paying our dues fully, on the one side, and holding a past due bond on the other, so to that extent these are perhaps tax anticipation bonds or something of that sort.

ALTERNATIVE TO BOND ISSUE

The CHAIRMAN. What is the alternative of bonds? Supposing you do not get it?

Secretary RUSK. The alternative, Mr. Chairman, would be for us to struggle along on the basis which has been used thus far, trying to get governments to pay their special assessments to the United Nations, and continue to bear something on the order of 50 percent of the cash budget ourselves and perhaps more than that in terms of additional services.

INTEREST RATE

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Secretary, why the 2 percent interest? Why not the going rate of interest on government bonds? Why have any interest at all if not the normal interest that we pay when we borrow money?

Secretary RUSK. I am not technically briefed on that point, Senator, quite frankly. The arrangements were worked out between the Secretary General and Mr. Eugene Black of the World Bank, who was a consultant on this.

I think, quite frankly, the point is that the higher interest rate would put that much more of a burden on the ordinary budget, and this would be a reasonable compromise.

It does add somewhat to our 32 percent contribution.

Senator CAPEHART. We have trouble with moneys we are loaning to SBA and for many other purposes in the United States, where we have a much higher rate.

Now we are going to ask our own American taxpayers and citizens to pay a higher rate, and here at the United Nations we are going to give it to them at 2 percent. Why any interest at all unless the normal interest?

Secretary RUSK. We have, of course, in the aid program, adjusted interest rates downward as a matter of aid below the actual cost to us of the funds.

Senator CAPEHART. I do not approve of it. Psychologically, it is bad. I think you could use the argument that it reduces the cost; where you said it reduces the cost, well, why any interest at all?

Secretary RUSK. To me one of the most important things about this bond issue is that every member, including the smallest one, will take their regular share of it in accordance with their proportions of the regular assessments.

Senator CAPEHART. It would be more tolerable to the American people if it carried at least the same amount of interest we are paying on the mortgages.

BOND ISSUE AND U.N. VOTING RIGHTS

Senator AIKEN. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Secretary, if there would be a favorable opinion from the World Court that the Soviets will lose its vote late this spring, and under the bond issue the Soviets could stall for the next 30, 40 years, and still retain a vote?

Senator SYMINGTON. That is what I was going to ask. There was an article in the Wall Street Journal this morning which at least implied, first, there would be the bond issue, and then the bonds would be assigned to the general levy of cost to the nations in the United Nations, and that then if those nations did not put up whatever was their part of the cost, including what would be their part of the bond issue, that they would lose their vote. That was the implication in the article in the Wall Street Journal this morning, and I would like to ask your comments on that this morning. It reads right against what the Senator from Vermont was asking.

Secretary RUSK. There are two separate points. One has to do with those assessments which have been refused and are already past due. That question goes to the World Court.

The question of seating with respect to those assessments can cut off at any time that the World Court gives its decision, and the General is prepared to take a look at it.

The same principle would apply to the U.N. bond issue. But the U.N. bond issue money will not be used to bail out the Soviet Union and others on their past due assessments under existing resolution.

There are two ways in which the Soviet Union could lose its vote: First, by not paying the past assessments, if the Court finds it, and, second, by refusing for enough years to pay its assessments for the bond issue so as to build up to——

Senator AIKEN. Doesn't the timing of the bond issue have something to do about that? If they rush the bond issue through, the Soviets would be taken off the hook. If you wait until after they are eligible to lose their vote, and with a favorable decision from the Court, you have another situation.

Secretary RUSK. I do not believe the Soviets would be taken off the hook. I think the United Nations, in its cash position, would be taken off the hook temporarily.

SOVIETS MUST STOP ROBBING THE PIGGY BANK

Senator AIKEN. Have you advised them that we are not going to pay our shares into Children's Fund until they stop robbing the piggy bank? Have you told them that? I have heard through the grapevine that you have already advised them you are not going to pay our assessment.

Secretary RUSK. We will press them very hard. We cannot continue to put in contributions to special funds if they are simply going to be borrowed temporarily for the Congo operations. This is one of the reasons we are trying to get this matter settled, so that the funds that the United Nations has been holding can be used for the purposes for which they were put there. I will have to check on the exact language, but we did speak to them quite strongly about this problem we have about borrowing from existing funds.

Senator AIKEN. I heard it referred to as borrowing from the piggy bank to get the old man a bottle of whiskey.

COULD BOND ISSUE DEPRIVE SOVIETS OF VOTE?

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to rephrase my question on this. If we vote for the bonds, then the bonds are given to the United Nations as part of the debt, is it possible under the rules of the United Nations that arbitrarily we can assign to the Soviet Union, already back on its payments to the United Nations, that additional amount which would be their share of the bond issue, and if we do that, can we deprive them of their vote in case they refuse to pay?

Secretary RUSK. If the Soviet Union refuses to pay its already existing assessments which it has so far refused to pay, that runs into a total now of, shall we say, roughly $30 million. That means that quite apart from the bond issue——

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand that.

Secretary RUSK. If the World Court decides, as we expect it to, that these are obligations under that article of the Charter, then

when the obligations of the Soviet Union exceed 3 years' dues, then their vote is at hazard.

The General Assembly would have to do something about it.

In the case of the bond issue, if the Soviets cleared the record of these assessments, the build-up annually of this problem would be somewhat less, at a slower rate. If a particular government said: Here are my dues but I am subtracting from it that portion of my assessment which would pay these U.N. bonds, then it would be spread over the time. That would be such a slower build-up of the crisis, you see, of the issue.

We do believe, however, that with the finding of the Court and the bond issue that France, Belgium, and certainly the Latin American countries, which have been deficient on it, will join the party, and the issue will concentrate on the Soviet bloc.

U.S.S.R. NOT LIKELY TO QUIT U.N.

Senator LAUSCHE. One step farther: What if you say, "You can't vote," and the Soviet Union said, "Good enough, then we will step out," what then?

Secretary RUSK. That is the issue the Soviet Union will have to face up to. We are not at all convinced that the Soviet Union would abandon that forum in New York over a financial transaction of that sort. They would find some method of finding money.

Senator LAUSCHE. You have given thought to that?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

BOND ISSUE FINANCING

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask a question, in trying to clarify that bond issue question. How is the bond issue to be financed, and is the interest deferred or is it payable year by year?

Secretary RUSK. The annual repayments will contain both interest and principal.

Senator SPARKMAN. Does that start immediately?

Secretary RUSK. It starts immediately.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, I thought I gathered this from Senator Aiken's statement, that some people believe it would defer it for 25 years or whatever the length of time was.

Secretary RUSK. No. These are repayable——

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, you start retiring them immediately, interest and principal?

Secretary RUSK. In 25 annual installments.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is affixed to your regular general assessment?

Secretary RUSK. It is an intimate part of it, organic part of annual assessments, in which our share is 32 percent instead of what amounts now to some 60 percent.

USE AND SOURCE OF FUNDS

Senator CAPEHART. I have two consecutive questions here: No. 1, is the $200 million to be immediately paid out on past indebtedness?

Secretary RUSK. That would depend upon what success the United Nations has in collecting some of these past assessments.

Senator CAPEHART. Now, the other question: Does the United Nations at the moment have $200 million of unpaid bills?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. It has in actual unpaid bills—I have that figure here, Senator—I believe its actual unpaid bills are running about $60 million.

Senator CAPEHART. They only owe $60 million, so we pay $60 million of the $200 million, and have $140 million left to pay on future bills?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, and an operating fund.

Senator CAPEHART. One other question: What other nations have agreed to take $100 million if we take $100 million?

Secretary RUSK. We expect Great Britain and Canada to take part, we expect Japan to take some of it, and we expect Germany, although not a member of the United Nations, to take some of it.

Mr. Black of the International Bank has been writing governments; he has taken a very active interest in this. He has been writing governments to assist in selling these bonds.

INTEREST RATES AND U.N. POLITICS

Senator CAPEHART. Would they agree to an amendment that this interest rate be the average interest that we pay on our borrowed money? Won't that please these foreign nations who have much higher interest rates in their country than we have here?

Secretary RUSK. I think that would, in terms, if I may say so, of the politics of the General Assembly—most of them will be payors rather than lenders on this obligation. In any event, I would have to check to see whether this would require going back to the General Assembly for further United Nations action.

Senator MORSE. Isn't it true, Mr. Secretary, that we have this difficult Communist bloc situation where the Communists are lending at 2 percent to their friends? Isn't that part of the politics of the situation within the United Nations?

Secretary RUSK. I think that is true, sir. But I would also think that on straight financial terms, if we could reduce the present situation to one in which we pay 32 percent, plus that 2 percent interest, we would be in a very favorable position.

Senator MORSE. I think so, too.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Connecticut.

FALSE REPORTS ON DODD'S TRIP TO CONGO

Senator DODD. I do not want to impose on my colleagues or the Secretary, but I would like to raise a matter of personal involvement.

There have been several false statements printed about my trip to the Congo, and I know the Secretary has knowledge of this.

First of all, I went over the opposition of the administration is what has been said. I want to say to the members of this committee, I not only did not go over the opposition of the administration, but the President asked me to do what I could to bring Adoula and Tshombe together. I had a long talk with him before I left, and I did my best, I think the record will show.

It has also been alleged that I told Tshombe I thought the State Department was filled with Communists. Of course, I never said any such thing. I do not happen to believe that, and no such statement was ever made.

At all times while I talked to Adoula and Tshombe and the others, I only talked with them through consular officials or Embassy officials, because I do not speak French, and Tshombe does not speak English, nor does Adoula, so far as I know.

I would appreciate it, Mr. Secretary, if you would tell the members of the committee the facts briefly. I do not want to hold anybody up, but I think it is important, to me personally anyway, that my colleagues understand that no such thing ever happened.

VALUE OF DODD'S EFFORTS CONFIRMED

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I am glad to confirm that before you went to the Congo, you and the President did have a talk, and that the President asked you to use your influence to the maximum to get Mr. Tshombe and Mr. Adoula in a frame of mind to negotiate with each other. The reports of our own representatives who were with you on that trip confirm the value of the effort you made in this direction.

On the other matters, I have seen some of these press reports, and we have no evidence whatsoever that you ever said in the Congo that the problem was that the State Department was filled with Communists. Mr. Tshombe said that once. But I do want you to know, Senator, so far as I have been able to learn, there has been none of this kind of talk coming out from the State Department to the press.

Senator DODD. No, I know it did not come from there.

Secretary RUSK. And I am happy to confirm both those points.

RUSSIA'S DOMESTIC TROUBLES

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, I had one question I wanted to ask. I won't ask you to give the answer to it now, but it seems to me it might be possible to give it in the form of a memorandum for the committee.

You discussed the trouble Russia was having as between Russia and China, but you did not say anything about the trouble that Russia was having at home, internal troubles. I wonder if a memorandum on that would be helpful?

Secretary RUSK. We could tell you the little that we know on that, Senator. This is a very difficult thing.

Senator SPARKMAN. If you do not know but a little, you can answer it right now.

Secretary RUSK. I am sorry. If you mean on the broad economic side, the agricultural side, problems of that kind, we could give you a good deal of information on that. But if you mean what seems to be going on right now in the upper echelons of the leadership there, we are convinced something very important is going on, but

we haven't quite been able to find out what it is. I mean, this Molotov thing is a very curious thing.[16]

Senator SPARKMAN. Perhaps sometime in the future we could have a briefing on that.

Secretary RUSK. Fine. I will be glad to.

LETTER FROM FINNISH AMBASSADOR

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, maybe Mr. Dutton can help. I had a letter that came to me from the former Finnish Ambassador to the United States on the Finnish-Russian situation. I think I sent it to the State Department, I am not sure. I can check it in my own office, but it was an excellent document from a man who is intimately acquainted with the Soviets, was a Finnish Ambassador to the Soviet Union for several years, and very well informed on this Finnish problem with the Soviet Union. If you will just double-check if it is over there, I want to get it back here because I want to share it with the committee.

It is a rather sensitive document. He asked me to keep it, not talk about it in public.

Secretary RUSK. We will be glad to do that, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. It is a very good one.

SITUATION IN INDONESIA

What about this Indonesian thing before we go? Everybody hits us over the head about this.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us a little fill-in on the Indonesian situation, what our policy is?

Secretary RUSK. We are at the present time trying to get these two governments into direct discussions with each other to see if there is any basis for an agreed solution.

Again if I could rely very strongly on the nature of this meeting, Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

TURNING INDONESIA OVER TO U.N.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper, do you want to ask any questions?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am interested in, from what I understood you to say, the attitude of the Dutch about resistance. From the standpoint of complete lack of knowledge of this situation there, I wonder if one can blame the Dutch very much? It seems that the Dutch have had very little, if any, encouragement or support from their natural allies in the West. They have been pretty much kicked around down in that area, and I imagine the Dutch are going to say, "If we don't get some encouragement we, as a small country, can't carry the whole burden ourselves here."

---

[16] Former Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov was reported by the Soviet Foreign Ministry, on January 8, 1961, to be returning to his post as delegate to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. The next day the statement was retracted, and shortly afterwards Molotov, who had disappeared from public view, was attacked in Pravada for his opposition to "peaceful coexistence."

If Sukarno keeps on, he is going to take that over by force, defy the United Nations. He has already said, according to newspaper reports, he does not care anything about public opinion.

I wonder whether we, that is we and others, cannot pursue with the greatest possible vigor this idea that the Dutch have put forward of turning this over to the United Nations and then let the processes of self-determination eventually operate there.

CONQUEST VERSUS SELF-DETERMINATION

It would seem to me if the Indonesians take this over, it will be like the Baltic States and several others. Once they get it, they have it, and that is the last there is to it.

There would be no possibility of real self-determination on the part of the people. Whether they will be capable, in the next 100 years or several hundred years, of self-determination is extremely improbable because they are aborigines and from the Stone Age down there. I think it is a very serious situation from a moral standpoint or from a standpoint of basic principles of the United Nations and its operations.

We have been pretty vigorous in the Congo. Here we have another aggression which is definitely threatened. There is a way of getting at least a method of determination through the United Nations, taking over for a period of time, and letting these processes of self-determination operate.

Certainly if the Indonesians take over, it is not self-determination on the part of the people of West New Guinea. It is conquest is what it is. It is either conquest by bluff or military force, and I think probably the way it is going now it will be a conquest by bluff, but it is, nevertheless, conquest and aggression.

U.N. ACTION IS A POSSIBILITY

Secretary RUSK. Senator, this is not a possibility that is by any means ruled out. The U.N. resolution to which I was alluding, itself provided a period of direct negotiations between the parties. We think that there is some point in that, and I think——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not objecting to that at all.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. Let me——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mean, the United Nations stepping in with supervisory control.

A MIXED QUESTION FOR THE DUTCH

Secretary RUSK. Let me add a remark on another aspect of it. I do not think it would be correct to say that the attitute of the Dutch toward this problem has been, shall we say, gutted by lack of support from its allies as a determining feature.

Over a period of years the Dutch themselves have genuinely lost interest in West New Guinea.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is understandable.

Secretary RUSK. There are very few members of the Cabinet who want to continue to be saddled with this problem, and there are many more leaders in the Netherlands who would like to see their entire relationship with Indonesia brought back into discussion

with the Indonesians so that their future interests out there could lie with a restoration of broad political and economic relationships with Indonesia rather than to have the matter completely blocked by this West New Guinea problem.

Now, the Prime Minister of the Netherlands is taking a very firm position on their present stance on this matter, but this is not by any means the general view of much of the leadership in the Netherlands on both sides of the political fence.

So it has been a mixed question from the beginning, and the Dutch have mixed reasons of their own, including this $30 million a year, not including the cost of the possibilities of much more productive and important relationships with Indonesia if those can be achieved.

The CHAIRMAN. To make clear, do you mean by trading it off peacefully they think they will re-establish more friendly and profitable relations with Indonesia as a whole? Is that another way to put it?

Secretary RUSK. This is not Mr. Laykens' view. There are many leading Dutch who think this ought to be tried.

LIMITED POLITICAL EXPRESSION

Let me also say that inherent in the official position of the Dutch Government is that if the Papuans indicate that association with Indonesia is all right with them, the Dutch will raise no objection to that.

The CHAIRMAN. They have no way of expressing themselves, have they?

Secretary RUSK. In a limited sense. They have certain councils there, but self-determination under these conditions is an extremely difficult concept to apply.

Senator CAPEHART. What is the population?

Senator RUSK. I think it is about 600,000.

Senator CAPEHART. Only 600,000.

WHY IS EAST NEW GUINEA DIFFERENT?

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary, what factors are there in West New Guinea that warrant it being turned over to the Indonesians, that do not exist with regard to East New Guinea being taken away from the Australians and likewise turned over?

Secretary RUSK. There has never been any doubt whatever that East New Guinea is the responsibility of Australia.

In the case of West New Guinea it was a part of a former Dutch East Indies. At the time of Indonesian independence, at the time of the turnover of independence to what is already Indonesia, there was a formula devised which indicated that there would be discussions within the coming year to determine the future of West New Guinea. This was left open.

This, on the one side, left the Dutch with what might be called an impeccable legal title, but it also left a very strong political presumption that the Indonesian claim to West New Guinea would be taken up in a serious way, and those discussions never got anywhere because meanwhile the attitude of the Netherlands hardened on this matter, and the matter fell into an impasse.

Senator LAUSCHE. What would we do if Sukarno demands East New Guinea?

Secretary RUSK. If Sukarno demands East New Guinea? We would back Australia to the hilt.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why?

Secretary RUSK. It is her responsibility there, and there is no shred of claim to East New Guinea so far as Sukarno is concerned.

A DICTATOR'S SMOKESCREEN

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I did not say we should not, but it is difficult for me to see a clear-cut black and white difference. I may not know anything about them, but I know of the very fuzzy and rather nebulous situation that existed at the time Indonesia was set up there with respect to West New Guinea.

There was probably some reason for that. West New Guinea is ethnically and every other way completely disassociated from the rest of Indonesia. Of course, I think Borneo and the Celebese and some of those, that was just kind of a lump deal. I think if one could get to the truth of the matter, the Celebese are not happy, Sumatra is not happy, and has not been for a long time, and I understand they are still not happy, but we forced them to set that up as almost a disassociated group of areas, not very much in common among the strains there.

But now this West New Guinea business, to me a typical emotional smokescreen of dictatorship, and suggests that a dictator always has to have something to talk about to excite his people. Somebody is taking something away from them. They are being put upon, and West Irian, as they call it, is a smokescreen, to at least some extent, in order to attempt to bring some unity of purpose in at least one field in Indonesia, by the theories that if certain action is inevitable, one must yield to the inevitability of it and not be so concerned.

INDONESIA'S CLAIM HAS SUBSTANCE

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I certainly would not approve in any way the exploitation of this issue by Sukarno, but I do think that there is some substance in Indonesia's claim, and there is not in these other territories that you mentioned. This is one of those unresolved questions at the time——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I agree these other territories were without doubt specifically included in the package deal. But, by the same token, West New Guinea was not included in the transfer. They said they would talk about it.

Now, it seems to me the Dutch position is very good there. The Dutch say, "We will turn it over to the United Nations for supervision for a period of time, for such reasonable period of time as such people can really have an impartial administration for the purpose of making up their own minds."

Indonesia, or Sukarno at least, refuses to go along with that. He just says, "We are going to take it."

BILATERAL TALKS SHOULD BE TRIED FIRST

Secretary RUSK. I would not yet, Senator, exclude the possibility of U.N. administration of some sort there, under certain circumstances. We think these bilateral talks ought to be tried out to see how far they can get, where the two parties have anything in common there that they can agree on.

A U.N. administration would involve, of course, very substantial burdens on us, if we look at what the Dutch have in mind. We would prefer to see these bilateral discussions tried out to see what will happen. I think we are some distance away from major fighting, and we will have to take other questions up one at a time to see what happens in these bilateral talks.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is all.

OPPORTUNITY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I do not want to stop this part of it—but there is one other point about another matter that I would like to ask you briefly about, and that is what you are doing in the Dominican Republic.

You will remember that we had extended discussions about the great opportunity that this situation presented to us, and now it has come down to a point of doing something.

I read in the paper that you were contemplating the appointment of a new Ambassador down there, someone—I do not remember his name—but it is a non-career man.

Secretary RUSK. The man's name is [John Bartlow] Martin. He has had a considerable number of years in the Dominican Republic, a linguist——

The CHAIRMAN. The only point I want to impress upon you, as I still think we did last summer—it was not just my idea, this idea was developed from other sources, but it appealed to me very much—was that here is a small sort of laboratory experiment, which you might be successful with if you really put your mind to it, that would make a great psychological difference in everything that happens in Latin America.

We needed a success, in other words, to counteract the Cuban matter and the inevitable difficulties that will result in the larger situations, such as Brazil, Argentina, and so on and so forth. I would just really like to urge you to proceed with the plan which we discussed, which takes some form of public authority for the administration of the Trujillo properties. It seems to me this is a wonderful and almost unique opportunity.

I talked very briefty to the Under Secretary the other day, and I got the impression—this was at a social gathering—that this plan had more or less been abandoned. Is that true?

CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES

Secretary RUSK. The plan that we discussed last summer was that the Trujillo properties, with the exception of perhaps some payment to the Trujillos for what might be considered their legitimate interests in some of these properties, that these properties be

turned over to a public foundation or trust that would be then administered for the public purposes in the Dominican Republic.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Secretary RUSK. Well now, in the circumstances of the actual departure of the Trujillos from the island, including the son Ramfis Trujillo, the foundation or public trust idea disappeared, because that took legal and other arrangements that included the required participation of the family. But the present governing authority has seized these properties, and they are not under the Minister of Economics.

The problem we were worried about, Senator, we are trying to get into as quickly as we can, is to be sure that, in fact, these properties are used for the same kinds of purposes, that they not be spun off in any irresponsible way to private interests under conditions that might involve graft, although it may very well be that certain ones ought to be and can be sold to advantage to private interests for responsible administration and management.

But the disposition of these properties is a very important point that can have a lot to do with the future welfare of the island. So the foundation technique had, quite frankly, too much Trujillo in it for the present authorities to be willing to go ahead with.

U.S. ASSISTANCE SUGGESTED

The CHAIRMAN. If the properties have been seized, I do not see why they still could not be held together in the form of some public authority, we will say, such as TVA or the Port of New York Authority in this country. There are various forms of it, the point being that you, our government, at least for a trial period, after at least 5 years, could see it was not grafted, they were not dissipated, but were devoted to the welfare of the country.

The only point I have in mind is I am afraid if you turn it loose on untried and irresponsible people, they may be irresponsible. Most of these Latin people have shown no disposition to do anything for their own country; in other words, I do not have very much confidence that this new government is going to be particularly efficient. I hope it will be reasonably so. But if you lose control, and by "you," I am speaking of our government, lose all control, in its direction—if this could be made successful in a reasonably short time, it would be a tremendous boost to the whole Alliance for Progress.

GIVING AWAY BARGAINING POWERS, OPPORTUNITY

I am thinking more of its effect on our ability to do something constructive than I am about the Dominican Republic actually. Here we have all these big countries in which it is going to take time to show anything for them, and here is a small country. If you could succeed in it in a short time, it might be a tremendous help in establishing confidence in our purposes, in an overall and long-term program. That is the point I am trying to get at.

It is not just the Dominican Republic. Everything I was told during those hearings would indicate this was a great opportunity. What I was afraid of is that we were going to give away the sugar quota and give away whatever bargaining authority or bargaining

powers we had, before we got any commitments out of them to allow us to participate in the direction of the development of these properties and their devotion to the public welfare. I would hate to see this opportunity slip through our fingers, because I do not think there is anything similar to it.

IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING PROPERTIES TOGETHER

Secretary RUSK. I think the bilateral and multilateral development programs being discussed with the Dominican Republic give us very substantial leverage in this.

The CHAIRMAN. As of the moment it is so.

Secretary RUSK. Because these properties are important in the orderly development of the country. But we are in this problem, Senator. I cannot give you any sort of semifinal answer today on how this thing could be worked out, but what we are very much concerned about would be their spinning them off under conditions of graft——

The CHAIRMAN. That is exactly what I am worried about. It is perfectly all right to allow them to file, anybody to file, that is, the people who lost their property to file, a legitimate claim which would be subject to review in an orderly way to some proper arbitration, and pay them. I am not objecting to that. But this looks like a unique opportunity, with what I understand to be the situation under Trujillo, to devote the real profits or benefits of these properties to the public welfare, and by that I mean to the building of schools and roads and whatever public improvements this island needs.

Otherwise, if it is spun off, the properties themselves, it is dissipated. You know the kind of graft that typifies what has happened in Cuba and many other places before, and which caused much of the trouble there. It seems to me you have a great opportunity, before you give up your leverage of bringing great pressure to bear on them, to constitute some kind of public authority in which you, the United States, retain some control to see that it is not grafted off, and to see that it is not dissipated.

A SHOWCASE OF DEVELOPMENT

I think it is a great opportunity. I was very sad to hear that this plan, which I had been told before was under active consideration, seems to be going down the drain, because I think there is no other country where you have a ready-made situation in which you could exercise continuing influence, at least 4 or 5 years, and make a real showcase.

If this place in a year could be made to appear to be a great success, really moving for the benefit of the people of the Dominican Republic, we are not exploiting them with the usual graft, the usual corruption that accompanies any democratic regime in Latin America; if that did not appear, it would be a wonderful thing to encourage the Venezuelans and everybody else down there.

WHY CAN'T NEW REGIME PROCEED WITH PLAN?

Secretary RUSK. The principal reason, Senator, that the earlier scheme broke down was that this public trust or foundation was to receive from the Trujillo family a very considerable part of their property. But the Trujillos were to retain some significant parts, and when the new government came in, they confiscated all of the properties of Trujillo.

The CHAIRMAN. Why can't you get the new people under the leverage that you have to go ahead, even better in some ways. That may be better than under the Trujillo plan. We do not reserve anything to them other than what you wish to give them as some kind of compensation, if any. I am not sure that there should be any.

PREVENTING THE USUAL CORRUPTION

The retention of some direction in the capacity to prevent corruption is what I was interested in, because we are invariably confronted with the idea every time these democratic regimes, which we back, end up with all kinds of corruption. We have had it in Laos, we have had it in Vietnam, the allegations, at least; Korea, everywhere we turn. If we could make kind of a model thing here, somewhat like Puerto Rico—I have never heard of any serious corruption alleged against the Government of Puerto Rico—if we could have a similar situation there for 2 or 3 years even, what a wonderful thing it would be to encourage the rest of Latin American countries that under the Alliance for Progress this is the kind of thing we expect to develop. It could also be a great proving ground for some of the techniques of the public authority.

I have very little confidence in the capacity of the Latins, even this new group, to have a corruption-free administration. I do not know anything about them, and I do not wish to publicly accuse them. But when you look all around, after all our experiences, time after time, when we put the Marines in, in eight different countries, then we got out, and it degenerated into the same old thing.

ACTION URGED BEFORE SUGAR QUOTA AGREEMENT

Here is an opportunity where you might, through some device, have at least a treasurer or adviser or secretary in there to see that this thing was done right. That is the element I like about the idea, that you could keep somebody, even the International Bank or maybe someone like that, who could be put in to see that this thing is run right for the benefit of the people of the Dominican Republic. That is the element which I would certainly insist upon before I would give them sugar quotas or gave them anything—before you gave up your trading capacity.

Secretary RUSK. I think we agree with the opportunity and the object. Let us report back.

The CHAIRMAN. Right now, before you make an agreement for a sugar quota—if you do that and go on, they will say, "What the hell, you have already made commitments that you cannot back out of." But before you make those, as a condition precedent, if you could make an arrangement in which some responsible people—if you do not want to take it on, somebody from the Bank or the

Fund or any of those agencies they rely on could probably be better than maybe one of our political people.

I think it is a wonderful opportunity. It is ready-made, almost, to demonstrate a really efficient administration of properties in a little place, and it would be a showcase.

VALUE, TRANSFER OF TRUJILLO'S ASSETS

Senator LAUSCHE. What was the amount of those assets?

The CHAIRMAN. We were told by a man supposed to know—we had several discussions last summer right after Trujillo's assassination—the estimates were from 60 to 80 percent of the major industries, the sugar, the financial institutions, the hotels, the import business, trade, everything, almost everything except retail business Trujillo had gathered together under his control.

Secretary RUSK. Senator Lausche, at the time they were actually listing properties to turn over to this trust, they listed properties that had a book value of about $80 million. The estimates of their real value varied all the way up to $300 million, so they are substantial properties.

The CHAIRMAN. Substantial, and for a little country like this it could make a substantial impression.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has he transferred assets that he brought with him to the United States?

Secretary RUSK. Well, those are being pursued through legal channels in a number of cases, but I am sure there are important assets in numbered accounts in Swiss banks and other places that we will never be able to find.

The CHAIRMAN. What I am thinking of is the tangible businesses being in there. It is no question of getting them in there.

Secretary RUSK. Actual plants.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is how you administer them so that not every newcomer who comes down there takes his bit, and nothing ends up with the government.

PATTERN OF LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I had an interesting talk with a number of Latin Americans, men who, I think, were genuinely concerned with the economics and the politics of Latin America in what I believe to be a very objective and farsighted way. They made this statement to me, which is perhaps an approximation—maybe it is imaginary, I do not know—but it sounds like it had a lot of sense to it, and it was this:

They said there are approximately 200 families with their various families and various relatives and cousins and brothers-in-law, approximately 200——

The CHAIRMAN. One family.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In Latin America one family may be 5,000 people. Their family associations are a little more closely knit than ours.

The CHAIRMAN. Like the du Ponts. [Laughter.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There are about 200 families in Latin America, half of which were in power for a while, and then when the other side got restless because they did not have their hands in

the till quite as much as they liked, then they had a revolution and threw them out. Then the other 100 families went in, not in every country, but one group would be in for a while, and then the outs would throw the ins out. For 300 years that has been going on.

QUESTIONABLE PROPERTY RIGHTS

Many of these so-called front-leading people have lost their property to a new dictator that has come in, in one way or another, either through confiscation or otherwise. The title or the moral right to what that particular group has is just as questionable as the moral right to what the crowd has that is in. It presents an economic problem in the Dominican Republic, without doubt.

The Trujillos went in there beginning 30 years ago, and they took right and left. They just grabbed a lot of stuff. But the moral question comes, was a thief taking from a thief? I mean, what was the moral title of the people that he took it away from?

A little group in the Dominican Republic, and that group that was opposed to Trujillo, is a little bit of a rich group, basically. What is the moral right of those people to restitution of what Trujillo took away from them? How did they take it in the first place? It may go back several generations. It may go back so that the statute of limitations has run not on raising any question as to their right. You have those problems.

Then you also have the problem of the opposing group now thinking that Trujillo is out and, "It is our turn for the boodle bag," and under the guise of and the banner of democracy and reform, "It is our chance, and we will put it in."

Senator MORSE. That is the basis of the Chairman's point.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that is the basis of a lot of the things you were saying. I realize the problem there.

DANGERS OF SUPPORTING COLLECTIVE ECONOMY

On the other hand, I would not want to see us support a collective economy down there, that is, where all this stuff gets into the hands of government, because if it does, unless we have hold of it completely, you will get right into the old boodle bag theory.

If the politicians get hold of all of these sequestered assets and begin to run them, you have the possibility of going right back in.

Senator LAUSCHE. Where would you put them?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Without minimizing the problems—I know the problems are tremendous, and it is easier to give the solution than to implement it. If a system could be set up there through proper supervision, where these assets, the land, the shares in the sugar corporations, and so on, would give opportunities for a widespread diversified investment by the people so that it would be ownership eventually—it might take 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 years—the people could get in there and own it like we do in our own diversified investments.

The same with these farms and land. I understand the Trujillo family owned vast land holdings there.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that the people could buy that land.

One of the difficulties in some of the land reforms we have seen in these countries is that they have not set up the machinery whereby people could buy the land in an orderly fashion. They have turned the land over to them, and they have nothing but chaos.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. And soon he gets it right back.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But the point is, I would not like to see an indefinite term of government ownership and government management of the sequestered properties because, unfortunately, unless you have a termination date or a definite plan by which this investment or this property or this wealth, whatever it is, can get back into the hands of the diversified population in some way, bureaucracy will hold on to it, government will hold on to it, which means the politicians will hold on to it.

COLOMBIA CITED AS EXAMPLE

Let me just give you an illustration. I was in Colombia about 6 months after this president, the last president they threw out there, went into office. It has been 6 or 7 years ago.

I talked to some very serious and very sensible Colombians, politicians who had a great understanding of the United States, and our economic and political system, and were great admirers of it. They were much oriented toward the United States.

They had supported this president, who was a college professor. He was a teacher, and had gone in under a great humanitarian program. He had been making political speeches for several years about what he wanted to do for the people and how he wanted to do it, and get the properties and government and everything else in the hands of the people.

Six months after he went in, I was there, and I had a very much off-the-record conversation with these people. They said, "This fellow has gone into office now with the finest ideals that we can OK and applaud. We supported him. He wants land reform; he wants this, that, and the other thing. But," they said, "in effect, we are sitting back with our fingers crossed, because we have had historic experience in Colombia that power seems to get hold of our people at the top. We hope that this fellow keeps his ideals, keeps his program, keeps the things he has been preaching for several years, and we will support him in this effort."

Well, the fellow went along for a year and a half, and then he began to have power in himself, and they threw him out when they put in this new system of government, because he became, in effect, a dictator. He and his crowd could not resist the temptation of the centralization of power and wealth.

That is the trouble with bureaucracy. That is why I would say that to sequester this property, to take it over without a concrete, definite and definitive program of the orderly dissipation of this property back into the hands of the people—even through long-range credits, without immediate repayment, something like that would be available, anything else—you put it into the open-ended hands of the Government.

COOPERATIVE V. COLLECTIVE OWNERSHIP

The CHAIRMAN. Bourke, I said that I think the opportunity to develop the final disposition can be preserved if we proceed along this line.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was not disagreeing with what you said, just talking about details.

The CHAIRMAN. If I may make just one comment. This man Kaplan, who first brought it to me, had it in his mind as his idea as a precedent, as he did with Welch Grape Juice, which now belongs to 3,000 farmers. He considered himself a great private enterprise man. He did own it. He sold it to them; they did own it.

It is not a government, nor is it a collective in that sense with the government having anything to do with it. It is owned entirely by the participants in it. They own their own land. It is a co-op, as a matter of fact.

Go ahead.

Senator MORSE. I was going to say that the Kaplan cooperative arrangement is a private set-up.

BASIS OF FREEDOM; DEAL WITH WHOLE ISLAND

I want to say if we are to keep political freedom anywhere in Latin America, you have to have individual and economic freedom. Here is a sort of in-between where we get these properties into private ownership of a large number of people.

I have one other point and then I will quit. You have to deal with the whole island. You cannot stop in the Dominican Republic. If you can get this problem solved, which gets Haiti involved, and the terrible condition of Haiti brought under the influence of the kind of program we are talking about, then we have a showcase. But you cannot separate the Dominican Republic from Haiti. You have to take this whole thing.

Mr. Chairman, what I wanted to say was this: It is after 1 o'clock. The Secretary of State has been with us since 10:30. I think we have gone into almost every point, and we certainly ought to close the hearing now.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. I have a luncheon engagement at 1 o'clock. I did not want this opportunity to pass, because from what I have been reading, I was afraid this was moving so rapidly that we were going to give up our leverage, and we would lose the opportunity. That is why I did not want to let this pass without raising the question.

ANGOLA; SINO-SOVIET DIFFERENCES

Senator LAUSCHE. Are the Angolans capable of running their sovereign and independent state?

Secretary RUSK. Not today.

Senator LAUSCHE. They are not.

No. 2, I read this document discussing the disintegration of the relationship between China and Russia, and the difference, according to that document, is that Khrushchev believes in co-existence, the non-inevitability of war, and a peaceful transition from existing

types of governments into socialism. The Chinese insist that war is inevitable, and obviously they want war.

Now, my query is, why does China want war? What motivates it in taking that position? Does it believe that, if war comes, the annihilation will be of the West and Russia and the sparing of China?

Secretary RUSK. I think it is possible, Senator, that they have some such thoughts in mind.

I think what is just as much on their minds is they do not want to see the Soviet Union become less daring, less risk-taking, less aggressive, because the state interests of Russia might point toward caution. In other words, I think there is no difference between them about wanting to get on with the Communist world revolution. The question is the methods and the procedures.

I would suppose that——

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, it resolves itself into two things: China is thinking of itself first and wants the West and Russia in war, or it is truly thinking of communication of the world.

Now, I cannot resolve in my own mind that I have a belief that if I were Chou En-lai I would want Russia and the United States in war. I would urge it because I know that they would destroy each other, and China would be left to run the world.

Secretary RUSK. So far as we can tell, Senator, Peiping is pressing upon Moscow the kinds of policies which would lead just in that direction, for example, in Berlin or Southeast Asia or wherever it might be.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I apologize for keeping you so long. I think this has been a very good meeting.

Senator MORSE. Wonderful.

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 11:30 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman), and Senator Dodd.

The subcommittee discussed procedures for future hearings on the situation in the Congo.

No record or transcript was made of the meeting.

BRIEFING ON THE CONGO SITUATION

[Editor's Note.—On June 30, 1960, the Congo became independent of Belgium. Five days later Congolese troops mutinied and civil disorders broke out. Belgium sent 800 paratroopers to protect Belgian civilians fleeing from the Congo. Soon afterwards, the mineral-rich province of Katanga seceded from the new republic.

On July 14, the U.N. Security Council approved a request by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold to send a U.N. Force to the Congo, to replace Belgian troops there and to end the civil war with Katanga. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba denounced Hammarskjold for "connivance" with Katanga President Moise Tshombe, and demanded that the U.N. Force withdraw. In September, however, the army led a coup against Lumumba, who was killed in February 1961. The Soviet Union, long critical of Hammarskjold's handling of the Congo, held him responsible and demanded his dismissal as Secretary General. The United States threw its support behind Hammarskjold and the government of President Joseph Kasavubu. In September, Hammarskjold was killed in a plane crash while en route to a meeting with Tshombe.

On December 20, 1961, Tshombe and Congolese Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula signed a unity agreement, but Tshombe quickly reneged. At the same time, Deputy Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga led a brief secession of Oriental Province. By January 14, 1962, most of Gizenga's forces had surrendered, and Gizenga was returned to the Congolese capital in the custody of U.N. Forces on January 20.

In August 1962, U.N. Secretary General U Thant submitted a national reconciliation plan to reunite Katanga with the Congo. Tshombe rejected this proposal, but after renewed fighting with U.N. troops he capitulated in January 1963. U.N. Forces then withdrew, and Kasavubu named Tshombe Prime Minister of the United Republic of Congo (later renamed Zaire).]

THURSDAY, JANUARY 18, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:50 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. Albert Gore (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Gore, Fulbright, Lausche, Church, Dodd, Wiley, and Capehart.

Also present: Senators Morse, Mansfield, Symington, Wiley, and Aiken.

Mr. Marcy and Mr. Henderson of the committee staff. Frederick Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; Samuel Parelman, Operations Center, Office of the Secretary.

Senator GORE. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, this subcommittee welcomes you and Secretary Ball and Secretary Williams.

This commences a review of the United States' action, program, and policy with respect to the Congo. The committee will be privileged to hear your statement, and then we will have some questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen.

I am very pleased to have the opportunity to appear with my colleagues before this subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in order to discuss U.S. policy with regard to the Congo and our support of United Nations operations there.

U.S. policy with regard to the Congo is consistent with our general foreign policy and our attitude toward Africa as a whole. Briefly stated, that attitude is (*a*) to help the African peoples form societies and governments that will be truly independent and consonant with their own consciences and cultures; (*b*) to maintain and promote the strong ties of culture, friendship, and economic life that already exist between the new nations of Africa and the nations of Europe and America; and (*c*) to cooperate in every way acceptable to both the Africans and ourselves as these new countries strive to produce the political stability, economic progress, and level of education that are essential to a free society.

In pursuit of these broad objectives, the United States has strongly supported efforts to preserve the territorial integrity of the Congo. Like almost every country in the world, the United States has firmly opposed efforts by Kasia, Katanga, Orientale, or any other province to secede. This is our policy because there is no legal, moral, or practical basis for the secession of any of these provinces; nor is there reasonable evidence that secession is the will of the majority of the population of any province involved.

HOW THE U.N. BECAME INVOLVED IN THE CONGO

Just how did the United Nations become involved in the Congo? Memories tend to fade, even after only 18 months.

You will recall that tribal fighting and mutiny in the Congolese army occurred in the first week of July 1960, immediately after the Congo became independent. During the night of July 8, many Europeans fled from Leopoldville, and Belgium announced the return of Belgian troops to protect life and property.

The new Congolese Government reacted violently to the return of Belgian forces. On July 12, that government requested urgent dispatch of U.N. forces to the Congo to protect the national territory of the country and avoid a threat to international peace.

On the same day on which the Congo Government requested United Nations aid, it also requested direct U.S. military aid. Three days later the Congolese President and Prime Minister cabled Chairman Khrushchev, "We have to ask the Soviet Union's intervention, should the Western camp not stop its aggression."

The urgent problem was to restore public order and to permit the withdrawal of the Belgian troops without leading to internal collapse in the Congo.

President Eisenhower rejected from the start any direct intervention by the major powers. In reply to the Congo Government's request for U.S. forces, the United States stated that "any assistance to the Government of the Congo should be through the United Nations and not by any unilateral action by any one country, the United States included."

Why was this decision taken? The alternative to U.N. intervention would have been violence and chaos and a ready-made opportunity for Soviet exploitation—which the United States would have been compelled to counter. There was no alternative to limited intervention on the part of the United Nations, if a direct confrontation of the great powers in the heart of Africa was to be avoided. Thus the United States strongly supported United Nations action in the Congo. Looking back, gentlemen, it seems obvious now that this was the right choice.

SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE CONGO

It seemed clear by August 1960 that if the Congo was to remain free and independent, U.S. support of the United Nations would have to be sufficient to permit U.N. operation in the face of a Soviet onslaught. Despite U.N. resolutions to the contrary, the Soviet Union was pouring personnel, materials, and political agents into the Congo to establish what the Communists hoped would be a foothold in the heart of Africa. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold challenged the Russians because of evidence which accumulated in August and September that each Soviet Ilyushin aircraft was bringing in political agents. When the Soviets refused to halt these activities, the U.N. Command closed major airfields in the Congo to all but U.N. traffic. Shortly thereafter President Kasavubu ordered the Soviet and Czechoslovak Embassies to close, and several hundred Russians and Czechoslovaks were forced to leave the Congo.

It was this blocking by the United Nations of the Soviet takeover scheme that provoked the Soviet Union to declare political war on Secretary General Hammarskjold and to begin the campaign for a troika directorate that would handcuff the world organization. The Communist bloc has refused to finance any part of the U.N.'s operations to restore political stability and bring economic progress to the Congo.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR KASAVUBU

The United States supported the first government of the Congo—a government that was a compromise under which Joseph Kasavubu, a moderate trained in a Catholic seminary, became President, and Patrice Lumumba became Premier.

Lumumba's ouster from office by President Kasavubu, in September 1960, was followed by a period of political turmoil. Not until July 1961 did the parliamentarians again meet to give approval to a government. Despite appeals by U.N. officials and American and European diplomats, Katangan Provincial President Moise Tshombe, after hesitations, decided not to let his party's parliamentarians participate in the formation of a new government. Thus he chose to miss an opportunity to play an important role on the national stage. Even without the hoped-for support of Katanga, moderate forces prevailed in the new government.

Kasavubu, of course, remained head of state and commander in chief of the armed forces. The new Prime Minister and Defense Minister was Cyrille Adoula, an able and dynamic leader of a trade union organization that is affiliated with the free trade union

movement, the ICFTU. Gizenga was given the post of First Vice Premier in the new government. Most of the 42-man cabinet were true Congolese nationalists who were moderate in their views. The United States view was that the Adoula government was not only the legal product of parliamentary process, but that it represented the only hope of achieving a stable, secure Congo.

SECESSION OF KATANGA

It was obvious, however, that there were two main dangers to the Adoula government: the political insurrection of Gizenga, who in effect withdrew from the government and attempted to create a new redoubt in Stanleyville, and the continued armed secession of the Katanga. The first was a political problem that had to be dealt with by the Congolese themselves. This effort came to fruition on January 15 when the Congolese parliament voted overwhelmingly to censure Gizenga, thus removing him from office. The United Nations responded rapidly and effectively to Prime Minister Adoula's appeal for aid in restoring law and order in Stanleyville in the face of armed insurrection.

The problem of the Katanga secession was more difficult to deal with because it involved the active participation of foreign mercenaries who had taken up arms against both the United Nations and the Congo government. So strong were the sentiments of nationalism of the Congolese people regarding the secession of southern Katanga that it became clear that no government would survive in the Congo unless it demonstrated progress in reintegrating the Katanga. It was obvious that failure to bring the Katanga back into the Congo would mean civil war and the ensuing chaos on which the Communists have capitalized in other parts of the world.

It was also clear that the moderate strength of Mr. Tshombe and his party leaders and the economic wealth of their area were needed in the central government. U.N. officials and United States and European diplomats therefore made repeated efforts to achieve the reintegration of the Katanga through conciliation and peaceful means. One of the difficulties was that foreign elements, not responsive to their own governments, sought to convince Mr. Tshombe that through military force he could maintain his secession.

REMOVING THE MERCENARIES

The United Nations sought to remove the mercenaries, in accordance with the February 21, 1961 resolution, so as to clear the air for a peaceful settlement. The mercenaries refused to leave, cut off the U.N.'s lines of communication, and resorted to violence. The United Nations fought to protect itself and to establish conditions under which it could pursue its objectives with reasonable security.

While it deplored the loss of life and the isolated acts of barbarism that grew out of warfare, the United States supported the United Nations in its limited military action because the alternative was to acquiesce in Katanga's secession and permit the civil strife that inevitably would result in a big power clash.

When Tshombe indicated a desire to negotiate, President Kennedy set in motion efforts which resulted in Mr. Tshombe's meeting

with Prime Minister Adoula at Kitona. We are pleased by the statesmanship shown by Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Tshombe in reaching an agreement at this meeting. Mr. Tshombe has indicated that he will abide by the agreement he signed at Kitona. If so, the Congo's political crisis may be moving toward an end, and both the Congolese and the United Nations can turn their attention from military efforts to the peaceful task of restoring the economy of one of the wealthiest countries in Africa.

The U.N. role in military matters can be brought to an end with a political settlement on constitutional and other questions among the Congolese themselves, and through U.N. assistance with the training and organization of the Congo's own security forces. Technical assistance in administrative, economic, and social fields will undoubtedly be required for a considerable time. It is simple, but correct, to say that the U.N.'s purpose is to help achieve as rapidly as possible the conditions which will permit the United Nations to withdraw, leaving full responsibility to the Congolese themselves. We support them in that objective.

Thank you.

THE TIMELINESS OF A PUBLIC DISCUSSION

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, is there any information, any statement in the statement which you have read to the subcommittee which, in your opinion, would be adverse to the security interests of the United States?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Senator GORE. Are you willing to submit this statement to be released publicly, or any parts of it, if the subcommittee should decide to do so?

Secretary RUSK. In the discretion of the subcommittee, the statement is at your disposal, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask the Secretary a question with respect to these hearings. Aside from this particular statement which you read very carefully, and which, I think, is very enlightening, a very excellent statement, do you feel that a public discussion of the questions and answers both from the committee and other people—in other words, the usual public hearing on this matter—is timely, and would you think it would be useful at this time?

What I mean is, is this a matter which has advanced sufficiently far that any discussions of a controversial nature, which may well arise, would assist or otherwise in the course of the discussions?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, if the discussions were in terms of background and policy and objectives and, to some extent, could avoid certain problems of personality clashes in the Congo, I think that could be very helpful in explaining what the general approach has been, both of this Government for the last 18 months and the United Nations, and if it clarifies some of the superficial differences that seem to have appeared between ourselves and some of our allies with whom we are associated for a common purpose here.

I do think in terms of the delicacy of the discussions going on between Mr. Tshombe and Mr. Adoula, if we got into certain kinds of

personality clashes, past and present, in a public hearing at this time it could get in the way of a satisfactory settlement of the Congo situation.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You know the custom in our hearings when they are open; it is very difficult to restrain any kind of a question once the matter is opened for discussion.

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, it would be up to the discretion of the committee to decide whether you wish to have open hearings. I think the witnesses from the State Department would do their best to be responsive without getting into some of these particular things.

Senator FULBRIGHT. But this is contemplated to involve witnesses outside of the State Department, not just the Department.

If we had open hearings, there would be witnesses with all degrees of opinion and from without the government. I was not thinking of your testimony or that of Mr. Ball. I was thinking of general public hearings with outside witnesses, several—at least I have seen some letters—who desire to be heard. It is a custom that once we enter into open hearings on the matter, no one knows where it may lead.

I just wondered whether or not the conditions that now exist, which look rather hopeful, would be promoted by such a hearing.

Secretary RUSK. One of the difficulties for that kind of a public hearing at this point would be that, to some extent, the controversy and opinion here is a little out of date. In other words, at the present time—this part of the record is wholly executive, I take it?

Senator GORE. Entirely.

A CONCILIATED SETTLEMENT

Secretary RUSK. At the present time we, the French, the British, the Belgians and Union Minière, the Rhodesians are all working closely for the same purpose, to bring about a conciliated settlement of the internal constitutional situation in the Congo. This degree of unity is very important in bringing about this result. On one occasion it may be up to us and some others to counsel moderation on the part of Mr. Adoula; on other occasions it may be necessary for others to counsel moderation on the part of Mr. Tshombe.

But I would say some of the controversy in the last 60 days is a little out of date now on how best to get an actual settlement in the Congo and, of course, the important thing is to get the Congo situation cleared up as rapidly as possible. This is the best way, to end the debate rather than to have the debate itself interfere with a settlement in the Congo. So this is the problem, something of the level we face.

Senator GORE. Of course, involved in the problem is the very factor—and I think the necessity—of an informed public opinion in this country.

Secretary RUSK. Yes indeed, sir.

Senator GORE. Neither the President nor the Secretary of State can lead very far unless the people will follow. So, as I understand your statement to the chairman of the full committee, it is that insofar as the State Department is concerned, you would have no objection to a public hearing, but you do recognize the delicacy of it,

and that there might be certain areas touched upon which could be harmful to the developing, we hope developing, solution there.

Secretary RUSK. That would be the danger. I do think that it is important for the public to understand what we are trying to accomplish in the Congo and understand the background of it. The public has forgotten in the past 18 months the entire story.

If the committee wanted a specific recommendation on whether to hold public hearings or not, I would be prepared to make one in the course of the morning. I would like to talk briefly to the President about it, but I would tend to lean toward a public hearing even though there would be some risks involved. We would have to see what could be done to mitigate those risks.

I am not so concerned about those who might be directly involved with the Congo problem, because I think they are all working in unison to bring about a satisfactory settlement. I think it is some of those who have not had and do not have a direct responsibility with it to read other problems into the Congo or who have picked it up as part of another kind of debate that concerns me a bit.

Senator GORE. If the subcommittee wishes to solicit your recommendation on that, we will communicate with you.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, sir.

Senator GORE. Without objection, the Secretary will be excused.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much.

Senator GORE. Very well, Mr. Ball. Do you have a prepared statement, Secretary Ball?

Mr. BALL. I do not, Mr. Chairman, but I would like to make one orally if I might.

Senator GORE. We will be pleased to hear you.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE W. BALL, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY STANLEY CLEVELAND, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO MR. BALL; SHELDON B. VANCE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CENTRAL AFRICAN AFFAIRS; AND G. MENNEN WILLIAMS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. BALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, we recognize that the Congo problem is a difficult one for the American people to comprehend because of the rather exotic nature of the Congo, the degree of disorder that has occurred there, and the fact that there has not always been complete agreement coming out of the Congo on what the facts may be. But through this, all the time, it seems to us that the main lines of U.S. policy have been quite simple and quite straightforward. Our long-range objectives and our policies in the Congo have remained essentially the same under the Kennedy administration as they were under the Eisenhower administration, and our purposes are, in fact, the same as those of many, I should say most, men of good will in the Congo, in other African countries, those of our European partners and, finally, those of the United Nations.

WHY THE CONGO IS IMPORTANT

I would like, if I may, to address my remarks this morning to six main questions:

First, why is the Congo so important to us?

Second, what have we been trying to accomplish there?

Third, why is the United Nations in the Congo? Why have we supported the activities of the United Nations there?

Fourth, why does the U.S. Government support a united Congo and oppose the efforts of Mr. Tshombe to bring about an independent Katanga?

Five, what progress have we made in the Congo?

And, sixth, what are the prospects for this area looking toward the next few months and the longer future?

I have some maps here. I apologize for the fact that some of the comments I may make I am sure will not be news at all to you gentlemen who have studied this situation very profoundly. In order to give you an orderly presentation I may be compelled to say some things you already know. But I thought it might be helpful, in order to have clearly in mind the nature of this area, if I brought up some maps, and I can run through them very quickly.

The first map simply shows the area of the Congo. It is about the size of Western Europe, but it is rather sparsely populated, with a population of only 14 million.

It is, however, an area which is singularly blessed with resources compared with other African areas. It has about 7 percent of the free world copper, 60 percent of the cobalt, 72 percent of the industrial diamonds, and a number of other mineral resources. It has major production of palm oil, coffee, cocoa, cotton, and other products that make it a potentially rich area.

Senator DODD. What did you say it has by way of percentage of diamonds?

Mr. BALL. I think, this is the whole of the Congo, something like 72 percent of the world's production of industrial diamonds.

The Congo is, in fact, one of the few African countries which was before independence economically and financially self-sufficient and which, hopefully, can be again when the necessary steps have been taken to restore order and to create a viable economy. The rudiments are there, the basis is there.

THE KEYSTONE OF CENTRAL AFRICA

The real significance of the Congo for U.S. policy, and for the policy of the free world, lies in its geographic location. It is in many ways the keystone of central Africa. The Congo frontier touches on almost all the major regions of central and southern Africa.

In the south it borders on two areas which can be potentially new colonial problems or colonial problems which become acute, which can potentially be new Algerias of the future: Angola, where, as we all know, the potentials for trouble are very great indeed, and Northern Rhodesia, where there is a substantial white population and where the potentials for difficulty, again, are very substantial. So that trouble and disorder and continued difficulty in the Congo can greatly aggravate the problems that exist in those other two areas.

On the east, there is the problem of Ruanda-Urundi, an area which is a very explosive one. It attains its independence later this

year. The prospects for an explosion are there, and I am afraid they are very considerable.

Above that is Uganda, which is an area just coming out from British protection. It is going to have substantial growing pains.

The Sudan on the northeast is an area where there are border difficulties and where there is a concentration of tribes in that section which could become a source of disorder, if there is disorder in the Congo itself.

Then, on the northwest are parts of the former French territories which, while they are presently peaceful and reasonably stable, nevertheless are going to encounter some problem of transition.

IDEAL FOR SOVIET PENETRATION

Senator WILEY. Is that white area with the arrows supposed to be a part of the Congo?

Mr. BALL. That is all of the Congo. That is what the Congo is, the white area. The reason for the arrows is simply to suggest the possibility which this could offer to the Soviet Union if there should be a real Soviet takeover in the Congo.

It is an ideal place for penetration because it is right at the heart of an area which is surrounded by reasonably unstable situations and where, if the Soviet Union should be able to set up business in the Congo, it would be in the heart of Africa. So obviously under these circumstances we have a real objective in trying to prevent the Congo from being an area in which the Soviets can establish themselves.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Ball, do you think it is in the minds of the Soviet that they would like to get into this key position?

Mr. BALL. I have no question whatever, Senator Lausche, that this is something they would profoundly like to do. Actually the history of the Congo up to this point has indicated that they have had ambitions in that direction.

PARALLEL WITH LAOS

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there any parallel between this position in Africa and the position of Laos in Southeast Asia?

Mr. BALL. I would suppose that this is worth far more to them than Laos could be.

Senator GORE. Both from an economic and political standpoint?

Mr. BALL. That is right; yes.

Senator DODD. Would it be fair to say that from an economic standpoint there is not much similarity between the Laotian situation, but from a strategic standpoint, would you say there would be some?

Mr. BALL. I would say there would be some, but I would like to note this exception in the case of Laos, and perhaps this could be off the record.

Senator GORE. Anything you desire to be off the record, say so.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator GORE. Back on the record.

TRIBAL SYSTEM

Mr. BALL. The organization of the Congo society is one which is based primarily upon a tribal system. I would not try to list all the tribes. I would suppose that there must be in the neighborhood of well over 100 in the Congo.

Some of the larger ones are indicated on that map, but you will get from the map a sense of the potential fragmentation if the country were ever to organize itself to revert to the tribal basis of its organization. These tribes do not recognize, or the tribes do not exactly coincide with, the traditional borders of the Congo.

As you will note from this chart, the tribes themselves tend to overlap the national boundaries, and parts of the tribes exist on the other side of the boundaries. This again reinforces the danger of infiltration, the danger of difficulty in case the Congo itself should be taken over by the Communist powers.

I can think of no better base of operations for the Soviet Union really anywhere in the world than this to pursue their purposes of having a whole continent in which they might establish themselves.

Senator GORE. Are you indirectly making the point that the fight for the Congo has really been the fight for Africa south of the Sahara?

Mr. BALL. That is precisely correct, Mr. Chairman. By the loss of the Congo, the creation of conditions under which the Soviet Union would come in, would, of necessity, lead to a situation which we could not accept, and therefore the dangers of a great power confrontation in the Congo is something which has been on our minds from the beginning.

If we come into the Congo bilaterally, then we invite the Soviet Union to come in. If they come in, they make it necessary for us to come in. This is the essential basis for the United Nations being in the Congo, because the situation has developed in a way where the Congo by itself cannot resolve its problems without some outside assistance, and that outside assistance, if it is not to come from one of the great powers and therefore, invite a great power confrontation, can come only from the United Nations.

COMMUNIST LEADERS IN THE CONGO

Senator CAPEHART. Who are the Communist leaders in the Congo at the moment, and who have they been in the recent past?

Mr. BALL. The man who has been the kind of chosen instrument of the Soviet Union is Mr. Gizenga, as you know.

Senator CAPEHART. He is still there?

Mr. BALL. He is still there. He is under house arrest in Stanleyville at the moment.

Senator CAPEHART. He is the only one?

Mr. BALL. No; there is a group of extreme nationalists who have been subverted to the Communist cause.

One always finds in a situation of this kind that the ideological motivation of these people is not very clear because of the fact that they are not sophisticated in the ideology with which we and the rest of the world are acquainted, and where extreme nationalism

and a commitment to some kind of Soviet or Communist doctrine becomes very fuzzy.

U.N. INTERVENED AT REQUEST OF CONGO GOVERNMENT

Senator CAPEHART. Might I ask this question, which has never been quite clear to me: What was the one direct reason why the United Nations intervened in the Congo situation?

Mr. BALL. They intervened at the request of the Congo Government when it was apparent that if they did not intervene, the Congo Government was going to bring in the help of the great powers.

Senator CAPEHART. Isn't it a fact that they intervened when Belgium moved the troops——

Mr. BALL. Well, they intervened——

Senator CAPEHART. To stop the Belgian troops?

Mr. BALL. What happened, Senator Capehart, was that after the independence of Katanga, within about 5 days afterward, the army revolted. It was in the chaos that followed that the Congo began to fall apart. There were secession movements springing up all over, based, to some extent, on old tribal considerations.

A WRITTEN OR ORAL REQUEST

Senator DODD. What Congo government was it, Mr. Secretary, that asked the United Nations to come in?

Mr. BALL. That was the government of Lumumba, which was the constitutionally elected government, although Mr. Lumumba himself was, as we all know, not the kind of leader we would have wanted to see in the Congo.

Senator DODD. He was certainly oriented toward the Soviet, wasn't he?

Mr. BALL. I think there is no doubt about it.

Senator DODD. And he was the one who invited the United Nations in?

Mr. BALL. He and President Kasavubu invited the United Nations in, but actually the situation at that time was that they had asked for help from the great powers, and that the United States and the Soviet Union were both on the verge of sending assistance in.

We had, as I recall, at the time refused to send in—is that true? We had refused to send in forces under purely U.S. auspices.

Senator GORE. Senator Church, I have a number of questions, as all of us have; I wonder if it would be agreeable for the Secretary to summarize these six points which he wished to make——

Mr. BALL. That is right.

Senator GORE [continuing]. And then take our turn, or do you wish to submit one now?

Senator CHURCH. Yes, it will be agreeable to me, Mr. Chairman. But just to clear this point up, since we are on it, is it true that prior to the time that Lumumba requested the United Nations to enter the Congo he had, in fact, requested the United States to enter the Congo?

Mr. BALL. My recollection is that he had requested the United States to enter the Congo; that we had said we did not wish to do

so because we did not wish to create an opportunity for the Soviet Union to come in. Our position was that we would do all we could to help within the framework of the United Nations.

Senator DODD. That is a matter that is disputed, Mr. Secretary. Can you tell us if he did make such a request, to whom and——

Mr. BALL. Perhaps my colleague, who is more familiar with the details, can furnish that. Can you do that?

Mr. VANCE. The Congo Government—I believe Mr. Gizenga, the Vice Premier, countersigned by Mr. [Justin] Bomboko, the Foreign Minister—conveyed a formal request to the United States for United States troops.

Mr. BALL. Do you have the date of that?

Senator CAPEHART. Was that a written physical document? Do you have that? May we see it?

Mr. VANCE. I will have to refresh my memory on that, but it was conveyed orally—I believe it was conveyed in writing to our Ambassador.

DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS IN THE CONGO

Senator GORE. Let us just hold up the proceedings until we can clear it up. This is an important point. Was it written? Was it oral? Who made it?

Senator DODD. I want to make it clear that when I was in the Congo I asked about this, and I was told in one case that there is no record, and no one ever heard of it, and that is why I said I wondered about it.

Mr. CLEVELAND. My name is Stanley Cleveland, and I am assistant to Mr. Ball.

The situation as it existed—it must have been around the 7th or 8th of July, or about 3 or 4 days after the insurrection began in Leopoldville—was such that our Embassy, I believe, had by that time destroyed all of its code facilities. In fact, communications from Leopoldville to the outside world were on a very peculiar basis. There was, however, a request from Mr. Gizenga to our Ambassador at the time in Leopoldville.

Senator DODD. Mr. Timberlake.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Timberlake. The request was conveyed by our Embassy in Leopoldville, probably over the telex machine, to Brussels. Then it was made into a telegram in Brussels and sent back to Washington. But I know, having been in the middle of this communications chain myself, that there was such a request made and transmitted.

Mr. BALL. For the information of the committee, Mr. Cleveland at that time was the political officer in our Embassy in Brussels.

Mr. CLEVELAND. That is right.

DIRECT MILITARY AID

Senator LAUSCHE. May I read what Secretary Rusk said on this because it is pertinent? He said:

> The new Congolese Government reacted violently to the return of Belgian forces. On July 12 that government requested urgent dispatch of United Nations forces to the Congo to protect the national territory of the country and avoid a threat to international peace.

On the same day on which the Congo Government requested United Nations aid, it also requested direct United States military aid.

I do not know what is meant by direct military aid. Did they ask us to send in materiel, or did they ask us to send in troops? But it seems, according to Rusk, it all happened on the same day; the first request went to the United Nations, then the second to our country. What the ultimate facts are, I do not know, and I think we ought to get it in some way.

Mr. BALL. We will be glad to furnish the committee with an exact statement of this.

Senator GORE. Without objection, the State Department is requested to submit an exact statement, with such documentation as is possible to achieve. At this point, and before it is printed in the record, each member of the subcommittee will have a copy thereof.

[The document referred to follows:]

CHRONOLOGY OF CONGOLESE REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN JULY 1960

Violence broke out in the Congo the evening of July 7, 1960, and spread to Leopoldville on July 8. Belgian soldiers moved to protect their citizens on July 11 and 12. The first Congolese request for outside military assistance came on July 10. Dr. Ralph Bunche, who had arrived in Leopoldville prior to independence, met for four hours with President Kasavubu, Prime Minister Lumumba and fifteen cabinet members. This meeting resulted in an official Congolese appeal to the U.N. for technical assistance to help in organizing, strengthening and training of the national forces of the Congo for purposes of defense and the maintenance of law and order.

The security situation continued to deteriorate and two days later, on July 12, Ambassador Timberlake at the close of a Congolese Cabinet meeting was given the following letter, dated July 12, which was handed to the Ambassador:

"To His Excellency, The Ambassador of the United States in Leopoldville:

"We have the honor to confirm today's conversation during which we informed you of the decision of the Congolese Government to invite the American Army into the Congo in order to insure the maintenance of order in the Lower Congo and Leopoldville.

"Since the situation is particularly serious in this part of the Congo and since the hope for collaboration between the Congolese Army and the Belgian Army has been compromised by the incidents of Matadi, it is essential that a foreign, neutral army be on the spot in order to assure peace and order in collaboration with the Congolese Army.

"We would be most appreciative if you would intervene immediately with the American Government so that a contingent of 2,000 men be sent in all urgency to Leopoldville. Thanking you for your courtesy, we are,

"Sincerely yours,

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs, J. Bomboko.

"For the Minister of National Defense, in his absence, the Secretary of State for National Defense, A. Nyembo

"For the Prime Minister, in his absence, Vice Prime Minister A. Gizenga."

The same afternoon, Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko delivered a radio address which elaborated on the request for American aid. *Inter alia* Bomboko said:

"For several days a climate somewhat approaching terrorism has existed in our country . . . We were on the point of achieving success. Unfortunately, serious incidents have jeopardized that success in the lower Congo, particularly at Matadi. Being aware of all these factors, we were compelled to consider restoring order within the framework of United Nations aid. However, for practical reasons, it is impossible to bring together the members of the United Nations on short notice, and since events in the Congo brook no delay, we have been compelled to request American troops, within the framework of that United Nations aid, in order that wherever it is impossible to restore order in cooperation with the Belgians, such troops could nevertheless assist us in restoring the peace."

Meanwhile President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba sent the following cable, dated July 12, 1960, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

"The Government of the Republic of the Congo request urgent dispatch by the United Nations of military assistance. This request is justified by the dispatch to the Congo of metropolitan Belgian troops in violation of the treaty of friendship signed

between Belgium and the Republic of the Congo on 29 June 1960. Under the terms of that treaty, Belgian troops may only intervene on the express request of the Congolese Government. No such request was ever made by the Government of the Republic of the Congo and we therefore regard the unsolicited Belgian action as an act of aggression against our country.

"The real cause of most of the disturbances can be found in colonialist machinations. We accuse the Belgian Government of having carefully prepared the secession of the Katanga with a view to maintaining a hold on our country. The Government, supported by the Congolese people, refuses to accept a *fait accompli* resulting from a conspiracy between Belgian imperialists and a small group of Katanga leaders. The overwhelming majority of the Katanga population is opposed to secession, which means the disguised perpetuation of the colonialist regime. The essential purpose of the requested military aid is to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is a threat to international peace. We strongly stress the extremely urgent need for the dispatch of United Nations troops to the Congo.

"(SIGNED) JOSEPH KASAVUBU
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO AND SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL ARMY

"(SIGNED) PATRICE LUMUMBA
PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE"

Based on this telegram the United Nations Security Council, on July 13, adopted the following resolution:

The Security Council,

Considering the report of the Secretary-General on a request for United Nations action in relation to the Republic of the Congo,

Considering the request for military assistance addressed to the Secretary-General by the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo (document S/4382),

1. *Calls upon* the Government of Belgium to withdraw their troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo;

2. *Decides* to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance, as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

The Congolese grew more and more insistent in their demands that the Belgian troops depart immediately, and on July 15 Prime Minister Lumumba, in a radio broadcast, declared that the Congo was at war with Belgium. The same day Lumumba and Kasavubu sent a telegram to Soviet Premier Khrushchev. This telegram declared that Belgium and "certain Western countries" are conspiring against the Congo's independence and that "we may have to ask the Soviet Union's intervention, should the Western camp not stop its aggression." They asked Premier Khrushchev "to watch hourly over developments of the situation." Premier Khrushchev in reply said that if Belgium did not withdraw her troops from the Congo, the Soviet Union "will not shrink from resolute measures to curb the aggression" and that the Soviet Government would give the Congo Republic "the necessary help which may be required by the victory of your just cause."

HANDLING SUCH MATTERS ORALLY

Senator GORE. Senator Church, is it agreeable to you to proceed in the regular order?

Senator CAPEHART. May I make one other comment? Are matters as far-reaching as this handled orally so that nobody can remember who did it?

Mr. BALL. I can say this, we will find, I would be amazed if we could not find, a cable record of this sort. But this was a matter where the Embassy at that time was under enormous pressure in Leopoldville, and where, as Mr. Cleveland has said, the code facili-

ties were in disarray because they had to burn them, thinking that there might be a takeover. It was not a normal situation.

Senator GORE. Is it agreeable with the subcommittee that the Secretary conclude the summarization of the six points which he wished to make by way of statement?

Then, will you proceed, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. BALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

OBJECTIVES IN THE CONGO

First of all, to summarize our objectives in the Congo, our immediate objective was to prevent chaos and civil war which could open the field for Communist infiltration.

We were quite as concerned to avoid the kind of situation which would require a major power confrontation or would lead to a major power confrontation and which could create a new Korea. We wished to give support to the development of a stable and effective government under a moderate national leadership, since this seemed to us the only long-range hope for stability.

We wished to maintain the essential unity of the Congo because we believed that this was necessary, not only for its economic viability, but that also the forces and pressures were such that without unity the Congo could not be politically maintained and, consequently, large parts of the Congo would become open for Communist penetration. In other words, what we were seeking to do was to channel the forces of African nationalism, which were the dominant forces in the Congo, into the orderly development of a stable new nation.

THE U.N. AND THE CONGO

To turn to the third question, why the United Nations is in the Congo: We will furnish the information which the committee requires as to the exact circumstances and nature of the request which the Congo Government made both to the U.S. Government and to the United Nations itself.

I may say with regard to this that the Soviet Union has consistently opposed the U.N. operations in the Congo because they saw in the initiative which Mr. Hammarskjold took after the United Nations came into the Congo, a real menace to the possibility of successful Soviet penetration there. This, as you may recall, was the basis for the Soviet vendetta against Mr. Hammarskjold and for their emphasis on the troika proposal.

ADOULA IS A PROMISING MODERATE

The final result—nothing is final in this moving history which we are confronted with—but as a result of the U.N. activity Parliament was reconvened and, as the result of the reconvening of Parliament, Mr. Adoula was elected as the Prime Minister. Mr. Adoula is, in the view of the U.S. representatives on the spot, the most promising moderate nationalist leader in the Congo, and the man on whom we believe a large part of the future of the Congo must necessarily depend if it is to be a stable area.

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one question. Are you 100 percent sure of Adoula or——

Mr. BALL. Let me say, Senator, it is very difficult to be 100 percent sure of anyone when you are dealing with this kind of a situation. But all of the evidence we have is that Adoula is a man of moderate views. We have hesitated, quite frankly, Senator, to call him publicly an anti-Communist. May I say something off the record?

Senator GORE. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator GORE. Back on the record. Make such a statement as you desire to make for the record.

Mr. BALL. For the record, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that in the opinion of the U.S. State Department, based on the very close observation of Mr. Adoula in his working relationship with our representatives in the Congo and in his activities generally, we believe that he is opposed to communism. We believe that he is an effective nationalist leader and an effective anti-Communist leader.

Senator GORE. Will you proceed?

Senator CAPEHART. One more question, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. Senator, the subcommittee decided to let him conclude and then take our turn.

Senator CAPEHART. I have to leave at 12 o'clock. If you prefer to ask a few questions here or come back this afternoon, I do not care which, I will be just as happy to do so.

Senator GORE. We cannot finish today, but I was hoping that the record would show some chronological development of the Secretary's statement, and then we could take our turn in asking questions. But if the individual members of the subcommittee wish otherwise, I am the servant of the subcommittee.

Senator CAPEHART. I am one who believes you can get more good information and make a better record if you ask pertinent questions as you proceed. Now, maybe I am wrong in that.

Senator GORE. The Chair shall not interpose.

CONGOLESE CONSTITUTION

Senator CAPEHART. Just one more question: The Congo constitution has never been approved, has it, by a parliamentary body in the government?

Mr. BALL. The situation is this, Senator: There was prior to independence a round table called in Brussels. This was in January 1960.

As a result of that round table, plans were made for the independence of the Congo. There was appointed in the course of the round table, and Mr. Cleveland can refresh my memory on this, there were appointed various factions in the Congo itself to assist Belgian experts in the creation of a provisional constitution which was known as the Loi Fondamentale. This was the constitution, the organic law, which governed the calling of elections which resulted in the creation of a central government in Leopoldville.

You are quite right in saying that this has not been submitted to the Congo people since independence. This is entirely true.

Let me say, if I may, by way of parentheses here, because I think it is relevant, that it is not our view that the Loi Fondamentale is necessarily an immutable document. In fact, I think there is a general opinion among all groups in the Congo now that some changes are going to be necessary, and that it probably should be loosened up in the direction of——

Senator CAPEHART. But at the moment they have no constitution which has been approved by a duly constituted parliamentary body?

Mr. BALL. I think that is correct, Senator.

Senator CAPEHART. Thank you.

Mr. BALL. However, let me say that this is probably the only——

Senator CAPEHART. It may not be important.

Mr. BALL [continuing]. This is the only basis for legitimacy that one can find.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE CONGO'S LOI FONDAMENTALE

The present constitution of the Congo (the Loi Fondamentale) was promulgated by the Belgian Government on May 19, 1960, before Congolese independence. Essentially, it was drafted by Belgian constitutional experts on the basis of the consultations at the Round Table Conference of Congolese leaders held in Brussels in January–February 1960. The Congolese leaders who attended the Round Table Conference represented all of the major political factions in the Congo and included, among many others, Tshombe. Mr. Tshombe expressed his pleasure "at the satisfactory conclusion" of the Round Table Conference. The constitution that emerged from this conference was intended to serve as an interim constitution until such time as the Congolese could draft a constitution for themselves.

As indicated above, the Loi Fondamentale was not adapted as a result of any popular vote in the Congo but was promulgated by the Belgian Government prior to independence and after approval by various Congolese leaders. Rapid adoption of a new, permanent constitution was envisioned by the Belgians and the Congolese leaders who participated in the Round Table Conference. The Loi Fondamentale provides that this new constitution must be approved by the first Congolese parliament by a two-thirds vote and by all of the provincial assemblies. There are complicated provisions relating to the ratification procedure in the provincial assemblies which indicate that the assemblies, if they failed to approve the constitution as a whole, must propose amendments to cover the points with which they are in disagreement. These amendments are then re-submitted to the parliament and subsequently to the provincial assemblies.

Since the Loi Fondamentale was promulgated by Belgium, the legal power then administering the Congo, with the consent of the Congolese leaders, since it is clearly provisional and specifies the procedure for adopting a permanent constitution, and since the Congolese government and leaders have, by their actions (including the Kitona agreement), implicitly expressed their acceptance of its validity, we regard it as legally valid until Parliament and the provincial assemblies take the necessary steps to replace it.

ALTERNATIVE TO GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION

The final and, I think, the most important, justification for the United Nations being in the Congo, and for our supporting its being there, is the fact that this was the alternative to a great power confrontation.

This is a matter which has been deep in our minds. The last thing in the world we wanted to see come about was another Korea or possibly the establishment of Soviet power there, and the necessity then for the non-Communist countries to come in, with the real danger of creating a brushfire conflict which could be escalated.

So that we frankly do not know of another alternative to the United Nations that could have been utilized for this purpose and under those circumstances.

SUPPORT FOR A UNITED CONGO

To come to the question which has been widely discussed in this country as to why we have supported a United Congo and why we have opposed the efforts to create an independent Katanga, Congolese unity is the principal issue in Congo politics. No Congo politician outside of South Katanga could exist without being committed to the creation of Congolese unity, and the political leadership outside of South Katanga is unanimous on this point.

If we are to have a moderate government which meets the requirements of our policy in Leopoldville, then it can only exist if it can be shown to be capable of dealing with the problem of Katanga's secession. This is not a situation which we invented. This is a situation which exists.

We think that history has, to an extent, demonstrated this rather vividly within the last few weeks, because the progress which has been made since the Kitona meeting on the solution of the problem of Katanga secession, has been very largely responsible for Mr. Adoula's ability to begin to cope with the Gizenga problem. The fact that Mr. Gizenga is now under arrest in Stanleyville and that his personal power has been very largely dissipated by the initiative of the Adoula government, is a demonstration of the fact that in the proper sequence of events the Katanga problem had to be dealt with first. This was the postulate on which our policy was based. I think that events have so far tended to justify this.

The only historic basis for a government in the Congo are the boundaries which were established under the Belgian Congo system, and while I agree with Senator Capehart—he is quite right in his observation that there has been no constitution formally adopted by the Congolese people—there is no other document than the Loi Fondamentale at the moment that is available to serve for this purpose.

Now, if the principle of self-determination were applied, which is the principle which has been implicit in what Mr. Tshombe has been—in the position that he has taken—if this were applied generally throughout the Congo, the result could be a kind of fragmentation which is roughly illustrated on that map, which is a fragmentation based on the dominance in individual areas of the large tribes which have formed, to some extent, and might coagulate for

some political purposes. I think no one has said this better, sir, than the chairman himself in the report which you, Senator [Maurine] Neuberger, and Senator [Phillip] Hart did on this, where you pointed out, I think, very clearly indeed, the situation that would result if there were a Balkanization of the Congo along tribal lines.

I think that, at the same time, as I suggested to Senator Capehart a moment ago, while there cannot be fragmentation and a stable situation, and there cannot be Balkanization, there is a reasonable need for some loosening in the Loi Fondamentale. I assume this is something which would be undertaken in the course of working out the problems with Mr. Tshombe.

STOPPING A CIVIL WAR

Let me raise the fifth question, as to what progress have we made in the Congo. First, we have—when I say "we," I refer to U.S. policy in this case, carried out through support of the United Nations—has resulted in a stopping of total chaos, in stopping a civil war which could have resulted in a more sanguinary and hopeless kind of struggle. It has prevented great power intervention which could result in great power confrontation.

There has been a broad coalition under moderate nationalist leadership created. Peaceful reintegration of the Congo is now underway through the initiative of President Kennedy, following a telegram from Mr. Tshombe, which brought about the Kitona meeting. While one cannot be assured of the ultimate result of the present discussions, certainly we can see the spectacle today of the representatives of Katanga in Leopoldville discussing the constitutional revision while, at the same time, the patrols that are undertaken at Elizabethville are joint forces of the Katanga forces and the United Nations, which is in sharp contrast to what prevailed a while ago.

Most important, the Gizenga problem is now being dealt with, and we hope it will be dealt with effectively.

CALCULATED RISK

This policy which we have followed was a policy of calculated risk. We recognized all along that there was no assurance that it would succeed. We cannot assure this——

Senator LAUSCHE. Which was the most important factor in that calculated risk, if you will identify it?

Mr. BALL. I would say, Senator Lausche, it was the risk of supporting the United Nations throughout, and in supporting the United Nations in what amounted to its efforts to bring about a reintegrated and stable Congo, which meant——

Senator LAUSCHE. Were personalities of the incumbent government in the calculated risk?

Mr. BALL. The incumbent government——

Senator LAUSCHE. Was Adoula a calculated risk?

Mr. BALL [continuing]. Adoula is a calculated risk. We think this is a risk which is one where the odds are very much on our side, because we are impressed with Adoula as the most promising moderate leader in the Congo.

Now, as to the problems for or the prospects for the future, the first problem is really twofold: First, to continue to press for a complete reintegration of the Katanga with a very active participation in the government by Mr. Tshombe or his representatives in the central government. We think Mr. Tshombe is a very important political figure in the Congo. We think that he can play an extremely constructive role in a reintegrated Congo. We have never questioned this point.

Second, it is to bring about in the course of this constitutional revision a constitution which will perhaps be better adapted to the needs of the Congo itself.

Third, there is the problem of finishing up the elimination of the Gizenga influence in the Congo, and bringing Stanleyville clearly under the control of the central government.

But, again, all of these things are only the beginning of a process which is going to take a lot of time and a lot of effort before we realize our long-range objectives.

DISCIPLINE OF THE CONGO ARMY

At the moment we must face the fact that with the elimination of the Belgian command, the Congo army is not under the discipline of the Congo Government, and if the United Nations were to leave the Congo tomorrow, the kind of incidents which we have already seen occurring around the Congo would be multiplied many times over.

I think the danger of chaos, with an army running wild, without being under the effective control of the state, is very great. So that I think perhaps the first thing that has to be done in order to bring about a stable Congo is to retrain the army, and this means disarming units of the army progressively, retraining them, bringing them under the discipline of Congolese officers so that they, in the long run, can become an element of stability in the state, rather than an element of chaos which they are today.

Let me say, this is something which probably only the United Nations can do, because to have too large or too active military missions for many of the outside powers involved, is to create opportunities for real difficulty.

TRAINING OF CIVIL SERVANTS

At the same time, we have a very serious problem of re-establishing the elements of effective administration in the Congo, and this means the training of civil servants.

Under the Belgian system there were, as I recall, seven classes in the civil service. There were almost no native Congolese in the upper four classes.

The assumption of a possible future for the Congo after independence was a viable assumption only if the Belgian top administrative group was to continue. After the troubles really started, a large part of that group left. I think it consisted of around 8,000, didn't it?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Eight or nine thousand.

Mr. BALL. Eight or nine thousand, but I think, hopefully for the future, many of them have come back and are accepted by the cen-

tral government and have been accepted as individuals working in the machinery of the central government.

There must now be about 1,500 or 2,000 in the Leopoldville government. I think that the restoration of individual Belgians in the system of civil government can be a useful element for the future. At the same time, the Ford Foundation, for example, has a school in Leopoldville where they hope to train as many as 1,000 a year to work in the civil service.

It is going to be a long, slow process of training enough people to be able to take over the responsibilities of this very big country. We have to get the Congo finances in order. The situation right now is that a very large part of the revenues of the Congo are derived from the operations of a handful of Belgian companies in the Congo, in Katanga and the Kasai, largely. At the moment, these revenues are, to a considerable extent, being paid to the Katanga government rather than to the central government.

The old apparatus for collecting taxes in Belgium itself, which used to be the system, has been dismantled, and something has to be set up to substitute for that. But we must find a way of having the tax revenues flow into the treasury of the central government in order to give it the means to carry on.

Not only the tax revenues, but the income from the securities which were set aside for the benefit of the Congolese people are now being held, I think, in Brussels in escrow, and the apparatus must be worked out so that this can be accomplished.

At the moment, I think that the position of the Belgian Government is one of reluctance to make these revenues available until the central government assumes the obligation to pay the debts of the Congo itself. This must be negotiated and worked out.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE CONGO

Then we will have the problem of providing enough economic assistance to get the development progress going throughout the Congo in a way which will satisfy some of the needs, some of the felt needs, of the Congolese people.

In this connection, let me say that while the requirements for the immediate future may be substantial, the financial requirements, the promise of the Congo is very great. The national income, gross national product, of the Congo is in the neighborhood of $1,100,000,000. This is something which provides a per capita income of something over $70 per head, and while this is not large, it is large by some Asian standards. The resources of the Congo are such that with careful development it should become an area which can, to a very large extent, sustain itself.

A stable Congo, a Congo which is able to sustain itself in the heart of Africa, could become a great monument to the efforts of the free world and make a very real contribution to a stable Africa as a totality. I think this is something that is going to take work; it is going to take time; it is going to take effort, but I would hope that we are on the way to at least seeing the beginning of this process.

Mr. Chairman, this is a very rough and not particularly coherent sketch of what we have been trying to do, and is some appraisal of the results to date.

FURTHER QUESTIONS

I will be very happy to answer any of the questions that the committee may have. Mr. Vance and Mr. Cleveland are very familiar with the history and background of this, and Secretary Williams is here and is going to testify later, so that if I cannot answer the questions, perhaps I can find someone who can.

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, it is now 7 minutes past 12. Senator Capehart had to leave for a program and he says he cannot be here Monday, but he can be here tomorrow. I have a number of questions. I am sure that all members have questions. Could you return tomorrow to continue this session?

Mr. BALL. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, I am leaving for Panama tonight. I will be back Sunday morning, and I would be available on Monday, but I cannot be here tomorrow. However, you will be here, won't you?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I will be here if you want to intersperse that.

Senator GORE. I think some members of the committee will want to submit questions directly to you, in view of the statements you have made.

Senator DODD. I have a number of questions.

Senator GORE. I thought so, and I have some. When will you return from Panama?

Mr. BALL. I will be back Sunday morning, so I will be available any time next week.

Senator GORE. Senator Capehart, as I understood him, said he could not be here until 11 o'clock on Monday, so perhaps it would be 11 o'clock before we reached him anyway. Would it be satisfactory with you to return on Monday?

Mr. BALL. I am at the convenience of the committee, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. Without objection, the committee will reconvene——

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, could I check my schedule? I do not think it will make that much difference, but I am very anxious to ask some questions and to get some information.

Senator GORE [continuing]. The committee will excuse you, Mr. Secretary, and the other State Department witnesses for the moment, and we will advise you whether to return Monday.

Will you check your schedule, Senator? In the event, I dare say, that the subcommittee may not be able to finish the questions of you Monday morning, what is your schedule Mr. Secretary, on Tuesday?

Mr. BALL. I shall be in Washington all week, Mr. Chairman, I am available to the committee.

Senator GORE. Any time next week is satisfactory to you?

Mr. BALL. Yes.

Senator GORE. You understand that your testimony here is entirely in executive session?

Mr. BALL. Right.

Mr. LONG. Can this statement of the Secretary of State be released?

Senator GORE. It has been released.

Mr. BALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. The subcommittee will adjourn until Monday at 10 o'clock.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Monday, January 22, 1962.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, JANUARY 22, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS;
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Lausche, Church, Dodd, and Wiley. Senators Fulbright and Aiken also attended.

George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, accompanied by G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, briefed the committee members on the Congo situation.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The meeting was adjourned at 12:10 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JANUARY 23, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee continued into executive session at 12:16 p.m., in room 4221, new Senate Office Building.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Church, Symington, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

On motion by Senator Humphrey, and without objection, the committee approved the nominations of William C. Foster, to be Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Adrian S. Fisher, to be Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Frederick G. Dutton, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; William J. Handley, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Mali, and Henry R. Labouisse to be Ambassador to Greece, for report to the Senate.

The International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (Mollusks) (Executive M, 87th Congress, 1st Session), and the Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Executive N, 87th Congress, 1st Session), were approved for report on motion by Senator Humphrey and without objection.

The nominations of Chester A. Bowles, to be the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs, and Ambassador at Large; George W. Ball, to be the Under Secretary of State; George C. McGhee, to be Under Secretary of State of Political Affairs; John O. Bell, to be Ambassador to Guatemala; John H. Burns, to be Ambassador to the Central African Republic; Parker T. Hart, to be Ambassador to the State of Kuwait; Ridgway B. Knight, to be Ambassador to Syria; Armin H. Meyer, to be Ambassador to Lebanon; Raymond L. Thursten, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Haiti; Dr. Ansley J. Coale, to be U.S. Representative on the Population Commission of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations; and John M. Cabot, to be Ambassador to Poland were approved unanimously for report.

The committee agreed to hear in open session W. Averell Harriman discuss the situation in the Far East at a later date in connection with his nomination to be Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

The bill (S. 512) To extend the time for completion of the Free Highway Bridge between Lubec, Maine, and Campobello Island, New Brunswick, Canada, was ordered reported without objection,

but with the committee action first subject to the approval of the junior Senator from Maine, Mr. Muskie.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:26 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Lausche and Dodd. Senator Aiken also attended.

G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, accompanied by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, briefed the subcommittee on conditions in the Congo, and their relation to the United Nations.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 11 a.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 11 a.m., in room F–53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Humphrey, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Aiken, Carlson, and Fulbright.

The subcommittee was briefed on the situation in the U.S.S.R. by Ambassador Charles Bohlen and Foy Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

No record was kept or transcript taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 3:30 p.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman), and Senator Aiken.

Without objection, and subject to the polling of the members, it was agreed unanimously to report the nominations of William S. Gaud to be Assistant Administrator for the Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development; Edmond C. Hutchinson, to be Assistant Administrator for Africa and Europe, AID; Seymour J. Janow, to be Assistant Administrator for the Far East, AID; Teodoro Moscoso, to be Assistant Administrator for Latin America, AID; Robert McClintock, to be Ambassador to Argentina; Adlai E. Stevenson, Francis T. P. Plimpton, Charles W. Yost, Philip M. Klutznick, and Jonathan B. Bingham, to be U.S. Representatives to the United Nations; C. Allan Stewart to be Ambassador to Venezuela; and John M. Steeves, to be Ambassador to Afghanistan.

The nomination of Vice Admiral Edward Nelson Parker, to be Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was put over until he could appear before the committee, at the request of Senator Symington.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 4:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., in executive session, in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman), and Senator Lausche and Church.

The subcommittee was briefed on the Congo situation by G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Lausche and Church. Senator Aiken also attended.

Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, briefed the committee members on the Congo situation.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

WORLD MILITARY SITUATION AND ITS RELATION TO UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. John Sparkman presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Denney, and Mr. Newhouse of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. The committee will come to order.

Let me say to the members of the committee, you notice you have a statement before you that is classified. Leave it at your place when you go out. Don't take it from the room.

Mr. Secretary, we are glad to have you with us this morning. We are in executive session. We are glad to have you bring the committee up to date on the national defense picture and its particular relationship to foreign policy.

For several years now, at the beginning of each session of Congress, the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency have met with the committee to give us their assessment of the overall world situation. We are glad to have you here for that purpose.

Mr. Secretary, you understand that we do have this record taken down. If at any time, though, you would like to leave off any part of it being taken down, we can simply suspend the reporting.

This is kept confidential; it will not be published. It is kept locked in our own files here in the office for the use of the members of this committee, and not taken from the room. So, I think you can feel safe in its security, although sometimes there are some things that we would just rather not be put down in print at all, so you feel free to indicate at any time when you feel that is so.

You may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary McNAMARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to read a statement, one that may require 30 to 40 minutes to complete. However, there are certain points which I wish to make this morning with respect to our strategic policies and plans and I wish, therefore, to read it. I have reduced it to

writing and, with your permission, I would like to read this statement.

Senator SPARKMAN. Very good, sir.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I also hope you will interrupt at any time or ask questions relating to the text.

Senator SPARKMAN. Fine.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Today, and as far as we can look into the future, we face formidable international problems. None of these problems appears susceptible of an exclusively military solution. Military power is but one of our tools for pursuing national goals. It can be used effectively only as part of a unified effort, fully meshed with the other instruments of our national policy.

Nevertheless, the military factor is always influential and is often a determinant in international affairs. This factor establishes a set of limits to the non-military courses of action otherwise available to us at any given time.

Because of the powerful influence of the military environment upon the great issues with which this committee deals, perhaps the most useful service I can render today is to outline the Defense Department's current evaluation of the principal elements and trends in the worldwide military situation. I will do this first by reviewing the relative nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, and then by developing some of the considerations applicable to the balance of non-nuclear forces between NATO and the Soviet bloc. I will then treat the problems of covert Communist aggression.

SOVIET NUCLEAR STRIKE CAPABILITIES

We have recently completed a new estimate of Soviet strength in ICBM's. This estimate is the result of continued study of the available evidence which includes an accumulation of information in which we now have a high level of confidence. The essential conclusion of our assessment is that the Soviets have deployed a much smaller number of ICBM's than we had once thought they would by this time in early 1962.

The U.S.S.R. has relatively few ICBM's and a modest number of submarine-launched missiles capable of attack on North America. Despite the grave threat they pose to a number of areas, they are few in relation to the number of military targets it would be in the interest of the Soviet Union to attack. They represent only a limited threat to the nuclear strike force based in the United States or deployed at sea.

We now estimate that the Soviets will by mid-1962 have between 35 and 50 launchers from which missiles could be fired against the United States. The number of operational ICBM launchers will not increase markedly during the months immediately ahead. Our analysis leads us to believe that the Soviets decided not to deploy a large force of their first generation ICBM's, but to press for a more easily deployed second generation system. However, some of these new launchers will probably soon begin to receive second-generation missiles, and by mid-1963 we anticipate that the Soviets will perhaps be able to increase the number of launchers to a level of 75 to 125.

LAUNCHERS V. MISSILES

Senator GORE. May I ask a question?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Surely

Senator GORE. When you say launchers, would this term include a facility from which a succession of missiles could be launched?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It is difficult to answer that question with certainty with respect to the ICBM launchers. It definitely does include a launcher with a capability of firing more than one missile in the case of the medium-range missiles, and I will cover that subsequently.

Senator GORE. Very well.

Secretary MCNAMARA. But with respect to the ICBM launchers, it seems most probable to us they have a capability of launching only one missile per launcher, but I cannot speak definitively on that point.

Senator LAUSCHE. When you speak of launchers, you mean the entire device equipped with the missile?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Right.

Senator LAUSCHE. Ready to be fired?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Right.

I use the term "launcher" as ready to be fired rather than missiles, because sometimes confusion has been injected into these discussions by using the word "missiles," which obviously includes missiles not on launcher and not ready to fire.

Senator GORE. Thank you for the clarification.

SOVIET BOMBER AND SUBMARINE STRENGTH

Secretary MCNAMARA. The Soviet threat will thus increase in the future, but continued improvement in our own dispersal, hardening, and mobility will offset the threat to our U.S.-based nuclear delivery forces.

The bulk of present Soviet capability to attack the United States is in bombers and submarine-launched missiles. We believe that the U.S.S.R. could put about 200 bombers, excluding combat attrition, over North America on two-way missions in an initial attack, but such an attack could not be launched without our receiving warning more than adequate to alert our strategic forces and air defenses. The Soviets now have about 30 submarines equipped to carry and launch a combined total of about 90 ballistic missiles. Although about a third of these submarines are believed to be nuclear powered, all of them are handicapped for effective surprise attack against the United States by the long transit time from Soviet bases, by the short range of their missiles, and by their apparent inability to launch while submerged.

INTERMEDIATE RANGE STRIKE CAPABILITY

Our earlier estimate of large Soviet MRBM strength has, however, been substantiated. We believe that there are about 300 MRBM launchers within range of targets in the NATO area. These launchers are equipped with ballistic missiles having ranges from 700 to 1,100 miles and, as I mentioned a moment ago in answer to Senator Gore's question, we believe they have multi-launch capabilities.

We believe that the Soviets will also have a 2,000 nautical mile IRBM available in the near future. The Soviet nuclear strike capability against the European NATO area also includes several hundred jet medium bombers, plus short range aircraft and missiles. However, the Soviets cannot commit these forces threatening Europe, even in conjunction with a first strike on the United States, without the certain knowledge that they would receive an overwhelming counterattack by substantially intact U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

Finally, the ICBM's, IRBM's, and bombers of the U.S.S.R. are vulnerable to attack, being deployed at fixed, soft bases. Although Soviet air defenses are extensive, we are confident that we have sufficient knowledge of their locations and their performance limitations to avoid or neutralize them.

NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND NATO

In contrast to the Soviet strike capability, the United States and its allies have available a large and diversified nuclear arsenal which now provides, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future, a decided advantage in both delivery systems and nuclear weapons of practically every category.

The strategic forces include 50 operational ICBM's, and close to 1,700 heavy and medium bombers, including the V-force and available carrier based aircraft. In addition, 80 operational Polaris missiles and 90 IRBM's are deployed. Further, NATO now has a vast arsenal of tactical aircraft and missiles in the nuclear strike forces.

We have good reason to believe that our stockpile of nuclear weapons for delivery by this extensive system is of far greater magnitude and diversification than that of the Soviet Union. We have tens of thousands of warheads, ranging from a fraction of 1 kiloton to the largest size for which we now see any military use.

A STRONG NATO POSTURE

Much more important than our numerical superiority is the fact that the overall NATO nuclear posture, including forces external to the European continent, is far less vulnerable to enemy attack than the Soviet system. Our strength is deployed to strike Russia from every direction, and much of it is remote from the Soviet Union; in contrast, theirs is centralized and more easily reached. Our strength is better protected, more mobile, more dispersed, more diversified, and generally more advanced technically than theirs.

The external nuclear forces, principally those of the United States, of the NATO Alliance have a great and growing capacity to survive surprise attack. Fifty percent of the U.S. bomber force, with each aircraft carrying as a matter of fact—is on 15-minute ground alert. An airborne bomber alert capability has been developed and is constantly maintained. Our early warning system is being strengthened.

The United States already has some hardened ICBM sites coming into operational status, and the number of such sites will increase rapidly. The Polaris submarines, which add greatly to the invulnerability and flexibility of our overall system, do not depend on warn-

ing for their survival, and can launch their missiles from a submerged position at a range of at least 1,200 miles. This range will be increased in the near future, in 12 to 18 months.

STRENGTH OF BOMBER FORCE

Senator LONG. Can you tell us how many bombers we have capable of carrying these atomic missiles?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would be very happy to tell you. At the present time, let me give it to you as of July 1 of next year, that is a little easier, we will have at that point 1,550 bombers in our Strategic Air Command Forces, that are made up of 615 B–52's, 855 B–47's, and 80 B–58's.

The B–52's, generally speaking, can carry [deleted] and at that same time, which is next July 1, we will have about 460 air-to-surface missiles for those B–52's, the so-called Hound Dog. We will have in addition to that on the order of 140 Atlas and Titan missiles operational, and we will have 144 Polaris missiles operational. But that number, only about two-thirds at any one time on station. The net effect of all of this will be—may I have this off the record?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

BOMBER PENETRATION CAPABILITIES

Senator LONG. These bombers will have what I take it to be enough to shoot their way into the Soviet Union if they have to?

Senator WILEY. Does the Kremlin know this?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would like to answer his question first, and then I will answer that.

The penetration capabilities of these bombers are something that we cannot evaluate precisely. The Soviet Union has emphasized the construction of air defense weapons and systems over the past 2 to 3 years. They have placed a tremendous amount of their defense budget into the procurement of such systems, and today I believe that they are very effective.

These bombers, many of them, are equipped with Hound Dog missiles which can be launched between 350 and 600 miles from the target, and thereby they are penetration aids in the sense that they can be launched against air defense sites and air defense facilities, thus helping the bombers penetrate. Furthermore, the Polaris submarine missiles and the Atlas and the Titan missiles can also be launched ahead of the bombers against the air defense systems.

For both of these reasons the bombers' penetration capability will be greater July 1 than it was 1 or 2 years ago. Nonetheless, the air defense system of the Soviet Union against manned aircraft is likely to be so strong as to take a heavy toll of our bomber aircraft as they proceed to the target.

We have taken account of this, of course, in developing the force levels which we recommend to the President and he, in turn, to the Congress, and which are the foundation of our fiscal 1963 budget.

SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF U.S. FORCES

Now, to answer Senator Wiley: I believe that the Soviet Union does know this. We have made it our objective to tell them in the last 9 months. Mr. Nitze, Mr. Gilpatric,[1] and I have on several occasions spoken to this point publicly, both in order that the Soviet Union may know our power, but also so that our own allies and our own people may know it.

This is an extremely dangerous situation we are in. As I pursue this paper, I will try to indicate that, despite this power, we are in great danger. But we would be in greater danger if either our allies or our own people or the Soviet Union failed to understand the power we have. So we have made it our objective to disclose it.

Senator WILEY. That is why I wondered why you took this off the record, because if it is a deterrent, and the people here know it, Russia knows it, I do not see the advisability of keeping it further secret, because I just wondered——

Secretary MCNAMARA. The specific point I wished to leave off the record was the number of warheads in our alert force. This is a vital point that can affect the disposition of their air defense and the operational plan that they would develop for the use of that air defense, and I wished to withhold that, at least for the present.

Senator WILEY. And the Kremlin does not know about those warheads? That is what my question was.

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir. It knows of the warheads, but it does not know specifically the number we have in our alert force.

Senator WILEY. Thank you.

U.S. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

Secretary MCNAMARA. If I may proceed then, starting with the second paragraph on page 5.

Finally, the United States has a command and control system which we believe will continue effective operations under major nuclear attack. We have hardened underground control centers, a continually airborne command post, and a command ship at sea, all of which provide a highly centralized system for control of nuclear weapons. We are confident that our command system gives the President a rapid and secure mechanism for bringing our nuclear power to bear when needed, and that it would remain operational throughout any foreseeable United States-Soviet nuclear exchange.

The net result of all these facts is that a clear military superiority for major nuclear conflict now exists, even if the Soviet Union strikes first. Moreover, this superiority is growing and we are determined that it shall be maintained.

In passing, let me say I gave you the number of warheads planned for our alert forces as of July 1 of this year. We plan to approximately double that in the 3 to 4 years ahead, and the programs which we presented to Congress are designed to that end.

---

[1] Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, and Deputy Secretary Roswell S. Gilpatric.

CONSIDERATIONS OF GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR

In light of the relative nuclear strike capabilities of the U.S.S.R. and NATO, we have developed a number of basic and critical judgments of the probable results of general nuclear war should these strengths on both sides be put to that test in a near time period.

The first conclusion which emerges is that U.S. nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union after a nuclear exchange, measured in surviving strategic nuclear forces, would be even greater than before. This would be the case no matter which side initiated the nuclear exchange. The Soviets cannot attack the relatively well-protected main base of our nuclear strength in sufficient force to keep us from inflicting enormous destruction on their delivery systems and on all parts of the civil societies of the Soviet Union as well.

The second major conclusion, however, is that Soviet-inflicted damage to the civil societies of the Alliance could be very grave indeed. Even if we attempted to destroy the enemy nuclear strike capability at its source, using all our available resources, some portion of the Soviet force would survive to strike back.

SOVIET STRATEGY CANNOT BE PREDICTED

In estimating the civil damage that might result, one must take into account not only numbers of vehicles that would reach their targets, and the size of their warheads, but also the strategy chosen by the Soviet Union.

There would be a high priority to hitting at military forces and, in view of the substantial Allied nuclear superiority, it would not seem militarily sound for the Soviets to attack civil targets. To do so would invite prompt, certain, and massive Allied destruction to the Soviet Union. Further, the Soviets may avoid nuclear attacks on civil targets in the hope of ultimately controlling a relatively intact Europe. Nevertheless, the rationale of a Soviet attack cannot be predicted, cities may be targeted, and even if this attack aimed primarily at military forces, extensive civil destruction would occur.

The final major conclusion which emerges is, therefore, that leaders on both sides must be aware that the likely results of a full nuclear exchange might be: Virtual destruction, not only of the nuclear power of the Soviet Union, but of its economic and social fabric as well; survival of the United States and the other NATO nations, but with very serious damage to their human and material resources.

THE NON-NUCLEAR BALANCE IN NATO

The implications of general nuclear war impose restraints on both the East and the West, but the pressures on the Soviet Union, arising from the nuclear balance, we believe, are stronger. Despite our best efforts to achieve a solution by political means, we must consider the possibility that we may have to take some kind of military action if we are not to lose our vital interests in Berlin through erosion. The threat of general nuclear war has not been sufficient thus far to deter the Soviets from pressures and other ac-

tions designed to erode our vital interests in Berlin. Conflict is inherent in the present situation unless the political course of one side or the other is changed.

Similarly, other crises at other parts of the NATO area may occur in the future. Bearing in mind the relative nuclear strength, it therefore becomes important to assess briefly our comparative non-nuclear strength and some of the implications involved.

In our view, the Russians have superiority in non-nuclear forces in Europe at the present time, but this superiority is not overwhelming. While the U.S.S.R. can today rapidly mobilize greater non-nuclear strength in Europe than can the NATO Alliance, the portion of this strength which can be effectively applied is limited by geographic, logistic, and above all by political and strategic factors.

It is our view that it is within the capability of the alliance during the course of the present tensions to provide non-nuclear defense of the NATO area adequate at least to hold a bloc non-nuclear attack for a period sufficient to cause the Soviet Union to realize the gravity of the course upon which it has embarked. In time, the NATO Alliance has the capability to create even stronger non-nuclear forces relative to such non-nuclear bloc forces as could be brought to bear under the restraint imposed by the nuclear threat.

RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF BOTH SIDES

The respective tactical air strengths which can now be brought rapidly to bear in Western Europe tend to favor the bloc. Maximum efforts by each side to reinforce might provide the bloc an additional quantitative edge; however, these increased capabilities could be achieved only at some sacrifice of other strategic considerations, and they would not be large. With a concentrated effort, the West can probably reduce or eliminate this advantage.

On the ground, there is a rough balance in effective divisions currently deployed in the area immediately critical to the Berlin situation. We can now count 24 NATO divisions on the central front so deployed, in comparison with the 26 Communist bloc divisions in East Germany. While the bloc enjoys a larger total reinforcement capability, the satellite divisions are of reduced value because of their doubtful reliability.

As to nominal total of some 147 active Russian divisions, over one-third are maintained at only cadre strength. Others are disposed for operations in other areas of the Soviet Union and in low states of readiness. It is therefore our considered estimate that, with due regard to the factors limiting Soviet freedom of action, a total of only 55 or so Soviet divisions would be brought to bear effectively in the first 30 days of hostilities.

Against this estimated ground threat, NATO could, during 1962, have on the order of 28–30 divisions deployed in Central Europe, with a capability of increasing this number up to 35–40 divisions within 30 days after the start of mobilization. These are not unfavorable ratios for the defender, particularly in view of the nuclear forces available to back them up.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO

A number of conclusions concerning general and limited war flow from three basic judgments.

General nuclear war superiority is and must remain a fundamental strength of NATO, as of the whole free world. The alliance must maintain the psychological and physical readiness for general nuclear war as a central objective of its military policy in order to defend the vital interests of its members. The effects of general nuclear war, however, could be so grave that the alliance should engage in such action only when necessary in the defense of these vital interests and only after exhausting all feasible political, economic, and other lesser military actions.

Short of general nuclear war, the relative non-nuclear balance leaves the West vulnerable to the continued aggressive policy of the Soviet Union. The Soviets can attempt to exploit our vulnerabilities, always trying to avoid the threshold of general nuclear war, by a series of minor aggressions or possibly through limited but serious non-nuclear actions, probably followed by a prompt call for negotiations to avoid Western reaction. The capability to defeat Soviet aggression at whatever level it occurred would make such Soviet actions clearly futile.

NATO now has superiority in nuclear warfare and at sea and on land. To repeat, in the short term the NATO Alliance can offer a non-nuclear defense in Central Europe capable at least of holding a bloc non-nuclear attack without significant withdrawal for some period of time. In the longer run it is within the capability of the alliance to create still larger non-nuclear forces. In our view, the alliance should make certain that a future crisis will find us better prepared then the present one.

U.S. MUST HAVE CREDIBLE DETERRENT

Deterrence, the prevention of war while achieving NATO's objections, must clearly remain our principal goal. However, NATO has heretofore not given adequate consideration to the possibility that deterrence may fail and that war may come in spite of our best efforts to the contrary. It is our belief that deterrence against large-scale Soviet military aggression based primarily on the threat of general nuclear war is not credible against many lesser Soviet actions, political as well as military, none of which is grave enough, in itself, to warrant recourse to general nuclear war.

Thus, we consider that we must recognize the dangers of exclusive reliance on general nuclear war as an instrument of policy and make the effort required to build a strong non-nuclear capability as well. We believe that the United States and the NATO Alliance must, in the words of President Kennedy, "have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action."

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Finally, before leaving the question of the nuclear balance and its implications, let me refer to one issue that is now reflected acutely in a NATO policy problem, but that has wider effects as

well. This is the issue of the spread of nuclear capabilities to additional countries.

On this, the position of the United States is clear. We remain strongly opposed to the creation within third countries of nuclear weapons capabilities, whether by independent production or by transfer of weapons.

Although several countries are now capable—or might become capable within a few years—of producing a limited number of nuclear weapons, it is exceedingly improbable within the foreseeable future that any country or group of countries could develop a capability that even remotely approached that of the United States or the Soviet Union. Moreover, nothing in the actions of the Soviets suggests that they are prepared to transfer nuclear weapons to the independent control of another Communist country.

NATO'S NUCLEAR DILEMMA

Nevertheless, we are confronted with the desire of certain European nations for an increased nuclear role within the context of NATO. These nations state that such a role is necessary if pressures for additional independent national capabilities are to be reduced or eliminated. We hope that after the Europeans are exposed to more of the facts of U.S. nuclear capabilities, they will be reassured and convinced of the undesirability of fundamental changes in the present ownership and control of nuclear weapons within the alliance.

Basically, the development of additional independent centers of nuclear decision would have a destabilizing effect on relations among all the major powers. Even with relatively minor nuclear capabilities, each additional center of decision would increase the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used for national purposes, or by accident, miscalculation, irrationality, or desperation, with a corresponding increase in the danger of setting off a general nuclear war.

COVERT AGGRESSION

I have dealt previously in detail with the non-nuclear balance in the NATO area. Elsewhere in the world, there exists a continuing danger of overt aggression against the countries on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. However, there are also powerful restraints that operate not only against general nuclear war, but against lesser overt aggressions.

There remains another major technique of aggression, one that is repeatedly and skillfully used by the Communists. This is what Mr. Khrushchev, in his speech of January 6, 1961, calls "wars of national liberation." We know them as subversion, induced or supported insurrection, guerrilla operations, or covert armed aggression. It is a form of warfare which has the advantage of remaining well below the threshold of a conventionally defined international aggression. At the same time, it is usable in countries which are not contiguous to the bloc, though it is a much more powerful technique in adjacent countries, where supply and reinforcement are easier and where the threat of overt military action compounds the defender's problems.

Covert aggression is not a new Communist technique. The political/military cadres who gradually seized control of the satellites of Eastern Europe after World War II and those who later seized North Korea, Red China, and North Vietnam had been carefully prepared for many years. Today, cadres are active in Laos and Vietnam, where insurgency has reached a high degree of development. We believe they are forming in a number of countries in various other regions of the world where insurgency is still only latent.

MAGNITUDE OF THREAT

The President underlined the magnitude of this threat when, in his address to the Congress in March 1961, he said: "In more areas of the world, the main burden of local defense against overt attack, subversion, and guerrilla warfare must rest upon local populations and forces. But given the great likelihood and seriousness of the form of strong, highly mobile forces, trained in this type of warfare . . ."

There is a large range of military/political options open to Communist attackers utilizing the covert aggression technique. These options include the subversion of individuals, tribes, fronts, parties; guerrilla warfare; and the entire gamut of Communist operations designed to undermine the free world. As serious as are the threats of general and limited war, in our judgment they do not in the long run exceed that of covert aggression. This is particularly true in this decade of the 1960's.

Grave as this problem is, it is not insurmountable. We must remind ourselves of the fact that partly through the assistance of the United States, 28 million Filipinos are free; 14,300,000 South Vietnamese remain outside the Communist bloc; Greece and Iran are still free; and with British assistance, 7 million Malayans retained their freedom. The states on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc have been the most severely tested. In non-contiguous areas, where there were no bases nearby into which the Communists could reach for quick resupply and reinforcement, and without the leverage given by the direct threat of overt military aggression, they failed in Malaya, the Philippines, and—in the late stages of the fight—in Greece.

EFFORTS TO COUNTER COVERT AGGRESSION

The President has stressed the urgency of combatting Communist wars of covert aggression and we are acting to meet the problem. I should like to explain briefly to you how we are going about this task in the Department of Defense.

Our first problem is that of organizing and directing the effort. Both General Lemnitzer [2] and I spend a good part of our time giving personal direction to this endeavor. For instance, in the past 60 days we have twice been to Honolulu to meet with Admiral [Harry] Felt, the Pacific Commander, and with senior commanders to discuss our defense contribution to South Vietnam. I intend to

---

[2] Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

continue this practice on a monthly basis. We started similar meetings with our Caribbean Commander. We were there last Saturday.

In addition, Major General John A. Heintges, who served as chief of the Programs Evaluation Office in Laos from 1959 to 1961, has been designated as the chief focal point within the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization for problems pertaining to covert aggression. Brigadier General William B. Rosson has been designated Special Assistant to the Army Chief of Staff for the same purpose.

Under Presidential direction, I am sending senior officers from all services upon orientation and study trips to places in which Communist covert aggression is present or threatened. I have instructed that all promotions to senior Army positions be reviewed to make certain that senior officers are professionally qualified in all phases of warfare, including the counter-insurgency type. Doctrines are being refined within all service schools, and training courses for many officers who require further professional instruction are being intensified and expanded.

SUPPORT GIVEN TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

We recognize that our task overseas is largely to provide support to foreign military establishments and foreign governments. They do the job. We advise them and we support their anti-covert aggression activities. Our advice and support must be sound. It must fit in with that given to the same governments by the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the United States Information Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency. The advice and support given to foreign governments by all of us must form a pattern of activities which, if vigorously prosecuted, will bring success.

The balance of diplomatic, political, economic, psychological, military, and intelligence programs is difficult to strike. The Communists are attempting to establish states within states. There is competition by force and persuasion for the allegiance and control of entire populations. It is not only guerrilla warfare that is involved; it is total warfare on the level beneath that of overt invasion. During fiscal year 1962 we have worked hard, across administrative lines, to develop country plans which, when fitted into plans by foreign governments, together comprise a way to win.

EXAMPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM

The dual overt and covert threat that exists in certain countries along the border of the bloc makes the problem particularly difficult. South Vietnam provides a good example. Vietnam's military forces must be poised for double assignment. They must be light, fast, and quickly responsive to the internal threat, while retaining the capability of assembling quickly should weight and width be required to meet an external thrust from North Vietnam.

In South Vietnam, the United States is contributing that which the Vietnamese cannot themselves contribute: helicopters, versatile aircraft, transports, river boats, sea patrol boats, communications equipment, maintenance and construction gear. Experienced U.S. training, staffing, and intelligence teams are also helping bridge the gulf of inexperience.

ASSISTANCE TO NON-CONTIGUOUS COUNTRIES

In addition to countries contiguous to the bloc, the Department of Defense is also assisting countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. These are the countries whose first concern is internal security and whose force structures reflect the response to internal covert aggression more than to an external threat.

Our Military Assistance Missions and Advisory Groups are concentrating now upon the development of training, organization, equipment, and doctrine which can best assist countries like Colombia, Peru, Liberia, and Ethiopia to maintain internal security and help meet the needs of their awakening peoples. We are training friendly officers to use their security forces to assist in educating the people, providing sanitation, building schoolhouses, constructing farm-to-market roads, and treating their injuries and illnesses, as well as to protect them. These latter measures are part of the program known as Civic Action. They are essential elements of the larger effort of our military to assist the governments and people of the lesser developed countries to reinforce their defenses against the internal threats to their security.

DOD'S VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT

The policies of this administration on disarmament can be described in detail more appropriately by others. We in the Department of Defense have naturally played an active part in the greatly intensified study and research in this vital area that has gone on in the past year, and have been fully consulted in the development of national policy.

Briefly stated, our thinking on disarmament and arms control involves three central considerations. First, U.S. security may be enhanced by multilateral limitations and restraints on military capabilities—provided they are fairly designed and faithfully executed. Second, any system of disarmament or arms control that is adopted must include the pressures necessary to ensure Soviet compliance—to ensure that the Soviets cannot, through a covert violation, obtain a measure of military superiority over the United States.

Finally, any measures that are adopted must be designed in a manner that will preclude a decisive change in the relative military positions or capabilities of the two sides to our disadvantage. This means, for example, that measures which would reduce overall U.S. nuclear superiority should be matched by corresponding reductions in those Communist bloc superiorities which threaten friendly areas now protected largely by our nuclear deterrent.

Before closing, I would like to touch briefly on three factors which, while not directly related to the foregoing discussion, are central to our military posture, and of especial concern to this committee. The factors are mobility, military assistance, and State Department-Defense relationships.

MOBILITY OVERSEAS BASE REQUIREMENTS

In the East-West conflict, the Communists are clearly the military aggressor. The West does not seek its goals by military attacks. Thus the initiative rests with the Sino-Soviet bloc. It can

strike from its power center at a time of its own choosing, anywhere along its 14,000-mile frontier opposite the free world. This factor generates a requirement for a high order of U.S. military mobility.

In the defense establishment, we are concentrating on improving our capacity for getting quickly into action wherever needed. We are needed. We are expanding air and sea lifts, prestocking equipment abroad for forces in the United States, developing a novel shipborne forward floating depot—a self-contained, mobile, U.S. sea base, capable of delivering equipment and support anywhere on the Indian Ocean or Southeast Asian littoral in 5 to 25 days. We are also increasing the active forces held ready in the United States.

An element of mobility that is of particular current concern relates to our overseas base structure. Base requirements are not immutable; they change with change in equipment and weapons. However, as long as we must be ready to bring force to the Communist perimeter, a large and complex structure of bases, including, periodically, new ones, will be absolutely necessary.

I am aware of the political difficulties this requirement poses. We have experienced problems, as you know, with France, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and others, and foresee difficulties in the Azores, perhaps Spain, and elsewhere, but we must contrive to hold the needed structure. Loss of the Azores, for example, would seriously curtail our ability to move forces rapidly to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Bases remain an urgent and continuing problem.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

On the second of the three factors I mentioned, military assistance, I shall be appearing before you in April to present the specific elements of the program for fiscal year 1963. Let me, however, today indicate the highlights of our approach in this area.

In the NATO area, we are continuing major grant programs to Greece and Turkey, which clearly lack the resources to take the essential steps to develop their non-nuclear capabilities. For other countries, however, we have continued the policy of reducing or eliminating grant aid. In the few cases where it will be continued, this aid will be expressly contingent upon at least equal additional efforts by the recipient countries. Almost all the key European countries are now economically capable of carrying their own full share of the NATO defense burden.

A corollary to this military assistance policy is, of course, the effort that we have made to offset the balance of payments costs of our forces in Germany through an undertaking by the German Government to expand its military purchases of goods and services from the United States in amounts approximately equal to those costs. We are now seeking a similar arrangement with France.

REVIEW OF POLICY REGARDING MAJOR RECIPIENTS

From a dollar standpoint, the bulk of military assistance continues to go to the key allied countries on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc—Korea, the Republic of China, Turkey, Greece, Iran, and Pakistan. Vietnam, and to a lesser extent, Thailand, are spe-

cial cases, and, as you know, in Vietnam we are going all-out to assist them.

Over the past year, we have started an intensive review of military assistance policy in the six major recipient countries I have listed above. The effort has been to see whether military assistance can be reduced so as to permit greater relative allocations of U.S. aid on the economic side, and also, where possible, to reduce the burden on the local defense budget. This review has already resulted in some adjustments of the military assistance program without, however, reducing military force levels to an unacceptable degree.

A major question concerns Korea, where it has not been wise to consider an adjustment of the force level up to the present time, but where we are now engaged in a special overall strategic review to see what the future United States/Korean posture should be. It involves a most difficult weighing of strategic risks against the necessity for greater economic and political programs within Korea. I know that this matter has been of concern to this committee in the past, and I shall be prepared to speak to it more fully when we present the military assistance program.

IMPORTANCE OF BOTH LARGE AND SMALL PROGRAMS

Whatever adjustments we may make in these key programs, however, I should like to make it clear that each of these countries will continue to require major forces as a part of the overall defense posture of the free world. Unless external security remains assured, we cannot expect them to make the social and economic progress that is vital to their longterm stability.

The third and growing concern of the military assistance program is with those countries that do not confront a direct external threat from the Sino-Soviet bloc, but where there is a continuing threat of internal subversion. The dollar amounts we devote to Latin America, to Africa, and to countries in other areas falling within this category are not large. However, we have been devoting an intensive effort to the refinement and improvement of these programs, having regard to the particular local political situation in each case. I am convinced that we must do a much more effective job in this regard, particularly in Latin America, if these countries are to have the stability and freedom from Communist disruption that are essential to their continuing progress.

STATE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIPS

I said at the start of this statement that I would confine myself to military matters. In this period of cold war, covert aggression, and crisis, however, political and military matters are so deeply and continuously intertwined that the State-Defense relationship becomes an element of our military capability. Perhaps I should report briefly on that relationship as I see it.

The State Department is responsible, under the President, for formulating and directing the implementation of our foreign policy. This is fully understood in the Defense Department. On the other hand, in this time of troubles, military considerations bear on many aspects of our foreign policy, and in some cases may even govern policy decisions. It is our duty, from the Defense side,

to insure that the military considerations which apply are made known to the State Department at various levels, and supported adequately in State's decision-making process. Occasionally, on basic matters where important political and military objectives diverge, it is desirable to present the issue to the President for decision.

ON A SOUND FOOTING

Extensive machinery exists in both Departments to implement this relationship, both in Washington and in the field. In my judgment, it is working well.

My own contacts with Secretary Rusk are frequent, cordial, and effective. Members of my office, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the service departments have numbers of contacts, daily, with State Department officers. Military members of country teams throughout the world, and major commanders and their staffs, have intimate contact with ambassadors and embassy staffs abroad. Foreign Service officers serve as political advisers on the staffs of our major commanders. It is reported to me that in these contacts, in all but a handful of cases which can be corrected at higher levels, military considerations are given a full hearing and due weight in decisions.

I consider that State-Defense relationships, based upon mutual respect and understanding, are on a sound footing.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement.

U.S. PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. It is a very informative statement. You certainly are involved all over the world.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Much too much.

Senator SPARKMAN. I want to ask you a few questions with reference to one area, and probably others will deal with other areas. I want to ask a few questions based on Vietnam. How many American military personnel do we have now in Vietnam? Could you break this down as to the number and kinds of units that are there?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would be very happy to submit for the record a detailed statement of this. It is changing very rapidly.

There were approximately 1,000 U.S. military personnel there roughly the first of October of last year. That is rising rapidly toward a total of between 5,500 and 6,000 which we anticipate will be there by, roughly, July 1 of this year. At the present time—this is, say, February 10—we have on the order of 3,500.

Senator SPARKMAN. I do not see any need of your preparing a statement, if you could just give us a rough idea.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. Of the 3,500 we have, perhaps, 675 in three helicopter companies, roughly 225 per company, with a total of about 60 helicopters. We have about on the order of 5 to 600 in communication units. The communication facilities in the country, as you can well imagine, are very primitive.

There are 90 South Vietnamese battalions. We are placing five advisers with each battalion. There will, therefore, be 450 assigned in that role.

These advisers will include intelligence, communications, and tactical operational officers. Not all of those are there. I would say of the 450, as of today, probably not over 100 or 150 are in place.

We have several hundred carrying out the normal functions of a military advisory group, handling the receipt and disbursement of the materiel and the follow-up on the use of materiel. We have the remaining number handling training functions for the civil guard, the self-defense corps, and the Vietnamese Army.

SHIPMENTS OF MATERIEL

Senator SPARKMAN. Are we shipping a great deal of materiel into the country?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The largest shipments in terms of dollar value recently have been the 60 helicopters. We are not shipping large amounts of additional materiel in any normal sense of the word. We are, as I have indicated, greatly expanding the number of men who are there on training and advisory missions.

I omitted reference to two missions I should tell you about. One is what is known as Jungle Jim, which is a small air force training unit consisting of 16 planes and a small number of officers and men, something on the order of perhaps 150 altogether, which is sent there for training the Vietnamese Air Force in guerrilla type operations.

Also we have a small number of naval vessels present to assist the Vietnamese Navy, which is very small, in the development of coastal patrols to prevent further incursions by North Vietnamese along the coast. That would be about 150 men.

U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE; AMERICAN CASUALTIES

Senator SPARKMAN. What naval forces, if any, do we have available in these waters?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We have portions of the Seventh Fleet in the area, but the only vessels close to shore, say within 100 to 150 miles, would be two or three patrol boats which are assisting the South Vietnamese Navy in identifying North Vietnamese junks and shipping moving in the South Vietnamese coast.

Senator SPARKMAN. How many casualties have we had in Vietnam?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would want to check this for the record, but I believe we had two men killed in a grenade accident, unrelated to enemy action at all; one man killed, and one man missing, I believe, plus the three deaths that were referred to yesterday on which I have not received a full report. So I would say less than 10 and probably on the order of 6.

ARE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT MARKED?

Senator SPARKMAN. Are American aircraft that are operating there marked as American aircraft?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Are the helicopters and the few planes you mentioned the only——

Secretary McNAMARA. Those are the only operational ones we have.

Senator SPARKMAN. But they are clearly marked as American aircraft?

Secretary McNAMARA. They are. The helicopters are functioning as transporters of Vietnamese troops from one point to another. They are not participating in the action beyond that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask what is the significance of the question whether they are marked or not marked? Is there anything that is important about that?

Senator SPARKMAN. No; I just do not know. I just wanted to find out.

Secretary McNAMARA. I would like, in view of your answers, to go off the record here.

Senator SPARKMAN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENTAL REFORMS

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, what steps have been taken, how much progress has been made, or I will put it to you this way: has effective progress been made in the reforms that President Diem was going to put into effect?

Secretary McNAMARA. This is a question that could be answered much more authoritatively by the State Department. I do not really wish to give an answer therefore. My opinion is, yes.

LIKELIHOOD, IMPORTANCE OF DEFEATING VIET CONG

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you believe that the South Vietnamese can defeat the Viet Cong under President Diem's leadership?

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe that we should do everything possible to assist them to do so.

The Viet Cong are continuing to increase their forces in South Vietnam. The are continuing to supply those forces across the Laotian border and by sea.

It is too early to say whether the South Vietnamese will be successful in defeating the Viet Cong, but I believe very strongly we should make every effort to assist them to that end.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, hasn't the President expressed a determination that we would do that?

Secretary McNAMARA. He has.

Senator SPARKMAN. Don't we regard it as being absolutely necessary that we defeat them?

Secretary McNAMARA. I am tempted to say, yes. But I do not wish that to be interpreted as meaning that we consider it to be so essential that we would, for example, or that we have decided that it is so essential that we would deploy U.S. combat troops there. No such decision has been made.

We believe it highly desirable for the South Vietnamese to defeat the Viet Cong. We are committed to a program of providing them all possible training assistance and materiel support to that end, but it is too early to say that they they will be successful with such training support and materiel assistance, and if they are not suc-

cessful, we have made no decisions as to what the next act would be.

GUERRILLA TRAINING

Senator SPARKMAN. Are we training any of the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics for use against North Vietnam?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would like to go off the record again.

Senator SPARKMAN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator MORSE. Will the Senator from Alabama ask another question, will the Secretary comment on whether the jurisdiction of this guerrilla training apparently lies in some agency partly outside of the Pentagon Building? I would like to know why, if that is true.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SPARKMAN. This is my last question.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would the Senator yield for a preliminary question to you again?

[Discussion off the record.]

VIETNAM COMPARED TO GREECE

Senator SPARKMAN. The only additional question I wanted to ask is, isn't this operation in South Vietnam rather similar to the one we had in Greece back in 1946, 1947?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, it is. It is different, particularly at the present time, in that the guerrillas in South Vietnam are being supplied, quite openly and directly, by North Vietnam in a way that certainly in the latter parts of the Greek operation was not apparent.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Wiley.

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY; SITUATION IN CHINA

Senator WILEY. I want to compliment you on this statement, sir. Of course, to a large extent it confirms what we all know from reading the magazines and the newspapers.

I did want to ask you about whether you have any information that would tell us what the situation is between China, Mao Tse-tung, and Russia, Khrushchev. In other words, here we have your analysis which clearly shows that we have the deterrent power militarily. I wonder if you have any information to show that there are other deterrents such as internal dissension, I mean proof of dissension between Mao Tse-tung, and also what the situation is in the Far East in relation to possibly Mao Tse-tung thinking that the time is ripe for him to strike Formosa.

I realize a lot of this is a matter of CIA, also a matter of importance for the State Department. I think it is vital for you, too, sir.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Senator Wiley, these questions, as you have indicated, are primarily matters of foreign policy, but I will say this: first, we do have evidence that the Chinese military forces are being adversely affected by conditions within Red China. They have suffered lack of supplies; they have suffered lack of food. They

have been adversely affected by diversions of petroleum and other products from the military forces to other parts of the economy.

We do not have any information that indicates that Red China will or will not in the near future attack Taiwan. Our sources of intelligence are not sufficiently complete to bring information to bear on that point.

It is difficult to say who is supplying and who is directing the supply of the Pathet Lao in Laos, and who lies behind the efforts of the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam.

There is some indication that the Soviet Union and Red China are following somewhat contradictory courses in those two areas. But beyond that very general statement, I am not prepared to answer in more detail.

CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

Senator WILEY. Are the Chinese getting any of these modern weapons?

Secretary MCNAMARA. China is undoubtedly developing a nuclear bomb. However, our information as to their progress is not complete. We do believe that they will have the capability of detonating such a bomb within, perhaps, 12 to 36 months, but I think the possibility that they would be able to launch it successfully against any distant target is not great, and will not be great for a number of years.

We have no information to indicate that the Soviet Union is making available nuclear weapons to the Red Chinese.

CREDIBILITY OF U.S. DETERRENT

Senator WILEY. Is it your judgment that the deterrents that we have discussed, military and otherwise, have put off the day that Khrushchev would think, or whoever was in charge would think, to let the balloon go up?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do not believe that Khrushchev wishes to engage in nuclear war any more than we do. I think our danger is not that he would initiate such a war consciously and knowingly, but rather that the credibility of our deterrent is low as a deterrent against acts of political aggression, and is low against certain minor acts of military aggression, and that he may misjudge the point at which we would apply our nuclear power.

This is the danger, and I think, by far the greatest danger, we face. To minimize that danger or reduce it, we have tried, and will continue to try, to increase our non-nuclear power, thereby being able to respond more effectively to the Soviet Union's acts of political aggression or minor military aggression, and thereby reducing the danger of nuclear war.

SOVIET WEAPONS IN CUBA

Senator WILEY. How many nuclear bombs and otherwise has Cuba gotten from Khrushchev?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We cannot say absolutely they have received none, but it is my firm belief they have received none.

Senator WILEY. That is all.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Mansfield.

FUNCTION OF CIA

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, I want to join with the other members of the committee in commending you on an excellent statement concerning the world situation as it affects our country.

I assume that all the members of this committee had a pretty good idea that the CIA was operating in Laos, Vietnam, perhaps Cambodia and other places in that part of the world, and in other areas as well.

Is the CIA operating on a basis of setting policy? Is it operating on a basis of equality, or is it operating in a subordinate position?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The CIA does not operate in any of these areas, to the best of my knowledge, in a way that allows it or permits it to set policy. It operates only in accordance with established policy, policy established by the President, policies that are fully known to us and fully coordinated with us in the Defense Department.

Senator MANSFIELD. Its primary function is the gathering, coordinating, and the evaluating of information?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It is.

MILTARY SITUATION IN LAOS

Senator MANSFIELD. At the present time, there is a struggle going on in the region of Nam Tha in Laos. What is the military situation there?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It is very obscure. It appears to us that the Pathet Lao, if they choose, can take control of that village. They have not done so yet, or at least had not as of last night, based on the last information I received.

Senator MANSFIELD. On the basis of the huge amounts of money which we have expended in the maintenance of the Laotian Army which, incidentally, includes allowances for their families—on the basis of the year's further training and an increase in the size of the force, are they proving any more effective at present than they were a year ago?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, materially so. The size of the military forces has been increased during that period of time. The equipment supplied to those forces has also been increased. They are far better trained than they were. They appear to have a higher morale today than they did 1 year ago or even 6 months ago.

But, unfortunately, during the same period of time the number of Vietnamese opposing the force has more than doubled and almost quadrupled, and the North Vietamese are much more effective soldiers than either the Pathet Lao or the Royal Laotian Army personnel.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, am I to understand from your answer that the North Vietnamese are in Laos in force and aligning themselves with the Pathet Lao?

Secretary MCNAMARA. They are.

AMERICAN PERSONNEL IN LAOS

Senator MANSFIELD. How many American personnel are now in Laos?

Secretary MCNAMARA. About 750, I believe.

Senator MANSFIELD. How many of these, roughly, are with Laotian Army units?

Secretary MCNAMARA. In contrast to South Vietnam, where I am intimately acquainted with the number, I will have to express a guess here, and I will insert it in the record, but it is on the order of 550 to 600.

ARE AMERICANS IN LAOS UNDERCUTTING POLICY?

Senator MANSFIELD. One more question, Mr. Secretary.

There have been published reports that American military personnel in Laos have openly criticized official policy there. Recently the committee has received other reports charging that both the military and CIA personnel are undercutting official policy by encouraging General Phoumi to reject any compromise of his basic position.

What is your comment on these reports?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I have found no evidence to support the reports. Our instructions to our personnel in Laos, and also South Vietnam, are very clear and specific on these points. In the case of Laos, they are, under no circumstances to support Phoumi in his intransigence; in the case of South Vietnam, under no circumstances, to add to the current of criticism that is directed against Diem.

There have been reports that contrary actions have taken place in both cases. I have not found any evidence to support those reports, but I have taken action to make certain that the instructions are clear to the personnel involved.

Senator MANSFIELD. I am very happy to have the answer, Mr. Secretary, because I think that you must have seen some of these newspaper stories which have appeared. I am especially happy about what you had to say relative to Diem, who, in spite of all his faults, is the only man, in my opinion, capable of keeping South Vietnam free and keeping it independent. I think that a lot of these people who criticize him ought to recognize that without him and our aid, there would be no free Vietnam today, and he should be given a good deal more in the way of credit, I think, than criticism, as has been the case and seems to be increasing in this country.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Carlson.

AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN CIVILIAN DRESS

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, just one or two questions.

I agree with the other members that this is an excellent statement. In fact, I think it is something that our people and the country should continue to get this information on our military strength. I think it is important from our national standpoint and the world standpoint.

Ambassador Nolting was before this committee 2 or 3 weeks ago, and he made a very interesting comment that I have been thinking about. As I got it, he stated that our military personnel who are in Vietnam, when they mingle with the people, dress in civilian clothes. In other words, they mix with the people, and you do not realize they are American soldiers.

Is that true?

Secretary McNAMARA. It is true, in part. Frequently they do wear uniforms, but at other times they wear civilian clothes.

Senator CARLSON. Well, now, as of July 1 we will have 6,000 U.S. soldiers in this area. Is that to our advantage or disadvantage to have these folks wear civilian clothes?

It seems to me we are a great nation, and the soldier's uniform would, I think, add some strength and stability to them. Maybe I am wrong.

AVOID DRAMATIZING NUMBER OF PERSONNEL

Secretary McNAMARA. At the present time we are refraining from publicly stating the number of men we have in South Vietnam, hoping to avoid a direct clash with the ICC on this question. I think it would be unwise under these current circumstances to dramatize by any means the number of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese are very sensitive to the extent to which we appear to be directing their military effort, or directing their nation for that matter. For both these reasons, therefore, I think it is unwise to dramatize our power.

Senator CARLSON. It just occurs to me in view of the fact that we are building up from 1,500 to 6,000 in July, we are so committed that I do not think there is any use of our trying to deceive ourselves that we are not involved and will continue to be, based on your own statement. I think what we will all agree on is that no matter what the cost is going to be, we will be in there with strength, and we are going to have to stay. That, to me, appears a possible battleground in the future, and I do not see that we gain anything by trying at the present time to not be out in the open, but I am sure you have studied this through.

NUMBER OF POLARIS SUBMARINES

I have several other questions.

You mentioned in your statement the number of missiles that we have. I think you stated we have 80 operational Polaris missiles.

Secretary McNAMARA. I did, sir.

Senator CARLSON. How many Polaris submarines do we have?

Secretary McNAMARA. There are six missile submarines and, therefore, there are five we call operational. There is a sixth at sea, but not fully deployed as yet.

Senator CARLSON. How many do you expect to have within the next 12 months or so?

Secretary McNAMARA. We expect to have 29 at sea by the end of calendar 1964. By July 1, 1963, we expect to have 192 Polaris missiles operational.

Senator CARLSON. In how many submarines, five to each?

Secretary McNAMARA. That would be 12 submarines.

Senator CARLSON. Thank you very much. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Long.

Senator LONG. Senator Morse is senior to me.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right, Senator Morse.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARE FIGHTERS

Senator MORSE. I have a few questions.

We have been very much concerned on this committee, Mr. Secretary, about reports we continue to receive that the will to fight in Southeast Asia just does not exist in the population. You cannot count on them for being good soldiers. We pour our supplies in there and our men in there, but we are always confronted with sort of a slumping away from the training. They just do not have the will to fight.

Can you give us any assurance that the Vietnamese are fighters?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think the actions in Laos and the actions of the South Vietnamese are different. So it is not the Southeast Asians that do not have the will to fight.

I go on to say the South Vietnamese are quite different from the Laotians in this respect. The South Vietnamese have shown a definite will to fight and a considerable ability to fight when they are properly led and properly equipped, and when the operation is properly planned.

CIA'S ROLE IN GUERRILLA TRAINING

Senator MORSE. I come back to the discussion we had with Senator Sparkman when he was asking you a question about the CIA. I will state my view and then you can reply to it.

I like to feel that all of our military training and all of our training for guerrilla warfare is directly under your jurisdiction in the Pentagon, and that the CIA is in no way exercising jurisdiction or setting up some independent corps that we may call a guerrilla corps, that does not come under your direct jurisdiction.

Can you clarify my understanding about this?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. The CIA is not setting up any separate guerrilla corps nor is it carrying on guerrilla training operations.

Senator MORSE. When you have the kind of training we had in Guatemala prior to the Bay of Pigs, that was done with the full assistance of the Pentagon?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It was.

Senator MORSE. And all the CIA did in regard to it was recommend in the first place the grand strategy, but the military implementation was that of the Defense Department?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, you say the CIA; these are actions that go back before my term, and I do not believe I can comment authoritatively on them.

Senator MORSE. But at the present time, if you had a repetition of that pattern by the CIA, you would have complete jurisdiction over the training of any personnel, bodies, that are going to be trained for guerrilla warfare?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would, indeed.

TRAINING IS CLEARLY DOD'S FUNCTION

Senator MORSE. The CIA's limitation, then, or the CIA is limited to recommending what policy ought to be for covert activity?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, and particularly for supplying information relating to such possible operations.

Senator MORSE. The special training of a body of personnel for warfare in a guerrilla environment, which is sorely needed in many parts of Latin America, as you well know, is such that I want to know who is going to be doing it.

Secretary MCNAMARA. May I respond to say that quite clearly the function of the Defense Department is to conduct training in guerrilla operations.

Senator LAUSCHE. We had some proof within the last 2 weeks that there have been what you might call propagandists or infiltrators sent up into Vietnam, very few in number.

Now, would that type of a person be, come within the definition of a guerrilla operator?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I believe not.

IMPORTANCE OF THE AZORES

Senator MORSE. Two other subject matters very quickly.

You mentioned the Azores. I am concerned with the Azores, too, but I think we have to face what, in my judgment, is an inescapable future event, and that is, the colonial policies of Portugal, both in Mozambique and Angola, are doomed in the United Nations, so far as United Nations support is concerned. I think our policy of self-determination puts us into a position where we will not be able to support Portugal in the continuation of those policies.

This is a very hot issue and it was when I was a delegate to the United Nations at the Fifteenth General Assembly. I think we did pursue a mistaken course of action, but I think we have reversed ourselves since, as far as the Portuguese are concerned.

How important are the Azores to us? You mention in your statement that you think it is very important.

Let us assume a hypothetical—let us assume that if it is true, and I think it will be true, we are going to join with other nations against the Portuguese colonial policy, and let us assume that so angers Portugal that she refuses to extend any leasehold interest in the Azores. What posture is that going to put us in?

ESSENTIAL AIRLIFT CAPABILITY

Secretary MCNAMARA. It substantially reduces the airlift capability which we have. This is the most important factor, particularly in the short run.

At the present time, our airlift capability, even with the Azores, is far less than we need to properly deploy our forces. Using as an index of this the airlift capability to move men and units to South Asia—and I chose that only because I happen to have it in mind, but the same index number could be applied to Africa or Western Europe—we have a capability today to move about 27,000 tons by

air in a 30-day period to Southeast Asia. We need a capability of about 80,000 tons in that same 30-day period.

Now, therefore, we have something on the order of 30 percent of the required airlift capability, and that 30 percent figure applies whether it be to Southeast Asia or to Western Europe. If we lose the Azores, our capability to lift into Africa and certain parts of Western Europe is substantially reduced, and particularly so during certain periods of the year when the Azores base is absolutely essential to effective operations in that European area.

As our airlift capabilities increase over the next 3 to 4 years—and they will increase substantially from the program we are following—the 30 percent of requirement will rise very substantially. It will be close to 100 percent, but even when it is at 100 percent, it would be cut very substantially by the elimination of the Azores base. Certain of our aircraft cannot fly at all into that area without the Azores base; others of the aircraft will have their weight-lifting capabilities cut by about 50 percent.

COULD NEW TECHNOLOGY COMPENSATE?

Senator MORSE. Is there any indication that in the relatively near future our technology will develop new landing devices, whether on aircraft carriers or high sea barge landing docks or airstrips, so to speak, about which we hear something now and then, so that we might be able to compensate for the loss of the Azores if Portugal does not think of this in terms of her own security, too?

Secretary MCNAMARA. There is evidence that fighter aircraft technology will advance to the point where, in the period of 1968 and beyond, we will be able to fly distances such as to permit us to fly into Western Europe without the use of the Azores for the fighter aircraft fueling. There is evidence to believe that our C–141 aircraft, which will be the backbone of the military air transport system, and which will come into service in quantity 3 to 4 years from now, will be able to fly similarly into Africa and Western Europe without the use of the base.

But there I emphasize that the lift capabilities of that aircraft will be cut by about 50 percent if we lose the base and, in a very real sense, you can say our total airlift capability is cut by 50 percent because at that point that aircraft will be a primary element of it. Today the loss of the base would reduce our airlift capability by far more than 50 percent because the aircraft cannot fly any substantial quantity at all, even to Europe, without the use of the base during certain periods of the year.

REPRESENTATIONS TO PORTUGAL

Senator MORSE. I am pretty tough-minded about the kind of international pressure Portugal uses. Would I be safe in assuming that our Government is certainly making clear to Portugal that her own security is also involved in the continuation of that base, irrespective of whether she likes the fact that we do not like her colonial policy?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Definitely so.

TRACKING STATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Senator MORSE. One other question: When I was also at the United Nations we had a considerable problem with South Africa. One of the disturbing things that developed in connection with our position on South Africa was the threat of the Government of South Africa to refuse to let us go ahead with the erection of a missile base in South Africa.

Have we continued that base and has it been completed?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I believe that the action we are proposing was not the erection of a missile base, but rather a tracking station.

Senator MORSE. You are right, a tracking station.

Secretary MCNAMARA. And I would want to check my memory again on this, but it is at the moment that we have given up the thought of that, and instead have arranged for the procurement of missile tracking or satellite tracking ships which can be deployed in waters off of South Africa to attain that objective.

Mr. Bundy mentions that the missile tracking ships will be available in about 2 years, and in the interim period we will continue to use, or hope to use, the tracking station.

Senator MORSE. I want to join with my colleagues in saying that I think you only begin to appreciate the helpful nature of this kind of a briefing for those of us who are sitting here when you realize that we are trying to be of help on foreign policy. It has been a great education to me. Thank you.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Thank you very much.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Hickenlooper.

TRAINING OF CAMBODIAN FORCES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am sorry I was late. I did not hear the Secretary's presentation, and I have not read it. But I think I have read this in the last couple of days, or the substance of it, from other sources. From just skimming it over here, it is a very fine and helpful presentation.

I would like to ask just one or two questions about the situation in Cambodia. Are the French still training the Cambodian forces and are we paying the bill? To preface it, the French were in charge of the training and management of the military forces in Cambodia, and we were paying the salaries and the costs.

Secretary MCNAMARA. If that is continuing, I am unaware of it. I do not believe it is, and I would like to make certain I am right in saying that. Let me check the facts. I am not aware of our paying of any training by the French.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We stopped a short time ago, because we were, about 3 years ago, paying the bills, and the French were training and had charge of the military forces, and I wondered if that was continuing.

DUTCH REFUELING RIGHTS AT U.S. BASES

I would like to move for just a moment to Indonesia which, of course, creates a difficult problem.

We did take the position that we would stop the refueling of Dutch planes going through to West New Guinea. Could you discuss that and the reason why we have taken that position against the Dutch when they are sending soldiers to a territory over which there is no war, no declared, open, overt war, between Indonesia and West New Guinea? Why don't the Dutch have a right to send replacements or reinforcement of forces there?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Senator Hickenlooper, this is a matter of foreign policy. It is an action taken under an international agreement, and I think that representatives of the State Department could respond much more specifically and directly than I.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, if the British want to send soldiers to one of their colonies, which may be under some internal dispute of some kind or other, would we deny them the right to stop and refuel on our bases?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think it depends on the international agreements that relate to the right of the British, in this hypothetical case, to do so, and I do not wish to speak authoritatively on this subject, which is entirely within the field of the State Department.

PRO- AND ANTI-FRENCH FORCES IN VIETNAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then I will move on to the case of Vietnam for a moment, South Vietnam. What is the situation now with regard to resolving the difficulties growing out of the people in South Vietnam who were originally pro-French and those who were anti-French, and that conflict that went on prior to the French going out of South Vietnam? In other words, I have understood there is great difficulty there in the present government in bringing together those forces that were antagonistic a few years ago in connection with that revolution in South Vietnam as between those who favored the French and those who were against the French. There is a mistrust, and the bringing of those forces together has been difficult.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do not believe that that problem is affecting our military operations and activities in South Vietnam at the present time. We are affected by the strong antagonisms between the pro- and the anti-Diem forces. But these antagonisms are based not primarily on a former support or opposition to the French, but upon other factors that are affecting the activities of the Government in South Vietnam today.

It was because of these strong forces that are at work that I specifically issued the instructions to our military personnel that they were to support the Diem government. They were to support it in the sense that they were to avoid public comment or, for that matter, private comment that could become public, indicating their opposition or criticism of that government.

NOT A MAJOR FACTOR

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand that there is political conflict in South Vietnam today with regard to Diem. But I have also been under the impression that a part of that conflict still stemmed from the hostility that occurred at the time of the revolution, and the division between those who were pro-French and

wanted the French to stay there, and those who were anti-French. They dislike each other very much and distrust each other even though they were united in the idea that they were South Vietnamese now. The hostility between them makes for lack of trust and confidence and difficulty in really getting the forces together.

Secretary McNAMARA. That is one of the factors, I am sure, affecting the difference of opinion, but I personally do not believe it is a major one today.

Again, however, I would say this is a matter for State rather than Defense to speak on authoritatively.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Long.

POSSIBILITY OF SUBMARINE IDENTIFICATION

Senator LONG. Mr. Secretary, you made some mention about these Polaris submarines and the growing Russian capability in the same general field in the launching of intermediate range missiles from submarines.

It occurs to me in that field there might be some possibility of making a little headway, at least, on the subject of disarmament by trying to work out an arrangement where both sides would identify the position of their submarines periodically, perhaps on a day-to-day basis.

I was just curious to know if you think there might be some possibility of exploring that with the Soviets and whether you have given some consideration to it.

Secretary McNAMARA. Any such action would have to be a part of a total program of disarmament. I doubt very much that either we or they would be willing to participate in such an agreement without it being related to other acts of disarmament.

In our particular case, for example, we would be very reluctant to identify in any way the locations of the Polaris equipped submarines because, at the present time, this is a major element of our survivable and invulnerable deterrent force, and we have a force advantage that is substantial in relation to the Soviets today. We would be reluctant to give that up, and we would run the risk of giving it up were we to identify the location of those submarines and thereby make them subject to attack.

The other side of the same problem is that the Soviets have a larger number of non-missile equipped submarines, attack submarines, and they would very likely be unwilling to identify the location of those.

If the submarine identification proposal could be part of a larger disarmament plan, it might well be a useful part of such a plan.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES LAG BEHIND OURS

Senator LONG. It seems to me as though both sides, with such an arrangement, would have pretty much about the same problem, and it might tend to give both sides a little more superiority rather than to have all of those submarines poised for a moment's launch of those missiles each on the other. I assume the Soviets are in position to do upon us what we are in position to do on them.

Secretary McNamara. It is within their capability to do that if they wish to undertake a development program leading to that, but it would take them 5 years, I guess, to get to that point where they had a submarine-launched missile force equivalent to our force today, and by 5 years from now, ours would be many times theirs.

Their submarine-launching capabilities are not nearly as great as ours, and are unlikely to become as great as ours any time within, I would say, 3 to 5 years.

A MULTINATIONAL NATO FORCE

Senator Long. It has occurred to me on occasion that perhaps a solution to this impasse with our allies in NATO might be to have some divisions that could be regarded as pure NATO divisions, rather than divisions of any one particular country.

We have had such organizations under the American flag on occasion, special service forces, for example with, I would say, about 40 percent Americans, 40 percent Canadians, and 20 percent Norwegians, and we had a sufficiently efficient and creditable record with that.

I wonder if there has been some exploration of having two divisions that could be trusted with nuclear weapons under the direct command of a NATO commander?

Secretary McNamara. The nuclear warheads are, of course, in U.S. custody, and would have to remain so because of legislation action, if for no other reason.

Senator Long. We are not going to change it unless you recommend a change.

Secretary McNamara. That is why I say, "if for no other reason" I think we would be loath at the present time to recommend any such change. Moreover, the command of those nuclear warheads, even though they are in U.S. custody, remains directly in the hands of the President, and I am sure we would not wish to recommend any change in that.

So I think that the multi-nation division, if its objective were to modify the possession and/or command and control of nuclear warheads, would be undesirable.

ASSISTANCE IN COUNTERING GUERRILLA FORCES

Senator Long. I am sure you recognize that developments in Cuba are going to lead to the establishment of Communist guerrilla units all over Latin America as fast as they can get the arms there and organize the people. I wonder if you have plans worked out to help organize Latin American forces to counter those guerrilla actions.

Secretary McNamara. I very much fear that your conclusion is correct. There is evidence that Cuba is already trying to attain that end. We therefore are planning to provide every assistance possible that is requested of us by the Latin American nations.

I alluded briefly to the fact that last Saturday General Lemnitzer and I spent the day with our Caribbean Commander in Panama, or the Canal Zone, to review the plans that he had for expanding the training and other assistance that we can make available to those nations upon their request.

Senator LONG. It seems to me fairly clear that the Communists are on their way with weapons, and we had better be organizing somebody to be ready for them at the time they have their people in the field.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I have last night changed the command structure of the U.S. military personnel in Latin America, and have taken action to place under the command of the Commanding General of the Caribbean all of the military missions and military advisory groups in the Latin American nations, all the U.S. military mission advisers.

Senator LONG. Thank you very much.

I think you made a very fine statement, by the way, and it would give the people of this country some confidence if you would make this presentation to them.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Thank you very much.

REPORT ON DEFENSE PRODUCTION

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, I have here page proofs of a 125-page report, which had been prepared by authority of a subcommittee of this committee, which is intended to set forth the economic impact of arms control agreements upon this country.

In this report we find State by State listing of contracts of various sizes. We find also State by State sources of strategic material; State by State production of aircraft parts; State by State listing of atomic energy research for military purposes; State by State production of scientific instruments, and so on and so forth; also State by State deployment of all of our troops in this country.

This has been cleared by your office. Did it clear your office with your full approval?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I cannot recall clearing it personally, Senator Aiken. But I think that public disclosure of such information and, particularly, an analysis of such information as a foundation for a smooth adjustment to a lower military budget is highly desirable. I think my views on this subject are known throughout the Department and therefore I assume that it was cleared properly.

Senator AIKEN. You have no objection to all this information being made available in report form?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I have not seen this specific information, but assuming it is what I think it is, I would not only have no objection but I would be very pleased to see it made public.

Senator AIKEN. You have already given your approval.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir.

IS PUBLICATION PRUDENT?

Senator AIKEN. That is what I am pointing out to you. Your office has given its approval through the divulging of all this information as to source of supply for all our strategic material, our weapons of all kinds, of productive capacity for each time, and the distribution on a State by State basis.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I feel very strongly——

Senator AIKEN. If I ever intended to get into war with the United States, I would give most anything to get a publication of this kind.

Secretary McNAMARA. It depends, of course, on what other sources have already made the information available.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Secretary McNAMARA. We have a very strong review process.

Senator AIKEN. It will be very helpful to put it out in compact form so they won't have to go to all these other sources.

CLEARANCE PROCEDURE

Secretary McNAMARA. Our review agency which clears material of that kind has in its files standards against which it applies new information and against which it checks old information.

Senator AIKEN. It was cleared by Captain Foster, Acting Director for Disarmament; by Samuel Zark, I take it, who has been helpful on it; by Foster Adams, I believe, who furnished the statistical material.

Secretary McNAMARA. Perhaps, if I could just glance through it quickly, I could give you my personal opinion on it, but I can assure you that anything that is cleared in the Department—and we clear thousands of documents each month—is cleared after the review of our Security Review Office, which is the office that is presently under investigation and on which I testified before I came here this morning.

I would like to say two things. First, I have every reason to believe it has been cleared properly; but, second, as a matter of principle, I think it is very important that studies of the effect of disarmament on our economy be undertaken. I have encouraged such studies in the Department, because there has been a feeling in this nation that we cannot stand the price of disarmament.

I think that is an extremely dangerous feeling. My job at the moment is to build the military power of this Nation to higher levels, and I am engaged in doing that. I would like to see it disbanded just as fast as we can, but it cannot be disbanded without adverse effects on the economy unless we make those kinds of studies.

PROVING THE RUSSIANS CORRECT

Senator AIKEN. You never discussed the matter with Mr. Ed Murrow, for instance?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Ed Murrow, in his report to the committee, said that it would prove everything that the Russians were saying about us, that our economy could not stand except on a war basis.

Secretary McNAMARA. What would?

Senator AIKEN. That this would prove everything Russia has been saying against us.

Secretary McNAMARA. This report?

Senator AIKEN. That we cannot stand except on a war economy.

Secretary McNAMARA. Then this report is in error. I can document my own belief. I think it would be a serious mistake to publish anything——

TOO ACCOMMODATING

Senator AIKEN. If you want it published I am not going to disapprove the publishing of it. I am going to simply put in a statement that I consider it unwise to make this information available to any potential enemies in such compact and convenient form. I would make them work to get it. They probably have it anyway.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think, in view of your feeling, I would personally want to look at this. But I am certain they have it, and I am almost equally certain that if they do not have it, we would not have approved the release of it.

Senator AIKEN. I think they probably have. But it is a very convenient breakdown on a State by State basis. It states what the orders for tanks are in each State, how many people in each State are employed in making the tanks, and what the payroll is; about where the aircraft parts are made on a State-by-State basis, how many people are employed, and what their pay is. It would just seem to me that it was a little risky or it was being a little too accommodating, perhaps.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I will be very happy to look into it, Senator.

I have been amazed at the amount of information we in Defense put out on our capabilities, and I have taken action to reduce the amount of information disclosed. But there is so much in the public record already that I think it is very foolish to deny the release of information that is already made available publicly.

REPERCUSSIONS EXPECTED

Senator AIKEN. I expect that any potential enemy does know where ground control systems are made, where Atlas nose cones are made, and things like that.

I am not going to object to its being published, but I do not want to take the responsibility for its being published. If you want to take it, that is all right with me.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would be very happy to review it.

Senator AIKEN. I would expect there would be some repercussions, though. I do not know.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I will be very happy to review it.

Senator AIKEN. I expect there to be repercussions. When Canada made a big sale of wheat to the country of Communist China I expected repercussions. I never got one single complaint from anybody on it, so it may work out like that in this case.

PUBLICATION SCHEDULE

Secretary MCNAMARA. I will be very happy to review the information which has already been published and, hence, the extent to which that is new information. When is the report to actually be published?

Senator AIKEN. This was sent to your office the last week in October with the intention of publishing it the first of November. I happened to be one of the members of this committee who was home, and I got it, and for a wonder I looked at it, and I immediately called the chairman of the committee and Senator Hicken-

looper. The publication was delayed up to now. Most of the members of the committee, I think, half of them, were out of the country at the time, but I happened to be one who was home. Senator Hickenlooper and Senator Fulbright were home, and Senator Fulbright stopped the publication of it at one time until the full committee could consider it.

I do not know that there is a thing in there that should not be made public. I would take your word for it. but it seems that we are very accommodating in putting all this in one booklet form. Mr. Murrow thought it would have a—well, his report said it proved what the Russians were saying about us, that our economy could not stand except on a war basis.

MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND THE ECONOMY

Secretary McNAMARA. Does the report, in addition to listing the installations and facilities, go further and discuss the relationship of those to the economy? Because I do not see how this could prove what the Russians were saying about us, unless there is such an analysis.

Senator AIKEN. Well, the purpose is to prove how the economies of the various States are dependent on war orders, and I do not deny the facts, but I am not sure that it is wise to give the facts to the whole world.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Aiken, may I suggest that you just give the report to the Secretary——

Senator AIKEN. We have met what they charge us with.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Aiken, I suggest you give the report to the Secretary and let somebody at the Defense Department look at it.

Senator AIKEN. This is the committee print.

Mr. MARCY. I know Mr. Bundy and I will hand it to him.

Senator AIKEN. You have other copies and I have a copy, too.

I was just wondering whether it was wise to do it or not.

Secretary McNAMARA. So far as the Russians' attitude or the rest of the world's attitude about it is concerned, it seems to me that when we have a military budget of $52 billion in relation to a gross national product of $550 billion, it is perfectly obvious that an important portion of our activity is devoted to our defense purposes, roughly 10 percent, and I do not think any information published in the report would bear on that.

Senator AIKEN. I do not know whether it is wise to admit it to the world or not, any more so than I am sure it was wise to admit the U-2 incident and the Cuban invasion. Maybe it was. Maybe we had better be strictly honest.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is that all?

Senator AIKEN. That is all. That is enough.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Gore.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN INDOCHINA AND NATO

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, I found your report encouraging in many respects. I also found reassuring your answers with respect to Vietnam, particularly when you drew a distinction—when you recognized its importance, but also, I thought, putting it in its per-

spective by saying that no decision had been made as to the commitment of U.S. troops, thus drawing a distinction between that and NATO.

I say that, Mr. Secretary—and I can make my point easier by making a brief statement then by asking you a series of questions, I say that because it was not many months ago when officers very close to you, military officers, were recommending that the United States enter into combat action in Laos. I was greatly disturbed at that time that we might do so, and went so far as to go to the President personally about it.

I agree with you that South Vietnam is important. I think President Diem is the strongest leader with whom we can associate ourselves, but I think a few things should be recognized.

One, that any South Asian leader who associates himself with a European or an American automatically incurs the enmity of a very large portion of the population. Unfortunately that is true. Some of it is a hangover from colonialism; some of it may be racial, but, nevertheless, I believe that to be true.

The French had an army of 400,000 men in the Indochina Peninsula for a period of 7 years. They did not win.

CHINA'S STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES

The strategic advantages that Red China has there are somethings to give pause for lots of thought. When you couple that with your forecasts that sometime within 12 or 36 months from now Red China would achieve nuclear weapons detonation, certainly it gives pause for further consideration. So I was encouraged to hear you stop short of a commitment of U.S. troops in South Vietnam.

This is an excellent piece of work you have given us, and I am grateful for it.

SOCIAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

I have made my statement, expressed my views with respect to the South Vietnamese situation, and I hope you will bear that in mind and give it consideration if the difficulty grows worse there, as I fear it may.

Incidentally, I returned from there about 20 months ago and recommended then that the United States urge and insist upon a program of social improvement in Vietnam. That program is now underway, and I am glad that it is.

HAPHAZARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT

Mr. Chairman, I have a question or two about nuclear weapons. Are you familiar with the report that those of us who serve on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee made about a year ago about the haphazard dangerous way in which nuclear weapons were deployed?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, I believe I am.

Senator GORE. Have steps been taken to improve that?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, steps have been taken to improve it.

Senator GORE. That is good. I congratulate you.

POLICY TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR NATO

There has been a determined effort on the part of West European leaders, particularly the West Germans, the French, to give to NATO a maximum amount of control over nuclear weapons. Indeed, Mr. Strauss,[3] I think, advocated making it a nuclear entity.

You say the United States still maintains control and must under present law, in response to a question of Senator Long. That is true. But, as we found the situation upon our investigation there some 18 months ago or 15 months ago, control was really a fiction rather than a fact.

What are the developments in this area; has there been a change in our policy toward nuclear weapons for NATO?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, I do not believe there has been a change in our policy. I think our policy 18 or 20 months ago was as it is today, to maintain custody of those weapons and maintain clear control of them in the hands of the President.

I believe there has been a change in the techniques we used to accomplish, to implement that policy. Custodian arrangements have been strengthened. The communications between the area of custody and, in effect, the President have been strengthened and been made more secure.

DEVELOPMENT OF MORE AFFECTIVE CONTROLS

I do not wish to imply that even today all that needs to be done has been done. We are undertaking certain development projects directed toward developing what amounts to an automatic lock on each warhead no matter what the size may be, which would make it impossible for that warhead to be detonated without physical action originated by the controller, either the President or his clearly designated representative. Those technological developments are proceeding rather satisfactorily.

It will be several months, if not a year, before we will know if we will be completely successful. In the long run, I think that offers the greatest possible security to the control of these warheads.

Senator GORE. Well, again I congratulate you

We found, for instance, that in some instances a single rifle shot could remove any effective control of a nuclear weapon in station ready to be fired. This, we thought, was a dangerous situation.

I congratulate you on this improvement. You cannot expect it to be solved overnight.

NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF FRANCE

How near do you think France is to the development of a usable nuclear weapon?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would answer, first, by saying I think they are reasonably close to the development of a primitive fission type weapon, which would be available in very small quantity. I think they are much further away from the development of a fusion type, sophisticated weapon available in sufficient quantity to be an important military force.

---

[3] West German Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauss.

Senator GORE. Would this primitive type, as you have described it, be comparable to the first one we used in Japan or better?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think it would approximate those, perhaps a little better, but not materially so.

Senator GORE. What part of the French defense budget is devoted to nuclear development?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I cannot answer exactly. It is a rather substantial portion. I have heard, but I had better refresh my memory and insert it in the record. I discussed this with their defense minister while he was here last year.

WEST GERMAN PROGRAM UNLIKELY

Senator GORE. After France shall have achieved a nuclear operational capability, which you say is about a year, even though on a limited basis, what is the situation then with respect to West Germany doing so, what with the working relationships that seem to have developed between France and West Germany?

Secretary MCNAMARA. They are prohibited by treaty, as I understand it, at the present time as to any such action.

Senator GORE. I understand.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Second, France has spent years and literally hundreds of millions of dollars on this development, and it would be years in the future before Germany could expect to have any substantial number, and then only after (*a*) a clear violation of the treaty, and (*b*) the expenditure of substantial sums.

I do not see any real evidence that West Germany will move in that direction. It is a possibility, but I think a rather unlikely one.

Senator GORE. You think then that she would rather—that Mr. Strauss or such other leaders as may hold his views would pin their principal hope for nuclear capacity upon securing that through NATO or from the United States?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LACK OF U.N. PRESENCE IN VIETNAM

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Williams.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Secretary, I want to join with the committee on congratulating you on your statement and the frankness of your answers.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Thank you.

Senator WILLIAMS. A couple of questions come to my mind. Why are we operating in South Vietnam on a unilateral basis? Why has the United Nations not been asked to come in?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think again, Senator Williams, this is a matter of foreign policy, and I do not speak with authority in that field. I would prefer, if it is agreeable with you, to have such a question answered by the State Department.

QUEMOY AND MATSU

Senator WILLIAMS. In connection with the small islands of Quemoy and Matsu, if Red China were to launch an all-out attack,

as she has threatened a few times, would we defend those islands or would we back off?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think this would depend upon a number of circumstances: the state of mobilization of Red China, actions elsewhere in the world at that same period of time, the involvement of the Soviet Union, a number of factors; so it is difficult to predict at the present time.

Senator WILLIAMS. If there is consideration that we are going to yield those islands and would not defend them, wouldn't it be better to do that before they are under attack than to wait and then back down, or shouldn't that be a decision made in advance as to what we are going to do; and would not the uncertainty of whether we would defend them or not provoke an attack?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think it may also be the thing that prevents an attack. I would suspect that that has been the case in the past and probably is the case today. Particularly, I think it would be unwise to announce any such decision under today's circumstances, given the Berlin crisis and the——

Senator WILLIAMS. I was not suggesting the announcement. I just wondered whether we had advanced——

Secretary MCNAMARA. We have contingency plans that are related to a series of several alternatives as to the circumstances that we may face; circumstances which would be quite different depending on the environment or lack of environment of the Soviet Union or depending on the mobilization or lack of mobilization of certain of the forces of Red China.

DEFENSE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE

Senator WILLIAMS. One last question, and I might say this one is not in any way critical of your Department. It is on a policy that has been practiced for years before you took over. Of course, we realize that in the Defense Department we are spending at least half of our national budget and, as I understand it, it is your policy in these expenditures to the fullest extent practical to use competitive bidding processes.

Secretary MCNAMARA. It is.

Senator WILLIAMS. I notice that there seems to be a continuation of a past policy, and maybe an expansion of it, of allowing all the contract awards to be announced through Members of Congress.

Now, I am asking this question: Doesn't that tend to give the contractors back in Delaware, Ohio, or the other States the feeling that the way to get a Government contract through the Defense Department is through his Member of Congress, and are we not encouraging a situation where influence peddling could redevelop? I am making no suggestions about it, but I will put the question first this way:

Are you not in agreement that, in the awarding of a contract, congressional influence is not to be taken into consideration; it is to be a businesslike award?

CURRENT POLICY ON CONTRACT AWARDS

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. I would answer the question by several points. First, it is my definite purpose to expand rather than

contract the percentage of contracts awarded on a competitive basis. This is difficult to do at a time when the weapons technology is advancing toward such huge systems as the Minuteman, for example.

Senator WILLIAMS. I appreciate that.

Secretary MCNAMARA. But nonetheless I believe it can be done, and certainly that is my policy, and we have moved in that direction and I think made some progress.

Second, under no circumstances would I allow congressional influence to affect my judgment or the judgment of anyone working in the Department in the award of a contract. I have issued specific instructions to that effect, and we have followed this policy religiously.

Third, as to the effect of these announcements through the Congress on the attitudes of the contractors, that is an interesting question, and I cannot answer it specifically, other than to say no matter what the contractors' attitude may be, we are not going to allow it to affect our judgment. We follow this policy as a matter of courtesy, and it is not so much that we announce them through the congressional representatives as it is that we inform the congressional members of our action a brief time—I have forgotten whether it is an hour or 15 minutes or something like that—before the action is publicly taken.

CLEARING UP A FORCE

Senator WILLIAMS. I appreciate that, and I do not want my question in any way to be interpreted as a reflection. I think you are doing a good job in that connection, and I am not suggesting that there has been any congressional influence used.

I mention this because just the other day I was speaking with a certain contractor whom I told if he wanted a contract to go get it from the Defense Department on his own. He sent me back the clipping and notice, and he said, "That may be your policy but," he said, "the contracts are awarded through congressional influence, because I asked a certain Member of Congress, and he knew it 3 hours before I got the contract, and I called him." He said, "I know it does help."

I also heard a few jokes cast in the corridors about high ranking officers coming down as messenger boys to tell a Member of Congress about the awarding of a contract. One particular instance was called to my attention because I was having lunch with one of these officers; I knew him. They were going to three different offices, two Members of the Senate and the Congressman in the congressional district involved. They moved down on Capitol Hill, three officers; they set their watches as though they were going to zero in on a target, so there could be no arguments between the different members, they could all walk in the door at zero hour. Here you had three high ranking officers, who certainly must have had impressive military records, acting as messengers.

I am wondering if there is not something we could work out in cooperation with your Department—I realize the spot that you are in. It is not altogether your responsibility, part of it is ours—to clear up what, in effect, is a farce and should be a farce, wherein

any Member of Congress, the Senate or the House, could give any impression that he was helping on these contracts, because if he does it is highly improper.

MORE ORDERLY PROCEDURE SUGGESTED

Secretary McNAMARA. I think it is quite unfair for any contractor to imply that any Member of Congress even attempts to use influence, because I have never faced such a situation, and I have never had anyone in my Department, while I have been there, indicate that. I would be very happy, if there is anything I can do, to erase that impression from the minds of the contractors.

As to the procedure that we follow in notifying Members of Congress of the award of contracts, we do follow substantially the procedure you have outlined. I hope we are not misusing our people in pursuing that policy. At times there are criticisms made that we have not set the watches.

Senator WILLIAMS. I realize that.

I still do not think you are going to get it out of the minds of people back home that Congress does not have some influence in getting this contract for *X* contractor or for my State, if I am the one who knows about it and makes the announcement and, of course, when we, as Members of Congress are notified, we naturally make the announcement.

Secretary McNAMARA. Surely.

Senator WILLIAMS. I am wondering whether it would not be a more orderly procedure if the Defense Department could just go ahead and make their announcement in a routine manner because, after all, it is something over which I, or any other Member of Congress, had nothing to do, or at least we should not have had.

I am just passing it out, not as criticism, but I do think it is something that may come back to haunt us if we do not correct it.

Secretary McNAMARA. I am very happy to have the suggestion. I will certainly consider it, sir.

Senator WILLIAMS. Thank you.

RELIABILITY OF WARSAW PACT FORCES

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. I will try to be brief.

Mr. Secretary, under the heading of consideration of general nuclear war, and the non-nuclear balance in NATO, at the bottom of page 8, you made the statement:

"While the bloc enjoys a larger total reinforcement capability, the satellite divisions are of reduced value because of their doubtful reliability."

Would you expand on that a bit; if you can, in a quantitative way, express how significant is that doubtful reliability of the satellite countries?

Secretary McNAMARA. I cannot really quantify my expression of doubt, but it exists. The East German divisions, for example, fall in this category. The extent to which they would be unreliable, I think, would depend upon the use and the action to which they were directed.

If the East Germans were directed to enter combat against the West Germans, particularly if they were asked to do so under circumstances such as those pertaining to Berlin at the present time, I would believe that they would be highly unreliable, and in anticipation of that, not only would they not be deployed, but it is entirely possible that they would require certain Soviet forces to monitor their actions. Similar considerations apply to divisions in other satellite nations.

It would be very difficult to quantify this feeling of unreliability in a specific way.

A MATTER OF SPECULATION IN SOME CASES

Senator LAUSCHE. Is this subject of doubtful reliability a factor that is rather universally accepted as true in and among your top echelon men?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I believe so, yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, I can see the East Germans; what about the Poles and the Hungarians?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We are speculating here, and it is difficult to feel any certainty in such speculation. We have discussed it many times. We have considered it when we develop orders of battle. Even though we may think they are unreliable, we wish to be conservative, and therefore we assume that they will have a rather high degree of reliability in order that we can properly estimate the amount of force we need to bring to bear. But the probabilities are that they would be less reliable than such estimates.

Senator LAUSCHE. Frankly, in my opinion, we have no greater base of strength anywhere than, I think, we have in those satellite nations. I think they are uniformly waiting for the chance, and it is a factor that I know should be considered.

DEPENDABILITY OF SOUVANNA PHOUMA

Senator Mansfield asked the question about the reports that emanated out of Laos, I think he said, of military men and State Department persons doubting the choice of this coalition government; am I correct in that?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I understood him to say that reports had come out of Laos that U.S. military officers had encouraged Phoumi to oppose proposals for composition of the government that had been put forth by Souvanna, and thereby to oppose the national policy of this government.

I do not believe those reports are well-founded, although I have seen them myself. But in any event, we have taken action to indicate to military officers, for them to understand what our foreign policy objectives are, and to act accordingly.

Senator LAUSCHE. Have you examined the intelligence reports that have come from the Navy, Army or the Air Force concerning that the reliability of Souvanna Phouma?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I have.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do they contain any statements indicating that he is not reliable?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think they contain information that indicates that he has had problems of relationships in the past with

representatives of the U.S. Government, which have caused him at times to be confused as to what the policy was of that government or what it would be in the future. But I have no reason to believe that he is unreliable in the sense in which I think you are using the term.

I think that it is extremely important to recognize that the Communists, through the North Vietnamese and others, are a major power force in Laos today, and how effective a coalition government would be in the future in retaining the neutrality of Laos is very difficult to predict. I would not feel qualified——

APPREHENSIONS EXPRESSED

Senator LAUSCHE. The reason I am posing the question is that on February 2, 1961 the Ambassador to Laos, in this room, stated that Souvanna Phouma was not reliable and was not to be trusted.

Since that time there has been testimony that Thailand's upper officials have expressed the same doubt about Souvanna Phouma's reliability. Similar word has come out of Vietnam that they do not trust him, and similar word has come out of Taiwan.

I begin to wonder if maybe those rumors, if they were spoken by our military men, have some substance to them, and that you are getting a Castro into Laos. I have great apprehensions about it, and I merely wanted to express myself to you about it.

AZORES BASE AND POLICY ON ANGOLA

Now, getting to Angola, did I understand that our present monthly tonnage transport capacity is about 28,000 tons?

Secretary MCNAMARA. To Southeast Asia. I used this as a measure of our capacity.

Senator LAUSCHE. And it ought to be 80,000?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It ought to be 80,000.

Senator LAUSCHE. If we lost the base in the Azores, we will lose 50 percent of capacity during certain seasons of the year?

Secretary MCNAMARA. On moves toward Europe.

Senator LAUSCHE. Having in mind the significance of the Azores base, and having in mind the experience in the Congo and applying it to Angola, I will just put the question on that. Have we formulated an opinion that we ought to support the immediate independence of Angola?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Senator, this is obviously a question of foreign policy that I think should be discussed by the Secretary of State. I would simply say that the State Department has participated fully in our analysis of the Azores and their military use, and is fully informed on that point and has taken full account of that in preparing their recommendations.

SOVIET REFUSAL OF NUCLEAR AID TO CHINA

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you have an opinion as to why the Soviet Government will not give to the Red Chinese the nuclear bomb?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do, but it is based on sheer speculation.

Senator LAUSCHE. I would like to have it for my own information.

Secretary MCNAMARA. My own opinion is that the Soviet Union recognizes the danger to them of allowing the Communist Chinese to have control of such a weapon.

I have stated that increasing the number of independent power centers or decision centers relating to nuclear weapons adds instability to all international relationships. This is what we believe. I think it is also what the Soviet Union is perceptive enough to see, and they are acting on that belief in refusing, I believe, up to the present, to make such weapons available to Red China.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there possibly added another separate factor, and that is that the Soviet does not trust the everlasting fidelity of the Red Chinese to Moscow?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It would be the sheerest of speculation for me even to comment on that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Let me put it the other way. Do you believe that they are motivated by the same reasons we are in not wanting to give it to France or to Germany?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Personally I do, but I recognize the possibility of the other factor you have mentioned.

ANTI-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. Getting to the subject of covert aggression, you described that you had set up an operation under General John A. Heintges and General William Rosson for developing this covert operation in the Department of Defense. Is that a new operation?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It is new in the sense that these two men are being assigned to posts that did not previously exist. It is new also in the sense that additional emphasis is being placed in the entire field.

In the first amendment presented to the fiscal 1962 budget last March, we asked from Congress appropriations to permit an increase of 150 percent in the special forces which are the anti-guerrilla type forces of the U.S. Army, raising them from roughly 2,000 to 4,500 or 5,000. That was the first of a series of steps which have been taken to place increased emphasis on anti-guerrilla type operations within the Defense Department.

The President, upon numerous occasions, has expressed his determination that we will build a greater anti-guerrilla capacity, a capacity to oppose successfully covert operations.

These moves I mentioned are most recent of the series of moves to achieve that objective.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. Well, good enough.

Just one thing more. I was Governor of a State for 10 years, and I did not have a single department in the State government possessed of the willingness to keep rebuying and rebuying things, although there was no need, as did the military department. I am extremely delighted to see how vigorously you have taken hold of the subject.

I think all of the reports indicate that you are cognizant of the fact that there has been much waste, and you are trying to stop it. I am one who is refreshed and strengthened in my faith that a real

effort is being made to conduct that Department with some recognition of the taxpayers' right.

Secretary McNAMARA. Thank you very much. I hope the record will continue to support that conclusion.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Williams.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, I will just merely second what Senator Lausche said. The questions that I directed in this other connection were in no way intended to reflect on the job that you are doing.

Secretary McNAMARA. Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. You have been rather patient with us, quite patient, and we appreciate it.

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee continued into executive session at 12:40 p.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building.

Present: Senator Morse (presiding), and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Gore, Symington, Aiken, and Williams.

On unanimous vote, the committee ordered the favorable report of the nominations of Walt Whitman Rostow to be Counselor of the Department of State and its Chairman of the Policy Planning Council; Vice Admiral Edward Nelson Parker, to be Assistant Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Jacob Dyneley Beam, to be Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; William Averell Harriman, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Walter P. McConaughy, to be Ambassador to Pakistan.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:40 p.m.]

LAOS AND VIETNAM

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:45 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J.W. Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Aiken, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Denney, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse, and Mr. Kuhl of the committee staff.

[John Bartlow Martin appeared on behalf of his nomination to be Ambassador to the Dominican Republic. Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, reported to the committee on the brief filed with the International Court of Justice in support of the United Nations' power to raise funds through regular and extra assessments.]

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you are going to brief us on Southeast Asia, Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. AVERELL HARRIMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Mr. HARRIMAN. The President thought there might be some questions that the Senators would have about Laos and therefore suggested while you were away, Mr. Chairman, that I meet with you in executive session and discuss any aspect of Laos.

As you all well know, the President's position today is exactly as it was a year ago when he stated that it was his policy to attempt to support a neutral—I think his words are here, "To see Laos live in peace, independent, free of all domination, and be a non-committed country." He a year later said much the same thing: "It is my judgment that it is in the best interests of the country to work for a neutral independent Laos, and we are attempting to do so. I can assure you that I recognize the risks that are involved, but I also think we should consider the risks if we fail, particularly with the possibility of escalation of a military struggle," and so forth.

AGREEMENT REACHED AT GENEVA

In the intervening period—I won't go into detail—I was in Geneva attending the 14-nation conference, and we came to a substantial agreement. There are one or two points left which require the presence of a Laotian Government of national unity to settle,

but I think it is fair to say that we would have come to the conclusion of the Geneva international aspects of the understanding very quickly if there was a government organized, if there were some government.

The agreement is somewhat better than I expected, and I think it is satisfactory considering all of the factors. The problem of the "troika" with the demand for unanimity was one of the subjects we had a good deal of difficulty with, but we composed that to our satisfaction. All matters that were substantive questions, there would be the majority rule which would govern.

There is an important new aspect to the agreement which gives me a good deal of hope for a successful operation under the agreement, and that is that the Soviet Union agreed voluntarily that the co-chairman should undertake to see that the agreement was observed. [Deleted.]

The declaration and the undertakings of the 14 nations are very specific not to interject any foreign troops, not to interfere in the internal affairs, not to use the Laotian territory to interfere in the internal affairs of their neighboring countries.

COMMUNIST COUNTRIES PARTY TO AGREEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. That does not include the Chinese?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, it includes the Chinese. They were present.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they agree?

Mr. HARRIMAN. They agreed to it. The agreement so far is tentative. The understanding was that we would agree, we wouldn't be committed until they finally signed their names, but they have agreed to these provisions.

The four Communist countries were present. Of course, the Soviets, the Chinese Peking Government, and North Vietnam.

Senator MORSE. It is remarkable.

Mr. HARRIMAN [continuing]. As well as the Poles.

Senator GORE. I didn't understand this about South Vietnam.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I said North Vietnam. South Vietnam was present, too.

The four Communist countries were Russia, the Peking Government—Chinese Reds, North Vietnam, and the Poles, who are a member of the International Control Commission which is to supervise and to control the cease-fire and also the carrying out of the agreement.

LAOS PROHIBITED AS BASE FOR OPERATIONS

Among the undertakings was this provision which I speak of, not to use Laos in any way against any other country. I think it was quite clearly recognized, and so stated, that this referred to the use of Laos as a corridor from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that set out in the agreement?

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is in the agreement, yes.

Senator MORSE. It is remarkable.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Chinese, Soviet, and North Vietnam—who was the other one?

Mr. HARRIMAN. The Poles.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Poles.

Mr. HARRIMAN. They are the third member of the International Control Commission, which is chaired by the Indians. The Canadians are the Western member and the Poles are the Communist member.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. They are to supervise the carrying out of the agreement, have certain specific powers and authority, and certain limitations, of course.

But in this agreement, all of the 14 nations agreed to withdraw any military personnel they have there, and also keep them out, and not to interfere in the internal affairs of Laos. They declare that Laos shall now be neutral and independent and, as I say, one of the provisions relates to the use of Laos as a base for operations elsewhere. Incidentally, it refers as being interpreted to subversive as well as military action.

WILL NORTH VIETNAM OBSERVE PROVISIONS?

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask two questions. First, when I was out there last fall, the universal opinion was that the North Vietnamese were billeting troops in overt fashion at times in Laos.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, no doubt they were doing that at the beginning, and they have somewhat increased their forces since.

Senator SYMINGTON. Does this mean they will take them out now?

Mr. HARRIMAN. They have undertaken to do so. Whether they do or not, I can't guarantee, but they have undertaken to do so and the Soviet Union has undertaken to see that they carry out this agreement.

Senator SYMINGTON. My final question would be, do you feel that the North Vietnamese will observe this?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I have no impression of North Vietnamese. I have had very little contact with them. I had some contact with Chinese Reds, as a constant contact—and so did the British cochairman, Mr. [Malcolm] MacDonald—with the Soviet representative. I became satisfied that the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, wanted such an agreement and wanted to see that this agreement was fulfilled, carried through.

Now, how long it will last nobody can tell. Mr. Khrushchev made it very plain, as all Communists have, that sooner or later all of us will come under Soviet dominance.

SOVIETS ARE COMMITTED; OTHERS MAY NOT BE

Every indication was given that Khrushchev wanted an agreement. On several occasions [deleted] of course, but we came to a compromise on situations which composed our differences and on one occasion even settled the affair, the open questions. [Deleted].

Senator GORE. That is the Russian that said it?

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is the Russian. I have no confidence in North Vietnam. They are behaving in a completely aggressive way.

Senator GORE. He said this?

Mr. HARRIMAN. This was [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. Did [deleted] had no confidence?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I say that.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you said [deleted].

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, I say I have no confidence in North Vietnam nor any confidence in the Red Chinese. But the Soviet Union has agreed to see that they fulfill their obligations. Whether they were able to do it or will do it, I can't guarantee, but it is my judgment that the Soviet Union wanted to come to an agreement in Geneva.

TIMETABLE FOR IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT

Senator CARLSON. May I inquire how long you would think it would be before we see some effects of this agreement?

Mr. HARRIMAN. The agreement does not come into effect until there is a government of national union. The agreement is based on a coalition government being formed, which is to be known as a government of national union. The three princes who represent the three principal forces in Laos at the present time have been attempting to negotiate and haven't been successful in forming that government.

This government would make a declaration of neutrality which would fit into the international aspects of the agreement which was negotiated in Geneva, so we have nothing unless and until a government of national unity is organized.

This would complete our work, so far as possible, before Christmas, and in the meantime the princes have had varying discussions from talks at Zurich in June to different conversations they have had during the intervening period. They met on February 16, not all of them, but the man who is accepted as the neutral, Prince Souvanna Phouma, was asked by the King to attempt to organize a government including the three factions. He was there in Luang Prabang, which is the royal capital, on the 16th, and is encouraged to continue his efforts.

Senator CARLSON. 16th of what, February?

Mr. HARRIMAN. February, yes. These negotiations have been going on.

DIFFICULTIES IN FORMING GOVERNMENT

It is pretty hard to get people who have been fighting a civil war to come together on a government. There is general acceptance of the idea that the two wings, the Pathet Lao, which are Chinese-dominated, and the present government, should have certain representation. There should be a strong center built around those who have been independent, supposedly, of both sides in this conflict—or rather, between the Pathet Lao and the present Laotian Government.

Now, there is agreement in principle, but they have not been able to come to agreement on the portfolios that each side would have. That is where the discussions have been bogging down.

I thought that it would be important for you to realize that we have been attempting to get the Royal Laotian Government to accept the principles of this agreement, and we are having some difficulty getting General Phoumi, who is the dominating force in this government—Prince Bon Oum is the Prime Minister, but General Phoumi is the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense,

and is the driving force in his government. He is very reluctant to accept the concept. He has been very anxious to get the American SEATO help to carry on the fighting.

MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND INTERIOR DISPUTED

Senator LAUSCHE. What does General Phoumi say is the basis of his unwillingness to accept a coalition government?

Mr. HARRIMAN. He doesn't have confidence in Souvanna Phouma. He doesn't believe, that is what he says—it won't work. He is attempting to get the Ministries of Defense and Interior for himself, which would be unacceptable to the others but makes Souvanna Phouma a puppet and would make him the dominating force.

It has been agreed by us and the others who negotiated this that neither side should have either one of these two portfolios. If they did each one have one, then it would create an impossible situation of immediate conflict.

Senator LAUSCHE. What portfolios are they disputing?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Defense and Interior.

Senator LAUSCHE. And those two portfolios are to be given to Souvanna Phouma?

Mr. HARRIMAN. The idea is the neutral group or the central group would have those two portfolios. The names have not been agreed to. It has been generally agreed that about half the center group would come from Souvanna Phouma's followers who went to Xiengchiang, which was his capital under the, we call it rebels, they call themselves the general government. The other half would come from independents in Vientiane, roughly half. That is the basis of discussion at the present time.

NEGOTIATING ABILITY PRAISED

Senator MORSE. I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I think this record ought to show the Ambassador has done some of the most effective negotiating for our Government in what we all thought, when he went to Geneva, was simply an impossible situation. We are not out of the woods yet, but the fact that we are this along, I think, is to the everlasting credit of Ambassador Harriman's ability to negotiate with the Russians and the Red Chinese and the North Vietnamese. I just didn't think it was possible, Mr. Ambassador, that you did get as far as you did.

CREDIT GIVEN TO PRESIDENT'S POLICY

Mr. HARRIMAN. Thank you, Senator. I think it is the President's policy, and he stuck to it. The alternative to carrying this through is, of course, a continuation of a war, and unfortunately the northern group have so far the greater strength in that civil war. We think it has been quite outrageous that the Soviet Government and the North Vietnamese have interfered. But they have, and the outlook for a military action there is one which would involve substantial forces of the United States, under SEATO or alone. The alternative of the program the President has is a major involvement of American forces in Laos.

Therefore, the President has made it plain—I am working on his policies, and I personally agree with his policies, but that is unimportant—that we should make every effort to come to an agreement, and we should not permit General Phoumi to make American foreign policies. We had some discussions in the past as to generals making foreign policy in the United States, and I have always been in favor of the President of the United States being able to carry out his constitutional responsibilities uninterfered with by military men.

In this case it happens to be a foreign military general who is attempting to force his will on all concerned.

SOUVANNA PHOUMA'S LOYALTIES

The CHAIRMAN. What is your own evaluation of Souvanna Phouma?

Mr. HARRIMAN. There is no doubt in my mind that he has no intention of becoming involved in a Communist takeover of his country. He is completely anti-Communist. He was educated in France. He has properties in France. He has a family in France, and he has wanted his country to be neutral for some period of years.

The CHAIRMAN. He is a nationalist, you would say?

Mr. HARRIMAN. He is a nationalist.

The CHAIRMAN. He is not a Communist?

Mr. HARRIMAN. He is not overly fond of the United States because we were responsible for throwing him out, he thinks, on more than one occasion.

The CHAIRMAN. Does he think that with some justification or not?

Mr. HARRIMAN. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. This is an executive record, but this is always a point of difference.

Mr. HARRIMAN. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. What elements encouraged it?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I don't know; that was before my time.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think? [Laughter.] You have some thought about this. This is an executive record.

Mr. HARRIMAN. If he will stop taking.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Take it off the record. [Discussion off the record.]

WITNESS COMMENDED

Senator GORE. I would like to advert a moment to the statement made by the Senator from Oregon. I wish to concur in the congratulations to the Secretary and to the President upon the present state of affairs, in Laos, unsettled as they are, yet so less dangerous than they were 10 months ago. [Discussion off the record.]

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask some questions if we are going to proceed in the regular manner.

Have they all asked questions?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse, and then I will recognize you.

SOUTHEAST ASIA HONEYMOON IS OVER

Senator MORSE. I just want to take a couple of minutes. I want to say to the Ambassador that I am going to ask you some questions that I don't ask you to answer here, Mr. Ambassador. I am going to make an official request as a member of the committee for the filing to this committee of memoranda in answer to the questions I am going to put to you. I want to make very clear that one couldn't have greater confidence in a representative of our Government than I have in you, and I feel much more secure to know that you are having a great deal to do in advising the President concerning policies in Southeast Asia.

I also want to make clear that I am going to do everything I can to try to support my President if the facts can possibly justify him in regard to American policy in Southeast Asia. I also want this record, however, to show that it is my opinion that the administration's honeymoon in connection with Southeast Asia is about over. Southeast Asia has, I think, all of the pregnancy of terrific labor pains for this administration as far as American public opinion is concerned.

I think this administration is going to have to get itself clearly supported by the American people from the standpoint of its legal position, and therefore I would like to have a series of memoranda dealing with the following questions which I shall read and let the record be supplemented later.[1]

QUESTIONS ABOUT VIETNAM

My first question: From what provision of the Constitution or treaty or statute does President Kennedy receive the right for the U.S. military personnel to transport South Vietnamese troops into combat, to return the fire of North Vietnamese, to patrol the sea approaches to South Vietnam, and to drop propaganda leaflets over areas held by guerrillas opposing the Government of South Vietnam?

Second, I would like to have a memorandum that discusses the differences and similarities between the present use of U.S. forces in Vietnam and their use in Korea in 1950 and in Lebanon in 1958.

Third, I would like to have a memorandum that discusses whether or not it would be appropriate under the Constitution for the President to submit to the Congress a resolution covering the situation in Vietnam which would be comparable to the Formosa resolution of 1950 and the Middle East resolution of 1959.

Next, I would like to have a memorandum that would discuss the question of to what extent the actions by U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam are considered to be combat actions.

Next, is the action of the United States in Vietnam inconsistent with the Agreement of July 1954 on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, having particular reference to chapter 3, entitled, "Ban on Introduction of Fresh Troops, Military Personnel, Arms and Munitions, Military Bases"?

---

[1] See Appendix A.

Next, section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes the President to assist a friendly country by providing defense articles and by assigning military personnel to perform the duties of a non-combatant nature. To what extent are the operations of the U.S. Forces in Vietnam being paid for out of appropriations made pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961?

Next, what are the plans of this administration, if any, to seek to have the South Vietnam issues be considered by the United Nations and have the United Nations exercise any jurisdiction over the area of South Vietnam?

Next, what do we consider to be our obligations under SEATO in regard to supplying forces, military aid, economic aid, to South Vietnam?

Lastly, what is the administration's answer to the cumulating evidence that the Government of South Vietnam is not a democratic government, that it is a corrupt government, and that it is a government that probably will not have the support of its people unless we maintain that government by the use of our power?

AVOID DIVISION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

Now, I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I think this committee is going to have to have memoranda in answer to these questions, because I think there is boiling up underneath the surface of this country growing opposition to this administration's policy in Southeast Asia.

I said earlier in this committee that when those ships start coming back to the west coast with the flag-dragged coffins of American boys, look out, because the American people, in my judgment, are going to be very much divided. We have to avoid division in American public opinion on foreign policy—the American people are going to be very much divided if we follow a foreign policy in Southeast Asia that starts to slaughter thousands of American boys.

We know what happened to France. It is very difficult to say one cause is more important than another, but, in my judgment, the loss of the best manhood of France over the years in Indochina paved the way to very serious troubles in France.

I do not want to see the United States follow the unilateral course of action in South Vietnam. I know what Australia and New Zealand are supposed to be doing; I know what Japan is supposed to be doing. But on the basis of the evidence before this committee today, the fact is that most of what is happening in South Vietnam is United States action, both by way of personnel and economic aid and military aid.

I think, Mr. Chairman, the time for this committee to sit down in confidence with the Department of State and the White House on South Vietnam policy is right now, because if this breaks out into the open, you will never catch up, in my judgment, with what the American public opinion will do if your policy results in getting us into a war in South Vietnam through the back door. I think we have to take the American people into our confidence, out in the open right now, and get these legal questions cleared up, because I

have grave doubts as to the constitutionality of the President's course of action in South Vietnam.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will be very glad to see that the rather penetrating questions of the Senator are answered. I will consult with you, if I may, as to what part of them, if any, should be confidential. But there is no doubt in my mind, if I could comment on them, as to the constitutionality of the President's action and the support you have given.

AMERICAN DEATHS IN VIETNAM

There are one or two comments I would like to make. One is this question of thousands of American casualties. Let me say that since 1955—you see, we were engaged in assisting South Vietnam since 1955, and this administration has continued the policy which the previous administration pursued of attempting to help South Vietnam, which is a free government, free people, not wanting to become involved with the Communists of the north. There are nearly 1 million of the northerners who have fled to the south, and they have been resettled and are now part of the economic and social life of the south.

During those years from 1955, a total of 18 Americans have died in Vietnam in the services of either the civilian or military. There were five killed by the Viet Cong or the Communists, one civilian and four military—I think they were ambushed—and 13 accidental deaths, of which one is the airplane that crashed the other day. That makes a total of 18. Of course, there have been some others who have been wounded, and there is one missing.

The President has made it very plain that there are not combat forces there, but if the support we are giving to the South Vietnamese to counter this open aggression by the North Vietnamese in supporting guerrilla warfare, which is just as vigorous as open warfare, and very difficult to deal with—the support that the President has authorized to be given to the Government of South Vietnam will, in my judgment, make it possible for this country to survive in freedom. If we do not give them this aid, why, there is no doubt that, I would say no doubt, in all probability these 14 million people will go behind the Iron Curtain and will have a government superimposed on them from the north through force.

BREACH IN THE GENEVA ACCORDS

Many aspects of this situation exist. The breach of the 1954 accord was made by the North Vietnamese in the support and in the personnel and in the organization of this subversive action and the guerrilla warfare. It has been stepped up in the last 18 months very materially.

You will recall that we were not signatories to the 1954 accord, and we made a statement at that time that we would view any renewal of aggression and violation of these aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security. That was made in 1954 by, authorized by, the previous administration. This action which has been taken has been a continuation of that.

There are criticisms of the Diem government. His government has brought order out of chaos. If you will recall 1954, 1955, and 1956 the chaotic conditions that existed there, the number of different military forces that existed, he has brought order out of that chaos.

Incidentally, they have improved the standard of living of South Vietnam so that it is substantially higher than that of the north. They have improved the food production in spite of guerrilla warfare, and they have improved the social conditions of the country.

POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

I cannot fully at this meeting discuss all aspects of the political situation in South Vietnam, but his is the government that exists there.

There was an election held which supported the present government. There is dissatisfaction. It has been stated publicly by certain personalities, particularly those outside the country, and there is no doubt that there is discontent because of the guerrilla activities. A substantial part of the country was being held by the guerrillas, both by force and by terror.

You are all familiar with the great difficulty there is in eliminating guerrillas in a country. We saw it in Greece, if you will remember, and the Greeks had a great deal of difficulty eliminating the Communist-supported guerrilla activity there. We know what happened in the Philippines, and we know what happened in Burma, and we know what happened in Malaya. It is similar to those situations, but somewhat more aggressive and vigorous because of the support they are getting from North Vietnam, in violation of the 1954 accord.

This whole question of whether Southeast Asia should be supported by us and by SEATO and by the free countries of the world is a matter that there can be differences of opinion about. I can only speak for myself.

I am in full support of the President's statements which he has made. We have our own security which is very much involved in that area, and the steps that he has taken to support the free country of South Vietnam may well be successful and may well be an operation which we can be proud of.

As the President said, there are no combat forces, as such. There is a logistical support, training, and various aspects of guerrilla activities, as well as the military establishment, and support in the transportation and training of people.

I hope, Senator, that when you know all the facts you will come to the same conclusion as I have, that the President is very wise in our interest in accepting the responsibility that he has.

I do want to underline the fact that this is a situation which was not of his making, but one which he inherited, just as the situation in Laos is inherited. But the two areas are quite different.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE SELF-DEFENSE

The South Vietnamese are a vigorous people. They want to defend themselves. They have a substantial army of nearly 200,000

men; this is their war, and this is not the war of the United States, but we are giving them the kind of support that I have described.

I had the privilege of going with the Secretary of Defense to Honolulu to talk with Admiral Felt, who is in command of the Pacific, and with some of the senior officers directly involved. I was very much impressed at their grasp of the situation and the steps they were taking.

I can only conclude by saying that any guerrilla warfare will take a long time, and I think that the questions, at least some of the questions—I am not sure all of them—are questions which are pertinent. This committee should be fully informed about it, and there is no aspect of the situation that should not be presented to this committee and thrashed out and discussed.

If I can contribute to it in any way, I would certainly—through an understanding of the situation, as I say, I want to assure you that this will be a long, long pull. Malaya took 8 years. I do not think it necessarily need take that long here, because there is more knowledge of guerrilla warfare and dealing with it than there was during the Malayan situation when it was first undertaken.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson wants to ask a question.

ADDITIONAL SUPPLY SUPPORT TO VIETNAM

Senator CARLSON. I want to ask you just one thing, because it fits right into the statement you have been making; in fact, you partially answered it.

Several people sitting around this table heard our Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, spend 2 hours on North and South Vietnam and Laos. He did a very fine thing; he discussed the future strategy.

You have just returned—and if you want to keep this all off the record it is fine with me—you have just returned from a meeting with the military leadership in Honolulu. Is it our idea to continue to expand the number of troops, give additional supply support for these Vietnamese people?

Mr. HARRIMAN. There are no combat forces, as such, Senator. There are men, military personnel, who are training not only the regular military establishment but also the civil guard and the local defense forces.

We have, as is known, as undoubtedly the Secretary of Defense testified, a certain number of helicopters there to help the South Vietnam forces get to where the guerrillas are attacking. It is a country that is very difficult to get around in, and the helicopter lift is of great importance in dealing with the guerrilla attacks and other forms of support in terms of assisting in developing the coastal patrol, giving them better river transport, and so forth.

But the will to fight is there, and we are helping them fight their battle.

U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Ambassador, just on this one point.

It was brought out in the Secretary's testimony that our troops wear civilian clothes—this was generally discussed around this

table. He said that we would have a number of troops there by July 1st; he gave the figures.

Of course, I am one of these people—I want it definitely understood that I think the Vietnam situation is important with respect to the defense of our Nation. I think if we let that go that we have lost all that territory.

Senator Morse made a statement that we are not going to have that number of our troops over there without our Nation feeling that they are combat troops. We may put them in civilian clothing as they go up and down the streets during the evenings, but I think our Nation does expect some real understanding of this problem.

I am one of these people who thinks that it is very important that we do protect ourselves there. I have a very definite idea.

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I just say this, Senator, in comment: that number of our military personnel—and I think most of them are in uniform—they are training with the different groups; they are advisers in different activities. Then there are air crews, the maintenance men and otherwise. As far as I know, the numbers I am not speaking of—whatever the Secretary of Defense gave you is his responsibility—but I think most of them are in uniform, if not all of them. But there is undoubtedly, as the Secretary of Defense told you, reason for not giving out publicly all of the facts in regard to the situation because the International Control Commission is there, and the position of the United States which it has taken is that the Government of South Vietnam is under attack, in violation of the treaty, and they have the right of self-defense, and they have a right to ask their friends to help them.

Senator LAUSCHE. What treaty is that, SEATO?

Mr. HARRIMAN. The 1954 accord.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

ROBERT KENNEDY'S VISIT TO VIETNAM

Senator GORE. I think that you can feel, Mr. Secretary, although no member at this table, to my knowledge, has made any public statements for many weeks or months with respect to this situation, that nevertheless there is an uneasiness on the understanding.

I would like to know whether the statements that the Attorney General, the President's brother, made on landing at Saigon were approved by the President and the Department of State, either/or.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Senator, I am afraid I was in Honolulu, and I missed them. I did not know he made a statement at Saigon.

Senator GORE. I am not even sure that he was correctly quoted, but I read in the paper that he said, "We are here to win and we are going to stay here until we do win."

I may be incorrectly quoting him. He may have been incorrectly quoted in the press.

I think the committee, at least one member of this committee, would like to know just exactly what the Atttorney General did say and whether such statements were authorized by the President.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I cannot answer you on that. A number of Americans have said that we are there to help the South Vietnamese.

Senator GORE. He did not say that. He is not quoted as saying "helping."

Mr. HARRIMAN. And we feel that South Vietnam can win this battle, but they need outside help. I will have to get the statement. We have not got the statement.

Senator GORE. Please understand, Mr. Secretary——

Mr. HARRIMAN. I am quite sure, Senator, that this was a stopover for fuel, and somebody stuck a microphone in his face, I suppose, and he made a statement.

Senator GORE. Yes, but this making of statements about a situation like this, because someone sticks a microphone in front of you, is a very serious matter.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Understand, I do not know of any authorized statement. There may have been an authorized statement, but I do not know of any authorized statement.

Senator GORE. Certainly I have no desire to criticize the Attorney General or anyone else, but this is a very dangerous and a fluid situation there. I find that the policy of the President which he has followed in urging social reform upon President Diem is commendable. I thought this should have been started a long time ago. I made certain recommendations years ago.

PUBLIC COMMITMENTS TO VIETNAM

I have been uneasy about the public commitments which seem to be with us with respect to the presence of and the purposes of U.S. military personnel in Vietnam. If they are there as advisers, as assistants for purposes of training, that is one thing. But if our troops are there in terms of, "We are here to win and we will stay here until we do win," I am not sure that does not go further than the question of technical assistance.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Senator, may I suggest that the Attorney General has made a good many statements and he has done extremely well in Japan.

Senator GORE. I agree.

Mr. HARRIMAN. The statements he made in Japan were useful.

Senator GORE. I think he has done a magnificent job.

Mr. HARRIMAN. He hit the youth there in a way that the American position has never been put forward, so that until I see some comment which is very hard for me to believe that even an off-the-cuff remark he made, would not have been in accordance with the facts——

Senator GORE. That may be. This is not meant as criticism.

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I read the statement before I join in condemning him?

Senator GORE. I agree. I am not sure I am correct in quoting the Attorney General or whether he was correctly quoted. But if he did make that statement, I would like to know what kind of statement was made or whether it was authorized by the administration.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I did not recall any authorization of the statement, because he did not expect to be in South Vietnam. As a matter of fact, everyone I know has made generally the same statement, which was authorized, that the President made, which you undoubtedly saw in the paper, that this military personnel force is

not combat, they are not combat troops, and they will return the fire if fired upon; that they are there to give support to the South Vietnamese Government and troops.

It is an awfully difficult, complex subject. If the committee is interested, I think you would be fascinated by the problems that are involved, their intricacies and difficulties, and yet we have some confidence that in the long run it will win, with the support from our side. They cannot win it alone any more than the Greeks could win it alone.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche has a question.

DANGERS OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary, I am of the belief that in Laos there is being proposed a troika government which will end up identically as did the Polish, or the Hungarian, and other coalition governments that we had.

My questions will be directed to the end of pointing out that the evidence is now ours that we will not have a coalition government in Laos, but a Communist government. I begin with my questioning of Mr. Brown on February 2. I am speaking about the efforts to create a coalition government:

Senator LAUSCHE. In other words, Souvanna Phouma is trying to coalesce these divergent groups?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, with the idea that the result will be a middle road and everybody will be happy.

Senator LAUSCHE. What has been our experience with coalition governments?

And then I said

You need not answer, but I ask that we be supplied with a tabulation of the experiences of the nations of the world with regard to coalition governments with Russia.

At that point, Mr. Marcy said that we already have had supplied the tabulation of the experience.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is what you hear with respect to Phouma that while he is stating that he is a neutralist, that it is a neutralist government, the end will be an absorption by the Communists?

Mr. BROWN. That was our concern with Souvanna Phouma.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that is why you did not feel that Phouma should be allowed to continue?

Mr. BROWN. That is why we did not feel that he would be a good government; that is right.

That is his answer.

So Mr. Brown, in this room on February 2, 1961, positively testified that we did not feel—at least, he did not feel—that Souvanna Phouma, as the supposed neutralist, would be a good government.

Now, I ask this question: Isn't it a fact that the head men in South Vietnam do not trust Souvanna Phouma?

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I comment first on Mr. Brown's testimony? It is the first time I have heard it, and I am not here as a lawyer to attempt to analyze his testimony, but I noticed that you asked him, "How do you feel," and he answered, "We." He is the American Ambassador there. He was functioning under the previous administration whose policy it was to accept this situation, and his answer was, "We."

I happen to know him very well. In fact, he worked with me in London in 1941, and he was one of my principal assistants. This was the first job he had in the Government. I think he is a very capable Foreign Service officer, a New York lawyer who, as a result of his law experience, became a Foreign Service officer and served our country well.

He is quite loyal, as all Foreign Service officers are, to the administration for whom he works, so he might just as well go along with them or resign. I just want to make this comment about his testimony.

CONCERN OVER SOUVANNA PHOUMA

But so far as your question is concerned, my answer is, the information I have is that President Diem, whom someone else criticized, is not very keen about Souvanna Phouma.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why is he not?

Mr. HARRIMAN [continuing]. And he has not got very much confidence. The same is true, may I say, in case you ask it, of Prime Minister Sarit.

Senator LAUSCHE. Of what nation?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Of Thailand.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Those two countries.

Senator LAUSCHE. So you have South Vietnam on the east, Thailand on the south and the west, and both of them do not trust Souvanna Phouma.

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. What about——

Mr. HARRIMAN. But could I say that there are a good many other people in the world who do trust him, our NATO allies, some of the other countries——

The CHAIRMAN. The British and the French.

Mr. HARRIMAN. The British and the French, the Australians are supporting us; the Indians, the Burmese. Except for those two countries, there is unanimity.

Now, it is very rare that you get everybody in the world to agree upon a controversial personality. There is no question that he is a controversial personality. I might say that our choice between coming to an agreement—the alternative is to have war, and that is a subject which I have gathered from certain of the members of this committee, they did not want to contemplate.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if the Senator from Ohio, who seems to make a point, and I think it is a valid one——

Senator LAUSCHE. May I pursue my questions first?

The CHAIRMAN. I want to show the complete record, though, as to what Mr. Brown said. You only read part of it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Go ahead. Where are you reading from?

AMBASSADOR BROWN'S TESTIMONY

The CHAIRMAN. You go on, as I remember, on page 69 and page 70, and I will quote it just for the record, and then let you pursue your questioning. On page 69 Mr. Brown was talking, and he said:

If you remember, on the 31st of August the government was formed with Souvanna Phouma as the Prime Minister and with Phoumi as the Deputy, and then he broke away for various reasons which I do not need to bore you with at this moment.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who broke away?

Mr. BROWN. Phoumi. And he then formed his revolutionary committee.

The CHAIRMAN. With our help?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir. He did that solely on his own. We supported his forces later.

This is the key point on it, and this is Mr. Brown:

I believed at that time that this government, with Souvanna as the Prime Minister, and with other strong people in it, was a government with which we could work and with which we could have a broad support in the country, because at the time I"—not "we."

I felt that Souvanna did have a wide appeal, and that if there were others in the government who were strong and represented the kinds of point of view that Phoumi did, that he could be kept in balance. I was in favor of supporting that government for those reasons.

The CHAIRMAN. They sound like very good reasons.

Then it goes on. But this is where we were pursuing this thought, and it is a little vague. He very clearly there says,

I thought at that time the government could succeed if it was balanced.

Granted, as you have said—I do not quarrel with that—that later when Phoumi came in and the policy of the government was to support him, then he went along with it.

Senator LAUSCHE. But later Souvanna Phouma changed his conduct, his attitude, and with that change also came a change in Ambassador Brown's view.

Let me proceed with my questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go right ahead. I just thought this ought to be part of the record.

CONCERNS OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS

Senator LAUSCHE. Isn't it a fact that Taiwan does not trust Souvanna Phouma?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I do not know. I have never consulted with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the subject.

Senator LAUSCHE. Have you made any search to find out what Taiwan's attitude is?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is an important factor, though, is it not?

Mr. HARRIMAN. They are not involved in this situation.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Isn't it also true that Thailand—that is, we mentioned it——

Mr. HARRIMAN. I just mentioned it to that effect.

Senator LAUSCHE. What about Malaya?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I have not consulted the Malayans. I do not want to speak for their government. You see, there are 14 governments.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, but isn't Malaya just scared to death about what will happen in South Vietnam?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I think they are very much concerned, and very strongly approve of the policy which we have adopted in South Vietnam, which some of the members of the committee questioned. They are, in fact, assisting in advice and giving the benefit of their experience, which are 8 years of battling against the guerrillas.

They are most anxious to be of assistance in South Vietnam in a similar struggle.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

We at least agree upon this, that South Vietnam and Thailand fear Souvanna Phouma.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would say, have some doubts about him. I do not know how far they go. You would have to bring the goverments here to testify.

Senator LAUSCHE. We have had testimony here.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I think they are concerned, they have expressed concern, over whether a Souvanna Phouma government could be successful in withstanding Communist infiltration and subversion.

NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you have access to the CIA reports and the intelligence of our Army, Navy, and Marines?

Mr. HARRIMAN. As far as I know, I have access to them.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. chairman, I think we ought to have the intelligence reports on this subject because, as far as I am concerned, I am not going to be in the position of being silent when I firmly believe that we are setting up the structure for a repetition of the disastrous results that we suffered every time we created a troika government. We ought to know what those nations in the immediate vicinity of Laos think of Souvanna Phouma. I am going to ask that that information be provided.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you asking the Ambassador to do it?

Senator LAUSCHE. I do not know whether the Ambassador should do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dutton can see it is done.

NATIONS WITH COMMUNISTS IN THEIR GOVERNMENTS

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I say this, Senator: There is a grave difference between the establishment of a government with Communist infiltration when the Red army is in the country. There have been a number of countries, beginning with France and Italy and Austria, Finland and Norway, and they have had—I will be glad to submit to the committee the number of countries that have had—Communists in their government.

As far as I am concerned, I would not trust any country with Communists in it, which country was under the domination of the Red army, either Soviet or Chinese Communists or North Vietnam. But the record does not show, and I would like to have this recorded, that just because you have a Communist in the government or several Communists in the government that the government falls.

Now, I would like to be able to tell this committee, if I may, very briefly, what is involved.

STRUCTURE OF THE LAOTIAN COALITION

There is a discussion of having a government of 19, of which four would come from the Pathet Lao; the other 15 would not—maybe 18 or 19, it has not been decided fully. These others, if they work

together, can dominate the government. The great problem will be whether they can win the election.

Senator LAUSCHE. Before we come to the Pathet Lao, how many would come from the present incumbent government, four?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Four from the present incumbent government.

Senator LAUSCHE. And Souvanna Phouma would have ten?

Mr. HARRIMAN. There would be, the talk is of ten in the center, of which the names have not been mentioned. Five of them were his followers, supposedly non-Communist followers, at Xiengchiang, who have been supporting him there, and in his claim for his rights, which we do not accept, of course. The other five would come from independents in Vientiane.

Souvanna Phouma has made it very plain that the election can only be won if the majority of the non-Communists in Laos work together, where if they put up one candidate in his district he can win. If they put up five or six, as they have done before, they can get licked. They do not have a run-off system under their constitution as you have in certain of our States.

The other question is whether the armies can be integrated. That is a very serious problem, and whether it can be worked out or not, I do not know. But the general idea is that the armies would be integrated on a basis where each side will integrate them on a proportional basis.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT

Then, the other question is how much support this government will get from the outside. I hope our country as well as others will support this country with the necessary economic assistance in order to help them do a job.

Souvanna Phouma, I have been told by our AID mission there, USOM,[2] showed great interest in the social improvement of the villages. It is a very backward country, as you know, and it is a contribution which should be developed from the village up, agriculture as well as the social life of the village, education, and so forth.

The other question is whether the international agreement which has been made will be kept, and I cannot guarantee that. Nobody can guarantee it. But we have the acceptance of the Soviet Union of the responsibility of seeing to it that the other side does live up to this agreement.

These are the factors which are involved. This is not dependent upon one man, but a series of people.

The fact that the neighbors would like to see the struggle continue in Laos, rather than extend it to their own country, is quite natural. The fact is that most of those who have studied the situation in the rest of the world believe—we are together on this, we are not doing this alone—that the President's policy is a wise decision, and I think it should be considered, as well as the judgment of the two neighbors.

---

[2] United States Operations Mission.

CONSIDER THE ALTERNATIVE

Now, the alternative is to, with or without SEATO, put in not a number of training personnel, air crews, and maintenance forces that we have in Vietnam, but combat units, and this is a major war that you start there. Where it will escalate—if you look at the map, you will find that Laos is a neighbor of China, and also North Vietnam to the north; it has been supplied by the Soviet Union. How far this war will be escalated in the future is something that you can look at and prognosticate as well as anyone else.

But I think before you criticize, Senator, if I may be so bold as to suggest it, a proposal to have a peaceful settlement, you should consider the alternative.

Senator LAUSCHE. Oh, yes, I have considered it.

Mr. HARRIMAN [continuing]. And to weigh the evidence for what chance there is to be a success.

Now, none of us can guarantee this, but the President wanted me to come here and talk very frankly about it.

I see the committee is divided in its views as to whether we should join in a war in Southeast Asia or whether we should join in the future at all, the future settlement. I simply indicate that there is a difference between South Vietnam and Laos; there is a civil war there, which——

Senator LAUSCHE. You cannot make a difference.

Mr. HARRIMAN [continuing]. Which we can encourage the continuation of or attempt to find a coalition.

Senator LAUSCHE. Let me proceed with my questions, please.

COMPOSITION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT

So we do have this new government which will be made up of four representatives of the present government, four representatives of the Pathet Lao, and the balance followers of Souvanna Phouma.

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, they are called neutrals.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, they are called neutrals.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Followers of Souvanna Phouma and other independents, political personalities of considerable prominence and strength.

Senator LAUSCHE. You have answered my question.

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I just finish this, Senator—who have had positions in the government, some of whom in the past——

Senator LAUSCHE. And to Souvanna Phouma will be given the portfolios of Defense and the Interior?

Mr. HARRIMAN. To the center group. The independents and Souvanna followers—I accept your definition of those who followed him to Xiengchiang—will be half of the center group, at least, and who the personalities will be has not been agreed to. He has indicated himself that he wants to retain the Ministry of Defense.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. I hope that you are correct in your analysis of it. I hope the same mistake will not be made that was made in Cuba. I fear, however, that you are wrong, and pardon me for being so bold as to make that statement.

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I ask you a question, sir? Are you ready to face the alternative of very substantial military commitments?

This will require not just advisers, this will require very substantial military forces being placed in this jungle country where there is very little communication. Are you prepared to, may I ask you, sir?

Senator LAUSCHE. No, I am not. I did not believe that we could logistically support the situation in Laos.

Now, my question is——

Mr. HARRIMAN. Senator, may I continue this?

COMPARISON OF LAOS AND VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. Why do you go into South Vietnam, then, with all of the signs of intending to prosecute a war if you pulled out of Laos in trying to avoid a war?

Mr. HARRIMAN. The situation is quite different. There is a civil war going on in Laos; there was, when President Kennedy became President. He had three alternatives: One, to support that civil war that was going against the government that we recognized. He had the question of putting in American troops with or without SEATO.

He had the second opportunity which was to let it be overrun by the Communists from the north. The third was to attempt to work out a peaceful settlement.

Senator LAUSCHE. In Laos?

Mr. HARRIMAN. In Laos. Now, that is what we are doing.

The alternative to a peaceful settlement is the United States putting in a large military force in Laos, with or without SEATO. If you do not do that, this country is going to be overrun by the Pathet Lao; there will be a Communist government there. Prince Souvanna Phouma will move to Paris and have nothing to do with it; he will be through with it.

In South Vietnam it is a completely different situation. You have a government there, Senator—you may not fully approve of it, but it is a government—which has made substantial progress in the last 8 years.

It has a standard of living 50 percent higher than in the north. It has increased its per capita food production. It has substantially increased its education, I do not know, from 200 or 300 to 1½ million.

It is not—perhaps some people do not think it is—everything that conforms to all of the democratic processes, but they are in the middle of an aggressive war being carried on by these guerrillas, and you cannot have—even we do not have—all the freedoms during war that we have otherwise. I wish you would bear that in mind.

We are helping that government save itself. The people are fighting themselves. There is no question about it at the present time, or so far as I know, of any plans of putting in American forces. They are men who will fight for their country, a government that will command a competent military establishment, and we are attempting to help them in dealing with this aggression which has destroyed the peace in South Vietnam.

Senator LAUSCHE. I cannot see the difference.

NEED TO GET THE FACTS

Senator MORSE. Will you give me 30 seconds to make a comment?

The Ambassador has referred several times to my position in regard to South Vietnam. I want to make it very clear to the Ambassador and to Mr. Dutton, to the people of the State Department, that I am submitting this list of questions as a member of this committee, because I know we have to provide the answers in our committee discussion on South Vietnam. I do not want the Ambassador or anyone else to reach the opinion that I have prejudged the situation.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I am glad of that.

Senator MORSE. I want to get what the facts are, but I have to have the facts if I am going to be able to intelligently discuss this as a member of this committee.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I am very grateful for that statement and, to the best of my ability, I will get the advice and help of the Department and the Defense Department and attempt to give you as much information which you can put on the record. If there is any part of it, Mr. Chairman, or Senator, which should be for executive session, I would like to have the privilege of asking your permission to submit it in that manner.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I am sure you agree, but I fully accept your position that this is something which is very difficult to understand and very complicated, and I think that the help of this committee in having the country understand it will be immensely useful.

Senator MORSE. Thank you, Frank.

A NEUTRAL, INDEPENDENT LAOS

Senator LAUSCHE. At this point I would like to point out how a year ago the same arguments were made about Laos that are now being made about South Vietnam.

Mr. Brown testified:

> I think that Laos is a very key place in Southeast Asia, as I say, both from the point of view of the physical fact that if it is neutral and independent and free from Communist influence it acts as sort of a cordon sanitaire between the Communists and the Thais in the south and the Cambodians, and also because the effect on the people of South Asia if another country falls to the Communists and if the Communists move that much nearer to them, is bound to be an effect which will weaken their morale and possibly lead them to positions of greater compromise and greater weakness.
>
> Senator LAUSCHE. Well, in fact, if Laos should go Communist, you will have Red China practically brought to the border of Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam?
>
> Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir. From a moral standpoint that will weaken the strength of Cambodia and Thailand and South Vietnam; yes, sir.

That was an argument that was made a year ago. The same argument is now made with reference to South Vietnam, and I frankly say that I find it difficult to follow what the policy is.

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I say, Senator——

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN [continuing]. What Ambassador Brown testified to a year ago is exactly the President's policy today, a neutral, independent country. I have forgotten the words that were used

there. That is exactly the President's policy today; there is no change in it.

The difference of opinion between you and the Administration is that you are unwilling to accept Souvanna Phouma as the Prime Minister. I can tell you, Senator, there is no alternative except war, and therefore you have to be honest with yourself, if I may say that.

MUST IT BE SOUVANNA PHOUMA?

Senator LAUSCHE. Must it be Souvanna Phouma as the third party neutralist?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why can't it be someone in whom the bordering nations will trust as not being oriented to Peking and Moscow?

Mr. HARRIMAN. All I can tell you is that this is a decision which everyone there will tell you the same thing; no other government is negotiable.

Senator LAUSCHE. No other government is negotiable? That is, it must be Souvanna Phouma, and unless it is he, it means that you are involved?

Mr. HARRIMAN. There has been some talk of the King. He has declined to accept it. But at this stage of the negotiation, the overwhelming majority of the nations there are ready to support a Souvanna government, providing he brings into the government, which is not clear yet, some stalwarts of the non-Communist group.

Senator LAUSCHE. Does that mean, inasmuch as you say that it is either Souvanna Phouma or no one else, that we have to yield to the demands of Peking and——

Mr. HARRIMAN. No.

Senator LAUSCHE [continuing]. And Soviet Russia?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No. We have——

Senator LAUSCHE. What does it mean?

Mr. HARRIMAN. This is an opinion which is shared by the overwhelming majority of the nations that are involved in this dispute. I mentioned them; I won't go over them again.

This is the only reasonable solution that can be found, and Souvanna Phouma is the one man who is available. Of course, if he were to die, there might be someone else. But he is the one man who is available to lead a coalition government at this time.

NOTHING WITHOUT RISK

Senator LAUSCHE. I hope that you are right and I am wrong. That is all I say, but I am afraid, I fear intuitively and on the basis of proof, that you will find Laos Communist before a year is past.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I cannot guarantee what is going to happen in the future, and I have explained to you the very considerable risks—and the President himself has said there are considerable risks. But there is nothing in the world which is without risk. This is, anyway, the program the President has put forward, and I hope it will get the support of this committee.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, that is all.

Senator MORSE. We are greatly indebted to the Ambassador.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, I think it has been very informative. I know we have a vote in just a moment. I wanted to ask just a question or two about the South Vietnamese situation.

TRAINING THE VIETNAMESE FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE

Are you somewhat optimistic about the progress that we are making in training them for guerrilla warfare?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Mr. Chairman, of course, they know a good deal about it themselves, and they have consulted with Malaya and others, so that we are——

The CHAIRMAN. Do they have someone from Malaya up there helping them?

Mr. HARRIMAN. There are some people that are helping them who are familiar with Malayan experience. But this is a long, long pull.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I was impressed with the progress made in the civilian side of civilian defense, as well as the progress that was being made and the difference it could make, the speed of communication.

These guerrillas are much fewer in number. There is an old story that you need somewhere between 5 to 10 members of the military force to rout out 1 guerrilla, but the speed with which the loyal forces can be brought to bear on a community that is attacked is of vital importance.

What I can say, Mr. Chairman, is that I am very much impressed by the progress that has been made in the plans that are being developed, and progress which has been made in training, both among the military personnel and the civilian defense, and in protecting the villages.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you say anything about any increase in the confidence of the people generally in their government? Do you think the South Vietnamese are really interested in——

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, I think it is too early to do that. I think there is a large part of the country that is still under the threat of guerrillas, a considerable part of the country in which they are the dominant factor. It is the process in Malaya, which was to take and clear and defend, clear and defend, until you got rid of them.

The CHAIRMAN. In the long run, it will depend upon whether the people themselves in South Vietnam have confidence in their government, that it will prevail and so on, isn't that so? That is the key thing, whether or not they have confidence.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would think in the villages it is a question of who can give them protection. They are not well educated. This government is the first one that has attempted to give them education. Their interest is, their first interest is, protection. They want to be left alone to lead their own lives. That is true of the peasants there, as in most countries.

COUPS AGAINST DIEM

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any alternative to Diem that you can think of?

Mr. HARRIMAN. He is the head of the government, and I would not have thought that it was a proper function of the United States to attempt to make and break governments.

There was a coup, you remember, in November of last year, which was an interesting coup. They did not attack Diem himself, but attacked some of the people around him and urged him to make a change in his government. There was no one suggested to take his place.

That coup was put down and, as a result of the very much increased tempo of the guerrilla warfare in the last 18 months, there have been greater security measures taken. Whenever you do execute those measures, there is considerable complaint of those who are affected by it.

The CHAIRMAN. Does he cooperate with our people in these plans for defense, and so on?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would think it would be fair to say that he gives on the basis of questions of cooperation. On the questions of some of the suggestions we have made, he has not accepted them; others he has. Others are questions of disagreement on timing. I think you would say from what has been stated publicly that there were some proposals that were made—I will be very glad to get that for the committee—proposals that were made for the improvement of the social and economic condition of the country, which he accepted.

Can I put that in the record? It is a statement that was about nine points, I think, that had been accepted.

Now, he is an independent government. I do not think it is quite—it is not surprising that he disagrees with some of the suggestions that are made, both as to the manner in which his military operates and the manner in which he feels he can liberalize his government under the wartime conditions which he is in, and I confess myself I would like to see him liberalize his government more. I think we have to give him a chance to get his country under some basis of peaceful conditions before we become too critical of him.

OUR MONEY IS ON THE WRONG MAN

Senator MORSE. Along the lines of your questioning, Mr. Chairman, you remember when Ambassador Nolting was here, we had a conference with him and colloquy with him about the non-Communists that seemed to be opposed to the head of this government. It would not bother me if all the Communists were against him, but what bothers me is the reports that we get of non-Communists or responsible leaders, some of whom have had to flee the country and have taken up residence in France and elsewhere—that disturbs me, that you have responsible non-Communists who do not have confidence in him.

I do not know what the facts are, and we will ask Dr. Marcy to get them, but we read newspaper clippings yesterday about how he has, in effect, severed relationships with the University of Michigan group because some of those professors have written some critical articles about him. I would like to know what they wrote, and I am going to ask Dr. Marcy to get us a digest of these University

of Michigan reports. But here you have the University of Michigan being apparently thrown out of the country because there are so many things about his administration that they do not like.

God knows, I want to do what we can to support a strong non-Communist regime in South Vietnam. But what bothers me is whether or not we are not going to find ourselves in the position where we have our money on the wrong man.

The CHAIRMAN. That is just exactly what I was trying to develop. Is there any alternative to this fellow? Is he the best one we can find to support, and who could inspire the allegiance of the people, the non-Communist people, in the country?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Even the coup of a year ago last November did not suggest an alternative.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a man here—I always have trouble with their names—I was told he was one of the most intelligent men down there. We had luncheon with him, and he was putting their finances in order, and they fired him. He quit. He was here, and we were told that this is the hope, you know, of the future. This is one of the close associates of Diem. He was installing a system of taxation, and so on and so on, and he went back, and it was not any time until he quit. To me it seemed very disturbing.

Do you know anything about that?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes. I saw him. I would rather not have this put in the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 10 a.m., in room F–53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Church and Dodd. Senator Symington also attended.

Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of the State for International Organization Affairs, briefed the committee on the situation in the Congo.

[The subcommittee recessed at 12:05 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The subcommittee reconvened in executive session at 3:10 p.m., in room F–37, Capitol.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman) and Senator Dodd.

Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland continued his testimony. Robert Eisenberg, Deputy Director, Office of Central African Affairs, also testified.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 5:50 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1962

U.S SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee continued into executive session at 12:10 p.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Carlson, and Williams.

The committee approved for report sundry nominations in the Foreign Service among them being the promotion of John Calvin Hill from Class 3 to Class 2.

The committee also approved for report amendments 10(a)(2) and 13 to the Convention of the World Meteorological Organization (Executive F, 87th Congress, 1st Session), and amendment to the first sentence of subparagraph A. 3 of article VI of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency approved by the General Conference of the Agency, October 4, 1961 (Executive A, 87th Congress, 2nd Session).

The committee passed over the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, 1960 (Executive K, 87th Congress, 1st Session.)

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 12:20 p.m.]

48-688 O—86——8

THE SITUATION IN THAILAND

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:30 p.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Newhouse of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased to have Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Chayes, and Mr. Dutton with us.

You may proceed, Mr. Ambassador. We are glad to see you again.

STATEMENT OF HON. AVERELL HARRIMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY ABRAM CHAYES, LEGAL ADVISER

Mr. HARRIMAN. Thank you.

I will attempt to make it very brief. I am here at the request of the President and Secretary of State to advise you of certain developments in our relationship with Thailand, Mr. Chairman.

We value our relations with that vigorous country very much. Thailand is one of the important countries in Southeast Asia. She is a member of the SEATO Organization, the Southeast Asia Defense Pact.

Prime Minister Sarit and Mr. Thanat, who is the Foreign Minister, have become somewhat concerned over the manner in which SEATO has been functioning. It came to a head over Laos, because they had hoped there that SEATO would agree to intervene militarily in Laos, and protect against the Communist support of the Pathet Lao and Souvanna Phouma.

CHANGE IN SEATO VOTING PROCEDURE SUGGESTED

There have been discussions throughout the summer about the wisdom of making an agreement, coming to an agreement, of a coalition government with Souvanna Phouma as the Prime Minister. There has been a feeling that he has been too much with Moscow and Peking, and he is too close with the Pathet Lao and the Communist; whereas we and most of the other members of SEATO felt

this was a wise thing to do. This has led to their suggesting that SEATO could not function unless there was a change in voting procedure.

There are eight members, and it was suggested that SEATO should act with three-quarters votes, six out of eight. That, to some of the others, did not seem to be wise because they felt the principle of unanimity should be retained. It might be a bad principle in other organizations.

THAIS CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR SECURITY

We have pointed out, we understand the concern of the Government of Thailand. I think if Laos would be as close to the United States as it is to Thailand, I think if we had a border of 1,000 miles with Laos, we would be concerned as, of course, we are—more concerned than we are—as to the possibility of that country not retaining its independence.

We, of course, would not enter into any arrangements which we did not believe would assure a reasonable chance of our maintaining independence. But to the Thais it is much more serious, and so they have wondered whether the SEATO organization gave them sufficient security.

They wondered about their own security, if it would require a full unanimous vote. We pointed out to them that under the Treaty of Manila, there is a Article IV(1) for unilateral action on the part of each member rather than the unanimous action. It states that each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

So we have pointed out that the Manila Pact was, in fact, an agreement of action on the part of countries individually as well as collectively, and that we were bound under the pact just as firmly to take action individually, with or without all of the members of SEATO or with as many of them as care to act. There is no inhibition to act on the part of one country or a group of countries, even if all of them did not function.

INVITATION TO PRIME MINISTER

Now, this has become so important an issue that it was felt by us and also by the government—in the first place by us—that it might be well to ask the Foreign Minister, Mr. Thanat, to come over to this country to have a discussion, with public indication of our interest and concern, to meet the President and the Secretary of State, and that after these discussions were completed over a period of several days, there would be a communique issued. This was what I wanted to put before you, and to get your comments and advice.

The idea would be that this communique would have a certain amount of window dressing, assurances of the United States of friendship and support for Thailand, and a general statement of our confidence in the effectiveness of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. Then it would have an important paragraph which would affect the obligations—not affect, but would underline the

obligations—we have taken under article IV(1) to indicate the United States' intention to meet its obligations under this article in case there was an overt Communist aggression. There would also be a statement in this communique that the treaty provided for individual as well as collective action, individual as well as collective obligation, of the parties under this proviso.

OTHER ITEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN COMMUNIQUE

Then there is concern in Thailand over this question of subversion and guerrilla warfare similar to what we have seen take place in South Vietnam. There is some indication that the Communists intend to engage in that type of aggression in Thailand as well as elsewhere in Asia, and the treaty itself does not specifically provide for that. Therefore, we suggested that we might add a paragraph to or a sentence or two in the communique to the effect that the United States had indicated its concern over indirect aggression such as has taken place in South Vietnam, and therefore it was an indication of the kind of attitude that the United States would take in the event Thailand was subjected to a similar type of aggression.

Then, lastly, of course, there would be a further paragraph of general goodwill, which would indicate that both countries would work together to support measures to raise the standard of living and the economic growth of the people of Thailand. That is already included in our bilateral agreement, in our aid agreement.

INTENT IS TO CLARIFY TREATY'S INTERPRETATION

The CHAIRMAN. Is all of this to be in a communique or are these to be revisions of the Treaty of Manila?

Mr. HARRIMAN. This is purely a communique.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I should say that indirect aggression is provided for in the treaty, but under Article IV(2), it requires unanimity of action.

There would be no intention of changing the treaty, but since this committee had been responsible for its advice to the President in the ratification of the treaty, it was thought by the President and the Secretary of State that we should advise you of this coming visit, and to indicate that there was no change contemplated, but that there was to be a statement which would clarify our interpretation of the treaty. In fact, this is the interpretation that we have always had—I think I am correct, am I not, Mr. Chayes—there never has been any question of doubt?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, that is true.

Mr. HARRIMAN. But since this is being stated publicly, we wanted to be sure that this committee understood it and had no comment to make.

REASSURANCE REGARDING GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES

The CHAIRMAN. In this paragraph IV(2) you are speaking of it says "threatened"—or "any state which under the provisions of (1) of this article, from time to time is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or

situation which might endanger the peace of the area." Surely that would include these guerrilla activities.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes. It does include that, Mr. Chairman. But I meant to indicate that IV(2) really does require action by the parties to the treaty, because it goes on to say that the parties shall consult immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. Consult?

Mr. HARRIMAN. In order to agree upon measures which should be taken for the common defense, and there possibly the rule of unanimity might apply. Therefore, this indication—there would be no commitment, but it was contemplated that this communique would purely carry an inference that since the United States had taken action to be of assistance to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to meet this type of aggression, it could be considered a reassurance as to the attitude of the United States and other countries in this area.

PRINCIPLE OF UNANIMITY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How do you interpret Article IV(3) as applied to Article IV(1) on the question of unanimity? It seems that (3) contemplates a unanimous agreement. Under paragraph 1 it specifically says "unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article."

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I ask Mr. Chayes to answer that question?

Mr. CHAYES. Paragraph 3 relates to the so-called protocol states. That is, the treaty area included the territory of, designated in the treaty of, member states of the treaty. It was extended by unanimous agreement to the so-called protocol states, which included Laos and South Vietnam.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Also Cambodia.

Mr. CHAYES. Cambodia, that is right.

Paragraph 3 refers only to action taken under paragraph 1 in one of the protocol states. The protocol states were not members of the treaty. Therefore, it was said that when under Article I we acted in one of the protocol states, we had to have the consent of the state in which we acted.

The reference to a state designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this article, referring back to paragraph 1, talks about an attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against any state or territory which the parties, by unanimous agreement, may hereafter designate. It is that any state or territory which the parties may, by unanimous agreement, hereafter designate which is referred to Article III.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So the words "of any state designated as contained in paragraph 3 of Article IV," refer directly to the phrase or clause "which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate," in paragraph 1.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is a direct and sole reference to that particular situation.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir.

HAS THAILAND REQUESTED ASSISTANCE?

Senator AIKEN. Have we already been invited by them, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Have we what, sir?

Senator AIKEN. Have we been invited in? I did not get the first 3 minutes of your remarks.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Thailand is one of the parties to the treaty. She is not a designated state. She is one of the original parties and signatory of the treaty.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see.

Mr. HARRIMAN. And this article does not refer to her.

Senator WILLIAMS. But have they invited us in?

Mr. HARRIMAN. This clause 3 refers to the protocol countries, those who are designated, not members. When it comes to action within the country, presumably no action would be taken unless—

Senator WILLIAMS. Has Thailand asked for our military assistance?

Mr. HARRIMAN. They have, of course, invited us to participate in self-defense. we have intimate relations with Thailand in helping them with their—we have a MAAG group there, military advisory group. We are helping them with their military training and with their military defenses, so we already are engaged in mutual defense activities in Thailand.

Senator AIKEN. Would Thailand fight among themselves if General Sarit passed on?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I understood the Thai fought very well in Korea, the small units that were there. They have a force of some 90,000 men, that I know of, and they have been of some assistance in training the Royal Laotian Army.

ASSISTANCE VIS-A-VIS LAOS

Senator WILLIAMS. Do I understand they have invited us to enlarge our operations in there now?

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is what the discussion is about. They want to make sure that if they are attacked, it will not require a unanimous action on the part of the other seven members of SEATO in order to have the United States act.

This would be a public assurance, in this communique, of assurances which we have given them privately on our legal interpretation of the treaty which was approved by the Senate.

Senator AIKEN. In other words, they want a bilateral assistance rather than depending on this multilateral assistance?

Mr. HARRIMAN. We have been giving them bilateral assistance under our military assistance program.

WOULD OTHER SEATO COUNTRIES ACT?

Senator AIKEN. If they were attacked, what members of the treaty do they expect would hold out?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, they would expect—they would want us to come to their defense at the earliest possible moment.

Senator AIKEN. Unilaterally; they would want us to come unilaterally?

Mr. HARRIMAN. They would want us to come unilaterally. They have more confidence in our ability to be helpful to them than they have in the other countries. They, of course, would want to have as many countries as possible join, but knowing that our military power is greater than the others in that part of the world——

Senator AIKEN. Which other countries would not? Australia, France, New Zealand, Philippines, and the United Kingdom?

Mr. HARRIMAN. France and the United Kingdom. I do not know, they all might come in, but they do not want to have their security jeopardized by—I should not say jeopardized, but their security—depending upon the vote of every one of these countries.

NO NEW POSITION IN PROPOSED COMMUNIQUE

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask you something. I am not sure I am clear on this.

Does the proposal amount to simply a statement of our interpretation of the existing terms of the treaty?

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is correct, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, then, that becomes the basis upon which we would act unilaterally?

Mr. HARRIMAN. It is our interpretation of—it is a statement publicly, really, of what we have consistently said privately for a considerable number of years.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. CHAYES. I should also add that I think Secretary [John Foster] Dulles, in presenting that treaty to this committee, made that pretty clear. I do not think this is a new position. In other words, it is one that has been stated before. He said:

"The agreement of each of the parties to act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes"—this is under Article IV(1)—"leaves to the judgment of each country the type of action to be taken in event an armed attack occurs. Of course, there are a wide range of defensive measures which might be appropriate depending on the circumstances. Any action which the United States might take would, of course, be in accordance with its constitutional processes."

This is page 4 of the hearings if you have them before you. There at the very beginning it seems to me Secretary Dulles made it clear that action under Article IV(1) was an individual matter with each of the states; each of the states responded in accordance with his own judgment of the situation; whereas, in the following paragraph of his testimony, he discusses the situation of Article IV(2), under Article IV(2), and says:

"The paragraph contains no obligation beyond consultation. The purpose of consultation is to agree on measures to be taken for common defense."

So that contrast was a little——

SEATO UMBRELLA EXTENDED BY UNANIMOUS VOTE

Senator SPARKMAN. This is to me a little puzzling statement in that section 1 of Article IV:

"Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against any

state or territory which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate would endanger its own peace," and so on and so forth.

What does that mean, "which the parties by unanimous agreement may designate"?

Mr. CHAYES. Well, this again was an effort to extend the unbrella of SEATO, so-called, beyond the parties themselves to the areas of Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. They were prohibited from joining the treaty.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, I remember.

Mr. CHAYES. By the Geneva accords. Their signature to the Geneva accords prohibited them from joining, from becoming parties to, the treaty.

Senator SPARKMAN. Have the parties by unanimous vote designated them?

Mr. CHAYES. They have.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, that has been done, and it is our contention then that it is up to each signatory country to decide for itself the procedure that it must take?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes. The unanimous designation has only reference to the extent of the three——

Senator SPARKMAN. The three states.

Mr. CHAYES. Right; and that has been done. I think it is reported——

Mr. HARRIMAN. Page 7.

Senator SPARKMAN. That clears it up.

REAL PURPOSE OF COMMUNIQUE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, what the real purpose of this declaration is? Is it just to serve notice that this is it, and any activities in Thailand, we are now fully and unquestionably committed to go in there and help them?

In other words, if it is not a declaration of that kind, then the treaty ought to speak for itself. I would see no reason for a declaration. It must have some effect on somebody.

Mr. HARRIMAN. The purpose is really to reassure the people of Thailand, I think. That is the only—it does not, in our opinion, either increase or diminish the obligations which we have already assumed, but it will give public assurance to the people of Thailand.

You see, they have been——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Governor, what will we assure them we will do? What will that interpretation be?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, the wording will follow the wording of Article IV(1). It indicates, points out that we are prepared to undertake, unilaterally or with any other members of SEATO, our obligations as we interpret them under the article, as we may interpret it at the time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not quarreling with you about this.

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I explain that the reason for this really is that the government and the people of Thailand were a little unhappy that SEATO did not take action, military action, in connection with Laos, their neighbor. They are concerned about that.

They are wondering whether this means—there were certain other countries in the debate which took place over whether—this was in April last year I think they met. The Secretary went out there in March and April, and there was a debate. Some of the countries thought it would be well to intervene militarily, and others thought it would be better to attempt to reach a peaceful settlement.

[Discussion off the record.]

NEED FOR PUBLIC REASSURANCES

Mr. HARRIMAN. So since that time we have been conducting these negotiations for a peaceful settlement, the establishment of a government of national union whose neutrality and independence would be assured by the international agreement which was negotiated at Geneva.

The reason for it is the concern, the particular reason at the moment is the concern, of the government and the people which they have as to what the meaning of this treaty is. They knew about this international discussion which took place in Bangkok. It was highly publicized at the time. They knew there were some pro and some against, and they wondered whether this SEATO was a debating society without any will to act.

Therefore, that is the history of why there is a need, thought to be a need, at the present time on the part of the Government of Thailand and also ourselves to give them public reassurances, which we have given them privately over a long period of time.

INDICATION OF U.S. OBLIGATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In other words, this will be saying to them that while SEATO did not act unanimously as was required in Laos under this treaty, "We reassure you that if you are put upon here by outside forces or other"—well, I guess it has to be armed attack, does it not, under (1)?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, under (1).

Senator HICKENLOOPER. "If you suffer armed attack, regardless of what SEATO or anybody else says, we will come to your rescue."

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, that will be "come to your support." We won't mention Laos, of course, but it will state, as you say, that we will honor the obligations that we have assumed under (1).

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. I am using curbstone language. I am not using protocol language, but just trying to find out what this means.

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is right. We will really point to the fact that we have already considered the legal interpretation of Article IV(1) as indicating an obligation on our part to act unilaterally or with some of the members, but not all of the members of SEATO.

EXTENT OF U.S. COMMITMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Will this mean that if the Thais anticipate an attack and invite us to land troops and supplies and give them logistical help there, we will be substantially committed to do it?

Mr. HARRIMAN. This refers to aggression, and we——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand. But suppose they mass troops on the north border; suppose they mass troops in Laos—I am not so sure that is not so far way—on the border between Thailand and Laos, and they are just poised for what might be interpreted as a probable attack.

Mr. HARRIMAN. There is not any aggressor country that is an immediate neighbor of Thailand that would have the power to do so. There is Burma on the north and the west, and then South Vietnam.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They are still quarreling with Cambodia over that old ruined temple, aren't they?

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is right. There are a lot of things they probably have been quarreling about for a long time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. About every third feast day, which is about five times a week, Cambodia has threatened military action, have they not, in one way or another?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes. But that is quite different, sir, because the Thais would be thoroughly able to take care of Cambodia, which, I am sure, really would not undertake any attack. I have forgotten how many people Cambodia has, but comparatively few millions compared with some 24 million of the Thais.

TYPE OF AGGRESSION COVERED BY TREATY

Mr. CHAYES. There is, at any event, an understanding which we announced at the time that we signed the treaty which stated that, as far as we were concerned, Article IV(1) applied only to Communist aggression by armed attack. It would not—as Secretary Dulles stated also in the hearings at the time the treaty was presented, in case there was aggression by armed attack that was not Communist aggression, that is, Cambodia or something of that kind, we had only an obligation under IV(2) to consult. Our obligation under the treaty extends only to aggression—under IV(1) extends only to aggression—by means of armed attack by Communists.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When does aggression begin, when they cross the border, or when they capture Laos and make threatening gestures?

Mr. CHAYES. Well, again, there is obviously a certain question of the judgment as to the facts and circumstances as the situation develops. But we have generally taken the position that language like IV(1), which is contained in a number of other treaties, means overt aggression of the Korean type. It does not occur until it occurs.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Does it include fifth column activities?

Mr. CHAYES. Again there is an area of gray, I suppose, in there where you have the possibility of fifth column activities heavily supported from the outside. But we have taken generally the view that subversion and indirect aggression are covered under Article IV(2) and comparable articles in the other treaties rather than Article IV(1).

OBLIGATION IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But that requires unanimous agreement?

Mr. CHAYES. That is right. Our obligation is different, and that distinction would be——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am trying to get at this obligation.

Mr. CHAYES. That distinction would be preserved in any statement that we made, that is, any statement that we contemplate now would only go to our Article IV(1) obligation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Suppose the Thais said today, as conditions exist right now, "We are in mortal danger here, and we want you to land troops and supplies," or, "We invite you to preserve the security of our country."

Can we do it under (1)?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would think, sir, that would depend upon the situation. It would depend upon the President's interpretation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am talking about the situation as it exists right now.

Mr. HARRIMAN. There is no situation which exists today which would necessitate our landing troops there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There might not be any situation today which would give the basis for calling into effect paragraph 1, that is, for demanding that we perform obligations under paragraph 1. I am talking about the situation as it stands today, with no overt aggression across the borders, but with Thailand saying to us, "We have every reason to believe that we are in deadly peril here, and we invite the United States to land troops, to land supplies, to give us military cover here because of the potential threat."

Would we have the authority to do it?

A MATTER OF JUDGMENT ONLY

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would assume that we would, the President of the United States would, view the situation as to whether the security of the United States was involved in such a matter. Certainly there would be no obligation under the treaty for us to do so.

It would be a matter of the judgment of the President as to whether he felt the safety of the United States was involved in such a threat to Thailand, but the treaty would not provide for any obligation, would it?

Mr. CHAYES. I think that is exactly right, sir. The treaty in such case would neither——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thought I made clear in a rather long postulate that I put out here that probably it would not give them the right under the treaty to demand performance.

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But I was talking about an invitation by them which would not be—where they would not say, "Now, the terms of this treaty have been met here; we have aggression." We do not have aggression, so no overt aggression exists, but they announce that they fear that they are in deadly peril.

Would we have the right at their invitation, if we wanted to, to go in there with military forces for the protection against anticipated dangers or threats?

ACTION NEITHER COMPELLED NOR INHIBITED

Mr. HARRIMAN. Mr. Chayes, haven't we got that right under the Military Assistance Act of 1950?

Mr. CHAYES. I would say, first of all, the treaty does not inhibit us from going in. There is nothing in the treaty that prevents us from going in if, as you say, we want to, and the President determines that it is necessary to go in.

Senator GORE. And they request it.

Mr. CHAYES. And they request it.

If we went in under those circumstances without a unanimous vote of the SEATO Council, we could not say that we were taking SEATO action to go in.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand.

Mr. CHAYES. It would be bilateral action. The Military Assistance Treaty to some extent would cover that, but the Military Assistance Treaty is limited basically to training, assistance, logistics, and so on. I think you were contemplating more than that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Mr. CHAYES. So the answer I would make from a legal point of view—Governor Harriman properly replied that the decision as to whether to do this or not is obviously a political decision and so on—but from a legal point of view, the answer that I would make is that the treaty neither compels nor inhibits us from doing what you said in the circumstances that you described, unless there was a unanimous vote of the SEATO Council.

U.S. FREE TO SEND TROOPS IF IT WISHES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let us leave the treaty out. If Thailand today did not invoke the treaty, said nothing about the treaty, but said to us, "We are in deadly peril of being invaded; we are not yet overtly invaded, but we believe we are in deadly peril of being invaded," and our information tended to agree with the fact that there was a threat there, and Thailand said, "Please send troops in to help us," could we do it?

Mr. CHAYES. I think we would be free to do so if the President made the judgment that it was necessary; yes, sir.

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I ask, Mr. Chayes, the treaty neither gives him more nor less authority to do that, does it?

Mr. CHAYES. No more and no less than the Constitution, yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would we be in the same position as we were in Lebanon?

Mr. CHAYES. A similar position, yes, comparable position.

CURRENT U.S. PRESENCE IN THAILAND

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How many troops do we have now in Thailand?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I do not know. I will get that information.[1]

There are no troops there. We have military personnel. We have a MAAG mission and certain training personnel. We also have some Army engineers there who are helping in the construction of a road which we feel, which we both agree, is very important from

a political standpoint to open up the northeastern territory, which is very backward. Our Army engineers have some units there.

I will get that information and give it to you, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Didn't we have some helicopters based in Thailand awhile back, or perhaps now ready to fly into Laos, at one time?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I will have to check that.[1] I do not recall offhand. I may say that Thailand has been very cooperative in giving assistance to Laos, and to supply the Royal Laotian Government forces, and the use of their airfields. Some of that, much of that, material has been flown in by American planes and, therefore, they have been using our—we have been using helicopters as well as transport planes to bring that material and personnel into Laos.

SOLE AIM OF QUESTIONS IS CLARIFICATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, don't misunderstand me.

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, no.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have the greatest respect for the Thais and for their consistent friendship for the United States. Certainly I do not want to throw our friends down the drain. So it is not from any other standpoint that I approach this than I want to find our what we can do and what we cannot do there.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I regret that I do not have the information at the tip of my tongue to give to you, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think Thailand is very important, very vital. But I am just wondering what the ulterior—I do not use the work "ulterior" in any offensive way—but what the ulterior purpose of this particular statement is; whether it is an additional commitment which we unilaterally assume which, in effect, is really above and beyond what is in this treaty, or whether it is a restatement of this for reassurance only of the Thais.

COMMUNIQUE'S AIM IS TO ALLAY CONCERNS

Mr. HARRIMAN. We feel that there is no greater commitment than is contained under Article IV(1), but it is giving them publicly an interpretation, our interpretation, of our obligations under IV(1) and, as Mr. Chayes indicated, the interpretation which Mr. Dulles gave to this committee when this treaty came before it.

So its purpose is really to allay the concern which the Thais, I think—and I have great sympathy for them, Senator, and I am sure you have. We all know that the establishment of this government of national unity in Laos, and the agreement which we are entering, cannot be guaranteed, and this is on their border. It is a thousand miles of common border between Laos and themselves, and they are concerned about its action.

The people, the government, do not understand why the SEATO organization did not act militarily rather than attempt to find a solution of the kind which we have been working for. Therefore, our thought is that this will give reassurance to the people and, therefore, give reassurance to the government itself.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

---

[1] See Appendix B.

TIMING OF DECLARATION

There must be a reason why it is considered desirable to make this declaration or reaffirmation of our obligation at this time. Is it because the Thais or we believe that the situation in Laos is deteriorating to a most dangerous point?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, Senator. This thought originates from the concern of the Thais. There is nothing behind this other than what I have tried to say to the committee.

They are more concerned than we are. We are concerned over any agreement that has been made.

BASIS OF THAILAND'S CONCERNS

It is the view of the administration that the risks are worth taking if the arrangements can be worked out, as we hope they will be, but it is one thing to have those arrangements made when you are exactly at the opposite side of the earth, as we are, or whether it is, let us say, Mexico. You know, then we would be much more concerned then, perhaps, somebody living around the other side of the globe, and I think it comes from that proximity.

In addition to that, we must remember that many of the Laotians and the Thais, have not been good friends over the years. They have been battling over a frontier.

There is an overlap of population; a good many of the people in Thailand are of the Laotian race. You know the feeling that exists, you just mentioned it, between the Cambodians and the Thais; to some extent there is the same feeling between some of the Laos and the Thais. It just so happens that General Phoumi is a cousin of Marshal Sarit. But it also happens that Prince Souvanna Phouma and Marshal Sarit have never been close or friends; it so happens that they have been enemies in the past. These personal relationships enter into it as well as other matters.

NO EVIDENCE OF AN IMPENDING ATTACK

There is not, Senator, any special information that anyone has of any intentions on the part of the Communists to attack Thailand.

We do not know where they might come from. There are some indications of a step-up in subversive activity in the northwestern part of Thailand, nothing of any importance, but there is enough to cause the government concern, and enough for us to recognize it. There is enough, as I have said, to indicate that we are prepared in an aid program to help them build a road into the area, and under the aid program a couple of dams being agreed to be built in there, which would help them to improve their agriculture. It is rather a backward part of the country, and the agriculture is not very prosperous, and it is hoped by these measures that it will cement the political situation there, so they will be impervious to possible infiltration from the outside.

But it is nothing of any great moment. There is no secret about it. Nor is there any particular concern that the administration has or any particular intelligence information that we have at this time.

The reason for this is the natural concern that the Thais have over the possible instability of their neighbor.

THAILAND'S REJECTION OF U.S. FORCES

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask just this one question. I ought to remember it; I asked it at a session we had not too long ago.

Was it last year that Thailand objected to the use of our forces on Thai territory?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I think there was a question of an exercise which they did not want. Do you recall? There was an air exercise which was contemplated.

Senator SPARKMAN. That has always puzzled me.

Mr. HARRIMAN. They did not want it there. I do not know whether there was a political reason—it came before I got in there—but there was a certain amount of expense attached to it. I think we are going to have an exercise in Australia.

We thought it might be useful politically to show the strength of SEATO there. We have asked them whether by stationing American forces there it would give them any greater assurance. They have said no, they do not want any. Maybe that is what you heard of.

Senator SPARKMAN. Maybe that is what it is.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I am not sure that when the Vice President was there he did not——

Senator SPARKMAN. There was a discussion about concerted action in that area, and it seemed to me at the time to be a backing away by Thailand. I may be entirely mistaken.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I think, Senator, there was some discussion. I am not sure whether there was not discussion when the Vice President was there, a discussion about whether they would like to have a small contingency of American forces there, and they indicated they would not.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. HARRIMAN. But it was not seriously considered, there was no great issue made one way or the other. There was a general discussion as to what they felt would make their country more secure.

IMPORTANCE OF THAILAND

We do feel—I would like to speak to Senator Hickenlooper—the administration feels that Thailand, just as you do, sir, is a very important member of the free world in that area, and one that can be strengthened and can play an increasingly important role in the security of the whole area and, therefore——

Senator SPARKMAN. I certainly agree with you as to its importance, and I feel it is a country that we want to be in a position to strengthen if the time comes.

Senator Gore wished to ask some questions.

VALUE OF PUBLIC ASSURANCES

Senator GORE. As I understand your testimony, it is that the one and only purpose of this proposed communique is to give to the

Thais publicly the assurances which have already been given to them privately.

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is correct, sir.

Senator GORE. Of what value is that to Thailand?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I think it is a good deal of value. There are 22 million people, I think, who are concerned. There are other members of the government and those who sit down with our people—the papers discuss the spirit of their country, they know they are a small nation without any great military resources and strength. For the United States to indicate its concern, friendship, as well as its underlying treaty obligations, will have, we believe, a good psychological influence and, incidentally, be an observation which, perhaps, possibly might be useful in warning any potential aggressor.

SARIT'S POLITICAL STRENGTH

Senator GORE. Is there some feeling on the part of the administration that Marshal Sarit is in an uneasy position?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Not that he personally is in an uneasy position, but he is concerned about the future.

Senator GORE. I mean in a position where there is some feeling on your part that Marshal Sarit may be in an uncertain political situation in Thailand.

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, there is no indication that he is in any uncertain position as far as his political strength is concerned in the country.

Senator GORE. What is his political strength? What is the source of it?

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I discuss this off the record?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

NARCOTICS TRAFFIC THROUGH THAILAND

Senator GORE. Have you made any inquiry of Marshal Sarit that there is a possibility that his government and he personally would be cooperating in the movement of dope through Thailand to this country?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Of our using Thailand in connection——

Senator GORE. For his cooperating with the international community in trying to curb the illicit trade in dope. Perhaps you are not aware that his is the one country which refuses to cooperate.

Mr. HARRIMAN. You mean in the dope?

Senator GORE. Yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I have not studied that.

Can you give us any information on that, Mr. Chayes?

Mr. CHAYES. I do not have any at all, I am sorry to say.

Senator GORE. You mean that has not come to your attention in the State Department at all?

Mr. CHAYES. It has not come to my attention.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I will look into it, Senator.[2]

---

[2] See Appendix B.

Mr. CHAYES. We can find out about that. I am sure there are people in the Department who are well acquainted with it. We have been connected with the negotiation of narcotics conventions, and so on. We can very readily supply that information.

MILITARY DEPENDABILITY QUESTIONED

Senator GORE. I must once again express my concern with this growing web of commitments in the most peripheral of territories where our strategic disadvantages are most acute. In line with the observation of Senator Sparkman, let me remind you, Mr. Secretary, that the Japanese took Thailand without the firing of a single shot.

You spoke of their wars with Laos and Cambodia. I think one of the greatest wars there was over either a white or a pink elephant, and that their wars have traditionally been by shows of force rather than the use of force.

The Thais are a gentle, admirable people. I have been there several times, but so far as being a dependable military ally is concerned, I think we had better look at our whole card very carefully, not only with respect to the Laotians, but also with respect to the Thais.

PURPOSE OF PUBLIC COMMITMENT

I am still at a loss to know just what purpose is to be served by a public commitment when the private commitment has already been made, unless it is that Marshal Sarit feels the necessity of strengthening his own position in Thailand by way of a public commitment.

I do not know what other purpose could be served. You mentioned one possible one, and that is notice to any possible aggressor.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Senator, I think it is fair to say that although you have referred to this government in a certain manner, that public opinion in Thailand is of importance to him—public concern is of importance, the morale of the army, the morale of the people is of concern and, therefore, it is important to him to have the people know what he knows.

LINKS WITH DICTATORSHIPS ARE DISTURBING

Senator GORE. Well, you know, Governor, I saw one time the Parliament of Thailand in session. You do not see it in session now, and this growing net of commitments with military dictatorships, I must say, is disturbing to me. Maybe this is the best we can do—and please understand I said the same thing under the previous administration—but it certainly does not improve the image of the United States.

Maybe, as I say, that is the best we can do, but it is rather a poor substitute for the kind of self-determination of people who operate under the democratic processes by which we live and under which we believe in.

ATTACK ON VIETNAM'S PRESIDENTIAL PALACE

I wonder while you are here if you would bring us up to date on the attack on the Presidential palace in South Vietnam.[3] What is the latest news there and the situation as the Department assesses it?

Mr. HARRIMAN. The accounts of it as they have appeared in the paper, particularly the Washington Post, which was the latest I saw, were accurate from the standpoint of our information.

It seems that there were two planes—possibly more, but two which have been identified—that peeled off instead of making an attack on the Viet Cong, and turned and attacked the palace at a time when it was thought the President was in the palace. They dropped bombs and also straffed the palace with machine guns, and started a rather substantial fire.

There is no indication that there was any further organization back of these two pilots and their mechanics, and there was no action in the streets. Law and order were preserved, and in a rather short time President Diem went on the radio and reassured the people that he was safe, and so were the other members of the government.

He went about his business and asked them to do so, too. He went on a trip the same day to some other part of the country which he was going to visit.

There is no indication yet who inspired the two pilots to do this, whether it was their own dissatisfaction with some aspects of the regime or the command, or whether they were inspired to do it by someone else. There is no information available so far to answer your question.

FATE OF PLANES, PILOTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did they defect with the airplanes?

Senator GORE. That was what my next question was. Do we have any information as to the location of the airplanes now? Is that what you had in mind?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I was told one came down and one was captured. One was a forced landing within a few miles along the road and was captured, and the other one evidently went out of Cambodia. But we have not got the detailed information unless it has come on the ticker since I left my office. In other words, in this case the press comes faster than the telegrams from our Embassy.

CHINESE STATEMENT ON VIETNAM

Senator GORE. What is the Department's assessment of the statement from the Red Chinese with respect to the presence of U.S. forces in South Vietnam and the commitments which we have made to South Vietnam?

Mr. HARRIMAN. So far it is an indication of registering of objection to our assisting South Vietnam, saying that it endangers the

---

[3] On Feb. 27, 1962, two disgruntled South Vietnamese air force pilots, flying U.S.-supplied planes, bombed and straffed the Presidential palace in Saigon. President Diem and his family escaped injury by fleeing to a fortified cellar.

North Vietnamese. It fails to mention, of course, that our military assistance there is given at the request of President Diem to protect against the subversion and guerrilla aggression which is inspired, led and trained, supplied from the north.

It is not couched in any of the same language that was used at the time of the, before the Chinese intervention in Korea and, therefore, there is no indication so far of any intention on the part of Peking to invade.

WHY NOT SUBMIT COMMUNIQUE AS TREATY?

Senator GORE. If the proposed communique is, in fact, a commitment, why isn't it laid before the Senate in the form of a treaty rather than accomplished through the publication of a communique?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, Senator, if I did make it plain, I want to make it doubly plain, that the legal opinion is that there is no need to consult with this committee; that this communique would be stating publicly the interpretation of the treaty as presented by Mr. Dulles at the time he came before this committee, and as we have explained it to the Thais before.

This is brought to you as a matter of normal courtesy because of the relationship between the administration and this committee, and the desire of the administration to have this committee fully informed and to feel that the committee can give any comment and advice that the committee may feel it wishes to give to the administration. I would say that this is typical of the desire of President Kennedy to work very closely with the Senate of which he was a member.

NATURE OF U.S. COMMITMENT

Senator GORE. In order to identify the commitment which you say was made by the treaty and of which we have advised the Thais privately, and which is proposed to advise them of publicly, is it or is it not a commitment that the United States will intervene militarily in the event of a military threat to Thailand?

Mr. HARRIMAN. The treaty is very clear. The treaty language, the interpretation of the treaty language which, if you will read Article IV(1), states that the United States recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack on Thailand would endanger our own peace and safety, and we agree that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with our constitutional processes.

The question is how the President of the United States will interpret that sentence.

Do you have anything more to say, Mr. Chayes?

Mr. CHAYES. No. I think you have expressed it very fully. The Senator asked whether we had any obligation in case of a military threat, and the answer to that is no. The treaty applies, that is, this article of the treaty applies, only in case of aggression by armed attack which we construe as meaning—as I said, there is some gray area—but basically a Korean-type aggression, the formal invasion by troops of a foreign power across an international boundary, international border.

U.S. DECIDES WHEN, WHERE, HOW TO RESPOND

Second, the response that we are committed to make is to act to meet the common danger in accordance with our constitutional processes. And, as Secretary Dulles——

Senator GORE. Just there, does that leave to this country the responsibility of deciding when, where, how, whether by military, whether by diplomatic, or by what means it responds?

Mr. CHAYES. I think it does. As Secretary Dulles said to this committee:

> There is, of course, a wide range of defensive measures which might be appropriate, depending upon the circumstances.

And he also said:

> It leaves to the judgment of each country the type of action to be taken in the event armed attack occurs.

This is fairly common language in our treaty structure, and we have always taken the position that it places upon us in the given event, that is, in the event of armed aggression, to make a good faith judgment as to what is required to meet the common danger, and then to take that action in accordance with our constitutional processes.

SIGNIFICANCE IS REASSURANCE

Senator GORE. Isn't that well known in the international community? Isn't that well known to Thailand?

Mr. CHAYES. I think the significance of the communique, as Governor Harriman has pointed out, is a reassuring significance, particularly during the past eight or nine months, when there has been a great deal of talk about the problem of veto in the SEATO organization. We are stating publicly what we have always held and what Secretary Dulles said also publicly when he presented this thing to the committee, that we regard Article IV(1), we regard that commitment, that is the commitment to act in case of overt aggression, as not subject to the concurrence of the other parties to the treaty, and in that sense it contrasts with the Article IV(2) commitment, where our only obligation is to consult and to do anything that everybody agrees on.

REFERENCE TO MILITARY ACTION

Senator GORE. Is it proposed that the terms of the communique would refer to military action?

Mr. CHAYES. I will have at least something to do with the terms of the communique, and I would hope, and I trust and I think it is perfectly clear, that the terms of the communique will use the language of the treaty. It will refer to aggression by means of armed attack and say that, in that event, we would act to meet the common danger in accordance with our constitutional processes.

In other words, it would not go beyond the language of the treaty in the commitment that we make.

Isn't that the case?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes. In other words, after the communication is issued, the United States will have no greater or no lesser commitments than the Senate has approved.

Senator GORE. Nor any greater or lesser than has already been privately conveyed by way of interpretation.

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is right.

Mr. CHAYES. That is right, sir.

Senator GORE. So it really comes down to, it seems to me, the desire or advisability or necessity, as the case may appear to the administration, of satisfying the Government of Thailand.

Mr. HARRIMAN. The government and the people of Thailand.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COMMUNIQUE NOT YET DRAFTED

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Capehart.

Senator CAPEHART. I have one question. Did you read the communique you proposed to issue?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No. It has not been drafted.

Senator CAPEHART. I was not here.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I outlined it as giving five points. I will be glad to show it to you.

Senator CAPEHART. No, I just wanted to know.

WHY SINGLE OUT THAILAND?

Let me ask you this: How do we help the situation, and what necessitates picking Thailand out for a communique of this sort when we do not do so for Cambodia or South Vietnam and others? What is the reason for just picking Thailand out and not all members of SEATO?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, Cambodia is not a member of the treaty, is not a signatory of the treaty.

Senator CAPEHART. I mean the other members.

Mr. HARRIMAN. The other members have not asked for it.

Senator CAPEHART. Australia and the Philippines and others.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Actually, most of the other countries have other bilateral arrangements. Australia and New Zealand have the Anzus treaty; the Philippines has a bilateral; the British and the French are involved in NATO.

The reason for this, why Thailand——

Senator SPARKMAN. Pakistan has CENTO.

Mr. HARRIMAN [continuing]. Is because there has been a great deal of debate in Bangkok where the representatives of these eight countries meet over what action SEATO should take about Laos, and as Laos has a border of nearly 1,000 miles with Thailand, they are concerned over what may happen in Laos.

Since there is a good deal of talk about there having to be unanimity in connection with Laos before any action was taken, an impression has been gained, I think, in the public mind, that SEATO can only act if it is unanimous. So we have pointed out again to the government that we consider this treaty, both the individual commitments of the signatory countries and also the multiple commitment, collective treaty.

IDEA NOT PRESENTED TO OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator CAPEHART. Have you presented this communique to other SEATO countries?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No. It has not come up with any of the other SEATO countries. There has not been any request for it.

This came up because of the discussion that took place, after the Laos questions were under review by SEATO, as to whether there should not be a change in the voting procedure of SEATO, a three-quarters vote instead of a unanimous vote.

Senator CAPEHART. That has not been presented to any other SEATO country?

Mr. HARRIMAN. This particular subject has not, but the question of voting procedure has been a matter of discussion between all of the SEATO members over the matter of a good many months. There seems to be considerable opinion that there should be no change in the voting procedure for different reasons by different countries.

There have been several suggestions made and, by and large, it looks as if there would be quite a heated debate if the subject came up. Therefore, we raised with the Thailand Government, which was the first one to bring up the question of the voting procedure, whether it was worthwhile for them to do it.

BETTER THAN CHANGING VOTING PROCEDURE

We suggested since we interpreted this treaty, and always have, as requiring unilateral action on the part of each member in accordance with their interpretation of the treaty at the time, the obligations at the time, that there was no need for unanimity; it could be taken on the part of any one or several members of SEATO. It is for the reason that this matter has come to a head in this way. Possibly, as the result of these discussions—a communique has not been agreed to; we are not sure that it will satisfy the Thai Government, but we are inclined to believe by asking the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Thanat, to come here, we can convince him that our interpretation is correct, and to better leave SEATO alone, the voting procedure alone.

We feel confident, we believe that, if that reasoning is considered sound, he will want to have some public statement to indicate why they are not pressing any further the question of a change in voting procedure. The argument about whether there should be a change in voting procedure has become generally known and, therefore, it is our belief—it has not been suggested by the Thai Government, but it is our belief—that they will require some sort of public statement to explain to their people why this voting procedure may be dropped.

WILL COMMUNIQUE INVITE CHINESE ACTION?

Senator CAPEHART. One other question: Will this action not invite, might it not possibly invite, action by Red China?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No. This will not change, this will not either increase or decrease the obligation that we have today.

Senator CAPEHART. Is it sort of like placing a stick on the shoulder of a fellow and daring somebody else to knock it off?

Mr. HARRIMAN. They have been constantly criticizing SEATO; the Red Chinese have taken every opportunity to denounce SEATO.

Senator CAPEHART. Isn't the psychological effect on Red China one of sort of inviting trouble? I do not know, I am just asking.

Mr. HARRIMAN. The fact that the Chinese have taken such exception to SEATO makes me believe that it really is an important instrument in stopping aggression.

AN ADVISORY DISCUSSION

Senator CAPEHART. Are you asking this committee to approve this?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No. The purpose of this discussion is to advise this committee as to what we are planning to do.

Senator CAPEHART. As to what you plan to do.

Mr. HARRIMAN. And to give the committee a chance to express their opinions. There is no need for the President to legally consult this committee, because this committee has already acted on this treaty. But it was thought as a matter of common courtesy and, particularly, the relationship which the President wants to maintain with this committee, to discuss it so that they will not have to read in the paper about what was involved.

THAILAND HAS YET TO AGREE

Senator CAPEHART. Have you definitely made up your mind to issue this?

Mr. HARRIMAN. This requires two people. Mr. Thant is arriving on Thursday and will be here over the weekend. Presumably this will be a matter of discussion with him on the part of the Secretary of State and the President. If he agrees, this communique will be issued by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Secretary of Thailand next Monday, a week.

Senator CAPEHART. I do not question the administration, but it seems to me as though—you say Thailand asked you to do this?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No. Thailand has asked for a change in the voting procedure of SEATO.

Senator CAPEHART. The voting procedure?

Mr. HARRIMAN. The voting procedure. It has asked—I do not know that this has become public as to the exact argument; it is generally known that there has been some discussion, but I do not think that this has been known.

Mr. CHAYES. No. It is not public at all. It has been discussed in the council meetings in Bangkok, and it has also been discussed among the SEATO governments. But I do not think there is anything beyond the rumor stage that has gotten out.

Mr. HARRIMAN. What they have asked for in the conferences is that instead of unanimous approval, SEATO should act on an affirmative vote of six of the eight members, three-quarters.

Senator CAPEHART. Act on what?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Act on any step which SEATO might be required to take under the treaty or might decide it wants to take.

A U.S. INITIATIVE

Senator CAPEHART. What relationship is there to that and our issuing a communique tomorrow or the next day?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, one would change the treaty procedure, as has been agreed to among its members. This communique would only relate to the interpretation that the United States has put, always put, as Secretary Dulles indicated to the committee be put, on this treaty when it came before this comittee.

Senator CAPEHART. Pardon me, I was not here when you first started.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes.

Senator CAPEHART. But my understanding is that you are thinking about issuing a communique in which you simply reiterate the language of the agreement.

Now, my question is, did Thailand ask you to do that?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No.

Senator CAPEHART. Well, then, why are you doing it?

Mr. HARRIMAN. They are quite concerned over SEATO as not being an effective body because of the unanimity provision. We are hopeful they will abandon that, since there is a difference of opinion, if we state publicly what we have stated privately, namely, that we consider that we are bound under the terms of the treaty to act unilaterally, even if the rest of the members of the treaty are not bound.

This is Article IV, Paragraph 1, which is the provision of the treaty that we are discussing.

CORRECTING A MISTAKEN IMPRESSION

Senator CAPEHART. What is more public than this treaty?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Nothing is more public than this treaty. But very frequently the discussion in the press—I think it has been in the press, Mr. Chayes—has been that SEATO has to act by unanimous agreement, and there is a general impression around that any one of the eight members can veto action.

Senator CAPEHART. In other words, the general impression is that no one could help Thailand except by unanimous vote——

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is right.

Senator CAPEHART [continuing]. Of the SEATO members.

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is correct, Senator.

Senator CAPEHART. And what you are saying to them is that even though the other members do not act, we will?

Mr. HARRIMAN. We are obligated to act individually or collectively. That is the interpretation which we have always placed, the interpretation which Mr. Dulles placed on it before this committee.

Senator CAPEHART. In other words, under this treaty we are obligated to help Thailand or any other member of SEATO, even though the other members do nothing?

Mr. CHAYES. In case of aggression by armed attack; yes, sir.

Senator CAPEHART. What you want to do here is to state, restate, to the world what the treaty has been previously agreed to——

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is right, sir.

Mr. CHAYES. In other words, we want to say that the impression that has gotten around is a mistaken one; this general talk is not correct.

COMMUNIQUE WOULD RESOLVE ISSUE

Senator CAPEHART. You say Thailand has not asked this.

If they have not, why do it?

Senator SPARKMAN. Homer, the thing about it is this: They have asked for a modification of the unanimity rule.

Senator CAPEHART. And you cannot get that?

Senator SPARKMAN. To get that we would have to go through the whole process of modifying the treaty.

Mr. HARRIMAN. There is a very considerable difference of opinion. Thailand is the only one that wants to have a three-quarters rule. There has been one suggestion made by the Australians which I think we could accept, namely, that a country that did not want to vote affirmatively could abstain, in which case that would not be considered a veto of the action.

Senator SPARKMAN. Our thought is that a communique restating our position for the public might be acceptable as an alternative.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes.

IMMEDIATE CONCERN IS LAOS, NOT CHINA

Senator CAPEHART. Do you have any reason to believe, does Thailand have any reason to believe, that Red China may attack them in the near future?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, there is no immediate threat. What gives Thailand concern, immediate concern, is these discussions over a peaceful settlement of the dispute in Laos through the formation of a government of national unity. They are quite concerned over whether that will be successful or whether Laos will fall under Communist sway, in which event they would feel that they would be quite threatened.

ASSISTANCE TO THAILAND

Senator CAPEHART. Is it our intention to step up our military help to Thailand immediately?

Mr. HARRIMAN. There has been no intention of—the military program has not been submitted to the Congress yet. I do not think there is any material change in the request for military assistance to them.

Senator CAPEHART. But orders have already gone out to help Thailand economically, to step up the economic help?

Mr. HARRIMAN. We have asked for a certain increase for assistance, particularly in northern Thailand, which is somewhat backward.

Senator CAPEHART. I see orders have gone out to lending agencies to step up to economic aid to Thailand.

Mr. HARRIMAN. There is a modest increase requested for certain particular projects, particularly in the northwestern part of the country, which is backward, where the agriculture is not too good, and where there has been some Communist activity, which has not

grown to any importance. This is really an attempt to assist Thailand before the danger becomes great.

COMMUNIQUE MIGHT BE HARMFUL

Senator CAPEHART. Unless there is something that I do not see or understand, I would think that the communique might do more harm than good.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Would do more harm than good?

Senator CAPEHART. Yes, unless you have some information that I do not have. I think the communique might do more harm than good.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I am afraid I do not understand what harm it could do. I can only see good coming from a communique; I can only see the reassurance of the people of Thailand in explaning to them the obligations we now have.

We will have to restate those obligations occasionally, and I do not see any possible damage that could come———

Senator CAPEHART. Let me base that conclusions———

Mr. HARRIMAN [continuing]. From restating a fact.

ANTAGONIZING CHINA

Senator CAPEHART. Let me give you my reasons for it; they may not be sound. I think I read in the paper where Red China was threatening us on the ground that we were aggressors in this part of the world, in South Vietnam and this part of the world.

Now, if we immediately issue this communique, isn't it going to further antagonize them? That is the only reason I said what I did.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, Senator, I am not sure that we can further antagonize Red China. I cannot imagine how it is possible for us to antagonize Red China further.

I have never had the opportunity to go to Red China—I tried to go 3 years ago—but all my acquaintances who have been there say that the radio, 24 hours in the cars and in the streets, blasts out about American imperialism, the danger of American attack, so I cannot quite understand how that could be stepped up.

LIKE NATO, SEATO IS CALLED AGGRESSIVE

Senator CAPEHART. Well, I do not know, but it normally would be that it I were in an argument with another person, my reaction, if I were having a little fight with you—and maybe I am wrong———

Mr. HARRIMAN. Perhaps I have been in a position to have more opportunity to know about it, but I know they have been attacking this SEATO treaty ever since it was entered into. They called it an aggressor; we folks consider it entirely differently, but they have called it an aggressor organization, just like the Kremlin has called NATO.

We have never resisted underlining the importance which we think that NATO is in our common security. Just because Mr. Khrushchev happens to say that he considers it an offensive organization, I do not think we have ever hesitated, the President or any member of this committee has been hesitant, in making a

speech and pointing out how important we think NATO is to our security, and why we think it is a deterrent to aggression.

I am sure you have made speeches to that effect. I know I have, and I have not noticed that that had any adverse effect. Possibly it has.

WHY OVERLOOK CUBA, SUPPORT OTHER DICTATORS?

Senator CAPEHART. Just a thought is all. Of course, I do not quite understand our willingness to stop communism in Thailand, 10,000 miles away, and our unwillingness to stop it in Cuba. That is an old question; it has been argued back and forth, and I know both sides of the argument.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I am not here to discuss Cuba.

Senator CAPEHART. I know you are not.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I do not know that Cuba has any—with respect to other parts of the world, what is decided to be done in other parts of the world, has anything to do with Cuba's importance. But I would like to underline the importance that I feel personally, and the importance that I feel Southeast Asia bears to our security.

Senator CAPEHART. Another thing I do not quite understand is our apparent hatred for dictators, and yet here we go to bed with one and cuddle him, and now say that we are going to help him, and we are going to stand by him. I think we are getting ourselves into a very inconsistent position in the world.

APPRECIATION FOR MEETING

Senator GORE. At any rate, Mr. Secretary, I want to express my own appreciation for your willingness and the President's willingness to come and advise us so fully and patiently and in great detail on this problem.

Senator CAPEHART. I want to do the same thing. I thought the purpose of the meeting was to have an open discussion where one can speak his thoughts.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is exactly right.

Mr. HARRIMAN. It is very helpful.

Senator CAPEHART. I think it is good of you to do it.

FURTHER DISCUSSION OFFERED

Mr. HARRIMAN. Senator, if you are willing to stake your time against mine, I would like nothing better than to have the privilege of joining with you at luncheon and arguing with you the importance of this area to our security. I think it is very important to us.

Senator CAPEHART. I am not questioning it at all; I am not questioning that at all, but it seems as though these things, we enter into, when they do not work out, and we have what looks like at the moment as failure after failure—maybe not failure, but the situation gets worse and worse—then it seems to me that we ought to at least think about it.

I would love to have lunch with you.

COMMITTEE ACTION ON MARSHALL PLAN PRAISED

Mr. HARRIMAN. I should not take the time of this committee, but I think some of us remember the first time I ever appeared before this committee was in 1948. Europe was about ready to collapse, and we thought that Stalin was going to take over Western Europe.

In my opinion, Stalin would have taken over Western Europe if it had not been for the enlightened action of this committee. I remember very well a Republican who was chairman of this committee and who I respected as much as any man I have ever known in public life, the Senator from Michigan.[4]

There was a discussion and a debate, and I think we undertook one of the most enlightened moves of self-interest, and its effect is amazing. The Marshall Plan is alive today, and we have vigorous and capable partners.

Senator CAPEHART. He was not any more enthusiastic for it than I was.

Mr. HARRIMAN. It is rather hard for me to admit that we have failure after failure in the record of this country and in a post-war period. I think it will be written——

Senator CAPEHART. Let me make this statement: He was not any more enthusiastic over this idea, excepting that my idea or my thought was instead of giving them money, we should have loaned it to them.

SEATO MEMBERS WILL NOT BE SURPRISED

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, that is water over the dam.

I want to ask one or two more questions, very brief questions.

I think I know the answer to this question, and it may have been implied in an answer you gave to one of Senator Capehart's questions, but has this been discussed with any of the SEATO members? Do they know that this may happen?

Mr. HARRIMAN. The general question has been discussed, yes. This particular comminique has not been discussed, but we have pointed out to them—there has been a general discussion among the SEATO members about this voting procedure, the reasons for it, the need for it, the lack of need for it, and, therefore, this will not come as a surprise to any of the SEATO members.

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Chairman, may I ask this: Before you issue this will you tell the other members of SEATO that you are going to issue it?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I cannot answer you on that specifically. I am sure that we will tell the other members of the committee——

Senator SPARKMAN. Not the members of the committee.

Mr. HARRIMAN [continuing]. The members of SEATO that Mr. Thant is invited to come here, the purposes of the discussion, but the language of the communique has not been discussed, and I do not know that it is necessary. It will not come as any surprise. It will come as a logical conclusion to the discussions which they know about.

---

[4] Arthur H. Vandenberg.

CONSISTENCY IS HOBGOBLIN OF LITTLE MINDS

Senator SPARKMAN. Before we leave, Senator Capehart said something awhile ago about consistency. Carl Marcy reminded me of something that somebody said—I have just forgotten who it was—but I do remember that Senator [Henry F.] Ashurst said that of all the vices of which he was guilty, he had never been accused of the vice of consistency.

The one that Carl showed me was this—and I am not sure who used this—that consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.

Mr. CHAYES. Justice Holmes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Justice Holmes. And he said, Carl Marcy said, "Especially in foreign policy." That was Carl who added that, not Justice Holmes.

CONSULTATION COMMENDED

What I want to say is this: I join in what the others have said in expressing their appreciation for your coming here and discussing this with us. It is the kind of cooperation we ought to have, and I realize we are not called upon to take any action.

In other words, this is not a policy being set or even confirmed by this committee. We are not advising and consenting. We are simply being informed as to what is contemplated.

I do want to say that I have a very keen feeling regarding the importance of Southeast Asia. I think that Laos and Thailand—as much as I think of the apparent ease with which Thailand has gone with the winning side each time, nevertheless I think that it is highly important that we keep that part of Southeast Asia out of Communist hands. I think we ought to take any action that we can to that end.

I appreciate your coming.

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I say the press is waiting, and I think it might be better simply to say that we discussed with this committee the developments in Southeast Asia.

Senator SPARKMAN. We can call them right in here.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I do not think we ought to mention this question of the communique or the specific problem of Thailand. I will say that I explained the latest developments in Southeast Asia and answered any questions that you had. I do not think we ought to say much about the intended visit.

[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 3 p.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (subcommittee chairman).

The situation in Europe was discussed with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, William R. Tyler.

No transcript was taken or record kept at the meeting.

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MARCH 6, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:45 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Lausche, Church, Aiken, and Williams. Senator Sparkman presided in the beginning.

The committee discussed the mark-up of the bill (S. 2768) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the purchase of United Nations bonds.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

REPORT ON THE U-2 INCIDENT

[Editor's Note.—On May 5, 1960, the Soviet Union announced that it had shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance plane over its territory. American officials at first described it as a weather research plane and denied that it had been involved in espionage. Two days later, however, Soviet Premier Khrushchev revealed that the pilot was still alive and would stand trial for spying. That same day, the State Department admitted that the U-2 had been "endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain." Khrushchev's demand that President Eisenhower apologize for the U-2 flights, and Eisenhower's refusal, led to the collapse of the 4-Power Summit Conference scheduled for later that month in Paris.

The American pilot, Francis Gary Powers, was tried before a Soviet military tribunal and sentenced to 10 years in prison. However, on February 10, 1962, Powers was released in exchange for convicted Soviet spy Rudolph Abel. Powers returned to the United States, where he was interrogated by a special board of inquiry which the CIA had formed to investigate his capture.

On February 12, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee formally requested that it receive a full report of Powers' interrogation. At a news conference, the following day, President Kennedy said that Powers was "cooperating voluntarily" with the interrogation, and that the results would be made available to Congress.

On March 6, Powers testified before a public hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Chairman Richard Russell opened the hearing by reading a statement from the CIA board of inquiry that Powers had "lived up to the terms of his employment and instructions in connection with his mission and in connection with his mission as an American under the circumstances in which he found himself."]

TUESDAY, MARCH 6, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4 p.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Denney, and Mr. Henderson of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased this afternoon to have the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. McCone. You have issued a statement concerning Powers? Does everybody have a copy?

Senator SYMINGTON. I had one but I have not got it here.

The CHAIRMAN. I have read it. There is no need of reading it since everybody has read it. We will proceed, if you would like to comment on it, Mr. McCone, and then we can ask questions if any of the committee wishes to ask questions.

48-688 O—86——9

STATEMENT OF JOHN A. McCONE, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON, GENERAL COUNSEL, JOHN S. WARNER, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL AND MORSE ALLEN, CIA; MAJOR HARRY CORDES, U.S. AIR FORCE, AND ROBERT GOODNOW, PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSULTANT

Mr. McCONE. Mr. Chairman, there are a few notes I have. I see no reason to read the memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. McCONE. First, I have been asked many questions as to the purpose in securing Powers' release. The purpose was twofold; first, an understandable human desire to secure the release of a young man captured and imprisoned, and when acting under our direction. This has been and will continue to be our policy in other instances if they should occur.

Second, and perhaps of greater importance to the national interest, was to determine beyond a reasonable doubt if the U–2 plane was actually brought down by ground-to-air fire or otherwise from a very high altitude. If this fact was established, then the U–2 has obviously been compromised and cannot be safely used where such defensive installations exist. If, on the other hand, the investigation we conducted would prove that the U–2 descended from its altitude because of engine failure and, hence, finally came down within reach of Soviet fighter planes and was shot down, then the U–2 might make further very important contributions to our national security.

It is, therefore, in our national interest to know all ascertainable facts concerning this incident. For that reason the Powers-Abel exchange, in my opinion, has served the interests of the United States.

THE INTERROGATION OF POWERS

Turning to the interrogation of Powers: Powers, on his return, was first carefully examined by doctors who reported that he was in good physical condition, normal mental condition, and showed no signs whatsoever of abnormalities as a result of his imprisonment or any treatment he might have been subjected to during the period of his imprisonment. This examination, which continued throughout the period of his interrogation, was made by competent physicians, by psychiatrists and psychologists who were chosen because of their knowledge of brainwashing, truth serums, and other techniques which might have been applied.

One of these specialists is present now.

On the basis of these reports, the Board of Inquiry and the CIA have concluded that Powers' physical and mental condition and treatment during imprisonment would not distort his story regardless of what it was.

In connection with this interrogation, we selected a team of the most competent interrogators available to us, who questioned Powers intermittently over a period of 5 days concerning the incident and all related matters. These interrogators were chosen on the basis of their experience and, most particularly, because of their objectivity. We wanted men who, to our knowledge, were not

prejudiced in the case, and also men skilled in interrogation techniques. In this respect I think the executives of CIA were successful.

One of these interrogators is here to answer your questions.

All conversations were recorded and transcribed and were carefully studied by the Board of Inquiry, which I will refer to later, and by a technical evaluation group established by the U.S. Air Force, at my request, to render a judgment as to whether a plane damaged as Powers said his plane was damaged, could behave as he claimed it did behave, with the effects of the pilot which he claims he experienced.

As the paper before you indicates, the interrogators were satisfied that Powers' story was correct, that it was supported by collateral intelligence unknown to him, and that there were no contradictions which raised questions in their minds.

CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE

They therefore have reported that the Powers U-2 plane was damaged while flying at 68,000 feet. Actually it was above 68,000 feet, but this information remains classified.

While the exact nature of the cause of the damage cannot be established, circumstances lead to the conclusion that the damage was caused by the explosion of a ground-to-air non-nuclear missile. The explosion occurred some distance behind the plane, but close enough to so impair the stabilizer as to render the plane uncontrollable.

The plane acted as reported in the paper before you, and Powers was exposed to forces of gravity, which explains his difficulty throughout his descent. These have been carefully examined by experts.

The loss of control, the nosing over of the plane, the tearing off of the wings, the inverted spin assumed by the fuselage and the remaining parts of the plane, and the gravity forces on the pilot have all been studied by competent aerodynamicists and aeronautical engineers, who report that all these events would all occur in the manner described by Mr. Powers. In other words, there was no inconsistency between what Mr. Powers said happened and what scientists feel would happen under such circumstances.

A further point that has been examined is the extent of the damage of the remnants of the plane. Some have stated that a plane falling from such height would suffer far greater damage than was evidenced by pictures of the remnants of the Powers' U-2.

Aeronautical engineers who examined photographs of the remnants of four other U-2's which failed at 68,000 feet or above, find no appreciable difference between the condition of the remnants in each of these planes and the pictures of the Powers' U-2. This point was therefore dismissed by the experts.

SPECULATION THAT THE PLANE HAD DESCENDED

Conflicting intelligence which led to the speculation that Powers' plane descended gradually to an altitude of 35,000 to 40,000 feet, has also been examined.

As you will recall, Mr. Chairman, there was considerable speculation in the press that Powers was not shot down at 68,000 feet, but that his engine flamed out and he descended gradually, and finally was shot down when he came within range of Soviet interceptors. [Deleted.]

This information has been examined and reexamined by the Board of Inquiry. This [deleted] caused the Board to question the dependability and reliability of this particular information. Moreover, the fact that the information itself is in certain important details contradictory, contributed to the conclusion that such information cannot be accepted as dependable intelligence upon which Mr. Powers' story could be refuted.

[Deleted.]

POWERS' POLYGRAPH TEST

When Mr. Powers was confronted with the conflicting information, he requested, as the paper before you states, a polygraph test. He was under the polygraph for 5 hours, an inordinately long time for a polygraph test. The test was conducted by the most expert polygraph tester in the agency.

The results were positive. There were no reactions which, in the opinion of the experts, could be interpreted as indicating that Mr. Powers was deviating from the truth with respect to any essential aspects of the inquiry, including, of course, his story of the event which damaged his plane and the subsequent events during his descent.

His insistence on subjecting himself to a polygraph and the results of the tests have an important bearing on the conclusions of the Board and the agency.

[Deleted.]

THE BOARD OF INQUIRY

As has been reported, I appointed a Board of Inquiry to examine into this matter carefully and to report the findings to me. The Board was composed of three distinguished and knowledgeable citizens: retired Judge E. Barrett Prettyman, who was former Chief Justice of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia; General Harold R. Bull, a man of great experience in both military and intelligence matters; and John Bross, a very senior CIA staff officer of long experience, of legal background and no previous direct connection with the U-2 project. This Board spent 10 days studying all available facts and interrogating a great number of witnesses and specialists, including Mr. Powers himself.

They rendered a report to me, and then I met for several hours with the Board to personally review the reasons for their conclusions, and more particularly to examine the conflicts to which I referred earlier. The Board reached the conclusions stated in the final paragraph of the paper before you.

After a long and intense discussion with the Board and the consideration of all other information available to me at this time, I concur with the findings and concur in the findings of the Board. Those findings are to the effect, and I will quote:

"On all the information available, therefore, it is the conclusion of the Board of Inquiry which reviewed Mr. Powers' case," and my conclusion as well, after carefully studying the Board report and discussing it with them, "that Mr. Powers lived up to the terms of his employment and instructions in connection with his mission and in his obligations as an American under the circumstances in which he found himself. Accordingly, the amount due Mr. Powers under the terms of this contract will be paid to him."

That concludes my notes extending the statement that was made public.

SOVIET TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think, Mr. McCone, the Russians did not resort to greater pressure, if not torture on Mr. Powers? How do you account for their apparently rather lenient treatment?

Mr. MCCONE. It seems to be rather characteristic of their treatment of men who are imprisoned in this way. It was exactly the way they treated the two fliers on the RB–47 that was shot down a year or two ago, or were released about a year ago, you will recall.

This man was not part of any espionage system. He was a flier and employed to pilot a plane and to operate a mechanism in the plane which he didn't know too much about, although he knew the purpose of the——

The CHAIRMAN. It is much more clearly espionage than the RB–47 flyers, though, wasn't it? They were off the coast.

Mr. MCCONE. I do not think it more clearly espionage. It was over the country rather than offshore. But the purposes of that flight were very clearly known, which was to establish certain facts with reference to the Soviet defense mechanism.

A GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILE

The CHAIRMAN. The conclusion is that the Russians developed a more powerful vehicle, rocket, than we had thought they had, I guess?

Mr. MCCONE. This is the conclusion that I draw from all of the testimony, although Mr. Powers does not know and cannot say for sure what brought him down. No one saw a ground-to-air missile. But when you take his story and you take all collateral intelligence and examine the results of previous flights, you can only come to the conclusion that it must have been a ground-to-air missile, plus the fact that we knew from other intelligence that he was flying over Soviet air defense sites.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman, do you have any questions?

Senator SPARKMAN. Did I understand you to say that the plane was flying in excess of 60,000 feet at the time?

Mr. MCCONE. It was flying at 70,000 feet, Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. 70,000 feet?

Mr. MCCONE. Yes. The Soviets said that it was 68,000 feet, and Powers admitted 68,000 feet, although that was below his actual altitude and several feet below the capability of the plane, so we just let it go at that. That was consistent with his instructions, incidentally.

Senator SPARKMAN. We do not have any ground-to-air rocket in that range, do we?

Mr. MCCONE. I do not know—on the effective range of the Nike and the Nike Hercules—but I would think that it would be up in that altitude, yes. Colonel, could you answer that question?

Senator SPARKMAN. The Nike Zeus.

Major CORDES. To the best of my knowledge the Nike Ajax and the Nike Hercules could reach to this altitude.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think you are wrong, but I will check it.

Major CORDES. The Nike Hercules; and the Ajax is open to question, sir.

MECHANISM FOR DESTROYING THE PLANE

Senator SPARKMAN. I notice the gentleman sitting by you is holding some kind of an instrument. What is that?

Mr. HOUSTON. There was a lot of talk about whether it was just the activating of a fuse which could have destroyed the plane. This is not just a button you push. You have to go through four actions. There are covers here which are wired down. First you have to break the cover up like that, then set that switch, and then break that cover and set that switch, and then he has 70 seconds in which to get out. So it is not just as easy as pushing a button.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is what I mean. I believe, according to the statement, he said that there was no way of—first, he could not get to it, and second when he thought he might maneuver his way to it, he felt he could not get out within the 70 seconds, is that right?

Mr. MCCONE. That is correct.

Mr. HOUSTON. At that time he could get to it. It was within reach, easy reach at that time. But he did not know yet whether he could go out because he could not get into his ejection mechanism, so he thought he would wait until he got clear. When he got clear he was halfway out of the plane and he could not get in, owing to the G forces, and reach it.

MODEL OF THE PLANE

Mr. MCCONE. I think if Major Cordes could get this plane, he could describe Mr. Powers' story of what happened to him. Quite by coincidence, a U-2 plane came down in Louisiana on the 2nd of January, and the pilot of the plane describes the performance of the plane, and it was just identical with that of Mr. Powers—conformed practically identically with what Mr. Powers had to say.

Major CORDES. My apologies to you, sir. You have it already, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. You do it so well, I would like to hear it three or four times more.

Major CORDES. This is a model of the U-2 of the type that Mr. Powers was flying.

These are auxiliary fuel tanks. The engine is located in the fuselage, in the area indicated thusly.

These are the air scoops. This is the cockpit. The equipment bay where the camera is located is just behind the pilot in this area.

The analysis of the pictures of the wreckage reveals that a failure of some type occurred in the tail area. It was most likely a failure to one or both of the horizontal stabilizers. That is these elevators, horizontal stabilizers, in this area.

Mr. Powers stated that his right wing dropped thusly. He corrected this. The ailerons responded. He corrected with the controls, responded, at which time the nose started dropping, and at this time he pulled back on the control column. The controls were ineffective.

At this time he described a series of events that, in reconstructing it, is most likely that at some time during this nose-over maneuver, the tail perhaps came completely clear of the aircraft.

Also at some time in his nose-over maneuver, the structural limits of the wings were exceeded. The wings could have failed either upward or downward. The direction is not critical, but the fact that they did fail is clearly shown in the wreckage. They could have failed upward from excessive speeds and loads or downward from the effects of the winds.

PLANE WENT INTO A SPIN

This then is the portion of the airplane which is the range it went over into an inverted position and started into this inverted spin, as Mr. Power described it.

From my experience with a spinning aircraft, a spin is a very uncomfortable maneuver. I would imagine with only this much of an aircraft remaining, inverted spin of this type is quite uncomfortable.

He stated that the nose was up and he could see the sky up in the front of the aircraft. This would indicate that possibly the engine was still remaining with the fuselage at that time, providing this weight back in this area.

He stated that he attempted to get back in his ejection seat. He had difficulty assuming the ejection seat.

It is interesting to note that on the 2nd of January this year, a U-2 accident occurred in which the pilot landed in, I believe it was, Alabama or Mississippi. He spent the night in a tree.

This gentleman, in reconstructing the series of events preceding his accident—the events are quite similar to those described by Mr. Powers. The sensations that he experienced during this inverted spin are quite similar to those experienced by Mr. Powers.

AN AUTOPILOT MALFUNCTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask, what was the cause of his incident or accident?

Major CORDES. The cause of his incident, sir, the most probable cause, and these are the words of the accident report, was an autopilot malfunction that caused the aircraft to exceed the structural limitation and failure occurred in one or more control surfaces.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When you use those interesting words that you just used, what do you mean, the engine quit working or what?

Major CORDES. No. The automatic pilot is a device designed to fly the aircraft, allowing the pilot to devote more attention to navigation, fixing his position, recording information.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see.

Major CORDES. The automatic pilot senses changes in direction. It is gyroscopically stabilized and applies corrections to the control surfaces.

In this instance, the most probable cause of the accident was considered to be an autopilot malfunction that caused a pitching of the aircraft that caused failure of the structures.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is in the Louisiana fall?

Major CORDES. Yes, sir.

PILOT JETTISONED MANUALLY

In the case of Mr. Powers, Mr. Powers stated in his testimony that he was flying the aircraft manually, that the autopilot was not employed. The similarity between the two accidents is in the manner in which the wings failed, the inverted position, the sensations experienced by the pilots, sir.

In this spinning configuration, Mr. Powers stated that finally he was able to manually jettison mechanically. This is done by releasing two handles, one on each side of the cockpit. The canopy separated.

He states that he then released his safety belt, which allowed him to fly out over the forward portion of the aircraft. However, he was momentarily connected by his oxygen equipment.

This subsequently broke loose. He does not know whether it came loose at the ordinary disconnect position or if it were a break in a different position.

He was thrown free of the aircraft. At this time his parachute opened, he stated, almost immediately, and from this it was deduced that his altitude at that time was perhaps 15,000 feet or below, because the parachute is set to open automatically at 15,000 feet or below. He then floated down to Earth.

At the time the pictures were taken in Gorki Park, the engine was shown separate from the fuselage. There are indications that at some time during the descent of this portion of the aircraft, the engine may have been thrown free and landed separate from this other part.

Senator SPARKMAN. The wings and all the parts that show there, were they included in the pictures?

Major CORDES. The wing——

Senator SPARKMAN. The tail assembly.

Major CORDES. No, sir; not in this fine a condition, but damaged.

Senator SPARKMAN. And the wings?

Major CORDES. I believe that there is no positive indication that the left horizontal stabilizer was shown in any picture.

As I recall the picture of this other tail, it was up against the exhibits so that it could not be determined whether this was actually there or not. As I recall, this is more of the configuration that the tail was in, with damage to each of these parts.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, thank you.

OTHER U-2 CRASHES

Mr. McCone, you said that four U-2 flights had fallen at 68,000 feet or above. Did this include the two that he described a minute ago?

Mr. McCONE There were four besides the Powers flight.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, the Louisiana or Alabama——

Mr. McCONE. And elsewhere.

Senator SPARKMAN. Didn't you have one in California just the day before yesterday?

Mr. McCONE. Yes. That was at about 30,000 feet, I would say.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you know yet the trouble with it?

Mr. McCONE. I have not had a report. The initial report was that counterturbulence at the time of refueling occurred. Perhaps you have a report on that?

Major CORDES. No, sir. I have nothing official yet.

Mr. McCONE. That is the unofficial report I have. We lost the pilot.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, I noticed that.

MISSION OF THE FLIGHT

When we held our hearings back in the summer of 1960—you knew we held hearings on this?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, I did.

Senator SPARKMAN. I thought we had the hearings here, and we also issued a report. It stated this in one of the paragraphs:

> There remains the question of the wisdom of sending the flight at all. The committee was told that the flight was after information of well above average importance, but it was not told what this information was.

Can you tell us now what the information was?

Mr. McCONE. Yes. Have we got a map here? I can tell you what it was.

The pilot of this flight was to take off from here.

Senator SPARKMAN. Was that in Turkey?

Mr. McCONE. In Pakistan.

It was to fly over the Tyura Tam missile range, and then up to Sverdlovsk—and here is where the accident occurred—and then it was to go over here, which is a big base in which we were interested, and them up north.

Moscow is here; Leningrad is over here. It was to go up north in search of missile bases and other installations up north.

We had never had any flights up in that area, although we had a great many penetrations in the Soviet Union. We had never been up in the north or if we had, they had not been satisfactory. For that reason this was considered an unusually important mission.

THE TIMING OF THE FLIGHT

Senator SPARKMAN. If you remember, there was one question that was in the minds of a great many people at that time, and that was the timeliness of this flight. I do not know whether it is worth going into now, but this was, you remember, just on the eve of the opening of that conference.

Mr. McCONE. Indeed I do, Senator. I was over there in Paris at the time, so I remember it very well.

Senator SPARKMAN. I guess you know something. It must have caused quite a stir there.

Mr. McCONE. Indeed it did.

I was not part of the decisionmaking process on flights at that time. As Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, I was a member of the National Security Council, [deleted].

I am told that there were a great many considerations, not the least of which was the weather; that many of these flights aborted because of bad weather, and there seemed to be a brief period where there was particularly good weather, and therefore there was a desire to take advantage of those conditions particularly up into the north. Another consideration—we saw the rising defense effort of the Soviets and wanted to get as much done as we could before some incident might occur.

In retrospect, it might have been unfortunately timed with reference to the summit meeting. But we had to carry this effort on because this is the most solid intelligence, the hardest intelligence, that we have ever obtained. A great deal that we know of the Soviet military posture and atomic energy developments and all the rest come from this U–2 photography. Hence, had this occurred May 20 rather than May 1, I think it would have caused the same kind of an uproar.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have used my share of the time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Iowa.

TWO ABORTED FLIGHTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is my recollection that, at the hearings at that time, it was made quite clear that the days of the year when they had the greatest reasonable visibility over the entire proposed course were very few, and are very few in that area. This happened to be one of those days which had not occurred for a long time before, and might not occur for a long time afterwards, and they sent the flight when the conditions came as nearly being ideal as they usually are in that area. At least, to my recollection that was the presentation.

Mr. McCONE. Yes, I think that is right. As I recall, and I am speaking from memory now, there were—they aborted two flights, and this was a third one.

NOT CHARACTERISTIC OF A FLAME OUT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. If they had not settled on this day, there was no telling how many weeks or months might go by before they could get weather conditions which would answer as many of the problems as they wanted to find out about.

Now, this hollow-sounding explosion, or whatever it was, that Powers mentioned, and the subsequent or coincidental orange colored flash, was that accompanied by a physical shock, did he say?

Mr. McCONE. It was described as a feeling of forward acceleration. He got a push from the stern.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That would not be characteristic of a flameout, would it?

Mr. MCCONE. I would think not, no. It would be just the opposite, would it not, Major?

Major CORDES. No, sir. That would not be characteristic of a flameout, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you think it was characteristic of an air pressure or being struck by a solid object?

Mr. MCCONE. I would think it would be characteristic of an air pressure. I would think if he was struck by a solid object there would be much more of a violent reaction than he described.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

What happens when they have a flameout at that height?

That is at a substantial height, is it not, accompanied by an explosion or something of that kind, or by—well, an explosion describes it—what happens?

Mr. MCCONE. Major?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Does it just stop and there is no more?

CABIN PRESSURE

Major CORDES. Sir, I have experienced flameouts at that height, too, to be exact, and the sensation is, it gets quite violent in the airplane. The best way I could describe it is a chug in the engine, not an explosion, not a push, but a chug in the engine, followed by the next thing one would notice, his revolution per minute indicator going down rapidly. The next sensation, sir, would be the pressure suit automatically inflating because the cabin pressure would tend to adjust itself to that of the outside air, the cabin being normally pressurized.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Normally pressurized as the result of the engine operation?

Major CORDES. Yes, sir. A compressor on the engine compresses the air, which pressurizes the cabin in the neighborhood of 29,000 feet at 68,000 to 70,000 feet.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did he notice any immediate increase of that expansion of his pressure suit?

Major CORDES. Sir, he stated that he recalled at some time during this series of maneuvers he experienced that his suit did inflate.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see.

Is a flameout accompanied by a flash of light that could normally be seen by the pilot?

Major CORDES. No, sir; it is not.

POWERS' COURTROOM DECLARATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I take it, Mr. McCone, that you are satisfied with Powers' courtroom declarations.

As I understand the reports, they said that the direct question was asked him: Was he spying or was he a spy? And the reports said that he said he was spying. Then there were some reports that he seemed to agree with their condemnation of American policy and expressed regret, or something of that kind, that this had happened.

Those are apparently newspaper reports of one kind or another. What was the circumstance there?

Mr. McCone. I think they are right. I think it has been verified. I think that he did that under the advice of the counsel that was provided for him, who emphasized that the seriousness of his situation was great, and advised him to admit the purposes of his mission and express repentance because he was in danger of drawing a death sentence. His action in this regard did not materially conflict with the instructions that he was given as to the course of action he should follow if captured.

NO EVIDENCE OF BRAINWASHING

Senator Hickenlooper. You discovered no evidence that any means such as drug injections or anything of that kind or protracted brainwashing techniques had been used on him?

Mr. McCone. I would like Dr. Goodnow to answer that question.

Mr. Goodnow. We made a pretty careful analysis of his testimony, his behavior when he came back and was debriefed and interviewed by us, and through other collateral sources, the source of procedures that the Soviets have used or could use under the circumstances, and there is no evidence of any kind that——

Senator Hickenlooper. What does he say about it?

Mr. Goodnow. He says no.

Senator Hickenlooper. That is, they used no drugs?

Mr. Goodnow. No drugs, no hypnosis, no truth serum, no special procedures, no conditioning procedures.

Senator Symington. They did give him an injection.

Mr. Goodnow. He did get an injection the first night in prison, probably believed to be a general immunization injection.

Senator Hickenlooper. You mean against disease of one kind or another?

Mr. Goodnow. Fairly standard procedure in Russian prisons is to give a new prisoner immunization, because they are concerned with the general physical health of the prisoners.

Senator Hickenlooper. I see.

Was he questioned immediately after that?

Mr. Goodnow. No, he was not. This was on the first night in the prison. He was not questioned during the next morning, but was questioned sometime after that.

Mr. Houston. Excuse me, Doctor, he was questioned some that next morning.

Mr. Goodnow. In the morning?

Mr. Houston. In the morning.

Senator Hickenlooper. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator Lausche.

COLLATERAL INTELLIGENCE

Senator Lausche. What was this collateral intelligence that you applied in reaching your judgment, that was unknown to him as you interrogated him?

Mr. McCone. Well, at the point of his descent, he describes in considerable detail the geography that he observed during his para-

chute descent, and in this way identified the locality, the community adjacent to the point of his landing.

Now, we determined that individuals who came to him immediately after his landing and testified at his trial, actually lived in this particular community. This was determined and our knowledge of that was not known to him.

Senator LAUSCHE. How were those facts pertinent in concluding that this happened the way it was described by him?

Mr. MCCONE. I do not think that it was finally conclusive. I think it was contributory to the whole picture, though.

Senator LAUSCHE. Were any of these other experiences which you described known to him in the giving of this testimony? Was that collateral intelligence which you applied to determine whether he was telling the truth?

Major CORDES. Sir, the experiences that he described in going through this descent in the aircraft were compared with experiences described by other pilots who had experienced a similar type of break-up of the aircraft. There were no inconsistencies noted between what Mr. Powers testified and the testimony of other pilots who had experiended this same type of incident.

Senator LAUSCHE. Had Powers ever gone through an experience of this type before?

Major CORDES. He had not undergone this previously himself, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. So the intelligence which you acquired through other experiences was used in determining whether he was telling the truth, and you found that his description compared with your other intelligence?

Major CORDES. Sir, in our evaluation we were attempting to establish that the experiences that he described were completely consistent with what would happen in this type of incident.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

TIME OF DESCENT

Now, then, he was at 70,000 feet and his last observation of altitude showed him to be, I think he testified, at 34,000 feet.

Did you try to calculate what length of time it would have taken him to drop from the 70,000 feet down to the 34,000 feet?

Major CORDES. Yes, sir. We have had some estimates of this kind.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the estimate of the time, based upon his description of what occurred?

Major CORDES. Sir, the estimate went below 34,000, down to 15,000. There is evidence in his testimony that his parachute opened. This would be the altitude at which he left the aircraft, so our investigation concerned itself from the time of 70,000 feet down to 15,000 feet.

The time estimates, sir, varied from a minimum of approximately 1 minute and 50 seconds up to several minutes. There could be quite a significant variation, sir, dependent upon how much wing surface remained with the fuselage, whether or not the engine was thrown clear, and at what time it was thrown clear.

I am sorry, sir, that I cannot give you a more definite answer than that at this time.

Senator LAUSCHE. I understand that.

When you say several minutes, what do you mean by several minutes?

Major CORDES. I mean, sir, it could have been in excess of 5 minutes.

Senator LAUSCHE. 70 seconds to 5 minutes?

Major CORDES. Yes.

WHY PILOT DID NOT DESTROY THE PLANE

Senator LAUSCHE. There has been no description given in your demonstration of how this plane tumbled and revolved about the time when he tried to reach this lever or mechanism that would destroy the ship. When did he try to reach it and why couldn't he reach it?

Mr. MCCONE. Have you got your photographs of that?

Senator LAUSCHE. Isn't the issue why he did not destroy this ship? That is the principal issue.

Mr. MCCONE. Yes, I think, yes. This has always been a question, and there is an explanation for it that seemed plausible.

However, I would like to explain to the committee, if I might, Mr. Chairman, that the charge that was placed in the ship was a 2½-pound charge for the purpose of destroying the camera as an operational camera. It was not a large enough charge to destroy the camera or the film, to say nothing of the ship.

However, it was in a place where it was quite dangerous to the pilot because it was immediately under him.

Major CORDES. Yes, sir.

Sir, this is a picture of the cockpit. This is the control wheel. The pilot would be sitting facing the control wheel. The position of the destruct is on his right, indicated thusly by my finger.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Major CORDES. In the configuration that he described during his descent from this aircraft or what remained of this aircraft, this remaining portion of the aircraft was going through some wild gyrations, if I may use that expression. He was, by his description, thrown out against his safety belt, and his arms were thrown upward in this direction, sir.

He released himself by managing somehow to get his arms down and releasing his safety belt. By his statement, he was thrown out over the front of the aircraft—this would be out over in this direction; that is, upside down, spinning this way. Centrifugal force threw him out this way.

FOUR SEPARATE OPERATIONS

At this time he stated that he could not reach back inside and reach the switches. The switches, sir, if I may have that—this is not a mere one single operation. There are four separate operations involved to assure that this mechnism will destruct.

There is an arm switch in any such destruct mechanism, and one must build certain safety features into it. The arm switch guard must be raised; the arm switch must be activated thusly.

Next the destruct switch cover must be raised and the destruct switch activated thusly.

This is a spring-loaded switch; a momentary switch to the destruct position is all that is necessary.

On activating this destruct switch, the pilot has 70 seconds remaining to get clear of the aircraft.

From his description of the manipulations that this aircraft was going through and the difficulty that he was having in attempting to get at his seat and get his safety belt unfastened, in my estimation, sir, it would have been difficult to actuate the switches.

Does that answer your question?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, it does.

That is, you really have to use this 70-second period in determining whether under the circumstances he was able to liberate himself and also set into motion this explosive device.

Major CORDES. He must arm the device, then actuate the switch. From the time he actuates this switch he then has 70 seconds to get clear of the aircraft.

Senator LAUSCHE. What prevented him from getting clear of the aircraft?

Major CORDES. At this particular time, sir, at the time he unfastened his seat belt stating he was thrown out forward and hanging over the front of the cockpit, windshield, he stated that his oxygen equipment, that equipment which connects the pressure suit to the aircraft oxygen supply, was tangled up and it finally broke loose, again his expression.

Senator LAUSCHE. Could he have reached this thing while he was outside the plane?

Major CORDES. It would have been extremely difficult, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask Mr. McCone a question?

OTHER FLIGHTS IN THAT AREA

Generally how many flights were made in that area with the U-2?

Mr. MCCONE. I do not have the exact number, Senator. If you would take that down, there [deleted].

[Deleted.]

Mr. MCCONE. Not from the standpoint of interception or of engine failure.

Senator LAUSCHE. Right.

The only difficulty that we had was on this flight of May 1?

Mr. MCCONE. That is the only difficulty we had over the Soviet Union.

Senator LAUSCHE. Over the Soviet Union.

Mr. MCCONE. Yes. We had difficulty elsewhere with U-2's.

Senator LAUSCHE. [Deleted.]

Mr. MCCONE. Complaint?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, by the public or anybody else.

Mr. MCCONE. None whatsoever.

Senator LAUSCHE. The only complaint is that this flight should not have been made.

Mr. MCCONE. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. What if this one had proved successful?

Mr. MCCONE. If this one had proved successful?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. There would have been no complaint I suppose?

Mr. MCCONE. Eventually you were going to have trouble with one of these flights, either mechanical failure and the plane would come down or it would get shot down. But you are gaining the most useful, solid intelligence that we have had on the Soviet Union.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, you find no fault with the decision that was made on that day of May 1, to make this flight?

Mr. MCCONE. No, I do not.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

POWERS' SALARY

Senator AIKEN. Mr. McCone, it is probably unfortunate that Mr. Powers returned to a somewhat skeptical nation, and evidently that skepticism was not all being allayed by recent developments.

We folks get questions that we cannot answer. Some of them we probably should not answer even if we knew the answers.

As I understand it, Mr. Powers received his $2,600 a month pay as a test pilot rather than an espionage agent.

Mr. MCCONE. That is correct.

Senator AIKEN. Is that the usual pay for a test pilot?

Mr. MCCONE. It is the pay, standard of pay, that we pay for the pilots of the U-2 planes on these dangerous missions.

Senator AIKEN. Now, the question we are asked is how does the pay for Mr. Powers compare with the pay which the seven astronauts received, and was his job more hazardous than theirs?

Mr. MCCONE. I have not heard there were any special allowances made to the astronauts. I am not familiar with that.

Senator AIKEN. That is a question that we are asked. Why should he be paid so much more than they are?

Mr. MCCONE. I might say, however, that on the question of pay, it pays less than an American Airlines pilot.

Senator AIKEN. Yes. He doesn't have a union. [Laughter.]

Mr. MCCONE. No, there is no U-2 union.

Senator AIKEN. Which might account for it.

PROVIDING PILOT WITH DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES

Also you say that under general instructions that pilots—"If evasion is not feasible and capture appears imminent, pilots should surrender without resistance and adopt a cooperative attitude toward their captors."

If that is so, why would they be furnished with a needle and any other destructive devices?

Mr. MCCONE. Of course, this does not assure that their captors are going to have a cooperative attitude toward them.

The taking of the needle was a voluntary act and on his own initiative. It was not mandatory that he take it. It is a fact that this is the only flight of the 20-odd missions that he flew, it is the only flight that he did take the needle.

Senator LAUSCHE. How many flights did he make?

Mr. McCone. He made 118 total U-2 flights of which, I think, 27 were missions over either the Soviet Union or other denied territories.

Senator Lausche. Pardon me, George.

SITUATION OF DOWNEY AND FECTEAU

Senator Aiken. Now, we hear comparisons drawn between Mr. Powers and Mr. Downey and Mr. Fecteau who apparently were tortured severely and are still in prison and refuse to talk. Did they have a different type of training?

Mr. McCone. I am not familiar with the instructions that Mr. Downey and Mr. Fecteau had. They are in the hands of the Chinese Communists. I am quite positive that the Chinese Communists did not adhere to the same standards as the Soviets in these matters.

Are you familiar with their instructions at all?

Mr. Houston. They were given different instructions and they were engaged in very different operations. The operation was classified and a much more effective cover story existed to conceal the operation which was given them than was given to the public, so that there was more expectation that they would try to conceal the exact nature of their operation, whereas in the U-2 operation the very presence of the plane in itself revealed the operation.

Senator Aiken. Do you know of any recent efforts which have been made to effect their release?

Mr. McCone. Yes, I do. There was a meeting in Warsaw last week at which this matter was again discussed, inconclusively and disappointingly from our standpoint.

There is another meeting scheduled on the 5th of April.

I had a long talk with Mrs. Downey on Saturday morning. It is a very sad case.

Senator Aiken. Yes.

Mr. McCone. And we intend to use every effort that we can, directly or with friendly nations, to try to persuade the Chinese Communists that, on the basis of this very Power-Abel exchange, many of their arguments against exchanges or consideration of the Downey case can logically be dismissed.

Now, whether we are going to get very far with that or not, I do not know. I am going to keep working at it.

Senator Aiken. We would be warranted, perhaps, in going to rather unusual extremes to do something in order to get the release of Downey and Fecteau?

Mr. McCone. I believe so.

PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE PLANE

Senator Aiken. You say, "In the fifth place, a study of the photograph of the debris of the plane and other information concerning the plane revealed, in the opinion of experts making the study, no condition which suggested an inconsistency with Powers' account of what had transpired."

Is that a photograph which was furnished you by the Russians or ones you were able to get?

Mr. McCone. They were photographs from two sources. They were photographs that were released by the Russians and also photographs, I believe, that we took, did we not?

Mr. Houston. Life Magazine.

Mr. McCone. Of the exhibit, and also Life Magazine.

Senator Aiken. We took the one afterwards?

Mr. McCone. Afterwards.

Senator Aiken. Was it similar enough to the one used by the Russians so that it appeared to be the same?

Mr. McCone. Yes.

Mr. Houston. Except for those very first photographs which were their own plane.

Senator Aiken. Yes.

POWERS' CAPTURE

One other question: Mr. Powers, in describing his accident and his fall and his final parachuting to Earth, has he said anything, did he observe whether he was being pursued on the way downward or whether he was shot at or how was he captured?

Mr. McCone. He was captured—he landed in a field, and there were people there who observed him coming down, and were there even in time to help spill the air out of his parachute and help him get out of his rig. So they were there almost coincidentally with his hitting the ground.

Senator Aiken. Of course, they did not know he was American?

Mr. McCone. They did not know he was American. They, by fingers, seemed to be questioning him whether there were one or two people in the plane, and he signaled one, and then they pointed up, and he says he observed what appears to be another parachute coming down.

Now, this is unexplained. We have a certain conjecture and an opinion that they actually shot down one of their own planes in the excitement. But that is just a conjecture. We have no solid information on it.

Senator Aiken. How long after he was captured did the Russian military or police appear?

Mr. McCone. Mr. Allen, I think you might answer that.

Mr. Allen. Relatively few minutes, at least as far as he could tell.

Senator Aiken. Relatively few minutes?

Mr. Allen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Houston. He does say in answer to that question today that no one was in uniform until he got to the second village where he was taken very quickly, and then apparently there was someone in police uniform. The people who met him were not in uniform.

Senator Aiken. And he went willingly with the local people to the village?

Mr. Houston. That is right.

Senator Aiken. But he has no recollection of being pursued on the way down?

Mr. Houston. No, sir.

Senator Aiken. Or being shot at on the way down?

Mr. Houston. No, sir.

Senator AIKEN. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams.

POWERS' OTHER MISSIONS

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. McCone, how many of those missions were flown by Powers?

Mr. MCCONE. I cannot tell you exactly, Senator. He flew several, but of the 27 missions I cannot tell you how many of them were penetrating Soviet territory.

Do you know?

Mr. HOUSTON. [Deleted.]

Senator WILLIAMS. As a result of your examination of Mr. Powers, do you feel that he did everything that would be required of a man in his position?

Mr. MCCONE. Yes, I do, and therefore I agree with the findings of the Board and with the findings of our interrogators.

LEFT WITH A CLOUD OVER HIM

Senator WILLIAMS. With that feeling, don't you think he is being left with just a little bit of a cloud hanging over him? If he did everything he is supposed to do, why leave it hanging?

Mr. MCCONE. I do not think, Senator, we did. We tried to be objective, and the report which was released today explained, to the extent we could explain it publicly, the process we went through in verifying his story and came to the conclusion that his story was correct, and reached the conclusion that he had conducted himself in accordance with the contract and instructions, and comported himself as an American should, and for that reason we were paying him the money that he would be entitled to by law under that finding.

Senator WILLIAMS. I read your findings there, and they seem to give him a clean bill of health. But the earlier press reports were that, first, he had been subjected to intensive questioning, and later there was a lie detector test. Those things indicate a doubt in the man in the minds of somebody, and I do not think we can quite get away from that. If a man is responsible for negligence, it should be so stated; but if he did not act negligently, I am wondering if you have not pretty much left him hanging.

Mr. MCCONE. Senator, the facts are that the doubt was there. The doubt was there from the very day that he came down; there was doubt in a great many of us. I thought the way to dispel that doubt was to go into the whole situation with sufficient thoroughness so that when we did report on it, it would be a considered judgment resulting from a careful investigation, and the facts then stood up, the man would be cleared.

It is true that during the period of the last 3 weeks, while this interrogation has been going on and this high level Board has been giving consideration to the whole matter and interrogating Powers himself, there probably has been some doubt. But I would hope that the very thoroughness that was exercised here would clarify the matter, whereas I think if we just gave it a very light treatment, the doubt might have continued.

NO INCIDENTS OF SELF-DESTRUCTION

Senator AIKEN. Is it true, Mr. McCone, that one or two other pilots have destroyed themselves, their planes? We hear reports that two have destroyed themselves when there appeared to be danger of getting caught.

Mr. MCCONE. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. AIKEN. Do you know about this?

Mr. HOUSTON. No, sir.

Mr. MCCONE. Not to my knowledge.

The fact is that this is the only incident where a U-2 pilot has been downed on denied territory.

Senator AIKEN. But is this one the other day—you said you lost five.

Mr. MCCONE. Yes, but they had not been on denied territory.

Senator AIKEN. This has been accidental reasons.

Mr. MCCONE. It has been accidental and been over either friendly territory——

Senator AIKEN. There was no reason for self-destruction.

Mr. MCCONE. Yes.

[Deleted.]

Senator WILLIAMS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCone, I would like to return to Mr. Sparkman's first questions.

THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE FLIGHT

I did not quite get the significance of the answer with regard to this question that was raised on the report before, as Senator Sparkman read from one point on page 22.

There is another place, on page 7 of that report, which says as follows:

> In any event it appears that there was something very special about the May 1st flight, although the committee has been unable to determine exactly what.

This is not the weather. We discussed the weather at length. There was the feeling that there was some special event that justified going on this day. Can you throw any light on that?

Mr. MCCONE. No, I cannot. I do not know what is referred to there, Mr. Chairman. The special importance of the flight was reconnaissance in the north which would provide information that we needed.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be true for any flight.

Mr. MCCONE. But I do not know of any——

The CHAIRMAN. Your predecessor at least left the impression, and that is reflected in these two statements, that there was some event that made some very special reason why it should take place at this time, other than the weather. We know about the weather being always a consideration I thought maybe it might clarify that.

Mr. MCCONE. It has never been disclosed to me.

Let me ask Mr. Houston, our general counsel. Do you know?

Mr. HOUSTON. No sir; I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. What we suspected, and it was purely a guess, was that there was some event which you anticipated or you

thought there was reason that might be taking place that you wanted to be sure of.

Mr. HOUSTON. I know of none, sir. I only know of the importance put on the area to be covered.

COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE THE CIA

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder, Mr. McCone, if we could ask a few other questions that are not directly related to this, although this particular incident brought out an aspect of this operation which has concerned a number of people.

Senator [Mike] Mansfield some years ago, and more recently Senator [Eugene] McCarthy, have introduced a resolution regarding a joint committee for the overseeing, I suppose you would say, the CIA.

You had long experience or considerable experience with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Do you think that committee functions properly and effectively?

Mr. MCCONE. I had very satisfactorily experience with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, as you know.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you see any reason why a similar committee for supervision of CIA should not be set up?

Mr. MCCONE. I do not see the necessity for it in view of the manner in which the subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee and the subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee function.

The CHAIRMAN. Are those committees given this function by law or is that an informal arrangement? What is the basis for the supervision of the subcommittees of the Armed Services Committees?

Mr. MCCONE. Well I do not know, Mr. Chairman, what the background is. I do know that, and I have been told that, the legislation which established the Central Intelligence Agency, which was the National Defense Act of 1947, was processed through the Armed Services Committee. I imagine that was the beginning of their jurisdiction over the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that legislation give them jurisdiction over the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. MCCONE. I would be very much surprised if it did.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Houston?

Mr. HOUSTON. No. sir. The legislation does not mention it.

The CHAIRMAN. Does any legislation give any jurisdiction?

Mr. HOUSTON. Over in the House.

Mr. WARNER. Not legislation.

Mr. HOUSTON. In the constitution of the subcommittee.

Mr. WARNER. Not legislation.

Mr. HOUSTON. Not legislation, but official action of the House.

Mr. WARNER. The House Parliamentarian has ruled that the House Armed Services Committee has jurisdiction, but there is no legislation that confers jurisdiction that I know of.

[Deleted.]

CIA BUDGET

The CHAIRMAN. What is the size of the budget of the CIA?

Mr. MCCONE. I would like this off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. McCONE. This figure is always kept very confidential.

The CHAIRMAN. The regular budget of the State Department is about $260 million.

Mr. McCONE. I have not seen it for some years, but I remember it is in that order.

[Deleted.]

[Deleted.] Although this is a question on which I can see there are arguments on both sides of it, at the moment the Armed Services Committee considers themselves as the parent committee of CIA, and always has. Whether that is logical or not I think is a matter for determination here rather than for determination by us.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I am trying to do, to develop a little information with regard to this question. We have before us a resolution now, S.J. Res. 77, introduced by Senator McCarthy for himself and a number of others, there must be 15 or 20 Senators—on this question of creating a joint committee modeled after the Atomic Energy Joint Committee. As I say, this is not new.

As I recall it, the first resolution of a similar nature was introduced by the present majority leader, although he was not majority leader at the time. We have had on various occasions—I am just informed that the resolution introduced by Senator Mansfield as long ago as 1956 was sponsored by 35 Senators, which raises this question of whether there is a conflict.

ARMED SERVICES' INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

Let me go back a little with regard to the Armed Services. Each of the Armed Services has its own intelligence; it has its own G-2, does it not? Don't they all, the Air Force, the Army?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, each one has its own intelligence organization.

The CHAIRMAN. Organization.

Mr. McCONE. There is the G-2 and the A-2 and the ONI.

The CHAIRMAN. They are all quite substantial organizations?

Mr. McCONE. They are very substantial.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you, for the record, indicate if you know how large they are?

Mr. McCONE. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But they are very substantial?

Mr. McCONE. They are very substantial.

The CHAIRMAN. Employing several thousand people?

Mr. McCONE. And they are parts of the budgets of the respective services?

The CHAIRMAN. Yours then, the CIA, is not exclusively a military operation, is it?

Mr. McCONE. No, it is not exclusively a military operation. In fact, its basic purpose as established by law is to serve as a central facility for collecting, assembling intelligence for all agencies, correlating it and evaluating it, and then disseminating it.

The CHAIRMAN. Not only from all agencies, but you do it directly on your own, too, don't you?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, we do a great deal of that on our own. Then there are certain areas of activity which are assigned to us by the National Security Council.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CIA AND STATE DEPARTMENT

The CHAIRMAN. We have had from time to time in the committee, reports of differences of views between the CIA and the representatives of the State Department in such countries, as an example, as Laos. Are you familiar with that?

Mr. MCCONE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All of this is, of course, before you were in charge, but you have heard of that?

Mr. MCCONE. Yes; indeed I have. I have heard of the differences that have existed. I heard them debated many times in the National Security Council when I was there sitting there as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether or not this is justified, it has been my impression that in many cases the views of the CIA prevailed, is that not so? It did in Laos, didn't it?

Mr. MCCONE. No, I do not think that it did. I think the view of the State Department prevailed in Laos; at least it prevails today.

SITUATION IN LAOS

The CHAIRMAN. To be specific about it, go back, I think it was 2 or 3 years ago, to the time of the ouster of Souvanna Phouma and the bringing in of Phoumi and Boun Oum. There is certainly information in the hearings here that there was a difference of opinion as to the wisdom of that move, and that the military arm and the CIA were in favor of what did take place, whereas the representative of the State Department was not in favor of it. Is that correct? Have you ever heard of such position?

Mr. MCCONE. Yes, I have heard that debated many times, Mr. Chairman, in the cloistered halls of the National Security Council.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been debated in this cloistered hall.

Mr. MCCONE. I heard the spokesman for the military take a very strong position in favor of Phoumi, and spokesmen for the State Department strongly support Souvanna, and I left with the impression that the spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency leaned strongly toward the military position.

The CHAIRMAN. Which prevailed in that case.

Mr. MCCONE. I was not so close to the situation that I knew that any action was resulting from that difference.

The CHAIRMAN. The fact was that they did succeed in ousting Souvanna Phouma, and they did go to Phnom Penh, and Phoumi was installed with Boun Oum, was he not?

Mr. MCCONE. Yes, he was.

The CHAIRMAN. I only use this as an illustration and, of course, as I say, you were in no way responsible.

TWO STATE DEPARTMENTS

I am trying to resolve in my own mind just what we do have here, whether we have two State Departments each going their own way. I realize that the traditional response to this is that the CIA is not a policy-making agency but, as a matter of fact, I am quite unable to see the distinction when in a case like this the

views of the CIA prevail over that of the State Department which does make policy.

Mr. McCone. I think in the discussions I heard of this situation it seemed to me it was the view of the Defense Department that prevailed, because in the discussions I heard they took a very strong position, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs took a very strong position, and was supported by the Secretary of Defense.

The Chairman. I agree that the military and the CIA both took that position. That is what our information was, but it was not nearly authentic as yours in the NSC, because I was not in the NSC. This came out in discussions here with representatives of the Department of State.

I think this presents a very difficult position, at least for this committee and for what we say is our Department of State, in the formulation of policy. Do you have any suggestions to make about this?

This is one of the reasons why, I think, there is a feeling, rightly or wrongly, that some committee such as a joint committee suggested, should have supervision over the activity, perhaps coordination, if you like. If we do not, then the military not only are running our military establishment but also are making our political policy.

MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICY JURISDICTION

Mr. McCone. It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that we are discussing two different things here. One is the logic of the jurisdiction of the CIA resting with the Armed Services Committee as contrasted with the Foreign Relations Committee. That is one problem.

The Chairman. That is one problem.

Mr. McCone. The other is the establishment of a joint committee which would remove the jurisdiction of the CIA from either Armed Services or Foreign Relations and place it under the cognizance of a third committee.

The Chairman. That is right.

Mr. McCone. Then it seems to me you would have this situation where since CIA has its influence on both military matters and foreign policy, and, granted, whether it makes policy or not, there is no dispute over the fact that it influences policy—you would have three committees involved, so it would be further complicated, I would think.

The Chairman. It would be presumed, I would think, that if a joint committee were set up similar to the one on Atomic Energy, it would have rather exclusive jurisdiction. I think this committee—at least, I want to speak only for myself and not the whole committee although, as I say, a number of the members who sponsored or co-sponsored the resolution were on this committee—would feel that the normal supervision of the representatives in the Congress would be respected, that this would not be essentially a military operation.

It leaves me with the feeling, the way it is now set up, that the military not only directs the defense of the country but also are becoming the dominant influence in the political policy of the Government. Maybe it is a good thing, I do not know. I do not think it

is quite traditional, nor do I think the American people quite understand that this is so.

You remember the famous statement, I think it was that of Churchill, that war is much too important to be left to the generals, or something to that effect.

Mr. McCone. Yes, I remember it very well.

The Chairman. I would not want to be held to the exact quotation.

Mr. McCone. I can see the problem from the standpoint of this committee. I do think that the problem would be compounded by the establishment of a joint committee. I say this with some reluctance because I had a very satisfactory experience with the Joint Committee, but I would like to point out that the Joint Committee is established and operates under very special legislation with which you are thoroughly familiar.

INJECTING A THIRD DIMENSION

It has been my observation that both their authority and their success stem from the legislation that is basic to the committee. This situation would not prevail in the case of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

The Chairman. Why not? This is where I get lost. I do not see why it could not.

Mr. McCone. You might better accomplish what you are talking about by arranging between the Armed Services Committee and this committee, some joint subcommittee that could meet regularly and discuss Agency matters. Then you would not be injecting a third dimension into this problem, because I can just envisage a joint committee sitting off some place with maybe no membership from this committee or maybe one.

The Chairman. It would be logical that you would have some. On Atomic Energy we have two of your very important members, at least two, maybe more, important members on the Atomic Energy Committee on this committee.

Mr. McCone. Well, yes.

The Chairman. And they serve a great purpose.

Mr. McCone. But, as you know so well, Senator, these committee assignments go by seniority, and so on and so forth, and chairmanship becomes of special consideration. Just picture—this concerns me very much because I can see your dilemma, but I think it would be compounded if the Joint Committee were sitting concerning itself with an agency that you feel is affecting both defense matters and, more particularly in your interest, in your special interest, foreign affairs.

The Chairman. That is exactly what, it is the latter part of that, concerns me. I mentioned only Laos. I could also mention, at least rumors, with regard to Algeria. Guatemala, I think, is beyond a rumor.

Mr. McCone. What is that?

The Chairman. Guatemala was beyond a rumor. I do not think anyone would deny it.

Mr. McCone. Yes, we can go through a great many of them.

The CHAIRMAN. There are a great many of them, and they essentially involve very important policy matters.

Mr. MCCONE. There is no question about that, and I think this is absolutely true. For that reason there is probably a great deal of logic that there should be a more intimate relationship between this committee, or a subcommittee of your committee, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

A VERY SPECIAL ACTIVITY

But I cannot see how you answer your problem, which I recognize as a problem, by the creating of a joint committee unless that joint committee is, by agreement, made up of a group from the Armed Services Committee and a group from this committee. If that is what you are talking about, then it is——

The CHAIRMAN. The bill simply leaves it to the leadership to appoint it. I do not believe in the appointment to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee that they followed the usual rules in the appointment, if I am not mistaken about that, John. You probably remember this. This is what you would call a very special activity.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think it followed the same traditions that we have followed in the other committees, and I think one of the reasons why this procedure has appealed to them is simply because of the success of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.

Mr. MCCONE. Yes; but I want to point out to you that my observation from working with the joint committee is that their success is due to, in the first place, a very special area of their responsibility and the fact that it is controlled by special legislation; that it gives them great authority in this particular area.

Now, I think that the very things that concern you here that you have been talking about, and the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency apparently in their activity materially affects matters of your concern, of this committee's concern, is a reason why the joint committee is not the answer that you want, unless the joint committee is very carefully designed as really a subordinate element on both this committee and the Armed Services Committee.

Senator SPARKMAN. If the Chairman will permit?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

COMPARISON TO JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

Senator SPARKMAN. I do not quite follow you, because I see no reason why there could not be the same kind of legislation setting up this joint committee and giving them the same type of jurisdiction that was done in the case of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.

Now, in the case of the Joint Energy Committee you have a joint committee but, at the same time, that part of the joint committee which is in the Senate becomes a Senate legislative committee on atomic energy legislation, and the same thing is true in the House. Why couldn't the same thing be done with your Agency?

I was here when the Joint Atomic Energy Act was passed. I remember it quite clearly. In fact, it was handled by a committee of which I was a member in the House at the time, on the House side.

I remember the very hard fight and difficult time we had handling it and, by the way, it was not a case of filling it up with senior members. For instance, Senator [Clinton] Anderson and Senator Gore both became members almost immediately upon coming to the Senate, or within a year or so.

The CHAIRMAN. They were junior Members of the Senate.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator [John] Pastore, a brand new Senator at the time, was put on it, and it has followed that course throughout the years. So I do not see why it could not be done here.

You are apparently thinking of just a watchdog committee. I see no reason why it could not be branched out and made the same type of committee operation with the same type of jurisdiction that prevails in the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.

OTHER MEMBERS LEFT IN IGNORANCE

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask you, if such a committee is created would I, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, if I were not put on the joint committee, find myself in the same ignorance about what is going on in the Atomic Energy Commission, find myself in the same ignorance on what is going on in a matter of business that I have a right to know? I know nothing of what is going on.

Senator SPARKMAN. You probably would, but you would probably have the satisfaction of knowing that there was a committee with full jurisdiction over that to know what was going on.

Senator LAUSCHE. Frankly, I am barred from learning anything about the Atomic Energy Commission. I went over to a hearing one day and I entered that room in the House as if I were a person from—well, without any authority at all.

Senator SPARKMAN. You have not been in their new office yet. You ought to visit it.

Senator LAUSCHE. I do think if you create that committee in matters that I ought to know about as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I will be in the identical position that I am now in trying to learn what is going on in the Atomic Energy Commission.

TRAINING OF CUBAN REFUGEES

Senator SPARKMAN. I will tell you, if you will yield further, a thing that rather disturbs me about this whole thing. I just have been sitting here looking at that map.

We are nominally at peace with Russia. I do not see that that had anything to do with our defense; I mean the normal functioning of our defenses. It had a lot to do with our relations with that country.

The Chairman mentioned Guatemala. It seems to me the same thing is true down there. I am referring to the Cuban situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Or Cuba, either one.

Senator SPARKMAN. The training in Guatemala and the preparation that was carried on by the CIA and our military was not a part of it, not a part of the invasion. It was something that vitally affects the foreign affairs of this country. That is the thing that disturbs me about this.

Mr. McCone. There is no question about that, Senator Sparkman. Foreign affairs are of concern to the committee.

CREATING THE SAME SITUATION

How do you answer that problem by creating another committee? Don't you create exactly the same situation? Aren't you in danger of creating the same kind of a situation that Senator Lausche just was concerned with?

Senator Sparkman. My answer to that would be that I gave to him: at least he would have the satisfaction of knowing that there was a committee set up that did have jurisdiction over that. It might be that they would be taking away the powers of this committee when you did set up a new committee. It does take away powers from another committee when you do that.

Mr. McCone. My very sincere advice would be for you as members of this committee to find a different solution than the creation of an independent committee, because I think that if you do so you will find that you have a situation developing in this area that is exactly the circumstance that Senator Lausche criticizes in connection with Atomic Energy.

Please understand me, I am not resisting the concept of committee jurisdiction, because I worked closely with committees and without difficulty. That does not worry me in the slightest.

But the very matter you discussed, your concern about this flight—without debating the point, because I think I have a little difference of opinion in what you said in that regard—but I could see a Joint Committee on Intelligence which, because of their mission to gather intelligence, would be running these flights all over. You would not know anything about it, and it would be seriously affecting the mission of this committee. But you would not be privy to it, any more than being privy to what the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy does for the reasons that Senator Lausche states.

Senator Lausche. I was trying to find a word here before. I would say that I was accepted over there as a pariah. [Laughter.]

Go ahead; pardon me.

The Chairman. That is a good word anyway.

INTERFERENCE IN POLITICAL DECISIONS

You have to admit—I am just groping here for some answer—this is the only executive function I can think of in which it is not subject to some kind of legal supervision by a regular standing committee. I agree that the covert operations are rather distinct.

This sort of thing which Senator Sparkman used in this example is not really what is bothering me so much. It is what I believe to be interference in political decisions.

I think the Cuban example is a much better one than this, because here a project was developed by the CIA, so far as I can understand, almost exclusively. If the military had anything to do with it, at least the military tried to disassociate itself very much in the end. Whether or not that was sound—I remember when they came before this committee, they professed a very remote interest in that affair. That may have been hindsight, but we were given to understand this was a CIA operation.

Mr. McCone. If I might say——

The Chairman [continuing]. And with very grave political implications.

Mr. McCone. If I might inject a thought there, Senator, in reviewing that matter coming in after the fact, there was enough blame for everybody in that failure.

The Chairman. I do not wish now to argue the merits of any of these things, even of Laos, the demerits, but I was really trying to get at—and I am not trying to blame you particularly, because you were not even in the organization and you had no responsibility whatever for it—but there are a number of decisions and activities, I think, of essentially a political nature that have taken place in any number of countries. We have mentioned only some of them.

REAL POLICY DETERMINED BY CIA

The activities in the Middle East, in Iran, Iraq, and so on—at the time they occurred, we were very greatly interested in them. We were in those activities immediately preceding and during the Suez crisis, which had great ramifications in the political field, and yet this committee had no influence on it. We did not even have an opportunity to know they were underway.

Really, the first notice I ever had of the Cuban thing was a story that came from a New York Times reporter who had wandered into that camp down there. We had nothing other than just pure rumor, and these were very great political implications. It makes me feel as if this committee goes through the motions, but the real policy is being determined by the CIA.

I am convinced that in some of these places they were the dominant influence. [Deleted.]

But these are just incidental things that have happened now over the course of a number of years. [Deleted.]

If this is the way it is going to be run, I do not know really what this committee has to do. We are just going through some motions here, and we are pretending we are directing or influencing our foreign policy, while we are not.

A QUESTION OF SUPERVISION

You would not, of course, deny it, and I do not wish to try to deny it.

Mr. McCone. I would not deny it in the least.

The Chairman [continuing]. That you do not have this influence. I believe you do. It is a question of how we coordinate it and how it is supervised.

Mr. McCone. I do not think the CIA is quite as influential as Andrew Tully said in his book, "Inside CIA."

The Chairman. You do not agree with all that he says?

Mr. McCone [continuing]. But I am not here to deny that they are pretty active. [Deleted.]

Now, I just do not—I see your problem very clearly, but I do not agree, I do not think I agree, that the solution is a joint committee. I think the solution——

The Chairman. What do you think the solution is?

Mr. McCone. I would like to think about it, but if I have to say now, I think you and the Armed Forces Committee should set up a subordinate subcommittee with representation from both of you, and that committee should meet as frequently as necessary and on a basis on which you would be fully informed on our affairs. That is what I think.

Senator Sparkman. A consultative committee.

Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, are you intending to pursue this line of inquiry? I had not finished my questions on the subject that was on the agenda for today's meeting on Powers, and I would like to ask about two questions.

The Chairman. Certainly; I thought you had finished.

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I am going to have to go.

The Chairman. I did not cut you off. I thought you had all the opportunity.

COVER-STORY REVEALED

Senator Lausche. I only want to ask if Powers was questioned as to whether or not the Soviet interrogators told him that back home in Washington it was disclosed that he was not accidentally over the Russian ground but was there on an information-seeking mission?

Mr. McCone. Mr. Allen, will you answer that?

Mr. Allen. He was told that by the Soviet interrogators.

Senator Lausche. That is, they said, "Back home they admitted you were here seeking information?"

Mr. Allen. After it came out, yes, sir.

Senator Lausche. Was he asked whether that influenced him at all in his revelations to the interrogators?

Mr. Allen. I do not think they put it that way, sir, no.

Senator Lausche. But the moment it came out that he was there on an information-seeking mission, they told him that?

Mr. Allen. They told him that.

Senator Lausche. That would have just rendered him defenseless in trying to conceal what he was there on.

Mr. Allen. Actually, sir, he did very well in his defenses, we think.

Senator Lausche. To me it would seem that he became helpless when they said, "Well, they have said in Washington that you are here on an information-seeking mission."

Mr. Allen. On the overall, yes, sir.

Senator Lausche. I think that covers it.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Senator Lausche. I am going to leave, I do not——

The Chairman. I am not asking you to leave. You go right ahead.

COMMITTEE APPROVAL

Senator Lausche. I want to to leave this thought with the Chairman: I am inclined to the belief that this committee ought to do more than merely listen to this report. If Powers did act as an American should have acted in this flight, we ought to give some

thought of the entire committee saying that we approve of what has been done, and I am going to raise that question.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me say that I agree with you.

The CHAIRMAN. I would want to think about it. I do not interpret the report or the hearings we had as ever raising much question about Powers. It was an entirely different question. It was the timeliness of it. It had nothing whatever to do with Powers as a man and as a citizen and so on.

However, I do not object to what you are saying. But I did not want to leave this with the impression that I am going to approve of everything that was done, including the decision to make the flight at that time under the circumstances then prevailing.

Senator SPARKMAN. He does not mean that.

Senator LAUSCHE. I do not mean that.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean as an individual?

Senator LAUSCHE. You see, when the hearings were concluded in 1960, was it?

Senator SPARKMAN. 1960.

Senator LAUSCHE [continuing]. We were left with this information that Powers was completely investigated. He was trusted. There was not a scintilla of proof to show that he was unworthy of trust, that he was guarded against contact by possible infiltrators, and that there was no proof of any character whatsoever that he had defected.

You men conclude that he acted as an American should. He had been condemned by some, and I think, Mr. Chairman, we ought to talk it out, as to whether or not this committee ought not to approve what has been done by the Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency and by that Board.

The CHAIRMAN. We will think about it.

MATTERS WHICH MAY LEAD TO WAR

I do not want to prolong this too long. I think you get the point that several times in the course of our hearings in the past, I mentioned particularly Laos because we had Ambassador [Winthrop] Brown here, and he most reluctantly, I think--my interpretation of his testimony was that there was a great difference of opinion there, and that, in effect, he was overridden. He would not put it quite as bluntly as I say it, but I cannot read anything else out of his answers.

Just one example: the Cuban thing, I do not mean to imply that this committee has all the wisdom, but I do think the responsibility that the committee has is such that it ought to be at least advised in advance as to such undertakings as the Cuban thing, for example, because that is not strictly a military matter.

We are not expected to infringe upon the strategy in case of war, but in those matters which may lead to war and which affect it, it seems to me this committee, if it is to have any function at all, ought to be advised. In the activities of your people in many of the critical spots—and they always are in critical spots, that is part of their business to be there—I do not see why this committee should not be informed and play a part.

We would welcome a suggestion from you as the new head, and we hope in the new era here, to see if we cannot get a more satisfactory relationship.

I am not the only one, as I say. There are a great many. There were 35 sponsors to Senator Mansfield's resolution. I do not think there are quite that many to the McCarthy resolution, but it would appear to be in the neighborhood of 15 or 20. With this big an operation, you can see that it is going to continue to be troublesome, I think.

A REGULAR RELATIONSHIP WITH CIA

Mr. McCONE. I would like to think this thing over. I think this has been a very useful discussion, and I welcome an opportunity to talk it over further with you.

I feel that the concept of the joint committee, for reasons I have expressed, would compound rather than tend to straighten out the problem.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be.

Mr. McCONE. On the other hand, I do not think it beyond the realm of possibility to develop an arrangement which would meet your problem, which I can see is a real one, and one that cannot be left unnoticed.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me that the—go ahead.

Mr. McCONE. So far as I am concerned as Director of Central Intelligence, which has to do with the entire intelligence community and giving it guidance as well as the direction of the Agency itself, I have a great responsibility to this committee. I think.

The CHAIRMAN. It has not been easy for this committee to get, I would say, any regular relationship with the CIA. Your predecessor took the view that he had no responsibility to this committee, and it is my understanding he never would appear without clearance of the Subcommittee of Armed Services, which, under the law, has no particular jurisdiction.

As I understand it, under the law you report only to NSC. You are a creature of the NSC under the law, are you not?

Mr. McCONE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. This other business is purely informal, casual, if you like, as far as speaking legally, is that not correct?

Mr. WARNER. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. If things go wrong we have the responsibility in the eyes of the public, whether we have anything to do with it or not, as we have very recently experienced in that connection.

The kind of information which you are equipped to develop, of course, is extremely important to any judgment of any of these policies that we have, the kind of judgment which is presently under consideration in Southeast Asia, which is very important. They are going to ask us to pass upon authorizations, and so on, and we can do it only by doing it completely in the dark or very much in the dark, if we do not have any——

BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Mr. McCONE. I think information in the Agency, both from our own sources and then from the responsibility of gathering together

and evaluating intelligence from the entire community, and finally in the preparation of estimates is done by the Board of National Estimates, and that is all very vital to your committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The Board of National Estimates, that is made up of what?

Mr. MCCONE. That is made up of 12 very senior people.

The CHAIRMAN. But that is your shop?

Mr. MCCONE. That is part of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is really a facility of mine as Director of Central Intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research have independent existence now under the planning functions or is it part of your shop?

Mr. MCCONE. No, it is independent, as it always has been.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it amount to much?

Mr. MCCONE. Yes, it does. It has a very capable fellow running it, Roger Hillsman, a very able fellow.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know him.

Mr. MCCONE. He sits on the U.S. Intelligence Board. They receive and evaluate intelligence that comes through their sources, through their embassy sources and so forth, and feed their evaluations into our Office of Current Intelligence and our Board of National Estimates.

PARTICIPATION BY THE CIVILIAN ARM

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me only common sense that if only the military committees—and all committees, I suppose, human nature being what it is—become oriented to their particular responsibilities, what you really have is primarily a military policy-making agency here, which ought not to be. It ought to be at least partially participated in by, we will call it, the civilian arm of the Government.

Mr. MCCONE. I cannot disagree with that at all. I can readily see the problem. But the very thing you said, the committees get oriented to their particular mission, is the reason why I think a joint committee oriented to the intelligence function would make your life more complicated than it is now, in my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. I surely do not want to get it any more complicated than it is now.

Mr. MCCONE. I think there is a better solution.

The CHAIRMAN. I think then what we ought to do is you pray over it and see it you can come up with a good solution.

Mr. MCCONE. Fine.

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW BOARD

The CHAIRMAN. Did this new Board that was set up to review the CIA, by the President—under General Maxwell Taylor, I believe—have anything to say about this? I have never seen a report on that. They were set up last year, weren't they?

Senator SPARKMAN. Last fall.

The CHAIRMAN. Last fall, and they were supposed to review the whole operation and make a report to the President.

Mr. MCCONE. They really devoted themselves more to the Cuban operation.

The CHAIRMAN. Just to the Cuban operation?

Mr. MCCONE. That Board was made up of Maxwell Taylor, Robert Kennedy, Admiral Burke and Allen Dulles. They rendered a report that I have seen.

The CHAIRMAN. They did not consider this sort of problem at all?

Mr. MCCONE. No; they had some recommendations of corrections that should be made within the Agency, which I have taken into consideration, but they did not deal with this problem.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope you will give it some thought and with your colleagues and the others, I would like to pursue it at a later date, after you have had a chance to think about it.

Mr. MCCONE. I would like to very much.

MCCARTHY'S RESOLUTION

The CHAIRMAN. Every now and then Senator McCarthy says, "when are you are going to have hearings on my resolution?" We never have had any, but maybe with some solution better than that which could be found, we might have. It seems, I confess, that your own Joint Atomic Energy Committee was the reason, because of its success, why I thought that was the proper way. If there is a better way, as I say, I do not want to complicate my life any more than it is, if you think that it would——

Mr. MCCONE. I think you have to examine whether the conditions are exactly parallel, because the Atomic Energy Commission in its activities in its own field has little to do with any other field, and by the wording of the law, the military control the military applications, and it is all pretty clearly worked out. Nothing that they do, or nothing that the Commission does, affects what you do or what the Armed Services Committee does.

All the time that I was the Chairman of the Commission, I never appeared before this committee, nor did I appear before the Armed Services Committee. But here in the Agency it is quite different. It affects the affairs of your committee and of the Armed Services Committee, and therefore I question whether you are answering the problem that you propound by contemplating the creation of a third committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you could be right. I do not know whether that is the answer or not. It certainly does affect this committee, I mean its policies.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Which would mean that you would be subject to the State Department?

Mr. MCCONE. That is right, that is right, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. MCCONE. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 6:10 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 7, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 3 p.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman) and Senator Dodd.

G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and others briefed the committee on the Congo situation.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 4:55 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 2 p.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman), and Senators Humphrey, Mansfield, Long, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Capehart.

The committee resumed its mark-up of the bill (S. 2768) To promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the purchase of United Nations bonds.

The bill was amended as to text. After discussion, and on a declaration of the Chair, the bill was ordered reported, without objection, but with Senator Capehart announced as opposed.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 3:40 p.m.]

BRIEFING ON FORTHCOMING GENEVA DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

FRIDAY, MARCH 9, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. John Sparkman presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Capehart.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Newhouse, and Mr. Tillman, of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.

May I say to the committee that the Secretary and Mr. Foster both have an appointment at 12 o'clock with the President, and they would like to get away from here. After all, they are in their last stages of preparation for departure.

We appreciate you gentlemen coming before us this morning, when we know you are so busy. We should be very glad to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE AND WILLIAM FOSTER, DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. If my voice is not in good form, it is possibly because I am fighting off a cold. I hope the coughs will not be entered on the record.

I will be leaving with our delegation in the morning. We expect to be in Geneva for approximately 10 days. We look upon these Geneva talks as occurring in two stages: The first, the political stage, during which the Foreign Ministers will be there; and the second, the negotiating stage, with respect to disarmament, where the delegations will hopefully be able to sit down and negotiate systematically and carefully on the various proposals that will be before them.

I will see the Foreign Minister of Germany at lunch on Sunday, Lord Home of Great Britain later that afternoon, and then Lord Home and I will have dinner with Mr. Gromyko on Sunday evening. Then I will probably have two more meetings with Gromyko before the date of the opening of the conference on Wednesday evening.

U.S. APPROACH TO MEETINGS

The purpose in my going is to try to find out whether there has been any change whatever in the political framework in which we will be dealing with various problems with the Soviet Union.

I would say at the beginning, Mr. Chairman, that we do not go with either optimism or pessimism, at this point. We are approaching this meeting on a find-out basis. We want to discover, if we can, what might have been decided on what may be coming out of an intensive round of consultations within the Soviet leadership.

I think I have indicated to the committee earlier that we had the feeling that they were in a period of uncertainty about some of their underlying policies. We know some very serious discussions have been going on, because they have had for some time now their key ambassadors from various capitals back in Moscow for consultation.

POSSIBLE CHANGES IN ATTITUDE

Mr. [Anatoly] Dobrynin, who is coming here as Ambassador, has delayed his arrival, presumably to be there for those consultations. And when they decided to hold their meeting of the Central Committee this week, they brought people back from all over the world who were members of the Central Committee, which might not have occurred had agriculture been the only matter of the agenda.

We have not, quite frankly, had any information from Moscow that the Central Committee has been discussing far-reaching questions of foreign policy. But we think it most probable that in some form these discussions have been going on.

We need to know whether there has been any change in their general attitude toward the West, toward the difference between a crisis and a détente—whether the problems which they have been having with Peking, reflected all over again in what they said publicly about agriculture, makes any difference to their attitudes toward problems in which we are directly involved.

There are three things—and, Mr. Chairman, you did not mention this, I believe, but I would like to be completely candid—is this an executive session?

Senator SPARKMAN. This is an executive session. You understand our regular procedure. This is purely for our locked files.

Secretary RUSK. Right, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And if at any time there is anything you want left off completely, just say so, and it won't even be taken down.

DISCUSSION OF BERLIN EXPECTED

Secretary RUSK. There are four questions that I would expect to come up in my discussion with Gromyko before the disarmament conference opens. The first will be Berlin because that is an issue on which we are still on the record on collision course.

The Thompson-Gromyko talks have not produced any movement toward an agreement. Those talks have become increasingly sterile; there have been mutual exchanges of points of view without any indication from Gromyko that they are willing to pick up any

leads, to follow down any paths, to explore any possibilities of the settlement of that question. And I think I would have to report to you that, so far as we see it now, the Thompson-Gromyko talks have run their course. We have squeezed about all that can be squeezed out of that lemon and we don't see that as a profitable enterprise from here on out unless something unusual develops in the talks with Gromyko.

On the other side, we have not had the impression that they, in these talks or otherwise, are trying to precipitate this Berlin crisis to a first-class hot crisis. That is, in his talks, Mr. Gromyko has not been threatening. The talks have been in a businesslike mood, even if unyielding. We do not see military movements behind the curtain which indicate that they are preparing for an early crisis.

This, coupled with the fact that Mr. Khrushchev apparently is looking to the possibility of a summit sometime before June 1st, perhaps indicates a peace in their attitude that is not too critical at the moment from our point of view. But, on the other hand, there is no indication that they are seriously concerned about adjusting their views and moving toward any kind of an agreement.

POTENTIAL COURSES OF SOVIET ACTION

There are approximately six alternatives in this situation that we have to be aware of. One that I would tend to discount somewhat is that they are moving ahead to carry out their own proposals, and, drawing the inferences from their proposals, from their peace treaty, that they are thereby precipitating a crisis. As I say, we do not have very much indication at the present time that this is what they have in mind.

Secondly, they could sign a treaty, but do nothing about it in action. That is, they could sign their treaty, and the East Germans simply go ahead with existing procedures by and large, with perhaps occasional harassments but without blockade, without a major change in the practical situation. That is a possibility. The Ulbricht visit was the occasion for re-affirming Moscow's intention to sign a peace treaty.[1] But nevertheless, that itself would involve some increased tension at best and considerable increased tension at worst. So we really don't know whether that is in their mind.

Third, they could seek some agreement with the West, along the lines of the conversations we have already held. We are inclined to discount that, because they have not been working hard at it, in any negotiating sense, in the last several months, since Gromyko was over here—since he left here after his talks last fall.

Fourth, they might find themselves in a position where, on the one side, they don't want to precipitate a crisis, but on the other, cannot withdraw from their proposals. Therefore, they may be interested in some sort of modus vivendi which would postpone the problem indefinitely.

For example, if this were tossed into the kind of meeting of Foreign Ministers' deputies, which worked on the Austrian business, and put the questions into such a meeting for discussion over a

[1] Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the East German Communist Party, met with Soviet Premier Khrushchev in Moscow, February 26–27, 1962. They issued a joint communique indicating they had discussed a peace treaty and "normalization" of the situation in West Berlin.

period of time, on the basis that the status quo would remain pending the outcome of those discussions, that might be one of the ways in which they would not have to withdraw from their position, but in which a crisis might be set aside.

Fifth, it might be that they would just prefer to keep the matter in its present form, which is not very satisfactory from the point of view of either one of us, occasional talks, but not much else. Or finally, they could simply sit tight and do nothing at all, including talks.

POSSIBLE SOVIET-WEST GERMAN TALKS

There is a possibility that they may try out a suspension of talks with us, to see whether they can make any effective contact with the West Germans. There have been various reports of Soviet diplomats talking with businessmen, newspapermen, and others in West Germany, seeming to encourage the idea that the West Germans and Moscow ought somehow to talk these things over. And this is something that has gotten caught up in the so-called Kroll affair.[2] The West Germans are very reluctant to get involved in this, and so far the Soviet Government has not made any formal approaches to them that would seem to suggest this would make any difference.

QUESTION LIKELY TO BE PUT ON ICE

I would also remind the committee, as I have said before, that we have tried out tentatively various far-reaching proposals, along the lines of German unification, an all-Berlin solution, an international authority to handle this sensitive problem of the administration of the access. We have not been negligent in putting to them various ideas which have been discussed publicly at one time or another in the West. We find no indication, no readiness to go down any of those trails. They still are very set on the notion that East Berlin is not discussible, that this is a part of East Germany, that the only thing to be talked about is West Berlin. It is a very harsh and unacceptable point of view from our side.

I do not believe there are any gimmicks or gadgets that are going to solve this problem. The question here is a direct confrontation of far-reaching proposals on their side and vital interest on our side, and it has to be handled in that framework.

But I will have some talks with Gromyko on this subject. The Western view is quite clear and very firm. It may be that some sort of modus vivendi, some arrangement to put this question on ice, can be found if this is what they may have concluded is the only practical result at the present time. We do not believe the Soviets want a war over West Berlin, but over the period of the last 3 years they have gotten themselves very far out on a limb on their proposals, in their public statements. It may be necessary for them to find some way to put this matter in the refrigerator.

---

[2] On March 9, West Germany recalled its ambassador to the Soviet Union, Hans Kroll, after reports that he had urged a settlement between Germany and the Soviet Union based on two German nations.

PROPOSED TEST BAN TREATY

Second, there will be the question of the nuclear test ban.

When the President made his speech last Friday, both parts of that speech were made on the basis of security considerations. That is, it seemed quite clear to everyone that if we had no assurance that Soviet testing would not continue, it seemed obvious to those of us in responsible positions that we had to resume our testing—not so much because of the particular series which the Soviets carried out last autumn, but because, in addition to that, we have no assurance that there will not be another series and another series, and we must not face that with inactivity on our side.

The second part of the speech, which had to do with the nuclear test ban, was also made on the basis of a security judgment—that if there could be a clear, definite, and assured cessation of testing on all sides, that that situation would be in the security interests of the Unites States—given our present nuclear situation and theirs, and given the problems which lie ahead in an unlimited arms race in what is getting to be an extremely complex, costly field.

U.S. GENUINELY WANTS TREATY

From the point of view of our own security interests, this proposal for a test ban treaty was not made on the basis of a gamble that the Soviets would reject it. That is, that part of the speech did not depend upon a reliance on a prediction that the Soviets would reject it. If they were to accept it on the basis that it was put forward, we would be ready to see them accept it and we believe it would be in our security interests to move in that direction. However, I must say that we have had no indication whatever that the Soviets are prepared to sign such a treaty between now and the middle of April.

We are not going to link our testing with any vague notion of progress at Geneva. The President made it very clear that we have to have a satisfactory signed treaty, the implementation of which moves straight ahead, if we are not to go forward with our own test program.

BRITISH CONCERNS ABOUT PUBLIC OPINION

Senator GORE. You are not going to let the British talk you out of that, are you?

Secretary RUSK. No. I was just coming to that—if we could keep this very much among ourselves for the moment—because we think in the next 3 or 4 days this could be straightened out.

It is quite true that the British feel we should come up with new proposals in this treaty, that public opinion would be disappointed if we simply offered them the April treaty as modified by negotiation in the course of the summer.

My own view is that this is not a question that you handle like a debutante's dress—that just because you are going to another party, you have to have a new dress—that this treaty was carefully thought out, carefully discussed within the executive branch and with the leadership up here. It was a treaty which was consistent with our security and this must be the basis of our approach.

Also, we are not as fearful as the British are about the public opinion situation throughout the world. They may have some local problems in the United Kingdom, but—by the way, we ought to get this down to the committee—I have just seen a USIA round-up of world reactions, and we are not in any weak position here in terms of world public opinion. So we feel that we must go ahead and get the kind of treaty which would be thoroughly adequate from the point of view of our security, as a basis for any decision not to go ahead with our test program.

REFUSAL OF INSPECTION AND CONTROL

Now, in Mr. Khrushchev's letter to the President, he made it quite clear that they were not going to buy inspection and control as proposed, and his language indicated that they were not going to buy inspection and control on almost any basis. But that, of course, is an absolute fundamental from the point of view of a treaty which would be adequate from our point of view.

Nevertheless, we do need to clarify with the Soviet Union what their attitude is going to be. It is entirely possible that Gromyko will not himself say the last word on this; that he would try to put that question over, because Mr. Khrushchev may want to try that out at a summit meeting.

I doubt very much that we will see any movement of any importance on their side in this field. I could be wrong, but this was discussed thoroughly between the President and Mr. Khrushchev at Vienna, following the most careful negotiation and preparation, on the basis of the April treaty, and there was no indication whatever from Mr. Khrushchev that he was going to abandon this commitment to secrecy in the Soviet Union over such things as a test ban. I think the prediction now would be that they would reject a treaty, that they will try to make maximum propaganda out of our resumption, and that they then, themselves, will go ahead with another round of tests. That would be a candid prediction as far as we can see it at the present time.

SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The third question I would talk to Gromyko about before the meeting opens is Southeast Asia. We feel that either the Soviets are not in control of the Communist side in Southeast Asia, or they are not playing the kind of game that we would expect them to play if they are serious when they say to us, "We want to stabilize the situation and try to reach some sort of a settlement in that area."

I am thinking not so much of Laos at the moment as I am of Vietnam, because in the face of an agreement at Geneva, at the Laotian Conference, that Laos would not be used as an avenue for infiltration into other countries, such as South Vietnam, and in the face of protestations that they would like to get that situation settled down, agents and cadres and personnel and very limited amounts of supplies continue to go into South Vietnam, and the Viet Cong have stepped up the pace of their operations in the last 2 or 3 months.

There are some signs that the Chinese Communist wing of the Communist Party is moving into the ascendancy in Hanoi. It is just possible—and this is something we tend to be skeptical about in the West, through long experience—it is just possible that Moscow is losing its influence, its ability to influence that situation.

NO WISH FOR CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM

Senator HUMPHREY. Did you see that story this morning about the Yugoslavs?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I saw that. Whether or not Soviet policy has changed, which I am inclined to doubt, it may be that they have no choices, that they are losing their choices in that situation. But this is one of the things I want to try to sound out Gromyko on.

We do not expect to or wish to get into any general conference on Vietnam, where there would be proposals made that the Viet Cong be taken into the government and all sorts of things that would start us down the road on which we have been having so much trouble in Laos. If the government forces in Vietnam can maintain the pace of their present activity and initiative, and can sustain the rate of casualties of the present fighting, then we think that the situation can come under control.

BROADER DISARMAMENT ISSUES

Then the fourth point would be the broader question as it affects general and complete disarmament—that is, the broader discussion in the conference would be the general subject of verification, inspection, and control, because if we cannot get some sort of satisfaction on Berlin, on the nuclear test arrangements, on such things as Southeast Asia, and on inspection, I think it is fair to say that there just is not going to be any disarmament. So this is the sort of thing that we are trying to establish.

As I said just before you came in, Senator Humphrey, this meeting will be in two phases: one, a Foreign Ministers' political phase for about 10 days, and then a disarmament conference which would go on after that.

What we need to find out is whether there is an adequate political basis for serious disarmament discussions, and this will be the main purpose within the first 10 days.

Senator GORE. As I understand you, unless there is some satisfactory conclusion reached on the part of our Government in the first phase, the second phase cannot entail serious negotiations.

Secretary RUSK. I did not mean to say, Senator Gore, that there would not be a conference in the second phase. But I would say——

Senator GORE. That was not involved in my question.

Secretary RUSK. Right, I realize that. But I am saying that I would be pessimistic about making any serious headway in the second phase unless we can get some adequate political framework in the beginning.

AVOIDING ANOTHER PROPAGANDA ROUND

This was why the Prime Minister and the President urged that we start off at the Foreign Minister level and have some preliminary talks among the three Foreign Ministers before the meeting started, because we do not want, if we can avoid it, to convert the Geneva Disarmament Conference into just another propaganda round. If we had our choice, and if there is any indication of serious interest on Mr. Gromyko's part, we would be inclined to start off the conference without what the United Nations calls general debate, without a round of big speeches in which everybody tries to appeal to world public opinion and gets himself fixed on particular points, and we have a big argument about the nuclear test resumption on both sides, and things of that sort.

If we are serious about this, we ought to move straight into committee work, straight into quiet and systematic negotiations. I do not think we will succeed. I think Mr. Gromyko is coming there with a big speech in which he will try to unload on us as much as possible, our announced test program. He will undoubtedly——

Senator SPARKMAN. You said Khrushchev was coming?

Secretary RUSK. No, Gromyko.

In Mr. Khrushchev's letter, he used the words "atomic blackmail." It is interesting that this was the phrase that they threw at us to condemn the Baruch Report. This was the same phrase that they used at a time when we were trying to get an atomic monopoly put into international control. And even then they called it atomic blackmail, you see.

We will be ready for a propaganda fight, if that is what they want. But from our side, we would rather start it off more quietly.

COUNTERING PROPAGANDA ATTACKS

Senator HUMPHREY. I would be interested in how you are going to get ready for it, Mr. Secretary, because one of the things that disturbs me no end is we knew that the Soviets were about ready to have their tests last fall, when they went into that barrage of testing, and we did not have anything ready. We did not have any stooges ready to parade, we did not have any placards out, we did not have any walls painted, we did not have any radio programs, we did not have the French and the British and our allies all geared up to really make something out of it.

Gradually, something built up. But you can rest assured the Soviets, the day we have the first explosion, any American Embassy in any unstable country will be stoned, and mobs will be in the street, and there will be more women's meetings and peace meetings than you can count, and we will be under the most severe propaganda attack we have ever encountered.

I wonder how we are going to combat that. Don't misunderstand me. I think that the decision on testing is proper. I support that decision. But that is only one of the points.

PREFERENCE IS BUSINESSLIKE APPROACH

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I think that would be the second chapter of the propaganda battle, that is, to get ready for the actual explosion of an American test.

What I was referring to in my remarks was the debate at Geneva on the proposals and counterproposals on the record. And there we are assuming now that we shall have to make such a propaganda effort, even though our preference is that we start off on a businesslike basis.

You will notice the difference in mood, length, language, in the President's reply to Mr. Khrushchev's letter—simply a short 2- or 3-paragraph letter saying we will talk about these things.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think that was most fitting. I appreciate the position of the Government to go right ahead, not worry too much about what is going to be said, only to be prepared for it, and just hew the course.

MATTER HAS NOT BEEN PROPERLY PRESENTED

Senator SYMINGTON. With due respect to the Secretary, in the past, it is my opinion that the cockeyed policy we started in the fall of 1956, in our own party, which was embraced later on by the other party—no use in crying over spilled milk, but this matter has never been presented properly to the American people. And we have these scientists, as I said yesterday, who, under the cloak of science, betray our secrets in open speeches. The entire climate of this situation has been so negative to what to me seemed the most solid aspect of all—namely, distrust of the Communists—that I am not at all surprised, frankly, that we were not prepared properly last fall.

I would hope that now that we realize that we cannot trust these people, and that when Mr. Foster goes to this situation, Mr. Secretary, I am more reassured by some of the things you have said this morning than I have been in a long time—that is, that we recognize these people have no faith, they have no concept of honor, they have made us look silly before the world.

We talk about world opinion. I was so delighted to hear what you said about the British. I would just like to see what world opinion has done to hurt the Communists as a result of this betrayal and trickery on their part last fall. Unquestionably, they will do all they can among the soft people over here to promote the fact that they have a right to cheat and we do not.

This whole question of let's stop testing and start again, because we will be able to detect any testing that they do, and then we can start again: the people that put that type of thinking before the American people ought to study Operation Greenhouse, as to just what is entailed in starting hydrogen testing in the atmosphere, from the standpoint of the months and years of preparation that are necessary.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES HAVE SHORT MEMORIES

Secretary RUSK. Well, one of our troubles, Senator Symington—and this bears on Senator Humphrey's question—is that in a de-

mocracy like ours, and in the free world, we have such short memories. That is, people have forgotten our demobilization and our disarmament after World War II. They have forgotten the effort to put the atomic weapon under international control in 1946. They have forgotten why our military budget today is four times what it was in 1946 and 1947.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is the 1946 plan the Baruch Plan?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

These are things that people have to continue to remember in order to understand why we think control is important, and why we have to have assurance and verification on the steps that are taken, and why there is a connection between the possibilities of disarmament and such a question as Berlin. There is an inevitable connection, because if Berlin continues in a crisis state, we are going to have to be prepared for that crisis. And we cannot take on disarmament measures that reduce our ability to take care of the interests of the free world in a situation of that sort.

However, I think we have to continue to work at disarmament, despite these crises, to see if we can make some motion on both trails at the same time. I do think they are related, and that under present conditions, arms themselves do make their own contribution to tension.

FRENCH DECISION TO STAY AWAY

I might just comment very briefly on the attitude of France and Germany, because they are important here.

France, as you know, has announced that they are not going to the Geneva Conference. We had thought for awhile that they would have an observer there, but they have elected not to do that. This seems to be a personal decision on the part of General de Gaulle and is related to his view that great powers ought to talk these things over among themselves, and not have people, the smaller powers, the smaller countries sitting in to take part in discussions of great power problems.

Senator GORE. That has been Khrushchev's line a long time.

Secretary RUSK. That has been Khrushchev's line a long time.

NO RESENTMENT SHOULD BE SHOWN

If you did not see it, you might want to look at Mr. Walter Lippmann's column yesterday, because there is a certain element of truth in that. On the one side, General de Gaulle is very much interested in these problems. They have asked us to keep them intimately in touch with what is going on in Geneva, despite the fact that they won't be there. And my guess is that if there is any change of the sort I was talking about earlier in the attitude of Moscow, they would probably join up at some stage in discussing some of these problems.

But we do not wish to show any irritation or resentment or anything of that sort with respect to Paris on this matter. We will miss them there. We could use them there, because we need their support on certain points that will come up there. But General de Gaulle is in an historical climax, as far as France is concerned. He is almost wholly preoccupied with the Algerian problem. And we

feel that our best role is simply to go ahead and explore the situation without showing any irritation or disappointment as far as their absence is concerned.

SENSITIVITIES OF GERMANY

Then I think in Germany there is some sensitivity on these matters. We and the Germans, I think, are in pretty close agreement. I will be seeing Schroeder on Sunday.[3] Their preoccupations are mainly two, and two which we share. One is that whatever arrangements are made in the disarmament field, that they be thoroughly consistent with the security interests of the West. And Germany, at the point of confrontation, and in what might be considered to be an exposed position, naturally takes that seriously. So do we. And they will be looking at that aspect of it very closely.

Second, they do not wish any arrangements which are directly discriminatory as far as Germany is concerned.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is favorably discriminatory?

Secretary RUSK. No, in terms of disarmament—such as an agreement to demilitarize Germany, or an agreement to withdraw forces of both sides out of the two parts of Germany.

Now, it may be that there are some disarmament measures on a broader basis, both in terms of armed forces and areas, which would make some sense with respect to that vast area between the Urals and the Atlantic. But we are not prepared to go into arrangements which are specifically and directly discriminatory against Germany on the notion that Germany itself, standing alone, is a threat to the peace.

ISSUES OF WESTERN SECURITY

Senator LAUSCHE. Will the Secretary elaborate a bit upon his statement that you do not feel any disarmament agreement should be effectuated unless it is consistent with the security of Germany? I think you said that.

Secretary RUSK. Consistent with the security of the West, is what I said.

For example, if we move toward a reduction of overall forces, and the Soviets propose a proportionate reduction of forces stationed in the NATO and Warsaw Pact areas; they have 20 divisions in East Germany and we have 5½ in West Germany. Now, a third reduction of each is of no particular interest to us. If you had a proposition for such a reduction in that area and the Soviet Union had four divisions in Warsaw Pact countries, then we would have something to talk about. But the Soviets will not buy that. It is that kind of thing. We are not going to thin out our commitments to NATO, for example, under conditions of military disadvantage to us, looking at the total security situation.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Gore.

---

[3] West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder.

U.S. NEED NOT BE DEFENSIVE

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, I would like to advert to the question of world public opinion just a moment.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. I do not think we need to be tenderfooted at all in that regard. As one who has perhaps been the President's severe critic on domestic affairs, regretfully, I think perhaps his single most outstanding performance has been in the handling of this delicate, complicated, explosive question of nuclear weapons test policy. He has been very responsible in it, very deliberate, patient, and as a result I think that Khrushchev and the Russians stand condemned and convicted in world public opinion of duplicity, of intrigue, or trickery. It is they who resumed the testing, and it is Khrushchev who now accuses us of atomic blackmail.

I think the President has handled it exceedingly well, bringing on this delicate question just about as much unity in the United States as on any question I have seen in a long time, and a remarkable degree of unity of our allies in support of the decision to resume nuclear testing.

So, if the Russians undertake to make a play for world public opinion, it seems to me we ought to be on the offensive in that respect, and in no way on the defensive.

Excuse me for expressing those views. I feel very strongly about it.

BLACKMAIL FOR PEACE

Secretary RUSK. I was interested in an editorial in an Indian paper. It referred to the use of this phrase "atomic blackmail" on the part of Khrushchev. The Indian paper said, "Well, it is blackmail, but it is blackmail for peace."

I think that we need not be too fearful; people around the world, I think, do understand the reluctance that underlies the President's decision. Reluctance, because when you look down the road ahead, in an unrestricted arms race, you really are almost breaking through—trying to break through the ceiling of the capacity of the mind of men.

When you start with a problem of how to deal with hundreds of missiles that are traveling up to 25,000 miles an hour, you then get into the question of how you deal with those missiles so that they cannot be intercepted. Then you deal with defenses against that to search out which of these things coming at you is real and which is dummy, and you go on and on and on—massive resources committed with, at the beginning, very chancy results.

HIGH STAKES DEMAND "IMPOSSIBLE SOLUTIONS"

I notice that Mr. Hans Bethe made a remark that an anti-ICBM is impossible. That does not sound to me like a scientific remark, because scientists have made this sort or remark over the centuries and have had to eat it.

What is true is that you have to assume that it is possible, simply because the stakes are so high. You cannot afford to go on the basis that it is impossible.

So we will find ourselves, if we cannot turn this thing down, if we cannot get some genuine guarantees against testing—we will find ourselves committing increasing enormous resources to the most problematical outcomes. And that, I think, helps to explain the President's obvious reluctance, if there is any way to bring this thing to an end.

ABM RESEARCH BEST REASON FOR TESTING

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to say one thing there, as long as you brought up the Bethe remark. What that man, in his involved mind, does not realize is that it might be very easy to make an anti-ICBM missile, because nobody knows what would happen, according to his own speech—which violated security—a few weeks ago, if you had a uranium jacket instead of a lead jacket around that big one. It would be over 100 megatons.

If they find out through their testing that they can create a situation in the atmosphere over this country, or between this country and their country, which would make it impossible for our missiles to be directed properly, then you have an anti-ICBM missile effective and true that is not a defensive missile in Russia. And to me, of all the single reasons that I know, after doing my best to understand the subject, why we should resume testing, that is perhaps the most important of all. It is an anti-ICBM missile, but is is not the type and character of missile that is normally considered so.

MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF DETERRENCE

What worries me, Mr. Secretary, is these people continue to make these statements and these false implications, under the protection of science. I agree completely with what Senator Gore said. I agree without any reservation we should do everything in the world for our children and country to work on disarmament. But it seems to me that the fact that the President has gotten over the message, with your able support, that this country does not intend to go any further in retreat—that is what we are really talking about—is one of the reasons why the Soviets are more reasonable and more logical today than they have been in the past.

I think although an arms race is terrible, you must face up to the situation with respect to Red China. I am delighted to hear that there may be friction between the Soviets and Red China. On the other hand, an arms race is risky, but it is also, and I see it, the most important single aspect of deterrence.

RESPECT FOR AMERICAN COMPETITIVE ABILITY

Secretary RUSK. I think also on the matter of competition, Senator, that if there is one thing for which Mr. Khrushchev really has respect for this country, it is, I think, our ability to compete if we put our backs into it. I think he really has respect for our economic, industrial, and scientific power. And I hope that this resumption of testing will have caused them to take some second thoughts, and that we will find that Gromyko will be concerned about what happens if there is the kind of competition in which the resources of the United States and the free world can be mobilized, if they have

to, for a competition in which the other side cannot keep up over the long run.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE UNAVOIDABLE

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, since we are expressing our views on these matters, I felt, as has been indicated here, that the President's message was exemplary. It was outstanding. It did just what needed to be done to explain the situation to people.

Mr. Gaitskell's visits here, I think, were helpful, from the Labor Party point of view in Britain.[4] I think we have to recognize the political situation in Britain. I might say to my colleague that we all take care of political situations around here. If you happen to come from an area in which there is a large aircraft factory, you are very interested in airplane production. And if you happen to come from one like my part, where we get no Federal installations, you are not quite so interested, you know. It just depends upon where you live and what the pressures are upon you in a free society.

THERE ARE ALWAYS TWO SIDES

I do not think that the voices in this country that have been worried about the test program have had the ascendancy.

I want to say in all respect to Mr. Bethe, I think he is quite a scientist. I do not think his speech violated security. I think it was maybe a speech that was in—well, in poor judgment at the time. But this man is a scientist of competence. Scientists are fallible. They make mistakes.

Senator SYMINGTON. He thought it violated security. He said so.

Senator HUMPHREY. It is just a matter of opinion, I guess. All I am saying is that there have been scientists on the other side, too. I remember a short time ago here, when scientists were saying that all we need are underground tests; if we just get those underground tests, that will take care of it; we have to get underground tests.

We were talking about this yesterday, Mr. Foster. Well, we got underground tests, and that doesn't take care of it.

We were worried that the Russians were sneaking underground tests. Well, if they were sneaking underground tests, apparently that was not enough for them, either, because they went to the atmospheric tests.

Now, I feel we have to go to the atmospheric tests, on the basis of what has been revealed thus far in terms of Soviet testing. But I think, more importantly, what we need to do is what we think we need to do in light of our own decision. This has been my position about the defense program.

ARMS RACE SHOULD NOT BE PROFITABLE

First of all, I think for several years in this country we had a defense program that both the Russians and ourselves could pay

---

[4] British Labor Party leader Hugh Gaitskell met with President Kennedy in Washington on February 19. Afterwards, Gaitskell announced his support of a resumption of U.S. nuclear testing as a military necessity.

for. And I think that is nuts. If you are going to have one, you better have one that they cannot pay for without making substantial adjustments in their economy.

I think they are faced with that today; that the pressure that has been put on them by the diversification of our defense structure, by not relying entirely upon the nuclear deterrant, by getting a better balance in our forces, by modernization of our weaponry, has caused the Soviet Union to take a big, new look at whether or not the arms race is profitable to them. I think they may very well come up with the possibility that it is not profitable in the light of their serious domestic problems. And they have serious domestic problems.

The other thing I would like to—and therefore I think we ought to pursue what we are doing. I fully support even more than what we are doing.

IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION

Now, this comes to public opinion. I think we ought to get it on this record. Just as surely as we are sitting at this table, no matter how right we may be—and we are, and I think we have proven that we were right on the restraint that was exercised on testing, the fact that the Soviets tested first—there were people in this country that wanted us to test ahead of them. I do not think that would have been to our advantage at all in any way.

There is nothing that has happened in these few months that jeopardizes our security if we start testing now, unless people are lying to us. And I do not think the President and the Chiefs of Staff would tell us a falsehood. They do not say that we have lost the lead in nuclear weaponry. We could lose it if we stood still, but we have not lost it.

But we can rest assured that every little guy in every cell in every Communist Party organization throughout the world will be instructed to raise Cain the minute that first test goes off. This is going to be the real acid test of whether or not we can stand a wave of unfavorable public opinion.

I am not going to be particularly worried about what the editorials say. If I worried about what the editorials say, I would still be teaching school at Macalester College, because the editorials have never been on our side, and they are not on our side many times in political matters. They have not been on mine.

But what I am worried about is what the folks say.

WE MUST PREPARE FOR PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE

Now, the Communists have an organization. We do not. This is the point that I think we have to look into.

What kind of advance preparation are we going to make, organizationally, to combat or at least to dilute or to deflect some of the tremendous public opinion, manufactured public opinion, that will be coming out of this Communist organizational efforts. Mark my words, it will be there.

I met with the former Secretary of the Communist Party of Southern Italy when I was in Rome, and I have the propaganda bulletins and publications which that organization puts out in

southern Italy. They have captured 400 communities already, with mayors, city councils, and school boards, in the last couple of years—quietly. Now they are prepared, and the day that this first explosion goes off, they are going to be ready to explode themselves.

What do we have ready to combat it? I want my position clear: Whether we combat it or not, I think we must go on with our work. But I think it would be a good idea to be prepared to meet it.

I have not heard of anybody in this Government yet that knows how to meet this kind of propaganda offensive, and this is going to have its toll. This is going to affect the British, it is going to affect the Scandinavians, and it is going to affect the Italians. Fanfani's [5] government is in trouble, and we are going to find our allies in trouble. I think we have to be as prepared for this as we are for the scientific aspects of testing.

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Capehart.

TESTING SUPPORTED

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Secretary, you know occasionally I am against some of the things that you do—not very often, maybe, but occasionally.

Senator SPARKMAN. I was about to say not often.

Senator CAPEHART. In this instance, I am for you. I think we must test. I have been urging it for months and months and months. I think we have possibly waited too long, but that is water over the dam.

I was likewise with you when Mr. McCloy was trying to set up the disarmament organization in the United States. So I think you are doing the right thing by testing. I have said so for months and months, and I shall support you.

I will also support a real honest-to-goodness organization of people here to study disarmament, and to be prepared 100 percent to deal with it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, I did not mean to cut you off from answering this question of Senator Humphrey's.

FEWER DEMONSTRATIONS THAN EXPECTED

Secretary RUSK. Well, this problem of how we deal with these organized riots and demonstrations, or how we counter them, is certainly a very important one, and a very difficult one from our point of view. It is very hard for us the United States—to organize that kind of thing in other countries, and still have the kind of relationship with those countries that will be normal for our kind of world on this side of the curtain.

Now, I hope I would not be accused of optimism on this point, but I have been interested in a certain caution on the part of Moscow on this kind of thing in the last several weeks. For example, we expected to have demonstrations throughout Latin America as a result of the Punta del Este Conference. They did not occur. They tried one in Montevideo at the airport at the time that Dorti-

---

[5] Italian Premier Amintore Fanfani.

cos[6] went home. They got about 150 people there. He climbed up on the top of the fuselage of his plane and made a speech as though he were talking to 50,000 people. He was literally up on top of the plane, as though he were orating to 50,000 people instead of to a little handful of 150. And this was a matter of ridicule down there.

We expected demonstrations on the occasion of the President's speech.

Senator HUMPHREY. On the testing.

Secretary RUSK. On the testing. They did not occur. So far as I know, we have not lost a single window pane in a single Embassy over there.

Senator SPARKMAN. Knock on wood.

REASON FOR SOVIET CAUTION

Secretary RUSK. I think what Senator Symington said is making some difference here. I think that since about September the Soviets have shown more caution.

When the President's July 25 speech was made, and the Congress, with overwhelming votes, passed almost in—what—3 or 4 days, the defense measures that were necessary, Khrushchev had to face the fact that if he wanted to compete, we were prepared to compete. I think this has moderated his approach to a number of questions since then.

We see it in Berlin. They are not engaging us in Berlin as though they were trying to precipitate a first-class crisis.

ISSUE IS RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT, NOT TESTING

I think we have to get ready as best we can for the public opinion problem when that first explosion of ours goes off. But notice another thing, Senator. We have had no problem whatever about underground testing, despite the fact that we have announced—what, now—21 of them. We have had no public opinion problem or political problems anywhere, that we could ascertain, of any consequence whatever. That suggests that the problem in people's minds is not so much the strength of the United States—testing, as such, from a military point of view—but the problem is this one of fallout, which has become emotional, you see. If we can handle that. . .

But most of these people, wherever they are outside of the curtain, whether it is India or Burma, as well as among our allies—most of these people, I think, clearly want the United States to be sufficiently strong so that there is something with which to confront the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think that is true.

Secretary RUSK. Their own neutrality turns on that confrontation. I think most of them sense this even though they do not give us much help from time to time in saying it.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I say just this. We have to watch this clock. We have about 30 minutes more.

Senator Hickenlooper, you were not here when I announced that they have an appointment with the President at 12 o'clock. Therefore I want us to keep that in mind, in passing around the table.

---

[6]Cuban President Osvaldo Dorricos Torrado.

U.S. EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS ABROAD

Mr. FOSTER. I just want to add one comment in response to Senator Humphrey's question.

There is organized, insofar as we can organize it, a complete educational campaign around the world, through our embassies, to meet this very situation.

As the Secretary said, we cannot organize counter-riots or anything of this sort. We can talk, not only to the governments in power, but to the opponents thereof. Our embassies have had a complete education in the real reluctance with which the President faces this and in the reasons we have done it. We have attempted to get to the governments in power the background of this whole thing around the world, and I think this is having a very healthy effect in the direction in which you have asked.

Senator SPARKMAN. Have we had a traveling emissary doing that?

Mr. FOSTER. We have had both, Mr. Chairman. We have had a traveling emissary who has gone to the eight countries.

Senator SPARKMAN. Who is it?

Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Matteson, of our shop, has gone to the eight new countries that will be associated with us at Geneva in the discussions.

Senator SPARKMAN. Have you had him going into these neutral countries?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, we have. Of course, the task is being done primarily by the USIA, our embassies, their political affairs officers, and their scientific people in these countries. This is all organized and underway, and I think it has contributed to the rather favorable results which were referred to by the Secretary earlier.

BASES IN ITALY

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Symington wanted to ask another question.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield.

Senator SPARKMAN. Go ahead.

Senator SYMINGTON. All I was going to present to the Secretary is that I found to my surprise that we are partially feeding at least 6 million people in Italy every day. And when I went abroad, I came back and reported to the President that everywhere I went, for the first time, my 12th trip in 15 years, everybody was questioning our intentions—everybody—and in many countries they were questioning our capability. So if we are going to have trouble in countries like Italy, putting in this tremendous support on an economic basis, because we intend to stay stronger than the Russians in order that they do not hit us in the rest of the free world, I think we are licked right now. That is why I am so completely in sympathy with the policies you presented this morning.

Senator SPARKMAN. I believe that it has been published in some of the press—is it true that Italy is about to ask that our missiles bases be removed from Italian soil?

Secretary RUSK. We have heard nothing whatever on that.

Senator SPARKMAN. There was something in the press to that effect.

Secretary RUSK. There was a debate.

Senator SPARKMAN. A question asked——

Secretary RUSK. In the Parliament. One of the members of one of the conservative parties asked the question in order to try to build up a little——

Senator SPARKMAN. What was the answer?

Secretary RUSK. Well, unfortunately the Prime Minister did not knock it out of the window straight away. He said he would reply on Friday or Monday. But we have had nothing whatever from that. We do not expect anything because they have made very far-reaching commitments to us about the policies of this government toward NATO and so forth.

MEANS OF DETECTING DETONATIONS

Senator SPARKMAN. I want to ask one question that relates way back to the first part of your talk, about our proposal to the Soviets or to the Conference.

We still are insisting, I presume, and will continue to insist upon adequate means of detecting, of knowing when explosions are made. Now, in the New York Times, some time back, they had an item that said the United States has developed a technique for detecting nuclear explosions far in space, with at least hypothetical possibilities of monitoring detonations at twice the 93-million-mile distance of the sun from the earth.

Is that true? Is it going to be possible to detect detonations at such a distance that perhaps the physical inspection would not be required?

LIMITATIONS OF THIS TECHNIQUE

Mr. FOSTER. If I may answer, Mr. Chairman, it is possible to get far enough out into space so that these explosions cannot be detected. But this is, as you imply by the 93-million-mile allusion, a long way out, and would be a very, very costly thing to do, and one is unable to determine how useful the results of such an explosion would be, because the instrumentation that you would need to get any meaningful results is pretty limited.

We can detect in the atmosphere quite readily most explosions of any significant size—almost all explosions—but at tremendous distances away from the earth, it would be possible to make an explosion which would go undetected. But we do not feel that this is a tremendous threat.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am really asking it from the other standpoint. Can we detect it to a sufficient degree that it may be possible to eliminate our demand for physical inspection of sites?

Mr. FOSTER. No, because there are a number of types of explosions that might give them some advantages. The other side of this coin, of course, is the preparation side, to which I referred in my testimony yesterday.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes; I saw that statement in the New York Times.

TECHNICAL QUESTIONS AND POLITICAL CONCERNS

Senator HUMPHREY. We had testimony on this about 2 or 3 years ago from the scientists of the Atomic Energy Commission that were over here. The burden of that testimony was that it was easier to detect in outer space and in the atmosphere than any other area. I mean that outer space detection was theoretically——

Mr. FOSTER. Depending on how far out.

Senator HUMPHREY. Hundreds of millions of miles out. We had this elaborate testimony here. We had a whole panel of scientists that were working on this matter, and this was at the time that we were arguing about the reliability of underground detection. It was pointed out then that the original findings on underground detection were not as good as they should have been, but as far as outer space is concerned, you could go quite far.

Senator SPARKMAN. I would like to think of it not in terms of millions of miles, but perhaps 100 miles out. It seems to me that is where the most practical, useful explosions take place.

Secretary RUSK. Sometimes incredibly difficult technical questions have to be answered in part by some very simple and perhaps naive political considerations. If the Soviets want to stop this competition, there is no reason on earth why they could not accept a sophisticated and non-espionage type of inspection of the Soviet Union. It is just as simple as that.

Senator SPARKMAN. I agree with that completely.

CONFUSING FEASIBILITY WITH PRACTICABILITY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was just going to inject a thought about this detection out in outer space. I think we confuse feasibility of detection with practicability. I think there is no question but that it is feasible if we want to spend the money and set up the machinery to detect at tremendous distances. But the practicability is another thing. We are not practically set up to do it at the moment.

Senator HUMPHREY. And the same point may be made, Bourke—the feasibility and practicability of being able to record the findings of testing in outer space is a problem.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. These scientists, you know, you ask if they can do something—sure they can do it, of course. Then we assume that because they say they can do it, it is done. But it is a long time between the scientists saying, "Sure we can go around Mars in a few years, it is all right, we can do it"—there is a lot more to it than that. They talk in a different language and in a different atmosphere than we laymen talk about it.

Mr. FOSTER. And to locate and to identify it, we would still need control posts around the earth's surface in order to triangulate the explosion.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You have to have such tremendous installations, coming down to the nuts and bolts.

Secretary RUSK. Off the record, please.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SPARKMAN. I think the President's speech was a tremendous statement.

Senator GORE. Can't we be proud of the magnificent job that has been done?

Senator SPARKMAN. I think so. We would like to keep on.

U.S. MUST UNDERSTAND POSITION OF OTHERS

Senator GORE. I would like to add one thing in line with what Senator Humphrey said—that we needed to understand the people's position from other countries as well as from different states in our own country.

We must bear in mind that the British are under the gun. When Khrushchev told the British Ambassador that with ten bombs, or six, or whichever it was, there would be no more England, he was telling them the truth, and they know it. So we must bear that in mind. The real important issue here is that the United States, the last bastion of the free world that can resist this onslaught, not get itself in the same position.

Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, may I say in that connection—this is off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

IMPROVEMENTS IN SOVIET WEAPONRY

Senator WILEY. I just want to ask one question. This I am really anxious to know. The President in his speech intimated that during the time we were sitting on our fannies, the Russians had been making hay; in other words, they developed new weapons, very serious weapons. Do you know what they were?

Secretary RUSK. The President's speech referred to novel techniques and improvements in weaponry. This was an attempt to be as candid as possible without getting into too much classified material. They did do certain things that were new for them, and also to a degree, as far as techniques are concerned, that would be new for us. I think that is about as far as I can go. This was not a question of developing a new breakthrough in the nuclear situation, or changing the basic strategic relationship between the two nuclear forces. But if they built on that an additional series of tests, this could make a considerable difference.

Now, one or two of your colleagues are on the Joint Atomic Committee. Perhaps I ought to—I believe Mr. Scoville is coming up.

Senator WILEY. Let me just say—since I do not normally prepare myself for testifying on that particular kind of point, I am not sure of what security permits me to say about it. One or two of your colleagues are on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. They might know the rules a little better than I do. I am just a little inhibited by security considerations on this point.

Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Secretary, if I may, in answer to Senator Wiley's question, I think it is within the bounds of security to state that they made great progress in the weight to yield ratios. The President referred to this. They also have developed a larger megaton capability than any that we have ever developed, because we have not pointed our development in that direction. They have made great improvements in their own ability to improve weight to yield ratios. As the President said in his speech, they have done some work which indicated to us that command and control functions and electronics might be affected, as I think Senator Symington indicated earlier, by the massive nature of the explosion which they

could produce over our own facilities, and thus interfere with the direction of our own offensive missiles.

ARE THE RUSSIANS AHEAD?

Senator WILEY. Do you think that what they have accomplished during that period—and I have listened to all you have said—has put them ahead of us in relation to armament, as you might call it?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir. The Secretary referred to that earlier. We still feel that in spite of the advances they have made, they have not yet overcome the lead which we have in the field. But if they were able to run another series, or a series beyond that, without our undertaking our own tests, it is possible that they might then achieve such leadership.

Senator WILEY. That is not the way I interpreted what the President said. It is not the way that the press interpreted it. I was out in Wisconsin before the President said it, and it came forth in substance that during this period, the Communists had advanced so that we were behind them. Now, I do not know. I just want to know.

Mr. FOSTER. No sir, that is not the situation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think, Alex, the statement came out that they had made substantial advancements over what they had obtained, and that it could be interpreted that they had closed the gap substantially between what they knew and what we knew, in sophistication and in some other things. But I did not get any connotation out of any of these statements that they had forged ahead of us.

Senator SPARKMAN. Neither did I.

POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS DURING NEGOTIATIONS

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if my colleague, Mr. Foster, could indicate to the committee one or two points alluded to in the President's statement in his speech to the effect that we might modify our proposed treaty in the light of experience. There are one or two points there I think the committee would be much interested in.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, I would be interested, and so would the committee.

Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as the Secretary has said, it is the present position of the U.S. Government that we should not, in going ahead with negotiations for a test ban treaty, feel that we had to come up with a lot of new concessions over and above what we had put forth last April and during the summer. Nonetheless, the President has indicated in his speech that whatever controls, whatever treaty we put forward, should be modified in the light of recent experience. What he means by that is that if the Soviet indicates any forthcoming toward meaningful negotiations on this treaty, we shall do several things.

MONITORING SOVIET ACTIONS

First and foremost, we shall do whatever is possible to take account of clandestine preparations. The things that can be done are not tremendous; they are very difficult to do because it is hard to look into men's minds. Our scientists do believe that it may be possible, through certain kinds of inspections, through certain requests for specific declarations by the Soviet Union, and, upon a spot check basis, to look at preparations at test sites within a period of any preparations for an explosion, particularly with scientific and technical developments in mind. It is also possible that within the terms of the treaty as presented, we can accelerate the putting on their soil of the control posts, and thus shorten the period during which we have no access to what they are doing.

On the other side of the coin, in terms of liberalization of the treaty, to take account of any scientific development since last April, it is possible—and I think that this is one of the things the British have very much in mind—it is possible that a lowering of the threshold which is presently set at 4.75 would still give us the same ability to identify and to locate any tests which take place, assuming we have on their soil the control posts proposed in the treaty.

Now, these would not be put forth at the initiation of the negotiations, but they are things which, in the light of recent experience, the President wants our negotiators to discuss with the Soviet in return for some forthcoming on their part.

AIM IS TO STOP TESTS OR REDUCE U.S. LAG

Secretary RUSK. We have in mind that the experience since April, which has involved clandestine preparations and resumption of testing, would involve efforts to anticipate clandestine preparations. From a technical point of view, this is extremely complicated.

What we are really after is stopping the tests. At worst, presumably we would have to face the problem of a time lag between their breach of the treaty and our own testing, if we had to resume it. But to the extent that we can find ways and means of putting a brake on secret preparations, we want to do it in these negotiations in Geneva.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did we know that they were preparing for testing? You speak of these clandestine preparations. Did we have any knowledge of it?

Secretary RUSK. If I seem to hesitate on that, it is because, quite frankly, no one picked up the telephone and said to me, "They are preparing for testing." Here is another field in which considerable sophistication has—perhaps this should be off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

TRICKED INTO NEGOTIATIONS

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, I want to point to this question right now. I disagree about the fact that we took a licking in the last 3½-year period. It is true that the Soviets secretly pre-

pared for testing. It is equally true that we were also preparing for underground testing.

I have a letter in my file, and I wrote in June of last year, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Chairman of the Joint Committee—the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and you, Mr. Secretary, asking—because I was worried then. Senator Symington and others of us on this committee were concerned about it and argued about it. And I wrote and said it seems to me that we ought to be making preparations, that these discussions in Geneva are not going well, and they are undoubtedly going to break up.

The reply came back, "Yes, sir, we are making such preparations as we can, except insofar as the cables and the electronics, some of the electronics is concerned." Dr. Seaborg[7] came over to see me, brought over the information. Also there were newspaper stories that appeared, by the way, about some preparations that were underway.

My point is that I have heard—and I said yesterday to Mr. Foster—that we were tricked into 3½ years of negotiations. I asked this question, Mr. Secretary: Who was ahead during these 3½ years in nuclear technology, the Soviet Union or the United States?

Secretary RUSK. I think we have been all along.

Senator HUMPHREY. Were we ahead when they started testing?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, during the 3½ years of the moratorium, despite the trickery on the matter of preparations for tests, the Soviet lagged in technology, and we had the ascendancy, is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. Had we not developed a better weight-to-yield weapon than the Soviet Union? Wasn't this one of the advantages we had? In other words, that our weapon was smaller in sizes and weight, and produced greater yield?

Secretary RUSK. We had a much greater sophisticated combination of weapons of all types.

WERE WE SUCKED IN?

Senator HUMPHREY. Then it seems to me, as I said yesterday, that if I could find myself in a situation where I could hold an opposition at a disadvantage for 3 years, I would not think that I was being tricked; I would think that they were being tricked. I do not say that we were tricking anybody, because we had offered again and again, as was pointed out yesterday in the hearings, the treaties, the agreements, the Baruch Plan, half a dozen different proposals, to end this testing and to end this atomic race. But I believe that the American people are being told repeatedly that somehow or other we got sucked in. We did not get sucked in.

Senator SYMINGTON. I did. You might not have, but I did.

Senator HUMPHREY. I don't think we were sucked in at all. I think the fact that you—if you can be at a point where you are

---

[7]Glenn T. Seaborg, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

ahead, you can somehow stabilize that situation, that you are not being sucked in.

Senator SYMINGTON. What you are saying is it is unfair to be ahead of them.

Senator HUMPHREY. No, I say it is wonderful to be ahead of them. What I am saying is that it is grand to be ahead of them. If you can keep the other guy paralyzed while you are ahead, it is a decided advantage. Now, the fact of the matter is now they have tested and we must keep that lead.

WILL U.S. MAINTAIN LEAD?

Now, this is my final question to the Secretary.

Has anything happened in the Soviet tests that, as of this date, the 9th day of March, put the Soviet Union ahead of us in sophistication of weapons, variety of weapons, the weapon usable for either an offensive or defensive position?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, if you are talking about the total strategic nuclear situation, the answer is clearly no. But when you use the word "sophistication," I think you would have to ask Mr. Scoville or Dr. Seaborg, because there may be one or two points where what they have done is of an intriguing interest to us. I cannot honestly say I do not think in sophistication they have not picked up some things that we need to know more about.

Senator HUMPHREY. Right. But have they produced that weapon? It is one thing to have produced it in a test. It is another thing to have produced it on the assembly line.

Another way of putting it is if we engage in our tests, is there anything that would indicate to you that we could not maintain the lead we had before they had their test?

Secretary RUSK. That is the purpose of our tests; they would be to insure that we keep that gap, on the assumption that they are going to go ahead in any event with testing from here on out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I know these gentlemen have to go; I merely want to put in a nickle's worth here. I think there is no question we lost 3 years of superiority. They have narrowed this gap. We should be this far ahead of them right now, instead of this far ahead. I think we have lost time.

FUTURE CONSULTATIONS PROMISED

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, it is a quarter to twelve. We promised to let you get out in time for your appointment. We could go on, I think, possibly for a long time. We certainly wish you well in your venture.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say that we did not attempt today to cover everything that might come up in the next several weeks at Geneva. I tried to concentrate on the first 10-day period. But we will be in touch with the committee again and again as the situation over there develops.

Senator SPARKMAN. Will you be available when you get back?

Secretary RUSK. I would be delighted to come back.

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course, we would like, any time there is any turn in events, or developments—we would like very much to know about it.

Secretary RUSK. It is entirely possible Mr. Gromyko may bring something along in his satchel that will require consultation with the committee while I am still over there.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let us hope he has something worthwhile.

AN ACCURATE MEASURING STICK

Senator WILEY. Where did you get your measuring stick to be so sure that we, in the 3 years, did not lose our pants, so to speak? People are disturbed about that 3-year limit.

Mr. FOSTER. The judgment of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense.

Senator SPARKMAN. We are going to have the Atomic Energy Commission representative before the subcommittee.

Senator Wiley. There is nothing they can put their fingers on, so they have a measuring stick that gives you this result.

Secretary RUSK. There are some extremely reliable and accurate measuring sticks that work in this field.

Senator WILEY. It is a serious matter. I certainly do not want to be in the situation that we had at Pearl Harbor. We were so positive there was nothing to it.

U.S. WAS REMISS IN BEING UNPREPARED

Senator GORE. I hesitate to keep you one more moment, but just a word of caution, lest we go too far on this charge that they tricked us.

We had specifically withdrawn from the moratorium—President Eisenhower did that. The Russians had entered into no concert with us not to prepare for tests or not to resume tests. I think we were remiss in not preparing ourselves to resume at a moments notice. You might get yourself caught coming back on a lawyer's argument there.

Secretary RUSK. Off the record, please.

[Discussion off the record.]

DANGER OF CONTINUAL POSTPONEMENTS

Senator AIKEN. I have just come from the Atomic Energy Committee, having another briefing session—Mr. Foster's right-hand men and women. I got the impression in the short time I was there that there may be recommendations made to the President that he postpone the atmospheric tests, and perhaps postpone them again and again and again.

Secretary RUSK. You mean from executive department witnesses?

Senator AIKEN. I just got the impression there might be——

Secretary RUSK. I alluded to that, Senator, earlier. In terms of our attitude, we are not going to link the resumption of testing with any vague concept of "progress" at Geneva. What the President said in his Friday speech was, "If you sign by mid-April, this

is one thing; if you do not, we test." I am sure that we are going to have proposals from various parts of the world.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. "If you sign by mid-April," that is the term that worries me. If they sign an implement by mid-April.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Foster pointed out——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I raised that question several times. The Russians will say, "Okay, we will sign this thing. Now let's sit down and talk about if for another two years." And that is the trap we could—I don't think we will—I think I have ample reliable assurance that we are not going to do that. But that is the consistent danger, and there is a great volume of influence around here to do that very thing. If they sign up, we go on and talk. I think that would be the most fatal thing we could possibly do.

U.S. NEGOTIATORS ARE NOT NAIVE

Senator WILEY. You have not changed your mind—you cannot trust them; is that it?

Secretary RUSK. I do not want to discourage my colleague on my left here, but I got my first inoculations in this disarmament field in 1945, 1946, and 1957. I feel this is where I came in about 15 years ago. We tried hard after World War II to get somewhere in this field. We were not able to do it, for reasons you gentlemen fully understand. But I think we are fully alert to the important point Senator Hickenlooper made, and I do not think we are going to be led down the garden path on this.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I respectfully say I was associated with you in a very minor way in this effort—with the Baruch Plan, when this Government offered a complete partnership, and they refused it and called it atomic blackmail.

COMMITTEE'S SCHEDULE

Senator SPARKMAN. Again, thank you very much.

Just a minute before we adjourn. Tuesday—I think Senator Fulbright will be back then—but there has been sent down the program for the Peace Corps. We consider that on Tuesday.

Senator AIKEN. Open hearings?

Mr. MARCY. Yes; Mr. Shriver will be up at 10 o'clock.

Senator SPARKMAN. That will be over in the new office building. Notices have already gone out to you this morning, but I just thought I would call your attention to it.

The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m. the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MARCH 13, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 9:40 a.m., in room 4219, New Senate Office Building.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Dodd and Capehart. Senator Fulbright and Senator Carlson also attended.

The subcommittee discussed procedural questions in connection with future hearings on the Congo situation.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee then adjourned at 10 a.m.]

BRIEFING BY ATTORNEY GENERAL ON HIS RECENT WORLD TRIP

[Editor's Note.—During the month of February, 1962, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy made a round-the-world goodwill tour, stopping in Japan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaya, South Vietnam, Thailand, Lebanon, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and France. As brother of the President, he drew much press and public attention, met with top government officials, and faced considerable heckling. On his return, Kennedy met with the President, Vice President and Secretary of State on February 28, to brief them on the trip, and then met with the Foreign Relations Committee.]

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Symington, Aiken, and Capehart.

Also present: Senators Cooper of Kentucky, Smith of Massachusetts, Yarborough of Texas, Cannon of Nevada, Bush of Connecticut and Neuberger of Oregon.

Mr. Marcy of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased this morning to have the Attorney General who recently has had a very interesting experience abroad. We don't often have the privilege of having the Attorney General here. We don't deal with many legal problems, as you know, and we will be very pleased to have you.

We do have such things as the Connally amendment and the Genocide Convention and passport problems before us.

We followed with much interest your trip. Last year, as you know, the Vice President after his trip around the world, to various places, gave us the benefit of his experiences, and I thought it would be very useful to have anything that you wished to give the committee on the record.

The others will come in, I am sure, so just proceed in your own way, if you will.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT F. KENNEDY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your writing me and making this opportunity available to me.

48-688 O—86——11

I went to Japan for 6 days, stopped off in Hong Kong for a day and a half, went to Indonesia for about a week, and to Thailand, and then went to Berlin for a few days, and then for a day in the Hague.

I came back concentrating particularly on the Far East. I came back extremely encouraged with what I found. I spent a great deal of time with students and labor leaders and young people generally in both Japan and Indonesia. Although I found that all of these people have great questions about the United States and unbelievable misconceptions about what we are doing here in this country, how our system of government works and what our people are actually like, there is a very warm feeling toward this country and the American people by youngsters and by intellectuals.

Before I went, I think I had accepted the idea that the university students, the professors, and the intellectuals were anti-United States and perhaps pro-Communist. I don't think that is the situation at all. I think there is a great warmth toward our country, although there are all of these questions that they are waiting for answers.

I think the crucial time is over the period of the next 10 years. I think there is a great potential there, but I think that it is a potential that has to be met. There is a great deal of work that needs to be done and a great deal of effort that needs to be made, but doesn't mean the expenditures of sums of money, but efforts in other areas which I would like to get into in a few moments.

VISIT TO JAPAN

I went to Japan originally, the President and I had visited Japan in 1951. He was a Congressman and he took his brother and his sister and we were pretty far down on the list, but we were met by an older Japanese man—I don't know how we came in contact with him originally—by the name of Mr. Hosono, who has always been very much interested in Japanese-American friendship.

He met us at the plane and took us under his wing and showed us around and corresponded with us continually. He found the captain of the destroyer that sank the famous PT boat 109 and evidenced an active interest in my brother so much that the President asked him to the inauguration and had him come up at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. What was his name?

Mr. KENNEDY. H-o-s-o-n-o. He came by and spoke to me about coming to Japan and then he went to see Ambassador [Edwin] Reischauer, when Ambassador Reischauer was here in the springtime, and he spoke to me about coming, feeling that an effort in an informal manner made about some of the university students, with some of the labor leaders, by a representative of the United States could be very helpful.

The Attorney General of Indonesia came here to see me when he was here in the spring and he spoke to me about coming. He said, "Won't you come to Indonesia sometime?" And I said, "I would be glad to," figuring it would disappear, but he remembered it and he made a real effort, and we had never had anybody who has gone from the the executive branch of the Government to Indonesia.

Khrushchev had gone there and spent 2 weeks, other important Russians have been there and, of course, a number of the Chinese had been there, but nobody from the United States went and so the State Department thought it would be advisable if I went both to Japan and Indonesia and concentrated on those two areas.

JAPAN'S ACTIVE ECONOMY

My impressions in Japan are that, as all of you know, of course, it has a very viable, active economy and people, extremely impressive. They have 99 percent literacy. They are going to pass England in the number of television sets, be second only to the United States by next year. They have an immense interest in their own affairs, an immense interest in the affairs of the United States and the world situation generally. They ask all the way down the line extremely intelligent and bright questions. Their papers have circulations of 2, 3, 4 and up to 7 million a day, and they read them avidly.

The three basic matters they asked about always are Okinawa, trade—and particularly in trade we got into textiles, which was a very emotional question with them, and the other part of trade that they were very concerned about was fertilizer and what was going to happen as far as that was concerned—then testing.

I think that, at least all the government officials with whom I talked were pretty much—had pretty much come to the conclusion by that time we were going to test. They indicated that although they could never say so publicly, they understood our position that if the President and the Government of the United States felt that it was necessary to test, that they would accept that, although, of course, they couldn't indicate that publicly.

The issue that really was most emotional and which people felt most strongly and which the Communists had talked about most has been Okinawa.

INTENSITY OF FEELING ABOUT OKINAWA

I was surprised at the intensity of the feeling about Okinawa. I think they have some strong points, which I have reported to the President.

This matter was taken up by Prime Minister [Hayato] Ikeda, with the President when he was here. The President sent a commission to Okinawa to study the situation and see if it couldn't be improved.

The citizens on Okinawa have very few civil rights, and they are not allowed to associate with labor organizations. The efforts in the field of justice are inadequate, and in many other areas their rights have been ignored. There is much that can be done. Except for the Communists, nobody is asking for the return of Okinawa to Japan. They are asking just for a situation to be remedied, that the lot of the people on Okinawa, the Japanese particularly, should be improved. I believe that the President, based on the recommendation of the commission that went out to Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands, is going to make some recommendations over the period of the next 4 or 5 days in areas where the situation can be improved.

RECEPTION AT JAPANESE UNIVERSITIES

I spoke at a number of the universities. I spoke at Nihon University, and the student body were extremely enthusiastic. There wasn't any question period afterwards. It was a formal affair and I received a degree there. The student body, there were about 10,000 or more, were extremely enthusiastic to me as a representative of the United States.

That same day I went to Waseda University, and there was where the riot occurred. I think there were a good number of lessons that come out of that, and to me it got to the core of the problem that we have with students and intellectuals and with the Communists generally in these areas.

In the first place, when I arrived at Waseda University there were about 3,000 students outside the university and they mobbed the car. They treated my wife, myself and the other Americans as if we had just won the last game of the season, and that we were the heroes of the campus. I had never seen such enthusiasm.

We went inside; there were about 3,000 students in the hall that seated about 2,000. Again, the response was most enthusiastic. I started to speak and found that out of, maybe, 3,000, there were approximately 100 Communists, and they had come early and filled most of the front rows, and then they were spotted strategically around the hall. Then they started to yell, and every time I started to speak, they started to holler.

Well, in that kind of a situation, you just can't get anywhere, because when they started to holler, somebody would holler back at them—to shut up, I expect. After 2 or 3 minutes the whole place was just chaos, and I didn't know whether they were yelling language, "The Attorney General," or "Let's get him," or "Hurray for the United States."

There is a tradition in most of these universities that the college authorities will do nothing, that this is a student function, and the university authorities shouldn't interfere with them. So the result is they didn't do anything and so I was left up there, not speaking Japanese, and with a very good interpreter but hardly in a position to quiet this kind of a group. It was suggested by some of the authorities that I leave.

DEALING WITH THE DISRUPTION

I thought if I left then that any time I ever attempted to speak, either in Japan or Indonesia or afterwards, they would figure that just sending in 50 or 100 people, 1 or 2 percent, they could disrupt the meeting. Therefore, if I left at that moment, I would never get anyplace in any future stay and future efforts.

There was one fellow who was particularly loud, and I asked him up on the stage to ask his question. I said I was there to answer questions, and if he had some questions I would be glad to answer them.

He made a speech for 7 or 8 minutes, not really much of a question but a long tirade against the United States. Then I got the microphone and it went dead. I tried to speak without the microphone and that was unsuccessful. Some enterprising member of our

party went down in the basement and found a battery-run microphone and brought that up, and I spoke for 7 or 8 minutes.

Then we had some more questions. It was not terribly satisfactory.

However, the point did get across to the rest of the students—who were not pro-United States but at least the vast majority wanted to come and hear a representative of the United States, and the vast majority or a good number of them had questions that they wanted answered—that this group, a very small group, was ready, able, and willing to disrupt the affair, that they didn't want to hear any representative of the United States, and they didn't want to have any questions answered. They just wanted to cause chaos.

I think that we got through with it satisfactorily. It was in view of the fact that the riots they had had with Mr. Hagerty [1] a couple of years ago when there had been a good deal of soul-searching, that, to have this kind of disruption which was all on live television, the whole affair, also made them do a good deal of soul-searching as to whether this was the best way to proceed, and whether the university authorities and the university students shouldn't exercise a little bit more control.

DEMOCRACY IS NOT A LICENSE

I spoke to them about the fact that democracy and liberty are not a license; that under our system and under the system that had been practiced by the Japanese over the last 15 years, opposition and contrary viewpoints were welcomed but also it had to be done in a disciplined fashion; that I thought that in the United States a Communist could get up and speak. Anybody who opposed the U.S. Government could get up and speak, and that was the same as far as Japan—we welcomed this, and this was the great difference between our system and the system in Communist China or the Soviet Union, and that this kind of an affair where students opposed the existing government could never take place as it happened in Waseda University; also, as I had been asked to speak, that perhaps the opportunity should have been presented.

At the end, or what brought about the end, a man got up in the back with an extremely loud voice and rushed to the stage. I had the feeling that maybe this was the end of me also, and he got up to sing the Waseda school song and led all the student body in a very stirring rendition, punched my wife in the stomach while he was doing it, and then we left. The students then broke all the chairs in the hall and then left.

The point of this meeting, as far as I was concerned, was the fact that you have 1 or 2 percent of the university who could disrupt the meeting; who could capture headlines around the world; who could indicate to the world, to the United States, where some bad feeling might be built up; that could leave the impression once again that students are not interested in the United States, are not interested in the democratic way of life, and are pro-Communist.

---

[1] President Eisenhower's Press Secretary, James Hagerty.

MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES

As I said, that is just not true. They have students generally and intellectuals and labor leaders who have tremendous misconceptions about the United States. This is not just true of Japan, but Indonesia also.

For instance, I was talking to a head of the biggest labor organization in Japan, which is closely associated with the left wing socialists. I asked him if he agreed with the comment that had been made by the head of the left wing socialists who had gone to China just a short while before and had said that the great danger to the world was American imperialism; whether he thought the United States were imperialists. He said he thought the United States—and this is a very bright, able, articulate fellow, not a Communist—he said he thought the United States was imperialistic, that the United States was dominated and controlled by the Morgan Bank and by the Rockefellers.

I asked him how he could explain Arthur Goldberg, Secretary of Labor, and how the labor organizations would back the present President of the United States if this were true. He said, "You have some good people, but it is imperialistic. It is not imperialistic in the old-fashioned sense, but it is economically imperialistic."

I said, "Now, do you call the Soviet Union and Communist China imperialistic, after what Communist China did in Tibet or what the Soviet Union did in Hungary?"

He said, "No, we don't." He didn't feel they were imperialist. I said, "How can you say we are, when they use guns and bullets and shoot people, they are not imperialist?"

"MONOPOLISTIC CAPITALISM"

Unbelievable as it is, it never seemed to have occurred to him. He never had considered or thought about it. I asked him if he would come to the United States to find out what kind of system of government, what kind of way of life we have here.

I kept hearing the phrase "monopolistic capitalism." When I was in Indonesia, a boy got up and I found out later he was the head of the Communist Party in the University at Jakarta. He said, "monopolistic capitalism," and half the student body applauded at the use of the phrase and laughed. I said to him, "What do you mean by that? What is there in the United States that you disagree with?" And he went and sat down.

I said, "Anybody here who applauded and thought that was a correct appraisal of the United States, what is it that is happening in the United States that meets that definition, and what is it that you disagree with in our country?" Not one of them would come forward although they had all accepted this phraseology describing the United States.

I said, "We have a lot of things wrong in our country. We have our race problems and we have our difficulties of unemployment. We have our problems with juvenile delinquency and we have other difficulties, but we are trying to meet them as a people and trying to meet them with the support of the Government, whether it be Republican or Democrat. We are not saying we are faultless. But here you are being educated and having the great advantage of

education and yet don't know really anything and have accepted the slogans that have been in vogue 100 years. Something further is required of you as students."

I had this happen continuously in every area to which I spoke.

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE

My explanation, and the conclusion that I reached, as to why there are these misconceptions is, first, that the one group in all of these countries which is vocal, which knows exactly what it wants, knows exactly where it is heading, and has a very firm and strong discipline is the Communist Party. Any issue that comes up or any question that comes up, they know exactly in what direction they are going. So there can't be any falling away, for their disciplined cadres are giving out the party line continuously. They can play on the differences between the United States' position and their local government's position.

In Japan they could play on Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands. They don't mention anything about the Sakhalin or the fact that the Russians are occupying certain parts of Japan also. They can play on the trade question and the fact that there have been discussions over here as to what we are going to do to protect our textile industry.

In the country of Indonesia they can play on the fact that China and the Soviet Union are strongly backing Indonesia on the question of West New Guinea or New Irian. They say the United States is associated with the Dutch, and they give this stuff out continuously. While they give out this stuff they can talk about other matters. They give out all this information about the United States, and there is really not anybody there who can come in and answer the fundamental questions about our country.

THE CHARACTER OF THE UNITED STATES

They know we made great material gains here in the United States and they know we are a very powerful country and they know that economically we are strong, but they don't really know anything about the character of the United States. They don't know anything about our charitable organizations or the fact that citizens help one another in our various communities or various cities. They don't know anything about our foundations. They don't know anything about the fact that it is a country that believes in religion.

I talked to a group of student leaders, youth leaders, in Indonesia just before I left, and I talked about the United States' position on West New Guinea probably a dozen times. There were about 30 of them and they came to the palace. I said, "I would be glad to talk about the United States' position in West New Guinea," but I thought maybe they would want to get into some other issues before I departed, because I had talked so much and made the U.S. position clear.

Thirty of them indicated they wanted to talk about West New Guinea. I talked to them that we hoped the matter would be resolved peacefully, that the Dutch were ready to get out of West New Guinea, and there was a question of allowing the Papuans

also having a say in their own future and working out the details, but we hoped the two parties, Indonesia and the Dutch, would sit down and try to resolve this matter peacefully among themselves.

OPPOSITION TO COLONIALISM

The spokesman for the group, who was in his thirties, went into a long tirade about the fact that we didn't take a position, and this showed we were for colonialism; that colonialism was amoral, therefore we were amoral; and we backed colonialism, and how do we explain it. He just wanted to get into that and he said, "We are against colonialism of any kind." I said, "I don't agree with you as to your assessments of the U.S. position at this time, but if you are against colonialism as practiced by the Soviet Union in Southeastern Europe—are you against colonialism in Latvia and Lithuania and Hungary; are you against colonialism of the Chinese in Tibet?

And this fellow said, "As far as we know the Russians didn't do anything wrong in Hungary and as far as we know the Chinese didn't do anything wrong in Tibet." This had full support, everything that was done—there was a small group in Hungary who tried to take over, militarists who tried to take over the government, and the Russians came in and saved the people, and they have elections there, and the Communists are strongly supported. Nobody opposed this point of view.

I said, "If that is true, why did they have to put the wall up in Berlin? If this is so strongly supported, this system of government, why is it that they had to erect a wall to keep their people in for the first time in the history of mankind, not to keep bandits and marauders out, but to keep the people in?" And the fellow said to me, "We don't want to get into details; let's go on into other matters and discuss West New Guinea."

INTIMIDATION

Afterwards—which was the most significant part of it—I met with five or six of these students. I went in to pack, and five or six of them stayed around and they started talking. They were friendly and entirely different from the 30. They indicated to me, and also to some of the American newspaper men who were with me, that they thought the position on Southeast Europe and on Poland and on Berlin was absolutely correct. We said to them, "Why didn't you say anything at the meeting?" And they said, "Well, you can't do that. In our group, in our circle, you can't mention those kinds of things." The problem once again goes back to this other point, that they have been intimidated. They have the strong group—articulate, bright, and gutsy—the Communists, who are giving out these facts all the time. They just have been intimidated so they don't dare oppose them, so the other point of view is never given by the student.

I spoke at the University of Jakarta. I walked in and the place was surrounded by troops because they didn't want to have any trouble. A kid came 8 feet from me, wound up like Bobby Feller, and threw either a hard piece of fruit or a rock or a hard-boiled egg right in my face. Well, it was a cowardly act in one way, because I couldn't possibly defend myself; but in the other way, the

other side of looking at it, it was courageous, because he knew he was going to get arrested immediately but he was willing to risk all that because he wanted to show how he thought about the United States.

NEED FOR AMERICANS TO TALK ABROAD

My judgment, just summarizing at least that part of the world, and as far as this group is concerned, I would say, I think any efforts that we could make to bring labor leaders to the United States and have some of our younger labor leaders and heads of some of our locals go into these areas, the bright, articulate ones who are actually helping the unions at the present time and are working at it, would be very helpful because I think the labor movement is terribly important in all these areas.

If we could send Members of the Senate, Members of the House of Representatives, and the executive branch of the Government and some of our governors and some people from our local governments, periodically to these countries to lecture at the universities, to go for the purpose of making talks, to go not just to talk about democracy in the United States, but to go and talk about history, culture, philosophy, maybe even some more practical matters, that they would go and give a lecture for 30 minutes and then be available to answer questions for maybe another 20 or 30 minutes and then plan to meet with smaller groups, students, so that they would be available to answer questions—I think that could be extremely important. When Members of the Senate, for instance, go around the world, if they would also see if they couldn't go and make arrangements to speak at these universities and make a definite effort to meet with smaller groups of students to discuss a lot of these matters, I think it could be extremely important.

Second, send some of our professors; send some of our writers. For instance, I think if Walter Lippmann could go into Indonesia or Japan or Thailand and plan to spend 3 weeks there, go to the universities and even go to the high schools, and talk to the students, and speak on any one of many subjects, I think it would make a tremendous difference.

EVALUATION OF SUKARNO

I might just say a little bit on what efforts were so far as Sukarno is concerned. Those efforts were aimed at trying to get the Indonesians and the Dutch to sit down and discuss West New Guinea. I feel, of course, the government feels that this matter can be resolved peacefully.

The Chinese and the Communists are making a major effort to get the Indonesians to go to war and go to war immediately.

They realize that the United States could not back that kind of an effort, and the Chinese and the Russians would back it, and they would become more forcibly entrenched in Indonesia.

I found a good deal of strong feeling toward the West and toward the United States amongst the government officials in Indonesia. The head of the military forces, who is very bright, is very pro this country; Foreign Minister Subandrio is a very bright, articulate fellow and also, at least as he talked to me, was strongly for our

country. In fact, all of the ones with whom I talked realized that Indonesia was in great difficulty financially and economically; that not enough had been done. They are of the feeling if the West New Guinea matter can be resolved that many of these financial problems that are facing them can also be resolved.

Sukarno was a fine revolutionary leader but he hasn't done anything for his country since that time. They have tremendous potential which has just not been realized.

If there are some guarantees that could be given to Western businessmen to go in business with the Indonesians, that could be done for that country. I would hope if the West New Guinea matter is resolved, that the Dutch would make efforts to open up Indonesia to a closer relationship with the West.

The changes that were made in the Indonesian Cabinet last week were changes in the direction of individuals who are far more pro-West and anti-Communist, which, I think, is helpful. But I think Sukarno is an unreliable individual, and I think it is impossible to know in what direction he is ultimately going to go. I think that there is a great potential in Indonesia, and I think a lot of it is going to turn on getting this matter of West New Guinea solved peacefully.

AN INSPIRING VISIT TO BERLIN

Berlin was the most inspiring and moving part of the trip.

We arrived in about 25 degrees, and it was snowing. There were about 100,000 people on the roads going in, and in the square where Brandt and I spoke there were about 150,000 people who had stood in the cold and waited.

The people there—having been involved in political campaigns and gone through Japan and seen people wave there, and Indonesia and some of these other countries—the people in Berlin wave and react entirely differently. They are attempting to not just show friendliness and affection, but attempting to get over a message. The message is quite clearly that they are relying completely on the United States and realize that if it wasn't for the United States, they would just not exist. They had representatives of England and France who were important people who have come to Berlin, to whom nobody has paid the slightest attention.

They pay attention to a representative of the United States, because they realize that they would not exist if it wasn't for our country. They came out in such large numbers because they wanted to indicate to me, to the American people through me, that they are depending on this country. It was extremely inspiring.

I went, of course, to the wall. I saw the places where people had jumped out of their windows to escape communism, some of whom had been killed. The windows are now all walled in.

As we drove along the wall some of the people from East Berlin, despite great personal risk to themselves, leaned out of their windows and waved. We met some young students at the University of Berlin who go across from West Berlin over through the sewers and bring fellow students, parents and relatives out from East Berlin.

Just to show you the kind of interest, we were scheduled to go to a market one morning and because of the schedule it was cancelled, and I said I would go back at 5 o'clock that afternoon. We made our plans about 2 o'clock to go back at 5 o'clock, and when we arrived there were at least 20,000 people outside in the streets, who sang. I was very inspired by that, and by the courage of the people, and the students of the Free University of Berlin.

BRING NEW COMPANIES TO BERLIN

They have full employment in West Berlin, but any efforts that could be made to bring new companies into Berlin—not necessarily on a large scale, but, for instance, if the Ford Motor Company or General Motors would be willing to set up a small factory in West Berlin employing maybe 80 to 120 people, this would be an indication of our commitment and our interest in remaining there. The State Department is making some efforts along those lines, as is General Clay,[2] and I think that could symbolically be most important.

The morale of the people of West Berlin is high, and there is not the concern, except the natural concern—the same concern as there was at the time of Vice President Johnson's visit last August. They had become nervous but they are now pretty well convinced that the United States is going to meet its commitments. The population has been coming into West Berlin rather than leaving West Berlin, but they all admit if there was ever an indication that we would not stand up there would be a great flux out of West Berlin to West Germany.

TALK WITH ADENAUER

I had a long talk with Chancellor [Konrad] Adenauer. He is concerned about the lack of participation of the French in all of these discussions. He feels that the negotiations in Moscow are not productive but he thinks they are well worthwhile.

The CHAIRMAN. Moscow or Geneva?

Mr. KENNEDY. Moscow; this was before Geneva.

He thinks that all those efforts that have been made are worthwhile, although not productive.

He was convinced in his own association with the Soviet Union and the Russian leaders that they are concerned that perhaps the West, and particularly the United States, still has an interest in making war against them, and any of these efforts to indicate that we are trying to find a solution to these problems is worth the effort. He was strongly in favor of it.

He is concerned, as I said, about de Gaulle. He feels his relationship with de Gaulle is extremely good, but that he can't understand de Gaulle's position at the present time.

FRENCH MISUNDERSTANDING OF U.S.

Adenauer said that the misunderstanding so far as France and the United States is concerned goes back to 1958. He had a meeting

[2] Gen. Lucius D. Clay, President Kennedy's personal representative to West Berlin.

with President Eisenhower in the office, the same place where I met with him. At that time a question of censure of France on the Algeria question was up before the United Nations, and it was a question of how the United States would vote.

He at that time expressed de Gaulle's concern to President Eisenhower, and asked President Eisenhower if the United States would vote against the censure. President Eisenhower said they would, and he said, "Can I tell de Gaulle?" Eisenhower said that he could, so he called de Gaulle and said they would vote against the censure, and then when the censure came up the United States abstained.

The censure was defeated by one vote but de Gaulle has always held if the United States had voted against it, it would have been different; that many more votes would have defeated it and it would have solved the problem in Algiers. He feels that this is something which indicates the lack of understanding by the United States generally in French problems.

DE GAULLE'S ATTITUDE ON MOSCOW CONFERENCE

I talked to de Gaulle and he said that the conferences in Moscow, in his judgment, were worthless. He thought it was a great mistake going.

He said, "When the Russians stop threatening us, thank all of us, that is when we should meet." He was prepared to meet at that time but believed that to have conferences under these circumstances was a great error.

He said the reason he felt it was such a strong error was because it was causing so much concern amongst the Germans and that the Germans were apt to, and were having, tremendous second thoughts as to what was going on in Moscow and they were strongly against having these meetings. So I then said to him that I just talked to Chancellor Adenauer and he said he thought these meetings were very worthwhile and extremely important and should continue. De Gaulle said, "Well, we don't want to get into a long discussion about this matter."

THE DUTCH ON INDONESIA

I saw Mr. Luns [3] and some of the leaders in Holland. They were, at the initial meetings, very adamant and gave long lectures about the perfidy of the Indonesians on the question of West New Guinea. We had exchanges back and forth, and it was not very promising.

Luns, when I was in Paris, came to see me one night and said that they had changed their position and that they were willing to sit down with the Indonesians and have discussions to try to resolve the West New Guinea matter. I think that is about to go forward within the next week or so.

That is a general summary, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very interesting account.

I will ask just one or two questions in order to get other members to ask questions.

---

[3] Prime Minister Joseph M. A.H. Luns of the Netherlands.

AMBASSADOR REISCHAUER

I wonder how would you evaluate our Ambassador to Japan? I know he is a very competent man.

Mr. KENNEDY. I would say he is outstanding. In the first place, the ability to speak Japanese, of course, is a tremendous asset.

Second, he knows more about Japanese culture and Japanese history than, I guess, anybody in Japan. He is invited around, therefore, to the universities, not to talk about the United States but to talk on these matters. Then they have question periods and he can naturally get into other questions, which is a tremendous advantage.

He is making a major effort to see people in all walks of life and making a major effort to get in touch with opposition people. Yet, where the conservatives have had very strong reservations about him at the beginning, and about his being sent there because from his reputation they thought he was too far to the left, they quite openly admitted to me they feel very strongly about him now. They feel he really has made a major difference.

I think that a major factor and a different viewpoint of Japan and the Japanese people toward the United States now than what it was 18 month ago is largely due to Ambasssador Reischauer and his wife. She is very attractive and makes a major effort. I couldn't be higher on both of them.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a matter of very great importance to this committee. I think you are familiar with the fact that this committee, when Senator [Theodore F.] Green was chairman, sought to induce the State Department to be more discriminating in its selection of ambassadors. This was one we felt was sort of a test case because he was objected to, as you pointed out.

And I think the committee still feels that this is very important in all these cases.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We hope that we can gradually improve the quality of them.

Senator Sparkman?

RELINQUISHING U.S. CONTROL OF OKINAWA

Senator SPARKMAN. I have just a couple of questions. The question of Okinawa is the matter of administrative control of the island, isn't it?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did I understand you correctly to say that you thought that we were moving toward—I have seen in the press recently that there were going to be discussions relating to this.

Do you think we are approaching the time when we will be willing to relinquish administrative control?

Mr. KENNEDY. I don't think that, but I think the President is considering an executive order which will put more authority in the hands of civilians. The military control the island completely now, and I think that it is his judgment that perhaps that should remain, but the civil administrator, for instance, could be a civilian rather than two military men at the top. That would be a step forward. They should make some allowances—for instance, one of the

labor organizations in Japan is communistic and the other is pro West and pro our system.

No labor organizations can go in and organize. It probably would be advisable to allow some labor organizations to go in there at this time and perhaps make some selection of which one you wanted, rather than just leave it wide open.

The limitation of the amount of money we spend in Okinawa is $6 or $7 million. Obviously much more is needed. The Japanese are willing to put in more money, and it is perhaps advisable if the United States spends more money to help and assist the people in Okinawa.

There are things that need to be done so far as education is concerned. There are steps that could be taken to permit the local legislature to have more say in the governing affairs of these islands. I think it is steps along that direction, without relinquishing our control over the Ryukyus which are, of course, very important in our defense posture.

QUESTION OF TESTING

Senator SPARKMAN. With reference to this question of testing, you remarked that was one of the principal things in which the Japanese were interested.

Did you hear anything about it in other countries; was it brought up?

Mr. KENNEDY. No, not very much. In fact, it wasn't in Indonesia; 65 percent of the questions in Indonesia were on the West Irian matter. It wasn't, I think other than Japan, it was not—other than Japan, no.

Senator SPARKMAN. We have been told that the sentiment in most of the countries of the world is based upon editorials, and the best sounding that can be made is that it was quite understanding of the United States' position on testing.

Would you be able to express an opinion on that?

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, I would say——

Senator SPARKMAN [continuing]. In areas where you were?

Mr. KENNEDY. My impressions would be the same, without having seen that. My judgment would be that there is a good deal of understanding about the United States' position. I think—and just impressed upon me again and again—that what impresses these people to a tremendous extent is the power, the position of the United States, whether it be West Berlin or Indonesia. For instance, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia said to me, "I would have to deny it if it were made public"—if we ever moved the 7th Fleet—"that would be the end of Indonesia." But you know how that is.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

By the way, let me say that I saw the television review of your trip, and I thought it was wonderful exhibition. I saw, for instance, where you invited this Japanese leader to come up to the stand; I saw the meetings in Indonesia, if I remember correctly, where you met with the students there. I was greatly impressed with it and I congratulate you.

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Vermont.

PROMOTING RIOTS

Senator AIKEN. Did you hear any reference, particularly in Asia, to the schedule of payments to riot leaders; in other words, has the business of promoting riots and revolutions become commercialized?

Mr. KENNEDY. I think it is understood that at least in Japan, and I gathered the same impression in Indonesia, that the Soviet Union supports and finances all of these operations of the Communist Party. The riots that occurred toward the Hagerty visit, the placards, and all of these things are financed. The Communist Party is financed in Japan by the Soviet Union, or at least the funds come from outside sources.

Again, I was impressed with the fact that a good number of those people who participated in the riots were not Communists by any means.

Senator AIKEN. It's become quite commercial, and I think it is true in Latin America, too.

Mr. KENNEDY. Latin America?

Senator AIKEN. They have a schedule in Caracas. I was told they were given a good meal afterwards, that was the price they paid there. When they got to Japan, the rates were much higher.

Senator SPARKMAN. In Japan they were given lunch and pay, I don't know how much it was.

Senator AIKEN. A definite bonus. It seems to me that not all the rioting is due to devotion to an ideology, but also a means to earn a decent living. I didn't know whether you heard it; if it was understood or not.

Mr. KENNEDY. I went to a steel mill from which a good number of these rioters came, which was just a couple of blocks from where the Hagerty riots took place. They had about six pickets, Communist pickets, and the enthusiasm and the interest in the United States was fantastic.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. KENNEDY. It was. I think they will have a tougher time.

Senator AIKEN. I agree that 1 percent of the people, particularly if they have a little financial incentive, can raise hob with the other 99.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Oregon.

TALKS WITH DE GAULLE

Senator MORSE. Mr. Attorney General, I want to tell you what I have said many places elsewhere, that I think this trip of yours was a very great service to this country in creating a better understanding of American foreign policy generally, not only in the parts of the world you visited but in other parts of the world that took note of your visitations as to where you did go. I think we are all indebted to you for it.

I have two questions: Did you by any chance check with de Gaulle, in your conversation with him, concerning what Adenauer told you about our position in regard to the Algerian matter, to

find out whether or not he was as concerned as Adenauer has said; if it was a fact that he had been led to believe that we were going to vote with him and finally abstained?

Mr. KENNEDY. I did not.

ATTITUDES CONCERNING U.S. POSITION IN VIETNAM

Senator MORSE. Did you, in any of your conversations in Southeast Asia, pick up any information which you think would be of interest to this committee in regard to the attitude over there concerning our position on South Vietnam?

Mr. KENNEDY. Of course, they were particularly concerned in Thailand, and I had a long talk with Prime Minister Sarit.

I think the efforts that have been made in the last 6 or 7 weeks in South Vietnam have greatly reinforced the confidence that Thailand has in the United States. They have been very concerned about our position in Laos. They were against our efforts and even, as he said to me, they have less than full confidence in Souvanna Phouma, but he feels that now we have no other direction in which to go, that any kind of military action there would be unsatisfactory and unsuccessful.

But he spoke technically about the efforts that were being made in Vietnam. He felt that the same kind of efforts, if they had been made in Laos many months ago, would have been made a difference, but that this has strengthened their viewpoint, and the fact that the United States and some of the other countries are going, if they get into difficulties, to stand by them.

EFFECTIVENESS OF SEATO

They were very concerned, Senator—and in fact I met with the Secretary General of SEATO—about whether SEATO was a really effective organization or whether the fact that one country could virtually veto the efforts of the other countries to try to take some steps, whether it made it virtually a sham organization. I said to him, on the instructions of the State Department, that we considered under SEATO and under the treaty that we had an individual obligation and responsibility to each country, and that therefore we had individual responsibility to Thailand as we had to Vietnam; that there had to be indications, obviously, that the country was willing to take some steps itself, going to make some efforts itself, and had some courage and was going to stand up.

We had found that in Vietnam and therefore we were making an effort. In Laos that hadn't been true and so the situation was different, but we were confident that it was true in Thailand.

I think there is going to be great difficulty in Thailand, in the northeast part of it. The financial steps have not been taken to the extent that they should be taken, and I hope that that is changed.

No. 2, the efforts on the border police are just beginning, and that has to be stepped up. No. 3, the efforts made on non-conventional warfare; guerrilla warfare, to be prepared for any guerrillas that come across from Laos over the 1,000-mile border—a greater effort has to be made there. I don't think there was the awareness of the necessity, at least by some of the top officials, but they indicated at the end that they were going to take many other steps.

The Foreign Minister has been here, as you know, in the last week, and met with Mr. McNamara and others, and I think they will be taking steps in that direction.

ACCEPTABILITY OF DIEM

Senator MORSE. I think there is one thing that concerns us on this committee, Mr. Attorney General, and that is the acceptability or non-acceptability of Diem in that part of the world. What do they think about his administration?

We get very conflicting reports about the type of administration he is running in South Vietnam, and that raises the question as to whether or not there is any other place we can go but to support him. It also raises the question as to whether or not we are not going to end up once more having given support to a leader in a country which ultimately found himself out of favor with the mass of his people. We are disturbed about the Paris Group, for example, which is a non-Communist group, but which refuses to accept him. We are disturbed about this University of Michigan group withdrawing from South Vietnam, and very critical of the kind of administration that he is administering.

My question is this: Do you think we have some increasing evidence now that he is going to take account of these criticisms and recognize that he has a responsibility to us to keep us in a position where we can justify supporting him in the eyes of other parts of the world?

Mr. KENNEDY. I really am not in a position to say. I just stopped in Vietnam. I can just talk to you about what the reaction was in Thailand, Senator. I am not really an expert on that; I don't have any other knowledge other than I am aware of those facts but I wouldn't have any first-hand information.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Indiana.

SIMILAR EXPERIENCES

Senator CAPEHART. I don't have any questions but I would like to say that I think your experiences and observations generally speaking, are the same as many of us have had over a period of 20 years in which we have been traveling and dealing with this.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Missouri.

Senator SYMINGTON. I can't imagine anything better for this country than the trip that you have just made. It is wonderful, and it is absolutely vital. As you know, I made a trip last fall and reported to the President that for the first time in 12 trips in 15 years, everybody abroad is questioning our intentions and a great many people are questioning our capabilities. If we don't do things like what you have done and get off this self-satisfied kick over here, I think that people are going to start questioning our capabilities more and more. In that lies the essence of losing our friends.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. We still have a few friends left. Would you agree to that?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, I would, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. I congratulate you. I think it is absolutely magnificent, the whole thing, the way you have done it, the way you and your wife handled yourselves, it is just great. If we have a few more things like that and a few more flights like [John] Glenn's, then we are going to begin to see some real hope. Frankly, I was getting nervous about some of this.

LECTURES ABROAD

I would like to ask one question. I don't think it is a question of whether more people should go—you can't spend your time traveling and other people can't—I just think it is a question of how they should go and when they should go. With that premise, have you got plans; have you made suggestions?

I know Senator Fulbright did it—it could not be better—and the senior members of this committee and other people in Government. I just wonder, are you formulating an idea as to how this can be done?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, and I have had some talks with the people from USIA and also with Secretary Rusk and with the President about setting up on an organized basis, of asking Members of Congress and maybe some of the governors—Governor [Terry] Sanford of North Carolina, for example, or Governor [Nelson] Rockefeller—maybe somebody like Stewart Udall or Orville Freeman, Members of the Senate, House of Representatives, to go into some of these countries and spend a couple of weeks to give lectures. They are working on a program.

INCONSISTENT REACTION

Senator SYMINGTON. As I understand it, the thing that surprised you the most, listening this morning, was not whether they were right in their opinions or whether they were wrong or what the difference was, but was the extent of their ignorance about our country; is that correct?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, fantastic.

Senator SYMINGTON. Isn't that the primary reaction?

Mr. KENNEDY. Fantastic. But with all of that it seems almost inconsistent, the fact there is such a warm feeling toward the United States. For instance, Indonesia: Despite the fact, I believe, it has the biggest Communist Party outside the Soviet bloc, when Sukarno made his trip around Indonesia, he took all the ambassadors with him and the ambassador that invariably got the biggest hand was the American Ambassador. The Russian Ambassador was fifth or sixth down the line.

If we would go into some of these smaller towns and villages, the women are learning to speak English—in the universities they are learning to speak English, again rather an interesting thing. They have Marx books as a textbook to learn in Indonesia and they have, to counteract that, Walter Rostow's book [*Stages of Economic Growth*] which they believe and, as I understand it, is really the only book, unusual as it might seem, that has been written to answer Marx on the economic history of the world. And so they try to give these to counteract one another.

But also, Senator, I think that a lot can be done with the American community. For instance, we have 20 professors from the University of Kentucky, Senator, in Indonesia. I think if they are given the go-ahead sign and encouraged to also speak up a little on some of these matters other than the particular subject they are in, make themselves available—they are a very impressive group, Senator. I met with them, and they are very impressive.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken, do you have to leave?

Senator AIKEN. Do we have any business——

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted in a few minutes to have some nominations, if you are not in a particular hurry.

Senator SYMINGTON. I just want to say one thing more.

UNTAPPED POTENTIAL

Mr. Chairman, Fowler Hamilton and I went to Guinea, and wherever we went the people cheered the Ambassador everywhere, as soon as they saw the flag on the car, a fellow named [John Howard] Morrow, whose brother was working in the White House in the Eisenhower administration. It wasn't just cheering; everywhere, everybody, all the women, all the men, were in the streets and coming out of offices as soon as they saw the flag, and this was a country that was considered to be the most Communist of any country in Africa. When I asked Sekou-Toure why it was, he said, "We like this man and we trust him. We think he is for Guinea."

And I think what the Attorney General has told us this morning very much emphasizes the vast untapped potential that we have around the world if more people will do what he did.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Attorney General, I would certainly agree with the importance of this trip and your suggestion about the people going, especially the people who can, and are capable of explaining what these controversies are about.

RECRUITING PERSONNEL TO GO ABROAD

I recently have been trying to get the Ford Foundation to, in a sense, marry our foreign aid program from the point of view of getting personnel, recruiting them. Do you think that would be at all a feasible thing to fit in with what you are speaking of here?

Mr. KENNEDY. I do. We met some of their people in some of these areas, and of course they are impressive, but I think anything like that——

The CHAIRMAN. What was their reaction? They are people doing what?

Mr. KENNEDY. In Indonesia they were working with some of the universities on particular projects. They were making studies in some of these areas that we want into.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me this is a function that they are ideally suited to perform.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. With your influence with especially Ford, which now has so much money they might be induced to take on more of this burden that really only people like they can do very well.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned a moment ago about recruiting, in addition to members of the Government, private people, writers and other people of this kind.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me this is a thing that the Ford Foundation can do extremely well and not to be hampered by the inhibitions that afflict the Government in various ways, as you well know.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, and I think it would be more impressive if it could be done in that way.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope you will find occasion to speak to him about it. I proposed this. We had in mind mostly Latin America, but it would apply to this area just as much.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, I will do that.

FOREIGN AID

The CHAIRMAN. We had the foreign aid bill and, as now, it has always been a very controversial bill, and I hate to let you go without expressing your views about this bill and its importance.

Mr. KENNEDY. I will say really Indonesia, where the Russians are, I guess, outspending us maybe 8 or 10 to 1, what we are doing there, the highway that is being erected outside Jakarta, is something that is the subject of conversation and discussion, something that is on people's minds, and something that is well known. I think it is that kind of effort which is invaluable.

In Thailand, they are doing much better economically, and they acknowledge quite openly that it is because of the interest and the efforts which have been made in this field by the United States. I am very strongly in favor of it.

THE CONNALLY AMENDMENT

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, while the Attorney General is here, would you object to our taking a minute with him, if he cares to or would he be willing to express himself on the record as to his position on the Connally amendment? Sooner or later, it is going to be before this committee again in the session; I understand an attempt will be made to revive it.

The CHAIRMAN. If he cares to. If he was not prepared to, he would not comment on it unless he was prepared, but if he cares to——

Mr. KENNEDY. I am in favor, Senator, of the repeal of the Connally amendment. I was asked about this when I was in The Hague, and said so at that time. I am not prepared to discuss it in any great detail.

Senator MORSE. I knew it was your position and I thought we ought to have it as a matter of record so if the question is raised, where does the Attorney General stand on the question, why we can refer to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming.

It has been very useful.

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you.

[The committee then recessed briefly at 11:45 a.m., to reconvene in executive session at 12:05 p.m.]

On motion by Senator Morse, seconded by Senator Symington, the committee unanimously approved for report the nominations of W. Walton Butterworth, Walter C. Dowling, and Frances E. Willis, to be Career Ambassadors.

The nomination of W. Michael Blumenthal, to be United States Representative on the Commission on International Commodity Trade of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, was approved for report without objection.

On motion by Senator Morse, seconded by Senator Symington, the committee also approved for report the nominations of Roger M. Blough, the Rev. Edward A. Conway, John Cowles, Trevor Gardner, George B. Kistiakowsky, George Meany, James A. Perkins, Herman Phleger, Isidor Isaac Rabi, Thomas D. White, and Herbert Frank York to be members of the General Advisory Committee of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, MARCH 19, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:40 a.m., in room 4221, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Capehart.

Robert Sargent Shriver, Jr., Director of the Peace Corps, testified again on S. 2935, To amend the Peace Corps Act.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:25 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MARCH 22, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 4 p.m., in executive session in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (subcommittee chairman).

An informal discussion was had with Ambassador John Tuthill, United States Representative to the OECD.

No transcript was taken or record kept at the meeting.

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee proceeded into executive session at 11:25 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, seconded by Senator Humphrey, the committee approved for report the nominations of Walter Lingle, to be Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development; John L. Salter, to be Assistant Administrator for Congressional Liaison, AID; Herbert J. Waters, to be Assistant Administrator for Material Resources, AID; Franklin A. Long, to be Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Robert Manning, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

The committee approved for report without objection routine promotions and appointments in the Foreign Service.

Senator Humphrey moved that the committee approve for report the bill (S. 2935), To amend the Peace Corps Act. The motion was seconded by Senator Morse. After discussion, the motion carried on a voice vote.

The International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (Executive K, 87th Congress, 1st Session), was approved for report without objection.

The committee discussed, without action, the bill (S. 2818) To promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the purchase of United Nations Bonds.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[There being no further business, the committee adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]

BRIEFING ON DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA

THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4 p.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Humphrey, Morse, Church, Symington, Wiley, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Denney, and Mr. Tillman of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have you this afternoon. You may proceed in your own way.

I might say that I thought the reports from Geneva were quite favorable. It would be very interesting for you to fill in all the gaps.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope that we can be on a deep executive basis, because I think the principal thing that I can add would be more in terms of the real atmosphere and some of the details of discussion which have not been reported.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been pretty good about it this year. I think you can trust us.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. There are three points on which I might report to the committee, and then invite questions and comments.

NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

The first has to do with the nuclear test ban treaty. The President had in his March 2 speech, you will recall, expressed the hope that we could in fact move toward an end of nuclear testing on the basis of a valid effective test ban treaty.

At the very beginning of our discussions in Geneva, it became very apparent that the Soviets were flatly and adamantly opposed to any kind of international inspection or verification within the Soviet Union. In the talks which Mr. Tsarapkin had with Arthur Dean and the British representative, as well as the talks that Lord Home and I had with Mr. Gromyko, it became clear that the Soviets had completely abandoned the earlier discussion which they

themselves had participated in, looking toward control posts and on-site inspection inside the Soviet Union.

We did not accept any of these statements as the last word. As far as the President's March 2 speech is concerned, that matter still remains open. But I must say that nothing that was said in Geneva would lead to any hope or expectation that the Soviets were going to change their position on international inspection inside their own borders.

They kept making the argument that national detection systems were adequate, but they also kept refusing to have or permit any scientific consultation on the issue as to whether existing instrumentation would be anything like adequate for the job. Indeed, this attitude of theirs required clarification, particularly with the unaligned countries who were also at the conference, on the crucial difference between detection and identification, because that is a difference which has not been generally understood publicly here or certainly abroad.

It is quite true that intentionally there are capabilities for detecting a considerable number of what might be called suspicious events, but unless there is a capability of inspection within the Soviet Union, it would be impossible to discover whether these suspicious events were in fact man-made or natural in origin. So that the problem of an effective test ban treaty, which turns upon a degree of assurance, really turns on the possibilities of verification inside the Soviet Union.

SUPPORT OF THE NEUTRALS

We made, I think, considerable headway with the neutrals on this point. The Burmese delegation told us, for example, after they had consulted with other members of the conference, that if there were a private vote cast in the conference on the issue of international verification, the vote would be 14 to 15 against the Soviet bloc, but that we could not expect some of these neutral countries to make public speeches to that effect because of political situations in their own countries, and also because some of them felt that at this disarmament conference they ought to reserve their own positions so that if there is any chance later on for them to be of help toward reaching an agreement, as they put it, they would be in a position to do so.

I think the neutrals, as well as our allies, fully understood the flatness of the Soviet position. But we were under some pressure to make substantial modifications in our own position on this matter for, in effect, propaganda purposes; that is, to crowd the Soviet Union as much as possible into the position where it was rejecting the slenderest and slimmest amount of international inspection. We felt, however, that we had already made concessions on these points, down to the limits of our own security and safety, and it would be much too dangerous for us to make offers in this field which we ourselves were not prepared to accept, particularly since we had no reason to think the Soviet Union would accept any kind of international inspection. We also suspected that additional offers would not really change the view of the public opinion in some of the neutral countries, who would simply be opposed to testing in

any way, shape, or form under any circumstances. But we did have a considerable amount of discussion with those who wanted us to make even more far reaching concessions on this particular point.

Senator WILEY. Who were they?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the Indians, the Burmese, for example. Indeed, even the British and Cambodians expressed the hope that we might be able to make additional concessions—not expecting them to be accepted by the Soviet Union, but, as they put it, to improve the political positions in which we might be if tests were resumed.

I think, however, that there was a considerable amount of understanding as to the circumstances of our tests, if we have to resume them, that these would be reluctantly undertaken, that we genuinely wanted a test ban treaty, and that the Soviet responsibility last autumn was very large in opening up again this test competition.

As I say, the President's offer of March 2 remains open, but we have had no indication at all that the Soviet Union is likely to move on this particular point. Mr. Gromyko told me that each——

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Secretary, would you yield just a minute?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

ROLE OF THE INDIANS AND BURMESE

Senator CAPEHART. What do the Indians and Burmese have to do with this in the first place? Isn't it purely between ourselves and Russia?

Secretary RUSK. The fact that the Indians and the Burmese are members of the conference puts them in a position——

Senator CAPEHART. How do they get in that position?

Secretary RUSK. They were placed in there in the consultations of the General Assembly of the U.N. last August as two of the eight members. Those two, plus Brazil, Mexico, United Arab Republic, Nigeria, and Ethiopia, are additional members of the conference.

Senator, I think your question is quite right in reminding us of one point that we were very much aware of in Geneva. That is, in this particular field, the United States carries a unique and therefore at times lonely responsibility, because it was quite clear, and some of these delegations confessed it, that although they might press us now not to resume testing, they would be the first to be disappointed and the first to move away from us in opinion if the Soviet Union moved ahead of us in this field. So I think there is no misunderstanding on that.

Senator SYMINGTON. In what field?

Secretary RUSK. In this nuclear field. For example, I think the Indians fully understand that from their own point of view, it is not in their interest for the Soviet Union to achieve a substantial breakthrough in the nuclear weapons field.

REMOVING THE ARGUMENT OF ESPIONAGE

Now, the British would like to be able to offer the Soviet Union an inspection system which would involve control posts located outside of the Soviet Union, with an increased number of on-site in-

spections inside the Soviet Union. We did not go down that road, because we didn't think that it would really make any difference to the Soviet Union, nor to the neutrals, and might in fact wind up with a position which we ourselves could not in good conscience accept. We felt that it would be very important for us not to make proposals in the disarmament field purely for propaganda purposes, but make only those that we would be prepared to sign and which we could honestly recommend for ratification.

I don't really think that combinations of that sort would make any further difference to the Soviet Union. We have a good basic position on which to stand, and the compromises we have already made over the past several months fully meet our position.

I do think we made considerable headway in removing this argument of espionage. We did have an exchange. I opened the meeting one morning with a pretty full discussion of this point. Gromyko then spoke, and Lord Home came back in rebuttal. I think we were able to make it pretty clear that any charge that this kind of inspection we were talking about regarding nuclear testing had anything to do with espionage was pretty flimsy, and there were moments when the conference was in fact laughing at Mr. Gromyko on some of the positions that Lord Home was able to defend with on this matter.

GENERAL DISARMAMENT

Now, in the field of general disarmament, that discussion proceeded at a much more leisurely pace. The Soviets tabled what they called a draft treaty for general and complete disarmament. We had tabled a plan that was put to the United Nations last September, and will be following through with particular documents on special aspects of it in the next several weeks. But again, the problem comes back to the same point of international inspection and verification.

Gromyko continued to insist that the only thing that they would permit to be inspected would be disarmament—that is, in effect, the inspection of the bonfire so-called—that there could not be international inspection of retained arms or armed forces. The problem in the nuclear test field, as far as inspection is concerned, would be multiplied many times over in the general disarmament field, because the inspection for general disarmament would have to be much more intrusive and persuasive than the limited and highly technical kind of establishment we were talking about in the nuclear testing.

This repeated attitude of theirs on inspection, I think, lost them considerable ground in the conference. I think we will be able to move on that pretty hard.

The Brazilians and Mexicans and others insisted on the intimate relation between inspection and disarmament. I think there was a general acceptance outside of the bloc of the view that secrecy and disarmament are basically incompatible, and that disarmament proposals that do not permit inspection, except of those arms that are being destroyed, are not really serious.

COLLATERAL MEASURES

I do think, however, it is possible that we shall be able to get agreement on some of what have come to be called collateral measures at Geneva. There is perhaps some agreement with regard to the placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit, the possibility of some measures against surprise attack, the possibility of an agreement on the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to countries not now possessing them. Although on that last point we again are going to run into a very substantial problem.

We are, and have been for a long time, opposed to the addition of other national nuclear capabilities. We have not been willing to assist other governments in developing a national nuclear weapons capability. The Soviet Union will press that point very hard and try to include in it anything in the nature of a NATO nuclear deterrent. They say that this is not only right from the point of view of a national nuclear capability, but we should prohibit any attempt to do it indirectly through third parties or through association of powers. Now, this will give us a good deal of trouble, because one of the means by which we may head off pressures in Germany for the development of a national capability there would be to work out some alliance-wide arrangement whereby a NATO nuclear deterrent might take the place of additional national capabilities. And the Soviets, I think, will be very alive to that, and we will have a major problem with them.

I think the pace of the general disarmament discussions will be rather slow, and it may take some time to come to grips with the central questions. But the main question will undoubtedly be that problem of verification, and I am not at all pessimistic about getting wide international understanding of the necessity for verification of some sort, some adequate sort, during the process of disarmament.

DISCUSSIONS ON BERLIN

On Berlin—and I think Berlin was by all odds the most interesting aspect of the discussions—I had five sessions with Gromyko, bilateral. Our experts had four additional sessions on the same subject.

At the beginning Gromyko arrived in town with an expression to the effect that although they were not particularly interested in discussing Berlin, I indicated before I left this might be a matter that might come up, so they were ready to hear what I would say. But he had his entire Berlin expert staff with him, everybody in the Foreign Office who had been working on it all the time, had them with him from the very beginning.

The first three meetings we had on Berlin were more or less on Western initiative. Lord Home and I had him for a tripartite meeting and I scheduled a lunch—that was on a Sunday—scheduled him for a lunch on a Tuesday. He came back and invited me to lunch on the Monday preceding. But those three meetings were, in effect, on our initiative.

It was interesting that the last four meetings we had on Berlin, including the expert meetings as well as my own talks with Gromyko, were on their initiative. I think that this is, in effect, the princi-

pal thing that happened during the conference, because we found that we were going over the same ground, making the same records. We talked about every possible aspect of it. We talked about all the so-called side issues, the border questions. We reviewed everything that had been said from Vienna right down to the present time, and in effect we got nowhere on the essential substance of the question. We tried therefore to organize the discussion on the American side in three categories.

DRAWING A LINE UNDER WORLD WAR II

They had kept talking about drawing a line under World War II. They said it was important to wind up the situation in Berlin and draw a line under World War II. So we said, "All right, if you want to talk about how you change the situation, we will talk with you about that; we will talk about how you really end World War II. Our views on that have to do with a unified Germany based on the free choice of the German peoples with Berlin as its capital. We will put that alongside your proposals for a free city of Berlin, and talk to you about that on the basis that we each discuss our views about the desirable changes."

They then said, "Of course, we will, but that doesn't represent the factual situation." So we said, "All right, we will talk to you about the factual situation. You say that the facts are that there are two Germanys. We say that there is a third fact that you have consistently overlooked, and that is there is West Berlin and the Western position in West Berlin, with the Western access to Berlin. So we will talk to you about the factual situation, see if we can find a basis in which we can settle this question on the basis of the facts as they exist." Well, they came back and said, "But we want to change the situation in West Berlin." I went back to the first category, "If you want to change, let's talk about change. If you want to talk about facts, let's talk about facts." We got nowhere with that.

Then we asked the Russians to take it up from this point of view. "We are in basic disagreement with Germany and Berlin. We see no present prospect that we are going to get agreement. We have told you that our vital interests are involved in your proposals. You have told us that you are not going to be able to withdraw your proposals. All right, that creates a serious and apparently insuperable disagreement.

"Then perhaps we ought to talk about how we handle this disagreement; how, in fact, you deal with the situation in which you are in basic disagreement, without a resort to a major crisis."

A MODUS VIVENDI

So we made certain proposals to them, along the lines of a modus vivendi. We picked out certain general points, such as the freedom and viability of West Berlin, free access to it; such as the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons; such as the possibilities of a non-aggression discussion or pact, even between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries; such as the nonuse of force for changing the status quo in Central Europe: Things which both sides have been saying for years.

We said, "Now perhaps about all we can do is to register that we have agreed on certain general principles and then set up some machinery, such as a foreign ministers' deputies machinery of the sort that negotiated the Austrian settlement, and let them discuss this situation further—indefinitely, if need be. That wouldn't require you to withdraw your proposals; that wouldn't affect the vital interests of the West in West Berlin. But our problem is how we move to keep this situation from getting out of hand if we can't agree with each other." They pretended not to be interested in that approach, but they sent it immediately back to Moscow. It was at that point that they began to be interested in, or seemed to be interested in, continuing the conversations, because when we described this possibility of a modus vivendi, we decided that we would just wait and see what their reactions were. After about 40 hours, without anything happening, they then took the initiatives which led to the last four meetings for further discussion of Berlin.

They have not accepted the notion of a modus vivendi. They continue to press for their proposals and express the hope that we can agree to their proposals.

NO INCLINATION OF MOVE TOWARD CRISIS

On the other side, there are two points that I think were quite marked in the discussions. If I mention them, I have to add the caution that both these points could be changed and disappear overnight.

The one is that they showed no inclination to move this problem down the road toward a crisis. I did take occasion to press them pretty hard on this point, because we felt that we ought to try to find out a little more about whether we are headed for a clutch or whether we are headed toward a possible agreement. So I probed pretty hard on this, in terms of their readiness to engage the vital interests of the West with all the consequences that might flow from it, and they didn't pick it up. They moved away from that.

It was quite clear that they did not want to leave the impression that they were getting ready for a crisis or thought that this would move in that direction. There were none of the threats of last summer, there was none of the talk of war, there were no military pressures of that sort injected into the situation from their side.

Second, they seemed very reluctant to record any diplomatic impasse. That is, when we would get to a point where we would be tempted to say, "Well, then, apparently we have two non-negotiable problems here in front of us, two non-negotiable positions," their side would say, "Well, this ought to be discussed further at the ministerial level."

It was Gromyko who took the initiative at the end to tell the press, as we were breaking up from our last meeting, that our conversations would continue. And our small joint statement that we put out at the end, that referred to further talks after consultation with governments and allies, that joint statement went to Moscow and was cleared back there, before Gromyko would agree to issue it in Geneva.

When we check it against intelligence information as well, I do come back with the impression that they do not want this question

to move to an early military crisis. They do not wish to confess a diplomatic impasse. They want to talk about it further. In the next 10 days or 2 weeks we will be in touch with them again about where we go next in discussing this Berlin question.

That isn't very much to bring home. Certainly it is about the thinnest slice of bacon that one could manage in terms of 2 weeks of negotiation, but marginally I would say that the sense of immediate crisis over Berlin has been somewhat relieved, unless they were kidding us and they change their minds overnight, without notice. Of course, that can always happen.

I do think it is confirmed that it does help for us to show that we are prepared to be just as patient, just as reiterative, and just as persistent as they are about repeating our positions, the essential elements of our positions. We are under some pressure to keep coming up with new positions, without anything new from the Soviet side. But we kept at it. I think perhaps our job is to stay with it.

We did not talk about summitry at Geneva. Gromyko did not bring it up. I think on that subject the situation is about where it was before I went over, and about where it was when the President wrote Khrushchev on that subject some 3 weeks ago, almost a month ago now.

Mr. Chairman, I just make these first remarks as a basis for inviting any questions or comments the members of the committee might have.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask one or two questions.

REASONS FOR THE ABSENCE OF SOVIET THREATS

Do you attribute this reluctance to come to a showdown, in the absence of threats and so on, to their relations with the Chinese, or to what do you attribute this thin slice of bacon that you did bring home?

Secretary RUSK. I think there are several possibilities. One real possibility, Mr. Chairman, might well be that they decided several months ago that they must undertake a crash program of rearmament in certain aspects of their military machine, and that they might want to hold this question off until then. That is the more negative possibility, but we have some intelligence indications that could point in that direction, particularly in the missile field, where they are making now, we think, a major crash effort.

The other is the problem of China. It would be hard to judge exactly in which direction that would push the Soviets on this particular issue. If their relations with Peiping are fundamentally in difficulty—that is, if there is a prospect of a real split—then they would be cautious about Berlin. But if this is anything like the framework of a family quarrel, they would be tempted, I think, to pursue a more aggressive policy to demonstrate to the Chinese that their brand of tactics produced results, as per their promise to Peiping.

It may be, Mr. Chairman, that they simply have not finally decided. I think they may be just still puzzled about how far they should press it, because they have heard pretty insistently now for quite a long time that the West will not be pushed out of West

Berlin. They have been hearing it for 3 years, and very insistently this past year, after the Congress added to our defense establishment in a very significant way.

So I just do not know what the reasons might be. I would think that there is a little of all of these elements in the picture, but I am not at all sure that the Kremlin has decided on a very clear line of policy on Berlin at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. You think it is just the absence of any decision, they are just suspending it for the moment?

Secretary RUSK. It could well be, sir.

ISRAELI NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. One other question: In this matter of nuclear diffusion, was the status of the Israeli atomic developments entered into at all?

Secretary RUSK. That did not come up in our discussions in Geneva. We are, of course, ourselves, watching that development very closely. We have had experts look at the situation.

We would expect if there is an agreement in this field, that all countries that do not have atomic weapons would also sign it, or if any of them move to test atomic weapons, that would relieve others of any agreements relative to the problem. But Israel did not come into the discussions at Geneva. France did; Gromyko pushed us very hard on France again.

The CHAIRMAN. He did push you?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Humphrey.

HOW LONG WILL THE ARMS RACE CONTINUE?

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, the thin slice of bacon is somewhat reassuring, at least, to a kind of a hungry world. I think the point has been made that possibly no decision is equivalent to a decision, or no agreement.

My question is rather broad. Maybe this is off a long ways, but how long is this arms race going to continue, in light of the intransigence of the Soviet with their insistence that they will test and retest? Obviously if they test again, then the pressures will be on for us to test. In the meantime, somebody else is apt to get into the field.

What does that lead to? Don't misunderstand me. I supported the testing decision. I am just a concerned human being. Where does it all go?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think this is the underlying reason for the last portion of the President's speech of March 2. We are now getting into a stage in the arms race which becomes excessively burdensome from the point of view of the commitment of resources and talent, and extremely unpredictable and unstable in terms of the results in what might happen to military installations.

ANTI-ICBM EFFORTS

We move to strenuous efforts in the anti-ICBM field. If we succeed—and that will be a phenomenal job if we succeed—if we suc-

ceed in that, you have the problem of evading the other side's anti-ICBM. If we succeed in that, defense against that. We are now pushing already to the point where scientists speculate about whether it is even worth trying, because of the question of whether it is even possible or sufficiently possible to be worth the effort. Yet with these stakes that are involved, you cannot afford not to try to find out whether it is possible or not.

Senator SYMINGTON. Whether what is possible?

Secretary RUSK. To go on into the anti-ICBM field, then the decoy field, and the anti-decoy field, and all the rest. Down this trail, you see, you have massive resources being committed on the chanciest possibility that something effective might come out of it. So this is the gloomy prospect. This is why the President, in the most genuine sense, wanted to get a test treaty. That is the basis of why we went to considerable lengths.

I think we stretched—if I may say so—the receptivity of the Senate, for example, as well as some of our own judgments to the limit, trying to get a basis for an effective test ban treaty. We would be prepared to abolish the threshold, reduce our inspection ratios from 1 in 5 to 1 in 40 of suspicious events, to use sampling techniques, in a desperate effort to halt this thing under some reasonable basis of security, because of the concern that you are talking about.

OTHERS WHO BEAR RESPONSIBILITY

But I also would like to add this, Senator. We and the Soviets are not the only ones who bear this responsibility. I could come away from Geneva really quite cynical about the attitude of the rest of the world about disarmament, because when we talked to the other delegations there about their arms races and the contributions that could be made in their continents to disarmament, we ran into a colossal indifference.

India has no interest in doing anything about their arms race with Pakistan. The two African delegations and the two Latin American delegations had no interest in the possibilities of continental arms conferences, within their own continents, to see if they could come to arrangements among themselves to nip their arms races at a low stage. One of the so-called eight neutrals said, in the corridors one day, "Well, you know, if we can get somewhere on this disarmament that involves you people, my country will be able to get a lot of arms cheap, won't it?"

Now, we have pressures on the two of us from many parts of the world, but the full possibilities in this field have not really caught hold on many people and many governments. We are talking literally about—if we go ahead in general disarmament, we are talking about a transformation of the world political system. This is the basis for our caution in what happens in stage one.

So I can underline our own impression of the complexity of it. It is going to take a lot of time. We may not get anywhere. I think we have to make the effort, and if we do not get anywhere, I think I can honestly say it won't be because we won't on our side have made some strenuous efforts.

SOVIET MILITARY AND DOMESTIC NEEDS

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, the thesis has been advanced, and I have been somewhat inclined to accept at least part of this, that our present program or rearmament or giving greater flexibility and mobility and versatility to our defense structure, with the additional moneys being put into it, has placed a burden upon the Soviet Union of being able to keep pace. This is backstopped by my belief that in earlier years the armament program—we neither had an armament program nor a disarmament program, we just sort of went along. The Soviet could pay for it with some sacrifice, and we could pay for it with little or no sacrifice.

What I am getting at is, is it possible that by having a strong defense structure, with the updating of our weaponry, with the improvement of such weapons as the ICBM and the Polaris and the strategic air power, et cetera, that it may compel the Soviets, or may now be compelling the Soviets to take a brand new look at whether or not they can afford to continue this arms race?

I mention this in the light of Khrushchev's very obvious concern over the need for new machinery in agriculture, and the problems of some breakdown in their industrial plant which are now coming to the forefront, and whether or not the Soviet Union can maintain an armament program and keep pace with us at the same time it tries to meet some of its domestic requirements for its production expansion.

There are those that do believe, and there may be some credence to it, that the best way to get some ultimate beginning, or some beginning on the disarmanent program, is to put the pressure on so hard, risky as this is, that the Soviets are compelled to have a major review of policy. Maybe this is what is going on there now.

What is your view of that?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Khrushchev said in his electoral speech that military requirements would have to get first priority and that—this was in the face of a lot of discussion about what was required in agriculture at the meeting of the Central Committee. We know from intelligence sources, as well as what we can speculate about, that they are facing some important questions over the allocation of resources.

Mr. Khrushchev talked to President Kennedy about that problem in Vienna, in rather realistic terms. They need to make some very substantial capital investments in agriculture—fertilizer plants, for example—and that has to come out of something. But the indications are that he is prepared to give his military establishment first priority, and that they are engaged in something like a crash program in the missile and nuclear fields.

PRESSURE ON SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD INSPECTION

We would think, Senator—this is something we cannot quite—we just do not know how to figure out. We would think this at least would put pressure on their attitude toward inspection.

When you look at what is really meant by this international inspection system, with respect to nuclear testing, and you analyze that from the point of view of espionage, it turns out to be meaningless from the point of view of espionage. Although we would

cover the Soviet Union much more adequately with instruments, the actual inspection under our proposals would involve taking a look at 1/2000 of the territory of the Soviet Union in any given year—and everything that happened in the Soviet Union would be accompanied by as many Soviet observers as they wanted, using Soviet transportation. The activities of the inspection team could not do anything but concentrate on the job for which they are there. So, quite frankly, we cannot ourselves find a rational explanation of their attitude on no inspection, unless it is that they are, come what may, determined to go ahead with their own testing, because the espionage point just does not make any sense.

Senator CAPEHART. Is there a possibility that they are much weaker than we think they are, and do not want to disclose their weakness?

Secretary RUSK. Two of the satellite delegations at Geneva hinted at this. They said that in a few years' time the Soviets would open up much more readily, because they would not be so fearful that we would discover weaknesses that they now have. I mentioned that, without trying to evaluate it too far, but there is some possibility.

Senator CAPEHART. If my life depended upon it, and I had to say yes or no, I would say that is the reason.

REDUCING ATMOSPHERIC TESTING

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, just this final note. Do you think there is any possibility—or is this worthy of consideration—of trying to seek some kind of agreement that our next series of tests in the atmosphere would not exceed a certain number of explosions, and that the next Soviet series would not exceed a certain number, and then trying to cut them down? Is there any sense to that?

Secretary RUSK. We could make that suggestion, but the Soviets seem to claim the right to have an equivalent number of tests with the West. So they do not want us to have the last series. We could not get them to go very far in that direction, although I think if we could make that quantitative, we might—it might be interesting to see what their reaction would be.

Senator MORSE. Would the Senator yield on that point for clarification?

I just do not know. Am I right in my assumption that the President's position has been that he is going to limit our tests to that number that our scientists say are essential from the standpoint of scientific need? Now, if there is such a number, and if they have to have that number in order to meet our scientific needs, I do not see how we could offer to limit our tests to less than that number, whatever that number is.

I assume—and I would like to have you tell me if this is your understanding, and Senator Humphrey, too—that the President's position on testing is that he is only going to go ahead with just that limited number of tests that the scientists tell him have to be done to meet the scientific needs. Am I right or wrong about that?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. He hinted at that in his public statement in which he said that our test program would be

far less than the Soviet test program in terms of megatonnage or fallout, but it will be a highly sophisticated selection of tests on our side. You are quite right. But so far as I understand the program—I simply put that on for security reasons—what we have in mind would be consistent with Senator Humphrey's suggestion.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you yield for a question?

Senator HUMPHREY. I am done.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Wisconsin.

Senator WILEY. I have several questions.

ENCOURAGEMENTS AND DISCOURAGEMENTS

First, do you feel encouraged or discouraged over this meeting?

Secretary RUSK. On the disarmament side, I feel discouraged. On the Berlin side, I feel that there is a little encouragement in the fact that they seemed so obviously interested in talking about it further at the time that our meetings broke up.

Senator WILEY. As a matter of fact, then, there is practically no gain or no loss. It is just about where you were when you went.

Secretary RUSK. We did not expect during this first 2 weeks' period to come to any climax, either of agreement or crisis. So I would say that the situation was about what might have been anticipated before.

Senator WILEY. Do you want to give your impression as to whether or not you think Khrushchev—and you talked with Gromyko—from what he said, that Khrushchev is scared about his home conditions and the Chinese and the world situation? Is he not ready to let the balloon go up?

Secretary RUSK. I did not get any impression of fear. I did get the impression that he was not prepared to let the balloon go up at this point.

Senator WILEY. You got that from talking with Gromyko?

Secretary RUSK. That is right. His attitude on the merits of these issues was very firm and very direct and unyielding, on the merits. But the fact that he wanted to continue the talks, and went to some pains to insure that the talks continued, at least led us to believe that they were trying to convince us that they did not want this to move immediately to a crisis.

Senator WILEY. While we were sitting on our fannies, so to speak, and they were going ahead and seeking new discoveries in the field of bombs, missiles, and so forth, did you get any impression that they had something new? That is about a 3-year period, is it not?

Secretary RUSK. In the President's statement of March 2, he referred to novel techniques and improvements in weaponry. They did, in the last series of tests, do some things which ought to give them a good deal of data that will be of value to them in developing their own systems. I think they made some gains in their tests.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Senator WILEY. One other question: Were you satisfied from the climate there among those present that there was a real misunderstanding between Mao Tse-tung and the Kremlin, or is that just a superficial show?

Secretary RUSK. The Soviet satellites who were there were much more interesting on that than the people from Moscow were. There were also some other people in town, like the Yugoslavs, the Hungarians, who reflected the same point of view.

There does seem to be a very important difference between Moscow and Peiping developing. There is a big meeting going on in Peiping where these matters might be discussed and we might see some development, either toward closer association with Moscow or toward widening the rift. But it seemed clear to us in talking with the satellites, who are sometimes more talkative, such as the Poles, that the China question is a very large question inside the Communist world at the present time.

Senator WILEY. You did not arrive anywhere in relation to Berlin?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; not on the merits of the problem.

Senator WILEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to leave.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

NO ATTEMPT TO DELAY U.S. TESTING

Senator AIKEN. No, I do not think I have any questions.

Did you get any idea, Mr. Secretary, they were trying to be amiable for the purpose of delaying our nuclear testing?

Secretary RUSK. No; I think I could say quite categorically that the Soviets, in their talks with us, showed not the slightest interest in trying to delay our own testing.

Senator AIKEN. I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

SOVIETS ARE DETERMINED TO TEST AGAIN

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, during the time that we were negotiating all those dreary months with the Russians on a nuclear test ban, they held the position a long, long time that international inspection, even within the Soviet Union, would be acceptable. We came pretty close at one time to a treaty, but the problem was how many on-site inspections would be permissible. Then suddenly they changed their position and held all these tests.

Why do you think they changed their position?

Secretary RUSK. Could I answer that without this record, if I may, sir?

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator CHURCH. My second question would be whether you then think that they refused the offer you made that we would withhold further testing on our part if they would enter into an acceptable treaty, with reasonable inspection, because they still feel that they are behind in the development of their nuclear arsenal, and that they want to test still further.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I personally feel that the only—trying to put myself as much as I can even within their doctrinal system, I cannot find a rational explanation for their present conduct in this point, other than that they are determined to test again in any event.

Senator CHURCH. When you said that we had made the most strenuous efforts possible—I do not want to quibble on that score, I think our position has been far clearer than theirs—but have we really gone as far as might have been possible? For example, there were times when the Eisenhower administration offered, and there were times when the Kennedy administration has offered, to put an end to atmospheric tests, apart from subterranean tests, knowing that these are easily detectable and do not involve the inspection problems that subterranean tests involve. Yet this time we did not make that offer, following Russian tests. We said, in effect, you take the whole package with inspection, or we proceed with tests of our own.

Now, we could have made that offer again, as Kennedy had made it before, and as Eisenhower had made it even before that. Why did we not?

Secretary RUSK. First we made that offer most recently on September—I think it was September 3—after their third explosion. We did not feel that we could make it after their 50th explosion, until there had been a complete examination of their test program.

Even so, and knowing a good deal about what kind of advances they made in their test program, we would be prepared to stop all testing if we could in fact stop all testing. But if you leave open the possibilities of undetected underground testing, and the possibilities of a certain undetected small-scale atmospheric test, then several things flow from that.

One is that they could capitalize on the data which they got from their last test series, and develop it further with these small extrapolated tests. Second, with any testing whatever going on, they could maintain their test establishment on a status of full alert. They could keep their laboratories going, they could keep their scientists at work, they could have some actual undetected tests to give purpose and point to the whole exercise; whereas we, after a full and careful study of that problem, were forced to conclude that we could not keep our necessary talents and laboratories in a standby alert position merely on the possibility that the Soviets would break a test ban arrangement. So we felt that we were in a situation where we had to shoot the whole works and get this thing stopped right across the board, and not at this stage play around with just those kinds of atmospheric tests which could be reasonably detected from the outside.

WHERE A FIRST STEP COULD BE TAKEN

Senator CHURCH. Am I right in drawing from that answer that after our next test series is completed, we would not then be in a position to renew the offer for an atmospheric test ban?

Secretary RUSK. I could not speak to that at this point, because I suspect this is some part of the tragedy of it. I suspect that before our next series is completed, they will start again, and we will have to take a look at that.

Senator CHURCH. I stress this only because it seems here is where a first step could be taken that does not involve the complicated inspection problems that were involved with subterranean tests, where the issue of detection is not a serious one, and where,

if the time ever arrives when the nuclear arsenals on both sides are such that both sides are willing to proceed with the first step, that it can in fact be taken—that there are no technical difficulties to prevent it.

Secretary RUSK. It is possible, Senator, that if there could be some improvement at several points—I mean if this Berlin question can be somehow laid aside, if there could be some progress in the general field of disarmament, if there is some surer basis of indicating that we are moving toward a real détente—it may be that some possibilities will open up even here, along the lines you are talking about. But I do not think that we feel we should now move just in the large atmospheric testing field, in view of what has happened last fall and the total situation.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Indiana.

Senator CAPEHART. May I have this off the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Take it off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

SOVIET WEAKNESS

Senator CAPEHART. I cannot help but believe that these fellows are weaker than we think they are, and they do not want to show their weaknesses, and they want to get much, much stronger; because if they were really strong today, if they were as strong as we are, they would be in favor of disarmament and stopping testing. I cannot help but believe that is the answer to their failure to want to disarm.

I think in many respects they have us hypnotized. I think if we would start from that basis and that premise, and lead from that premise—that is the reason why—we would be much better off.

You ask me how to do it, I do not know how. That is your job.

Secretary RUSK. This problem was illustrated two or three times at Geneva. The Soviets were unwilling at any point to come back and criticize our own proposals on the grounds that they would be out of balance, because we had more than they did in certain categories. For example, we offered this 50,000 kilotons each, the Soviets and the United States. The Soviets felt unable to say that this was an unfair offer on the grounds that we had so much more than they, therefore we should make this proportional; instead they said this was such an insignificant amount that is did not make any difference and was not worth anything from disarmament. We were prepared to negotiate with them a bit on the ratio, but they were unwilling to come forward and say this was unfair on the basis of balance.

I think they are very sensitive about anything that seems to confess at any point that they are not equal to us.

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Secretary, the war has only been over about 16 or 17 years. You do not build up a great industry and great potential in 16 or 17 years when you start from nothing. That is about where they started. But how to handle it, even if my facts and assumptions are correct, is still a problem.

I would think that we could find some way to lead from strength, and on the theory that they are opposing these things because they

do not want us to know how weak they are and how little they have. Of course, I am not unmindful it only takes a dozen or less properly spaced, good, big atomic bombs to do the job. I have been over Russia, pretty well over it. I cannot see too much strength. I am not unmindful they are making great progress. My best judgment is that is their reason for it.

A DISADVANTAGEOUS POSITION FOR THE SOVIETS

The CHAIRMAN. I would be interested, assuming what you say is true—what is the significance of it? How would that affect our policy?

Secretary RUSK. You mean what the Senator said?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, supposing they are weaker than we.

Senator CAPEHART. That is the reason they do not want to enter into these agreements. They do not want us to know how weak they are.

Senator MORSE. If they are that weak, why wouldn't they be enthusiastic for any program that would end armament?

Senator CAPEHART. They want to continue to build up, and get much stronger than they are today, and then they will enter into agreements, in my opinion.

Secretary RUSK. Some of the satellite delegations even said to us that our proposal for a 30-percent reduction in armaments across the board—everything from delivering nuclear vehicles right across to all kinds of equipment, artillery, tanks, and so forth—would put the Soviets in a disadvantageous position. When you analyze that, this to me would suggest that they have significant weaknesses in some of the principal categories.

Senator CAPEHART. Another reason why I rather assume this position—I think I am right in this, you know much better than I—is the fact that Western Europe is not too much concerned about Russia, not nearly as much as we are. They have a lot to lose, but they are not too much concerned about it. They are more concerned over the capability of their factories to produce consumer goods and things of that sort. They certainly are not very fearful, because they are building skyscrapers.

Secretary RUSK. I think Western Europe, if I may say so, Senator, is betting pretty heavily on our concern.

Senator CAPEHART. Yes, I agree with that—which I think is unfair, too.

That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Missouri.

A FREE ROAD TO SUPERIORITY

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, in Mr. McCloy's article in Foreign Affairs this week,[1] he points out the four reasons why Russia should be willing to make an agreement with us. One was the bad aspect of a nuclear war for the winner as well as the loser. The second was the growing danger of a war starting through a mistake. Third was the growing danger incident to the nuclear club growth. And the fourth was all the economic things that the Rus-

[1]John J. McCloy, "Balance Sheet on Disarmament," *Foreign Affairs*, 40 (April 1962), 339–59.

sians could do for themselves, and we could do for ourselves and other people, if we did not have an arms race.

In discussing this the other night with some friends, including some of yours, we were wondering why it was therefore that they did not do it. What was the reason? Nobody seemed to arrive at an answer The most logical, generally agreed conclusion was they felt they were winning, and that is why they did not want to make a deal.

With this premise, we are all pretty ignorant technically about this problem of nuclear testing. I remember once in New York, about a year and a half ago, I shocked everybody, who were very ardent people not to test any more, by asking a scientist at the meeting what they could get away with underground that we would not know about. He said 20 kilotons, and possibly 100—20 for sure. Most people at that meeting thought five was the maximum they could get away with.

One of the great scientists today feels that the treaty that we have offered them—which he says fortunately they have not taken—ostensibly, or actually, gives them a threshold, based on the nature of the inspection requirements that we offered them, of 20 kilotons. He says that because of the importance of fusion, as against fission, that probably anything above half a kiloton is very dangerous for the future of the security of the United States, and therefore, in effect, we, in the treaty offered them by the President, have offered them a method of getting ahead of us rapidly, even if they accepted it.

This is a difficult subject. I have listened to talk about it. I would hope some committee had some hearings on it. The people do not really know the technical facts, which I think is always important. If you are going to make a decision on the basis of facts, you ought to know what the facts are.

As I understand it, because of the tremendous potential in the fusion picture, in light yield explosions, way, way down, far below what everybody would argue about in this new inspection offer we made them, one of the world's great nuclear physicists says that we have given them a free road to superiority.

Would you care to comment on that?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I cannot really comment as anything like an expert. I have listened over the years to the debates among the scientists on these issues. I frankly cannot avoid the feeling that much of the argument that is cast in scientific terms turns out to be political argument, on both sides. I would not say this just on one side.

We did go into this with great care. I found scientific opinion differing on what the acceptable risks might be. We were aware of the fact that the treaty we were offering was not 100 percent foolproof, that there were very significant risks in it. But the risks down the trail that Senator Humphrey and I were talking about earlier were also very large indeed. So the question was, on balance, in which directions do you take some risks? Do you take some massive risks by an unfettered competition; do you take some significant risks by an attempt at a controlled system? This is a matter of judgment and perhaps only history will decide who is right, depending on what happens.

WHY THE SOVIETS DO NOT MAKE A DEAL

Senator SYMINGTON. Just to make my point—the scientist I was talking to in the last 48 hours says it is 100 percent not foolproof. In other words, there is no question about the fact, on the basis that we offer, the world goes at their feet someday if they pursue it.

I read and reread McCloy's article—and after all he should know something about it, he was working on it a long time, this apparently is the giving up of his heart and mind and soul to the American people, after leaving the job. What worries me is you have all these reasons why—those four I remember were the four major ones he gave, plus a lot of surrounding comment that would tend to verify those four basics—why is it that they do not make a deal? Some people say it is their innate fear of letting anybody see what they are doing, and so forth and so on. But if McCloy is right, with his premises, it is incredible that they do not make some kind of arrangement, unless they are winning. That was the conclusion.

Secretary RUSK. Doesn't it also, though, work the other way around; that if the scientist with whom you talked within the last 48 hours was right, they should make it fast, the Soviets should make this deal overnight?

Senator SYMINGTON. No, because if they feel that they can proceed undetected, so long as the status quo continues, why should they want to change the status quo?

I asked Bethe in 1958 if the Russians continue to test and we do not, what will happen. He said if they continue to test and we do not, they will overtake us and pass us. But we can catch them. Of course, as they shifted from persuasion to intimidation, they did not worry about whether they would be caught or not.

We have had a great big apprehension on our part, many billions of dollars more for defense. So perhaps they will go underground, if they can get a deal, and learn clandestinely what they thought was necessary to try over, if this fellow is right. His approach on the fusion angle, where you can get your results from these very low yields that all the scientists will agree now, which they did not before—when we started out with this love your neighbor more than yourself philosophy, all the scientists felt that above 5 kilotons and so forth—now that has been very radically changed. I am just wondering if the scientists today are right, that these very low yields will give them what they want. Is that something that has been given consideration?

The CHAIRMAN. Would the Senator yield there? I am too thickheaded to follow him. I still do not understand why the agreement would not be to their advantage, if your friend is right, because it would stop our progress, assuming we live up to it. They do not have to live up to it.

Senator SYMINGTON. From a tactical standpoint I agree with you.

On the other hand, suppose they analyze it and at the last minute say they will agree to it. We have offered it, and if they do agree to it, they are unblocked, and of course we will go ahead and carry out our agreement.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is the point.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think you see what I am trying to get at, Mr. Secretary. I am not trying to be obtuse about it.

Is Mr. Foster back?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

There is one element here. In thinking about the next steps in the race, many scientists advise us that the critical next steps in this race cannot be accomplished solely underground.

Senator SYMINGTON. I agree with that from the standpoint of the position that we have always felt we were strong. But I am talking about the small yield, the neutron bomb potential, 1/100 of the cost for a warhead.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, that is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Kansas.

Senator CARLSON. I have one or two questions.

FUTURE MEETINGS

Mr. Secretary, at the conclusion of this conference, were plans made for future meetings of this type?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the disarmament conference will continue in session. Mr. Arthur Dean is leading our delegation over there and will go right through with it. It will undoubtedly last for quite a long time.

We do not have for the moment any exact agreement as to how we next consult with the Soviets on Berlin. Mr. Gromyko and I both agree that is the question that we would take up with each other after we have a chance to come back and talk to our governments and allies.

Senator CARLSON. You do not have any plans to go back immediately?

Secretary RUSK. No, although I would be ready to go back to Geneva if there appeared to be a need for it or an opportunity to get something constructive done.

Senator CARLSON. I want to say that I surely admire your patience. I think it must be a most trying and annoying thing to meet with these people. Personally, I do not believe they ever intend to reach any agreement.

The thing that I regret is that they seem to take advantage, or at least get the advantage, in propaganda. I have tried to follow this with the press, and that is all I know about it. I read about it every day as best I could. I think the one headline that I thought must have gone around the world that affects our nation was this: "Russia Resumes Tests if U.S. Tests." It just seems to me that was the propaganda they wanted out of it, and they got out of it, and it puts our Nation in a spot. I have no suggestion how to avoid that, but that is the thing I regret.

Secretary RUSK. I am quite sure, Senator, the rest of the world has not forgotten the tests of last fall. We did not run into as much of that kind of problem at Geneva with the others as we thought we would.

Senator CARLSON. That is all I have.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make a point.

CANNOT YIELD ON INSPECTIONS

First of all, I am very appreciative of your giving us all this time. I want to commend you, as one Senator, for your excellent work under most trying conditions.

This business of inspections is keyed, it seems to me. I have put a lot of time in on this nuclear test business. I do not have any doctrinaire or dogmatic position. I thought the position that the President made had to be made. I thought he made an excellent explanation of it.

I do not think we can afford to yield, Mr. Secretary, on the issue of the international inspection. The main reason I say this is because this Soviet society, highly disciplined, police state—they use the big word "monolithic"—the key to any kind of an understanding with the Soviet Union is to build a mechanism of inspection, observation, and control that can be a substitute for trust. Over a long period of time we have had this mutual distrust, and there has not been too much to relieve it.

Furthermore, if you are ever going to get a general disarmament program that is even worth work and consideration, you cannot rely upon national reporting, or upon inspecting the bonfire, so to speak, namely, that which has been cast off. You have to have the beginnings of some kind of international inspection.

This is one of the reasons that I was willing to take the risk—just expressing my opinion—I am not the negotiator—as a Senator, on a treaty. I would have been willing to go a long way to get the beginning of an inspection system, knowing the risks that this involved, because if we could once get the beginning of an international inspection system, we may unlock the possibilities for something that really is meaningful. I think if we ever make an agreement, that where we do not get the beginning of an inspection system, we have locked ourselves in.

You take even this business of an agreement of no atmospheric testing. While that seems to lend itself to some immediate relaxation of tensions, it does not get at the basic objective, because it still does not provide the means of penetrating—not for the purpose of espionage—the Soviet structure for further verification of any kind of an agreement that you may ever arrive at. I would feel very strongly about this. In fact, I would very vigorously oppose a treaty that did not have an inspection system involved. I think it would be a fraud. I think it would not lend itself to international peace; I think it would encourage tensions. In fact, everybody would be overly suspicious.

WE CANNOT TRUST THEM

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I am sure that is right. I tried my best to make some headway with Mr. Gromyko along this line. We know they won't trust us; they know that we cannot trust them—in the sense that no country situated as they and we are will put its future at the disposal of another country.

What we ought to work for would be arrangements which make the element of trust irrelevant. It is like the auditors in a bank. When you balance your books every day, you do not worry about whether the teller is running off with the money every day. If we

could work toward some minimum arrangement so that suspicion could be allayed, and you could have confidence, not necessarily in each other, but in the effectiveness of the system, then gradually over a period of time certain confidence will build up.

I would like to just say this off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL

Senator HUMPHREY. The other point I wanted to emphasize, if the Chairman will permit it, is this business of continental or regional arms control measures. I am not talking about Central Europe, which is a very delicate problem because of the power structure there. I think ultimately we may very well want to take the diplomatic offensive, not on the basis of trying to come to grips with the Soviets—I do not think they are willing to come to grips right now; I think Khrushchev is going through a big crisis at home, both ideologically and economically, and he is more or less in a position where he does not quite know what move to make. This would be just a personal calculation.

I think that from our point of view, worldwide, it would be good if we could line up some support outside the Soviet bloc, with the non-aligned or with some of our allies, and with the so-called neutrals, to talk about how you reduce armament structures in the Western Hemisphere or in Africa or in Asia or in Southeast Asia, or any other place—just pick places. As you indicated so well here—and I can understand your feeling about it, of viewing a cynical group—they say, "This is your problem, you talk about it." In the meantime, they want to arm and increase tensions in areas which could precipitate a struggle between the big powers.

In other words, these little fellows get out here in these back alley fights, and the next thing you know, it is out on the main boulevard with the big fellows. I think the regional or the sectional or continental disarmament proposals may have some real appeal.

Secretary RUSK. I hope very much we can find some way to move those along. I am sure that is right, Senator.

But I must say, at Geneva we did not get anywhere with the regional members in this direction.

Senator HUMPHREY. They were in the big ballpark.

Secretary RUSK. Brazil, for example, was interested in a nuclear-free Latin America. This is a free ride for them. It does not require anything of them, because they were not involved in the nuclear business now, but they were not interested in trying to sit down to see what we in Latin America can do about limiting the arms race among ourselves. I suppose one of the reasons is that—we have talked about this in this committee before—it is very likely none of these governments down there is in a position to say to its armed forces, "You have to be cutting down."

Senator HUMPHREY. There seems to be some evidence of that of late.

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, the press, I know, is going to ask me questions, as they always do—I have to say something. Would it

be fitting to say that nothing of significance relative to test ban or disarmament fields was achieved, other than a clear understanding of the position?

Secretary RUSK. I think that would be accurate, and that is the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Chalmers Roberts wrote a piece on Berlin. Would it be advisable to say you feel a modus vivendi has been arrived at on Berlin?

Secretary RUSK. I would not say that.

The CHAIRMAN. He said that, you know.

Secretary RUSK. I know he said that, but that was speculation that was not based upon facts or briefing. I think the only thing that one can really point to there is the two governments have agreed to continue the talks, and that itself is worth pursuing, or is to that degree encouraging. But I would not go much further than that, because on the merits of any of these questions, we did not really get any agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. They nearly always ask me whether the Secretary was pessimistic or optimistic. This is a stock question. What would you say?

Secretary RUSK. I would say that when I met the committee before I went over there, I was neither pessimistic nor optimistic, and I seem to come back in the same mood.

The CHAIRMAN. You are neither pessimisitc nor optimistic.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. But very patient.

Do you feel it was worthwhile? They will ask me that.

Secretary RUSK. I do think it was worth having the Foreign Ministers there for 2 weeks to help get the conference off in a good atmosphere, and to get the work of the conference established. So from that point of view it was worthwhile, and the exchanges with Gromyko were definitely worth having.

The CHAIRMAN. You got better acquainted and you understand each other better, is that right?

Secretary RUSK. We clarified each other's position.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they will ask you, I guess. They may not bother me too much.

Secretary RUSK. I think I will just pass them by, because I passed them by over on the House side. I will tell them it is for the chairman of the committee to comment.

The CHAIRMAN. It is going to be very brief.

[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

BRIEFING ON THE SOVIET UNION

TUESDAY, APRIL 3, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:20 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, and Capehart.

Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff; and Frederick Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

Consideration of the bill (S. 2824) To amend the Bretton Woods Agreements Act to authorize the United States to participate in loans in the International Monetary Fund to strengthen the international monetary system was held over on the request of Senator Lausche. Without objection, the committee approved for report the nomination of Robert Woodward to be Ambassador to Spain.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator Wiley, this is Ambassador Thompson, our Ambassador in Moscow. He is here for a briefing, not for any official reason—that is, no objection to be taken.

Senator WILEY. I am sure he has a lot to tell us.

The CHAIRMAN. I am, too.

We are very pleased to have you. I regret that we have several conflicting meetings this morning. Finance is meeting on the tax bill, and several others. So we won't have many members here, I am afraid. But I would like to put on the record whatever we can, so we will have it available for their information—anything you have to say.

There have been some very interesting recent developments in your part of the world.

If you will just say in your own words whatever you think is appropriate for the information of the committee, we will appreciate it very much.

STATEMENT OF HON. LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR., AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION

Mr. THOMPSON. Fine, Senator. I hope the usual thing will apply. It is always unhelpful to me if any views are attributed to me outside.

The CHAIRMAN. This is an executive session. This will not be published and not be made available to the press.

Mr. THOMPSON. As you know, any predictions about the Soviet Union are very dangerous. This thing changes from day to day. You never know what is coming next. They are having a meeting of the Supreme Soviet on April 10, and I think we will get some clues then as to where they are going. There are probably going to be quite a few changes inside, in both the government and the party. And particularly in agriculture.

OPTIMISTIC OVER RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS

Overall, I think, leaving the Berlin question aside, I am pretty optimistic about the situation now. I think the Soviets are running into a lot of trouble. As you undoubtedly know, this is true particularly in agriculture. Their output in 1961 was only 1 percent over 1960, which was itself not a good year. The population is increasing. Their plan calls for an 8 percent increase.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this just agriculture you are talking about?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, just agriculture.

Senator WILEY. What do you mean by saying you are optimistic?

Mr. THOMPSON. I am optimistic about our relations with them, because I think these internal troubles they are having are going to limit their ability to make trouble for us.

The CHAIRMAN. Make them a little more agreeable.

Mr. THOMPSON. That is right.

Their problem in agriculture I think is a long range one and a deep one. I don't think they are going to get over it in a short while. They don't have any real answer now.

MORE INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE

One of the things that they will obviously have to do is put more investment in agriculture, and this means they are going to have to take it away from something—at the same time that they have been stepping up their military expenditure. This means it has to come from somewhere, and it is very difficult for them to take it out of consumer goods, because this is one of the things they need to increase to deal with their agricultural problem.

In agriculture, they have to put in more investment in fertilizer, machines, better seed, but they also have to give these peasants something to buy with the money they make. A fellow was out in the new lands area last fall and told me—he was being conducted around by a Russian—this was not an American—and he said they saw nothing but women in the fields. About 54 percent of their agricultural labor is female anyway, but in this case it was about 100 percent. So the Soviet officials asked the women where the men were, and they said they were in the village drinking tea. They went up to the village. The place was full of men sitting around. The Russian said, "Why aren't you out there working?" They said, "Why should we, we have money and nothing to buy with it." And for them to step up their consumer goods production in a country that big, with as many people involved as there are, is a pretty big undertaking for them.

In order to meet their 7-year plan, they have got to keep up their investment in heavy industry.

The other sector that is important is housing, which has been their greatest problem.

They were 80 percent behind the plan last year. The pressure from the population grows—because Mrs. Ivanovitch was willing to share her one room with an entire family, as long as Mrs. Markov was in the same boat, but now Mrs. Markov has a new flat, she wants one too. This pressure is very strong on them.

Some of our boys went to a little neighborhood meeting on this, and it got so violent, they had to break it up and close the meeting. People were shouting and waving and everything else. This pressure is very strong. They find it very difficult to cut that back.

KHRUSHCHEV PROPOSALS FOR AGRICULTURE

Khrushchev has proposed a number of things to deal with the agricultural problem. One of them is reorganization. They are going to set up committees at all levels, agricultural committees, whose main purpose will be to try to actually direct and run the collective farms. You know, they abolished the machine tractor stations a couple of years ago, and the party used to exercise its control through those stations. They didn't have enough good party members to put on all the farms, so they used these MTS stations to exercise control. Well, one of their problems is that these farmers will do what they please. It is very hard for them to make them plant what they want them to plant, and to work the way they would like them to work.

The CHAIRMAN. Even on the collectives?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.

One of their problems has been that the peasants' real interest is in these little private plots they have, and not in working on the collectives. If you leave aside industrial crops and grain, about half the food grown in that country is grown on these little individual plots. They spend much more time and energy on that than they do on the collective farms. This is pretty much true throughout the bloc—except for Poland, which has kept private ownership in agriculture—the collective system has generally been pretty much a failure.

The Soviets are moving more and more toward state farms now. One of the reasons is that the poorer farms, to reach any satisfactory productivity, need big investments, and the state doesn't like to turn these investments over to these farmers, so they make state farms out of them and just pay these people straight wages.

But another effort that Khrushchev has been plugging lately is to change their grass rotation system. Our people think that if this is done in a very big way, he may ruin an awful lot of land, insisting that they grow row crops and give up this grass rotation. This is all right if you have the proper fertilizer to put on it, and people know how to do it, and you have machines to do it with, but for the large part, they don't have them.

A lot of these peasants don't believe in this anyway. They lack facilities for handling it. A lot of the fertilizer gets dumped out at a way station, out in the weather, and doesn't get on in the right time of the year, and all this sort of thing. Undoubtedly this will increase some of their production—if they keep a lot of it in row

crops rather than grass. But what it will do to the land is questionable.

I think probably one of the reasons Khrushchev is doing this is not only to increase production, but to try to break these peasants of grazing their cattle and stock on collective farm land, which they are not supposed to do. As long as the grass is there, it is pretty hard to control.

But in any event, this is a real problem for them. There will be some announcement about it at the Supreme Soviet meeting. At the last meeting they had about it, they raised the problem, but didn't give the answer. They didn't say where this extra money was coming from.

One result of this is that Khrushchev's interest in disarmament should be very greatly increased, because this is the one area in which he might find the money and the resources to put in the agricultural sector.

SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

Their industrial production is going much better. There again, their rate of increase is slowing down. Their goal for this year is 8.1 percent, whereas I think last year it was something like 9.1. But here again, their plan was based very largely on a great increase in productivity, and they were counting a lot on automation to accomplish this.

As we found out, this is a pretty tricky business, and I think they are going to have a great deal of trouble with it. They are not noted for their ability to maintain machines and look after them. If you have an automated line in which you have 20 machines, if each machine is 95.5 percent reliable, your line is down practically all the time. They have all got to be very reliable. As I say, their maintenance is very poor.

They shortened hours, which also made it more difficult for them to increase their productivity and output.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

MISINFORMATION ON SOVIET PRODUCTIVITY

Mr. Ambassador, with regard to your statement a minute ago about their productivity to be 6 percent or 7 percent or something like that, I think there probably has been a tremendous amount of misinformation put out—that is, interpretation—on this matter of percentage of increase. If you start with a base of "X," a 6-percent increase of X is 6X. But if you start with a base of 10X, a 6-percent increase on 10X is a whale of a lot.

We talk all the time about the Communist countries. We see propaganda in some of our newspapers, from some of our writers, that there is this tremendous upsurge of productivity. But a percentage on a small base in total is not very great. A much smaller percentage on a big base started from is far more in volume.

What is the situation there?

Mr. THOMPSON. This is bound to happen in this country. The figures they have been citing throughout the years were very impressive, but now—even China, in many ways now, will have higher rates of increase than they will, because of their low base. But cer-

tainly the Japanese and the West Germans and others are higher than the Soviets, starting from a high base.

This in itself of course, the fact that the rate of increase levels off, isn't a problem for them except in their propaganda. They have made a lot of this in recent years. But the actual increase, of course, is very great. Their steel production now, I think, is 70 million tons a year, something like that—getting close to ours. The actual physical increase last year was something like 5 million tons. Even though the rate of increase is less than it was, the actual increase is very great.

MEETING GOVERNMENT PLANS

One thing that is very important to them is the government plan. Now, this to us wouldn't necessarily mean so much. If you have a goal, as we have, in certain areas—if you don't meet it, if there are good reasons for it, that may not bother you too much. But with them, their whole psychology is based on plan fulfillment. The manager of a factory, if he doesn't meet his plan, even though the government failed to provide him with any raw materials, is punished, and all of his employees suffer from it. So their whole psychology is geared to the fact that if you don't meet the plan, somebody is in trouble.

Certainly in agriculture we are convinced they cannot conceivably meet their plan, and in industry I think there are signs now they are not going to meet that either. Their investments are falling behind their plan, and the increase in productivity is not keeping up with the plan.

One of the things that they have found out very clearly is that they can only operate on the basis of incentives. They freely admit this now. The difficulty is to provide the incentives. With these strains on their resources, they are finding that hard to do.

Their goal, of course, is to try to get into what they call the era of communism. They are now in socialism. They want to get in the era of communism in the next 10 to 20 years. Although their 20-year plan calls for providing certain things without payment—free transportation in the cities and things of that sort—they have admitted even in their plan that they are going to have to provide incentives to about half of the income of their people, even after they get to this 20-year goal.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM

Senator CAPEHART. What is the difference, as they see it, between socialism and communism?

Mr. THOMPSON. The main difference is that under socialism it is from each according to his ability, to each according to what he produces, and under communism it is according to his need. In other words, theoretically, in time, everybody would get what he needs, and is supposed to like work well enough to work regardless of the fact that everything is supplied to him.

They don't, of course, pretend that they would have absolute equality right across the board—some people would need better houses than others, and better transportation, and so on. But it

means that everything would be provided, and people would just work out of the love of it.

The greatest failure, I think, of all is that they have not produced this new Soviet man they have been talking about, that is supposed to have all these qualities. And the papers are full of stories of people engaging in private enterprise in every way. A lot of them get caught and a lot don't.

EXECUTIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION

Senator CAPEHART. Have they executed a lot of people recently in respect to the food situation?

Mr. THOMPSON. Not so much food as speculation—people dealing in foreign currencies, selling government supplies.

Senator CAPEHART. How many, do you have any idea?

Mr. THOMPSON. We have read of sentences of, I think, something like 8, 10.

Senator CAPEHART. Are they primarily Jewish people?

Mr. THOMPSON. Three of them were.

VOTES AGAINST KHRUSHCHEV

Senator WILEY. How do you interpret that vote—slightly over a million didn't vote for Khrushchev?

Mr. THOMPSON. This still was a very high percentage that he got, regardless. But there are a lot of people that don't like his policies, because they have suffered under them. For example, the people that were on these machine tractor stations, when those were abolished, they had to go to work on the farms and they didn't like it. Other people are opposed to his educational policies. There are people who lost their jobs, that were good jobs, and they are against him. There are always bound to be some, but it is not very significant. I think generally speaking he is pretty popular with the mass of people throughout the country.

DANGEROUS SITUATION IN BERLIN

Senator WILEY. Will you tell me what your ideas about Berlin are? That is what I asked you—when you said you were optimistic. What is your optimism as to Berlin?

Mr. THOMPSON. Senator, when I said that, I put aside the question of Berlin.

The CHAIRMAN. Except for Berlin.

Mr. THOMPSON. I think on Berlin that it is pretty clear we are not going to get an agreed settlement that settles the problem. Our positions are too far apart. I don't think we can reconcile them. But I think there is fairly good hope that we will get some means of dealing with the fact of disagreement so that we don't have a real conflict.

It is a very worrying and dangerous situation—the harassment going on, in itself, is very dangerous.

SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH

Senator CAPEHART. Do you believe they are getting militarily stronger each day?

Mr. THOMPSON. On a relative basis, I would doubt it. It is very difficult for me to pass a judgment on that. I think in the past year—probably we are better off relatively than we were a year ago.

Senator CAPEHART. You mean the Russians are?

Mr. THOMPSON. That we are.

Senator CAPEHART. My question was, are the Russians getting stronger each day?

Mr. THOMPSON. They are getting stronger, they are building up their strength, but whether or not it is relative to ours, I don't know.

Senator CAPEHART. My question is whether they are building up their strength.

Mr. THOMPSON. I think so.

Senator CAPEHART. Both in air and missiles and on the ground?

Mr. THOMPSON. Undoubtedly. They claimed to have increased their budget by something like the equivalent of between $4 billion and $5 billion. They are getting something for that.

Senator CAPEHART. Is their biggest weakness at the moment the farms?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, sir; I think their agriculture is their biggest weakness.

Senator CAPEHART. Is it worse this year than it was last?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, because of the population increase.

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH CHINA

The CHAIRMAN. What is their relation with China? Can you enlighten us any about this? We read a great deal of a divergence of their policies, that all their technicians have been withdrawn and so on.

Can you give us any views about that?

Mr. THOMPSON. Every sign we get is that it is getting deeper. I think it is fundamental. They may patch it over outwardly for a while, but I don't think they can cure it.

There are a lot of reasons for it. One is that nationalism seems to be stronger than communism on both sides. The leadership of the bloc is at stake. The Russians certainly don't want to give it up. The Russians are worried about the population explosion in China—15 or so million increase a year is something they should be worried about. They have a lot of relatively empty land there next door to them. And by nature they are antipathetic. I think the Russians have an inferiority complex, and the Chinese a superiority complex. This is a good formula for trouble. As far as we can tell, generally speaking, they just don't like each other.

And then they have their ideological differences, because China is in a different phase of the revolution than the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has reason to want stability while they develop their internal plans, and the Chinese, because of their internal difficulties, like foreign diversion. The Chinese are interested in getting Taiwan, which is of little interest to the Soviets and so on. Actually I think the Soviet Union has been engaged in a policy of containment of China for quite some years. This money they have put into Indonesia, for example, which is an area which, if they were coop-

erating, would have been a Chinese area, because they have a big local Chinese population.

INDUSTRIAL EXHIBITIONS IN MOSCOW

Senator CAPEHART. Have they expanded their permanent industrial exhibitions in Moscow?

Mr. THOMPSON. They add a little every year.

Senator CAPEHART. Is it still operating?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.

Senator CAPEHART. Do they still have dozens and dozens of groups that come in each day from all over the world?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, and they use this, not only for showing foreigners what they are doing, but the education of their own people.

Senator CAPEHART. Are there as many or more foreign groups as there were a year or 2 years ago?

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, there were certainly less Americans this past year.

Senator CAPEHART. Lots of Latin American groups?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, a lot. There are a lot of Indians. Africans have increased. But the Chinese of course have decreased.

Senator CAPEHART. Any Cubans?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, a lot of Cubans.

Senator CAPEHART. Have you any reason to believe they are training Cuban fliers in Russia?

Mr. THOMPSON. As far as I know, not in the Soviet Union. We have had reports of training in Czechoslovakia.

SOVIET FACTORIES

Senator CAPEHART. Do they still have pictures up in all their factories of their workers?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes; they have taken down a lot of pictures of Stalin, and a lot of statutes.

Senator CAPEHART. Interesting thing. You go through the factory and there are all sized pictures. You ask what it is. "Well, that is a picture of some worker that did some outstanding thing."

Is that big lathe factory still going in Moscow?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.

They also, in all their factories, have—their whole concept is victory and defeat, win the battle of this, and overtake the United States and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. They are still talking about that.

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes; they have stopped talking about overtaking us in meat production, because they have already passed the time when they said they would do it.

AGRICULTURE AND THE SOVIET STANDARD OF LIVING

Senator SPARKMAN. What effect does the shortage of agricultural production have upon the Russian economy? Is it dangerous, are they faced with famine, or did they just fail to come up to certain standards and goals?

Mr. THOMPSON. There is no danger of famine. The people have been led to expect and they want a better standard of living, better

life. I think the main effect of it, as far as it affects us—it is the thing I was talking about a little earlier—their need to find investments to bring it up.

This year there were very serious shortages for short periods of time in various places, including Moscow. This is because their total pie they were dividing was so tight that their distribution not being good, some areas would go without meat for a week or more, and then get supplies in again. But there is no question—they still have lots of bread.

Senator CAPEHART. You are not conscious of anybody being hungry.

Mr. THOMPSON. No; but of course, looking to the future, it isn't good enough if they stand still in agriculture. They have to go ahead.

Senator SPARKMAN. What about the consumer goods?

Mr. THOMPSON. There has been a steady increase up until now, very slow. But I think now, because of this need to find investment from other places, they are going to have to take it away from consumer goods—at least not increase it, not continue to increase it.

GROUP PRESSURE IN SOVIET SCHOOLS

I had an interesting insight this year. I have an 8-year-old girl in a Russian school, and I learn a lot from her I can't get directly. It is a neighborhood school in front of where we live. We have gone to some of the parent-teachers meetings and see how the system operates.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the schools? Are they pretty good?

Mr. THOMPSON. On the main it is very good. It is different than I had thought because you think of them as being very strict disciplinarians, and they are not. My child says the teacher has more trouble keeping order than the teacher in an American school.

On the other hand, she came home one day and said, "I don't know how they do it; they have made me want to work." The way they do it, the child does well, he gets up in front of the class, they praise him. If he does badly, he is criticized in front of everybody. And they almost force the parents to come to these meetings, and they discuss each child in front of the whole group of parents. Then the parents are brought in, and group pressure is put on them. They make a great business about getting good grades. And they really want to work.

The CHAIRMAN. This is really applying the incentive system to education, the reward and punishment. We accept everybody as being equal, a few being more equal than others.

Senator CAPEHART. Over there the emphasis is on the individual, what he personally can do himself, his own mind and his own muscle.

Mr. THOMPSON. They have a problem in that, Senator. These are rather homey examples. They sit two by two at the desk. There is another little American boy in this class, who didn't know Russian very well. My child knew it better. This little American boy started drawing on his wrist with his pencil, and the Russian boy started imitating him, doing the same thing. The teacher caught the Russian boy and started scolding him. My child knew the American

boy didn't understand enough Russian to know what was going on. She got up and said it wasn't the Russian boy, it was the American boy who started this. The teacher was very upset. She said, "You should stick by your Americans, this isn't good." They have this conflict as to where they should teach them to place their loyalties.

But, by and large, I think it is good. They make them work hard.

MOVING TOWARD THE INCENTIVE SYSTEM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They are moving toward the incentive system.

Mr. THOMPSON. Quite openly.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We are moving away from it in this country, and they are moving toward it.

Senator SPARKMAN. You think the twain shall meet?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think they have taken a lesson that what made this country great is the incentive system. We are moving away from it, and they are advancing toward it.

Senator SPARKMAN. I heard a commentator on the radio some time back, talking about the agricultural shortage. He gave something which to me was rather revealing, if true. On this little individual family strip of ground, 50 percent of the agricultural production—in fact, he said more than 50 percent had come from that.

Mr. THOMPSON. That is if you except industrial crops and grain production. Apart from that, about 50 percent comes from those.

COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL FARMS

Senator SPARKMAN. I presume it would mean as it applied to those particular farms. Of course, you don't have it on all kinds of farms, but you do on the collective farms and individually worked farms.

Mr. THOMPSON. The productivity on the fellow's little plot, compared to the collective he works on, may be 4, 5, 6 times as great.

Senator SPARKMAN. I knew it was a great deal more, relatively speaking. But I didn't dream it would be in excess of 50 percent.

Mr. THOMPSON. About 50 percent of their meat has come from those little plots.

Senator CAPEHART. What is the average acreage in hectares in those little plots?

Mr. THOMPSON. Of course, it varies depending upon the kind of land it is. It runs around about a half acre to maybe as much as 2 acres—a quarter of an acre to 2 acres.

Senator CAPEHART. I was on one of those farms, about 40 miles outside of Moscow.

Do they still have a lot of geese?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes; they are trying to develop vegetable farms around all the big cities. Before it was a sideline, now they are trying to specialize in this.

Senator CAPEHART. Do they still have all those wonderful exhibits in the industrial exposition?

Mr. THOMPSON. This is very impressive, yes.

Senator CAPEHART. But you can't find any of the good things you see there on the farms or on the streets.

Mr. THOMPSON. Particularly not on the farms. A lot of these are prototypes, anyway.

Senator CAPEHART. They exhibit a lot of very wonderful livestock.

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.

Senator CAPEHART. And that is just as good as it ever was.

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes; I think each year they improve it a little bit. The grounds now are wonderful.

INABILITY TO SOLVE THE AGRICULTURAL PROBLEM

The CHAIRMAN. I don't understand why they are able to do so well in these highly complex industrial activities that result in space vehicles and so on, and can't solve agriculture. What is the missing element that they are unable to solve the agricultural problem? These plants are not privately owned. What is your explanation?

Mr. THOMPSON. I think there are several, Senator.

One is that in the first place, taking the country as a whole, they have a very poor climate for agriculture. Except for the Ukraine, this is mostly a short season. You take these new lands. This thing is really enormous, the gamble they took there.

The CHAIRMAN. This is in Siberia.

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes; they plowed up an area about the size of all of England that had never been plowed before, about 100 million acres. This was all right the first few years, a pretty good crop. But now it is going down because they haven't had fertilizer for it.

Then they have an almost insuperable problem with wild oats. As I gather—I am not a farmer myself—about the only way you can deal with this is let them come up, and plow them, and then seed. Their growing season out there is so short, if they do that, they cannot possibly harvest a crop. They have no herbicide that will kill the wild oats and not kill the grain.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the wild oats come up in competition with what they are planting and squeeze it out?

Mr. THOMPSON. That is right. Also, they can get a dust bowl at any time. They could get a couple of dry years in a row.

Senator SPARKMAN. They are short of moisture in that area. Isn't that one of their big problems?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. They were depending on deep wells.

Mr. THOMPSON. The new lands did save them for the time being. I think the gamble has paid off, as of now. But nobody knows what they will run into in the future.

SOFTENING UP ON DISARMAMENT

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand you, this, you think, is likely to lead to a softening up a bit on disarmament. Is it fair to say that it might lead, if we follow wise policies, to a better modus vivendi all the way around or not?

Mr. THOMPSON. I think so. It makes sense for him. He has, it seems to me, to find some way to keep these military expenditures from going on up. Now, I don't see how he can do it unless we get

somewhere on disarmament or, at least, settle some of these political problems so you don't have this intense competition.

This stuff gets more and more expensive all the time, and with them it is not just a question of money, but of their resources in the form of engineers, scientists, technicians, and so on, that they need for other things. If you are going to go into this automation in a big way, you have to have a lot of competent people doing that. If they are all working on military stuff, they cannot do it.

Senator CAPEHART. Their original start after World War II—all the factories, equipment, machinery, know-how—they got out of Germany.

Mr. THOMPSON. They got a lot out of Germany. They got a lot from us in the very early days. They have come up quickly because they have been able to adopt the Western technology. It was there, and they took it. Now that they are relatively caught up to us, from now on——

Senator CAPEHART. They have to be on their own.

Mr. THOMPSON. That is right.

Senator CAPEHART. And they are falling down.

Mr. THOMPSON. We think in basic science they are very good, but in the application of it they are not nearly as good as we are.

Senator CAPEHART. Are they as strong as we might believe in missiles and rockets?

Mr. THOMPSON. That I don't know.

Senator CAPEHART. Nobody knows.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no way of knowing about that, have you?

Mr. THOMPSON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. They are still quite successful in their secrecy.

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.

Senator CAPEHART. Are the men all gone—mostly women?

Mr. THOMPSON. There are mostly women, certainly, on the farms.

Senator CAPEHART. On the streets.

Mr. THOMPSON. You see quite a lot on the streets.

SOVIET INTEREST IN AUTOMOBILES

Senator CAPEHART. How about automobiles? Are the streets empty?

Mr. THOMPSON. Mostly trucks. They are deliberately not going in for private car ownership. People don't like that; people are interested in having private cars. There is much attention to American cars.

The CHAIRMAN. They would like very much to have them.

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If you could persuade Khrushchev this might solve his agriculture program, if he could make cars the farmer could buy, and build roads——

Mr. THOMPSON. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever discussed this with him?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What does he say when you discuss this with him?

Mr. THOMPSON. He says this doesn't make sense. He says, "You have made a mistake. You have had to put all this money into roads and things, and your roads are getting congested. What is the point of it? The fellow is working most of the day. We have public transportation in the city. If he wants to go on a trip in the country, we will have cars for him to hire."

There again, this thing goes against human nature. A fellow takes pride in a car, he likes to have it, and it is a status symbol. They like to have status, have a better car than their neighbor. These instincts they have not been able to get rid of.

A VERY YOUNG POPULATION

One of the things is that their population is very young now. I think 56 percent of them are under 30. These people don't have this old Communist fervor of the people that went through the revolution and so on. They are much more interested in things that appeal to our people. Even the 5 years I have been there, there has been a great change in little things, but things that I think are symbolic and significant. For example, I remember the first few weeks I was there, there was a lot of stuff in the press about a little girl that put her hair up in a ponytail, and she was pilloried for being decadent. But now they are all going around with this puffed up hairdo, the latest style.

The French had an exhibition there in which they showed some modern clothes, and within a couple of weeks Moscow was full of women with their skirts above their knees. They didn't look very good, most of them are not built for that. But they are interested in these things.

Senator CAPEHART. Were you there when the first Sputnik went up?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been there 5 years?

Mr. THOMPSON. Five years in July.

The CHAIRMAN. The New York Times reported you were contemplating retirement, is that correct?

Mr. THOMPSON. I had thought about it, of course, but I don't expect to.

Senator CAPEHART. I think when I was there, you were in London.

Mr. THOMPSON. On a meeting.

Senator CAPEHART. Sputnik went up in September?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.

Senator CAPEHART. I was there the first of September 1957, I guess.

Mr. THOMPSON. I got there in July.

SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know this fellow [Anatoly] Dobrynin who has been sent here?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, very well. He was the head of the U.S. section in the foreign office.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us a little about him.

Mr. THOMPSON. He is a very able fellow, and I think as they go, a very nice one. He is as good as you will find. He represents the new generation in the foreign office. He has served a lot up in New York at the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN. Does he stand well with Khrushchev?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, I think he does. He doesn't have any political standing himself. He is a career man. But our relations with him have been about as good as with anybody we have over there. He understands something about us. This is one of our problems. So many of these people don't even understand what you are talking about. He has lived here long enough that he does understand how we operate. You at least get on the same wavelength with him.

The CHAIRMAN. What happened to Menshikov; [1] has he retired?

Mr. THOMPSON. He is now filling a nominal job as Foreign Minister of the Russian Republic, which is a job that has really almost no functions.

Senator SPARKMAN. Why was he assigned to that one? Did he fall in disfavor?

Mr. THOMPSON. He is about retirement age. This is the way they give him some pay without too much to do, I think—sort of a pension.

Senator CAPEHART. Who won the skating contest the other night in Prague? The Russians?

Mr. THOMPSON. I haven't seen.

U.S. AND SOVIET FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us anything about their foreign aid program and its relation, if any, to our foreign aid program? Is our foreign aid, the maintenance of it under the present level, important under our contest with the Russians or not? Are the Russians stepping theirs up?

Mr. THOMPSON. I don't have specific figures clearly in mind, but they are still carrying on a big program. Given these earlier remarks I made, I think it shows the importance they attach to it. When they are really pressed as badly as they are, they put money into the foreign aid. They think it is extremely important. Of course, this is one of the big quarrels with the Chinese. I think one of the things that made the Chinese maddest is that they were helping bourgeois governments, and the Chinese so desperately needed help from them.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you have the figures on what they are expending by way of grants and loans?

Mr. THOMPSON. I don't have them with me, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Are those figures available?

Mr. THOMPSON. I am sure the Department could give you some information on that.

Senator LAUSCHE. I thought they have always expressed the view that there is no certainty about the accuracy of the figures.

Mr. THOMPSON. I am sure that is true. You do the best you can to collect what you can.

---

[1] Former Soviet Ambassador to the United States Mikhail Menshikov.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dutton, would you undertake to get for us whatever you can on this subject?

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it your opinion that compared to our expenditures, theirs are large?

Mr. THOMPSON. On an absolute basis, I would say theirs are certainly much smaller. But from their ability to do it, given the demands on their resources, I think they are quite large.

Senator CAPEHART. Isn't it on purely a trade basis? They don't give them money, they give them credits to buy things?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, they usually give them credits.

Senator CAPEHART. They buy in Russia?

Mr. THOMPSON. Or the bloc.

The CHAIRMAN. We had reports that the Aswan Dam is proceeding, but very slowly. Do you know anything about that?

Mr. THOMPSON. I have heard general reports to that effect.

COMPETITION IN AID PROGRAMS

The CHAIRMAN. I had the impression—I may be wrong—that their pressure in such areas as Guinea and the Middle East are not as strong as they were a year or two ago. Is that your view?

Well, now, I don't know that there is anything more, unless you have anything further by way of advice you would like to give the committee on this question.

The foreign aid bill is going to come up again, as you know. We will start hearings shortly.

It is not your responsibility, of course, to make decisions on it. But I think it is useful to the committee to realize that this is a matter which is important in our relations, not only with Russia, but with the rest of the world. I take it from what you said it is very important.

Mr. THOMPSON. Oh, yes. This is one of the places where they are really trying to get the best of us, and in which they hope to win by it. They are basing it on two things. One, that they can eventually out-produce us and provide a better life for their own people. The other is this business, particularly with the underdeveloped countries, to gain influence through getting into their foreign aid programs and exercising influence on the development of those countries. So I think the two things where we have to really compete with them are to make our system work better than theirs and to see that these countries remain free by not getting under their influence unduly through their aid programs.

We have this problem throughout all of this area. These underdeveloped countries are impatient in expecting to get ahead. If we and the rest of the Western free world don't help them meet their problems, they are certainly going to turn to the Soviet bloc, and some of them would probably come under their influence and control.

I think lately it has been quite encouraging that some of these countries like Guinea have been having some quarrels with them, and having second thoughts. It looked as though they were going right down the drain for a while, but they have moved back a lot. I think in some of these cases we have to take a long range view of these things. There will be periods when we get pretty annoyed at

some of the statements these people make. But in the end, if we keep on a steady keel, they will come back.

SOVIET FOOTHOLD IN CUBA

I don't think Cuba really is an exception. The real danger of the spread of communism is the case when a country is contiguous to Soviet power, where they can exercise this influence. These countries, even though they do waiver over much farther left than we would like to see them go, I think in the end they will swing back if we keep on a rather steady course of helping them improve the lot of their people.

Senator SPARKMAN. You said that you did not feel that Cuba was——

Mr. THOMPSON. For the moment they have a foothold there, where it is not contiguous. But I think that the end——

Senator SPARKMAN. You don't believe that would be one of their great interests.

Mr. THOMPSON. I think they don't expect it to remain as it is, and I think they are a little worried about the money they are having to put in there. They are not sure it is going to pay them in the end.

Senator SPARKMAN. I have felt all along that Russia wasn't going to invest much in Cuba.

Mr. THOMPSON. Lately, of course, I think they have seen more promise there than they did earlier, in using it as a base, which encourages them to go on. But they don't like the fact that Cuba has declared itself a Marxist country and wants to be considered a member of the club, because this involves them in implied responsibility which they don't want to assume. It is too far away, and they know they couldn't fulfill them.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any information on the nature of their aid to Cuba, other than the military?

Mr. THOMPSON. I don't recall. I have seen some estimates of what they are getting, which is quite large.

The CHAIRMAN. Primarily military equipment, isn't it?

Mr. THOMPSON. They supplied almost all their oil, for example. That was a big item. As I recall, a rough estimate was—the bloc as a whole—something like $600 million.

The CHAIRMAN. They are trading oil for sugar?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, and they passed on some of the sugar to China.

TOUGH PROBLEMS REMAINING

The CHAIRMAN. I get very puzzled about it. I don't want to be too optimistic. But the developments in Guinea and in Egypt and Iran, or the lack of developments toward communism, seem to me to be very encouraging.

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, I think that is true. Of course, we have a lot of very tough problems still, in Laos, Vietnam. Iran is worrisome, because this is contiguous to them.

This is again part of their quarrel with the Chinese. The Chinese say they ought to go out and support Communist parties everywhere regardless, whereas they, for example, have been helping

the Egyptian Government, which suppresses the Communist Party. But I think their idea is to play for the bigger game. They found out in Iraq, where they for awhile did encourage the Communist Party to have a go at it. This alarmed the others and makes it more difficult for them.

KHRUSHCHEV IS THE COMPLETE MASTER

Senator SPARKMAN. Where is Molotov [2] now?

Mr. THOMPSON. He is in Moscow.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is he sick?

Mr. THOMPSON. No, he was in the hospital for awhile but he is out now. The Turkish Ambassador told me he walks every night in a little park near his house, and he meets Molotov nearly every day.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is Khrushchev complete master now?

Mr. THOMPSON. I think so. There is some disagreement about this. Some people think Khrushchev wanted to kick him out of the party and was prevented from doing it. I don't myself believe that. But there is a dispute going on in the Soviet Union on this question of de-Stalinization.

You had a lot of little Stalins all around the place. Of course, a lot of people now want to get at their enemies or people that blocked their promotion by saying, "This fellow was a Stalinist, we want to get rid of him." Of course, if they start that, nobody knows where it will end, because anybody who was in any high position was in a sense associated with Stalin. So there is a great argument going on about that throughout the whole system.

But I don't think the anti-Party group has any power at all. I think one of the clearest proofs is the length of time Khrushchev spends away from Moscow. He has been away 4 or 5 months. And you don't do this if there is any real challenge to your power in a system like that.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know. Is there anything else you want to ask?

IF KHRUSHCHEV IS CHALLENGED

Senator SPARKMAN. As a matter of fact, there would be nothing for us to hope to come out of it, even if he were challenged by the other side.

Mr. THOMPSON. I would be glad to say something about this. There has been a lot of stuff in the press saying that Kremlinologists have taken the view that Khrushchev is either good or bad for us. I don't know of anybody in this field who thinks that American policy should ever be geared to whether Khrushchev is good or not good for us.

In the first place, we don't know what action we could take, what the real effect of it would be, because we know too little about what the internal politics are. My own view is that certainly so far as internal affairs go Khrushchev is the best in sight, because he is doing more to make the country more normal. Almost all of his policies internally are leading in the direction that is, from our

[2] Former Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov.

point of view, more normal. This I think is hopeful in that if we ever are going to be able to work out a way of living with them, they have to become more normal than they were.

On external affairs, Khrushchev has followed some pretty dangerous policies, particularly over Berlin. Of course, you could argue that he is a capable fellow and therefore is bad from our point of view, but we don't know who would succeed him. Anybody else in sight I think would in the first place not have the power, at least for a number of years, to do the things, to make agreements with us. They would have to tend to follow the straight party line as it has been set before, and wouldn't be able to do things which he could do and get away with.

SPECULATION OVER SUCCESSORS

But it is pure speculation as to who would succeed him. The heir apparent is [Frol] Kozlov, and there is a lot of talk of [Aleksi] Kosygin as well. Kozlov is a pure party type. Kosygin is much more an industrialist.

I think there is encouragement because of the fact of his interest in production, Khrushchev is tending to bring more and more into positions of power, both in the party and the government, people good at production, who are technicians, engineering types. These, being less fanatical Communists, I think from our point of view are better. I think this trend will continue.

People it is impossible for us to deal with are these fanatical members of the apparat, as they call it. A lot of those are being eliminated.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you class Kozlov as one of those?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, I would more or less.

The CHAIRMAN. He was here once at the committee, and he struck me as a rather dull fellow.

Mr. THOMPSON. I would say he is a very poor caliber.

The CHAIRMAN. He wasn't near as bright and quick as Khrushchev.

Mr. THOMPSON. They have just named a cabinet member at the Presidium—V. V. Scherbitsky. He is a very impressive fellow, engineering type. He doesn't have any of this bombast that so many of the party types do. If they get more people like that in the government, this in the end could have an effect on their policies.

There are still a lot of the others around, too.

STALEMATE OVER BERLIN

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand you correctly, we have sort of arrived at a stalemate over Berlin, and you don't anticipate any particular change one way or the other. They are not going to give way, and we are not going to give way. It is just going to stay in the status quo for the foreseeable future.

Mr. THOMPSON. I think Khrushchev has gone so far out on a limb now he has to do something. I think probably this year he will sign his separate treaty. But what we have to try to deal with is what that situation creates. If we can find a way that we can maintain ourselves in Berlin, maintain access, and keep the city viable, even

though he does this, that is what we are really working for, it seems to me.

The CHAIRMAN. The paper reported that he has indicated a willingness to reopen the question of international supervision of access.

Mr. THOMPSON. There is a piece in the Times that is very misleading, because so far the only proposal he has put up is geared to our getting out and Berlin being created a free city. It is completely tied to that proposal.

The CHAIRMAN. Our getting clear out.

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.

So this is completely unacceptable.

But they certainly have shown signs they want to go on talking for the moment. I think in the end we have a very good chance of getting some kind of modus vivendi in one form or another, but not a settlement of the problem.

PROSPECTS FOR A SUMMIT MEETING

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any prospect of a summit meeting, any reason for one, in your view?

Mr. THOMPSON. It is very hard to say; as of right now, I don't see it. But I think if we can get within sight of some kind of a settlement on Berlin, it will be a lot easier for Khrushchev to arrive at some kind of a livable arrangement about it, if he does it himself.

This is, again, part of his quarrel with China. He advocates this personal, top level diplomacy. If he can in any way settle this thing, he certainly would be popular in Russia, with his own people, who are very worried about it. And I think probably the chances of settling it directly with him are a lot better than with anybody down the line.

The CHAIRMAN. There is nothing we can do to enhance the differences they have with the Chinese, is there? The fact that we intervene, doesn't it tend to draw them together?

Mr. THOMPSON. It does. But I think the best thing would be if we could reach an agreement, either about Berlin, any of these political matters, or disarmament. The Chinese are very much opposed to this. They say that they are wrong to try to make agreements with capitalist countries, particularly the United States. So that any agreement we would reach with Khrushchev would put a greater strain on his relationship with the Chinese.

AN AGREEMENT ON LAOS

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any prospect of any agreement in Laos?

Mr. THOMPSON. I think so. The Russians certainly are showing patience while we try to work this thing out, the composition of the Laotian Government.

The CHAIRMAN. That wouldn't please the Chinese, would it?

Mr. THOMPSON. No.

SITUATION IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. The news that we see in the press about South Vietnam would indicate that there is considerable strengthening of

the loyal forces and they are more successful in dealing with the Vietcong. Is that accurate in your view?

Mr. THOMPSON. I have very little information on it, Senator. What I have heard is from people that have recently come back from there, and there is reason to be encouraged. But it is going to be a long, slow process.

The CHAIRMAN. John, do you have anything further?

Senator SPARKMAN. Nothing further. I have enjoyed this discussion.

STANDING UP FOR WEST BERLIN

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador. I don't know whether it is accurate to say it is sort of quieting down, that our relations are not as dangerous now as they were a year or two ago. Is that accurate?

Mr. THOMPSON. I think that is correct. As I say, they are given to surprises, and they can make a sudden change at any time. But I think, generally speaking, that is what I meant by being hopeful. I think there is much more possibility.

The CHAIRMAN. If we can just keep doing successfully what we are trying to do now.

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes; of course, one important thing was that he just couldn't believe we would stand up for West Berlin. I think now at least he has some doubts, if he has not been fully convinced. And that was important.

SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM

Senator SPARKMAN. Are they going to have some surprises for us in space exploration?

Mr. THOMPSON. I doubt if there will be anything very startling. Again, there is the question of what they do with resources. The strain is on them for other purposes, which means they are not going to have as much to put in this area as they would otherwise.

Senator SPARKMAN. I read a very interesting article—I don't know whether it was in one of the local papers—about the buildup of deterrents, one against the other. It said that our ICBM's ought to be maintained at a level that would make Russia feel that we at least had that initial striking power if we wanted to make it, but not so high as to make her think that we were overpowering and likely to trip one off just on purpose. As long as we had an initial striking power, somewhat equal to what Russia had, backed up with that second and third strike, there wouldn't be any danger of atomic war between Russia and the United States. It was a rather interesting discussion. It said that it was certain that Khrushchev did not want a nuclear war, because he realized that would be the destruction of Russia.

Mr. THOMPSON. I think this is right. The great problem is miscalculation. That is the thing we have to worry about. Take a thing like Berlin: He might think we wouldn't go down the line, when we would. That is what worries me.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you believe that he thinks that we would go down the line in Berlin?

Mr. THOMPSON. As I said a moment ago, I think he now has some doubts, whereas before he was convinced we would not.

FAILURE TO ATTACK THE BUILDING OF THE BERLIN WALL

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you think our failure to attack the building of the Berlin wall might have made him think that we would not stand fast?

Mr. THOMPSON. I think, Senator, that his view on this thing is a little bit like ours, that we both are trying to be a little cautious. He took a gamble in doing this. At the same time, I think he didn't want his people—he probably gave them instructions not to shoot. But if we had tried to knock it down, this could easily have gotten out of hand because you can't control the East Germans, and if fighting ever started it would have been hard to stop.

Senator SPARKMAN. Why would he have doubts now about our standing fast in Berlin. I thought everything that happened from Vienna down to now has been a very firm declaration of our intention to stand fast, although I have seen reference recently in different articles by different persons about retreating in Berlin.

Do you feel that there has been any retreat?

Mr. THOMPSON. No; I was talking about the early period, in 1958, when he first started this. He was convinced then we would not fight, and for some time after that. And then I think he was encouraged by some differences between ourselves and our allies, which he exaggerated, probably, but nevertheless it made him believe that we couldn't unite on this problem.

I can give you a story about outer space, if you have the time.

[Discussion off the record.]

RUMORS IN THE SOVIET UNION

This has really become a political factor. The Russians now are telling stories by the hundreds, and a lot of them with a little political content. They are all attributed to the Armenian radio. Every Russian can reel off 20 or 30 of these things to you. They spread around. This is something that didn't exist under Stalin, and is a good sign, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they allow you any greater freedom than they did when you first went there?

Mr. THOMPSON. There is not much change in that. It is about the same. I see more Russians. They will come around more. This exchange program has been a great help in that respect. An American delegation comes over; I usually try to get their Russian counterparts to come to the Embassy. A lot of people have been in many times now, and they feel at ease there.

The CHAIRMAN. They talk more freely?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes; it is still pretty restricted compared to what we are accustomed to, but by looking back on what it used to be, it is a great change.

Rumors do get around. A lot of them know English. They pick up our English broadcast, even though they are jammed by the Russians. And people not being afraid to talk, rumor spreads all over the country in a very short time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, the hearing was concluded.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, APRIL 10, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 2:30 p.m., in executive session, in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Lausche, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and others continued the administration testimony on the bill (S. 2996) To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

For record of the proceedings, see the printed transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 4:15 p.m.]

TREATY OUTLINE ON ARMS CONTROL

TUESDAY, APRIL 10, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:30 p.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. John Sparkman presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Gore, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Tillman of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think we might as well get started. Senator Fulbright will not be here; I am afraid not many other Senators will be here, because they are running back and forth between here and the Senate. This is the time of day most of them try to get to sign their mail.

Here is Senator Aiken. Come in, George. We are just about to get started. We can do it now on a bipartisan basis. We will proceed. Go right ahead.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM C. FOSTER, DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE BUNN, GENERAL COUNSEL

Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Chairman, this is in connection with the items which we are presenting at Geneva to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference. We felt that you should be brought up to date on where we stand on certain parts of this and where we plan to go.

You will recall that the Soviet presented a so-called draft treaty to the Conference early in the session at Geneva, and we had presented our September 25 program, both directed toward the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament. We had felt that the best way to progress was to get the broadest measure of agreement on measures leading to general and complete disarmament, and reported that to the committee before we went to Geneva on March 10.

The Soviets have refused to, in effect, discuss the situation in these terms, and have said that since they have the only draft treaty, we should confine our discussions to a proposal working toward a treaty. Therefore, it seemed wise, at least from a tactical viewpoint, to put the substantive items which are in our September 25 program in the form of a draft treaty outline in order to offset this tactical approach which they have made, and to put this on an equivalent basis because many of the new nations there, the eight non-aligned nations, could not understand why we are unwilling to talk about the Soviet draft treaty.

DRAFT TREATY OUTLINE

So we have been working toward a draft treaty outline, and it was that, in particular, we wanted to discuss with you.

This, of course, is purely tentative. It is for purposes of discussion. It is for purposes of educating the members of this Conference to the complexities of what we are attempting to do. For the most part, it sticks almost completely to the September 25 program, and it then attempts to develop in more detail the items which have been covered in that September 25 program.

It begins with a preamble; it includes a set of objectives and principles which set the background for stage 1. It then progresses into stage 2 and stage 3. But the point about both the program and the proposed outline is that there is no time limit set for the overall achievement of the final objectives.

There was a time limit set as a possibility for the first stage in Secretary Rusk's first statement to the Conference. He said that we presumed it would be possible to achieve the objectives of stage 1 within 3 years.

ACROSS THE BOARD CUT IN MAJOR ARMAMENTS

In this draft treaty outline, which is still in the discussion stage within the executive branch, we did set forth an objective of a 30 percent cut across the board for various types of major armaments. The details of that, of course, are still to be negotiated out, both within the U.S. Government and ultimately, of course, also as between ourselves and the other countries at the Conference.

The treaty outline was felt essential as a device and also as a discipline under which we would think out for ourselves exactly the implications of some of these activities. Naturally, it would only be in the form of a discussion and an agreement over there on the general procedures, and it would have to come back to you gentlemen if we ever got to an agreement, to the point of an agreement, between ourselves and the Russians in the form of a treaty.

There have been some questions raised as to whether this is a 9-year suggestion of moving toward complete elimination of national armies. That is not the case.

We did set stage 1 of 3 years. We have set very definite provisions for a transition between stages. During that transition one would have to check whether all the items which were presumed to take place in stage 1 had taken place, whether the preparations for stage 2 had been been adequately set up; whether the international measures or mechanisms had been established to take care of the next requirements.

Senator GORE. To make the checks.

NOT A 9-YEAR PROGRAM

Mr. FOSTER. And we had not set a time limit publicly for either stage 2 or stage 3. So this could not be, as Lord Home said in one of his comments before the Conference, that the U.S. plan was a 9-year program. That is not the case. We do not know how many years it would be, because all these things would have to transpire before it would be possible to shift from one stage to another.

It is entirely within the realm of possibility that the third stage, in the best of all possible worlds, if everything had worked perfectly up to that point, it might be actually shorter than 3 years or it might be longer than 3 years. We do not attempt to define that at this point in time, because it is impossible to look that far ahead and see what would have happened.

It is fair to state, however, that we never in any sense have said that we were offering the 9-year treaty to remove the national armies and armaments of the United States. That is not a correct statement.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Foster—Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt for just a moment to clarify a point for this record?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. As Senator Gore interjected a moment ago, after stage 1, which was contemplated to be a 3-year period, the checking that is requried may call for a considerable amount of time; is that not true?

Mr. FOSTER. It is true, and we would not proceed until all of the things that are set forth have been suitably disposed of.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is true also of stage 2.

Mr. FOSTER. That is true of the transition between stage 2 and stage 3.

Senator HUMPHREY. Under the best of circumstances or almost under controlled laboratory conditions, speaking in scientific terms, the 9 years was a figure that would respond to the best of circumstances; isn't that about right?

Mr. FOSTER. I think it is apt to be a little better than the best of circumstances because that might allow for no transition time, so that you might have something from 9½ to 10 years in the best of circumstances, I would suggest.

BILATERAL DISARMAMENT

Senator HUMPHREY. All of this is at least bilateral and not unilateral, isn't that correct?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, this is true.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is more than that; it is multilateral.

Senator HUMPHREY. I said it is at least bilateral.

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, it is at least bilateral, and it might be, and we assume it would be, multilateral.

Senator HUMPHREY. The reason I mention that is that the point has been made that our policy is a unilateral disarmament, and that obviously is not the case, is it?

Mr. FOSTER. Not at all. There is no kind of unilateral disarmament in this plan whatsoever. Each stage would be balanced, each stage would be phased. The design of anything that would be done would be such that the relative military security of each side would not be harmed as you went down.

Senator HUMPHREY. But each stage relates to comparable action on the part of other nations and, particularly, the Soviet Union; does it not?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, this is not a self-enacting program. It requires a compensatory action on the part of other participants, and in this instance primarily the Soviet Union.

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct, and each of these opposite actions would need objective international verification to make sure that it had taken place.

AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE FORCE

Senator AIKEN. This objective is to reach a time when the United Nations would have the only sizable armed force in the world?

Mr. FOSTER. There would be an international peace force, Senator Aiken; this is the purpose.

Senator AIKEN. I am a little ahead of you, perhaps—this armed force of the United Nations would be complying with a majority vote of the United Nations?

Mr. FOSTER. Well, there are several phases.

Senator SPARKMAN. Or the Security Council.

Mr. FOSTER. The Security Council.

Senator AIKEN. The veto is still there. Why not the General Assembly? When we went into the Congo, we went into there under the General Assembly Resolution.

Mr. FOSTER. The first stage would not depend in any degree upon an international peace force; that is stage 1. The ultimate would be an international force, and at that point, frankly, we have left that a little bit to be an agreed procedure. In the first stage you would set the background for an international peace force which would begin to build up in the second stage.

Senator AIKEN. I see.

Mr. FOSTER. In the second stage, there would be a supervision of that by a conference of the signatories to any kind of a treaty, a council and an administrator.

These, however, would all be under the direction of and under the control of the Security Council. The Security Council, unless it were——

Senator AIKEN. You are giving all the power to the Security Council?

Mr. FOSTER. They have no power in this until it gets well into the second stage.

Senator AIKEN. Would that require an amendment to the Charter?

Mr. FOSTER. I think it well might.

Senator AIKEN. I see. In that case, the Security Council might function; otherwise it would not.

COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE TREATY

Senator SPARKMAN. One question that puzzles me is, you say that all nations will have to agree to the treaty or, at least, you anticipate all nations agreeing to the treaty. How in the world are you ever going to bring Communist China into this, or suppose——

Mr. FOSTER. Well, stage 1——

Senator SPARKMAN. Maybe this is anticipating by 10, 15, 20 years, but suppose Communist China bucks against it, and refuses to be covered by it, then what happens?

Mr. FOSTER. We had prepared this plan on the basis that Communist China would not necessarily, and probably would not, be in stage 1. We would not move into stage 2, however, unless Communist China agreed to the conditions that the other nations that were signatories to a treaty had accepted for themselves.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With whom would China agree?

Mr. FOSTER. They would have to agree with the international disarmament organization, the international peace force, and the other signatories to the treaty.

Senator AIKEN. That would be selected by the signatories to the treaty?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.

RECOGNITION OF CHINA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That would presuppose, then, recognition of Red China?

Mr. FOSTER. I am not sure of that, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As a de jure nation.

Mr. FOSTER. It is conceivable that you could do this without recognition of Red China by the United Nations if they would be willing to accept the obligations of the treaty, which would have its own independent conference, council, and administrator for the verification procedures and for the establishment of the peace force.

Senator SPARKMAN. We made some kind of an agreement for the return of prisoners without their recognition.

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir. This is one of the problems, and we recognize it as such.

Senator SPARKMAN. And in negotiations on Indochina, we did not participate in the conference except as observers.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Certain nations have recognized Red China.

Senator SPARKMAN. But we were part of the prisoner return. We actively led in the conduct of the proceedings.

Mr. FOSTER. One of my colleagues, Ambassador [Jacob] Beam, of course, has been negotiating with the Chinese for the last 4 years for the return of prisoners, from his position.

Senator SPARKMAN. And Alexis Johnson for 3 years prior to that.

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct. There have been hundreds of meetings on this and, of course, they have participated in the discussions about Laos in Geneva, so this can be done without recognition.

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course, if we approach a realistic disarmament or arms control program, the conditions may open up considerably.

Mr. FOSTER. We conceive that it might take a couple of years to get agreement between ourselves and the Soviet Union on the kind of treaty as proposed in the outline on which we are working. This would be July 1964. A lot of things might happen between now and then.

If the first stage took 3 years, and if we could, and we believe we could, benefit from the first stage without China's being part of it, 5 years or more is a time in which many things could develop. A

30-percent cut is felt that it could be bearable even without China in it, and some of the other things which we talk about.

COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS

We talk about the reduction of U.S. and U.S.S.R. armed forces to 2.1 million by the end of the first stage. We talk about a cutoff of the production of fissionable materials during the course of the first stage; we talk about a curb on the transfer of nuclear materials and nuclear know-how to nations not having it; we talk about outer space with no bombs in orbit, and with peaceful cooperation and notification; all of these things could be done, in the opinion of the Defense Department and, of course, all of these are being coordinated within the executive branch as policies which would be followed.

Senator SPARKMAN. Has this plan been worked out with the Defense Department?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir. We have some differences still as to exact methods by which we would reduce the categories of weapons. This has not yet been resolved.

We have had a number of meetings with the so-called Committee of Principals at which the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the CIA, the Chairman of the AEC, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director, and two or three White House representatives, Dr. [Jerome] Wiesner and Mr. [McGeorge] Bundy, sit in on it. We have had a series of meetings over the last several months to attempt to coordinate these things, and the outline of the treaty which we are coming to agreement on has very few items which are still open.

I think, Mr. Chairman, if I might go off the record for a moment, I could tell you of those.

[Discussion off the record.]

MANPOWER IN THE EQUATION

Senator AIKEN. Where do you rate manpower in your publicly estimated strength?

Mr. FOSTER. We had last summer suggested that the active forces be reduced to 2.1 million for each of the largest powers.

Senator SPARKMAN. By the end of the first stage.

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, by the end of the first stage.

Senator AIKEN. Yes; but if you train 2 million a year, we would have a tremendous potential manpower at the end of a few years. Is that taken into consideration?

Mr. FOSTER. To this extent, sir: We would recommend that the armaments which those men would use would be reduced by this 30 percent, and reserve armaments would also be reduced, so that even though you had the men you would limit their ability to be effective by a reduction in the armaments.

Now, this has some problems, and it is still under discussion.

Senator AIKEN. That is what I am getting at. If you reduce the armaments even though you reduced the manpower, the nation with the greatest potential manpower would, with each stage, achieve a degree of, if not superiority, a greater degree of strength

than the smaller nation, one with less manpower, which had been dependent on highly developed weapons; wouldn't they?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes; this is a problem and therefore we have——

Senator AIKEN. Is one of your problems.

Mr. FOSTER. And, therefore, we have in the plan this problem of reserve forces as well. As you move down this series of years and progress, we also have controls on the laboratories; we have controls on the educational institutions. Many of these, however, do not become necessary until you begin to get into the second stage.

Senator AIKEN. It would require pretty complete verification.

Mr. FOSTER. At all stages you would need verification proportionate to the amount of disarmament which you have undertaken. This is one of the basic things we have insisted on and one of the very great differences, as you know, between us and the Soviet Union.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

A DEPENDABLE SYSTEM

Mr. FOSTER. As I said when I appeared before your committee previously, sir, with Mr. Rusk, we believe we have achieved the outlines of a dependable system under which we could tend to meet Mr. Khrushchev's insistence that the amount of inspection be proportionate to the amount of disarmament. We do that by progressive steps, by a progressive system. We do it by statistical sampling. We have brought this forward in those general terms in Geneva, and they have never publicly commented on this. Of course, as Mr. Rusk told you privately, they had stated that they would not allow one inspector on their soil but, of course, this is impossible.

Senator AIKEN. Are you seriously wanting to put this into effect, or are you proposing it for effect?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir; this is something which we have studied from the viewpoint of it being a plan that we would be willing to accept, and we would hope would be accepted in the attempt to turn down the massive measure of the weapons of destruction which are in buildup more and more.

Senator AIKEN. When do you propose to offer it?

Mr. FOSTER. The points I touched on just a moment ago have not been finally agreed on within the U.S. Government, and the President has not made a decision.

But in addition to that we have to go to our allies in Geneva; in addition to this we have to put it before NATO to make sure that this is a Western plan, so there are another 2 weeks before this could possibly be cabled as a suggestion.

INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR TESTS

Senator AIKEN. This would not be used, then, as an alternative to nuclear tests?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir.

Senator AIKEN. It would not be for that purpose at all?

Mr. FOSTER. Nuclear tests are included in stage 2 if they have not before that time been agreed by the nations which agree to the treaty.

DISPOSING OF ARMAMENTS

Senator SPARKMAN. I notice here that in the first 6 months of stage 1, one-third of the weapons to be discarded will be moved in. What will happen with the other two-thirds, or when do they come in?

Mr. FOSTER. You do this progressively. Each year it is felt that one disposes of 10 percent, moving toward the 30 percent.

Senator SPARKMAN. Wait a minute, disposing of how much?

Mr. FOSTER. We said at the end of stage 1 there would be a 30 percent overall cut in certain specified armaments.

Senator SPARKMAN. By the end of stage 1.

Mr. FOSTER. By the end of stage 1.

Senator SPARKMAN. And you do that 10 percent in each of the——

Mr. FOSTER. Ten percent during the first year, 10 percent during the second year——

Senator SPARKMAN. Just in reading it over hurriedly, you said within the first 6 months of the first period you would collect one-third of those supposed to be surrendered in that time. I never saw any repetition as to its being done in the second year and likewise the third year, and so I wondered.

Mr. FOSTER. This is a progressive dealing.

THE THREAT TO SURVIVAL

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you have any feeling of confidence as to being able to make headway with this with the Russians?

Mr. FOSTER. Let me say this, Mr. Chairman; it is our belief that the pressures on both sides to get some sort of accommodation on armaments are such—both from the viewpoint of the threat to the survival, at least of the northern hemisphere, and also the threat of the growing economic diversion of resources into the buildup of these things, particularly in the Soviet Union—that there may be a possibility of some agreements on these things.

Certainly the diversion of our best scientific minds to the development of more and more complicated engines of destruction——

Senator SPARKMAN. I would certainly wish that it might be true.

Mr. FOSTER. There has been little indication of movement on the basic question of verification. There has been a continued desire before the other nations to put the Soviet in a position of being anxious to get this sort of thing, and we believe that this sort of pressure to which I have referred is such that, in their interest as well as ours, there may be movement toward an accommodation over a period.

ROLE OF NATIONAL ARMIES

Senator SPARKMAN. The other day on the Senate floor Senator Goldwater referred to the elimination within 9 years of all national armies. It seems to me that the term "national army" is probably subject to interpretation. For instance, I said on the floor that I certainly felt that the time would never come when any nation would give up its armed forces to the extent required to maintain internal order. That is not contemplated, is it?

Mr. FOSTER. Any plan that we have even discussed or thought about always had included the retention of sufficient arms to maintain internal order.

Senator SPARKMAN. I notice you have that in your paper.

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir. This is one of the basic requirements.

Senator SPARKMAN. There is another thing that I think people may overlook. I do not believe that the temper of Congress or the temper of our people would be such, certainly at this time, to build up what they conceived to be a United Nations army. I have always been in favor of the U.N. police force. I notice you refer to it as the United Nations Peace Force.

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, it seems to me that probably the way you conceive it, it would divide itself into two parts. There would be, perhaps, a relatively small police force that would be completely within the control of the Secretary General, and then there would be earmarked units maintained by nations for use by the United Nations in the event it became necessary for the United Nations to raise a force.

Mr. FOSTER. That is the general plan, sir, and it would undoubtedly need to be a strengthening of the officer corps, the cadres, the planning things within that international force, but the people in it on a permanent basis would be only those needed for the kind of emergency which faces us currently.

Senator SPARKMAN. I have to go and vote. I will be back.

[A short recess was taken.]

SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY

The CHAIRMAN. The committee had better come to order. We will continue to make a record, and the other members of the committee can read it.

Where were you? Go ahead. You were explaining this when we adjourned.

Mr. FOSTER. I was explaining, Mr. Chairman, that the purpose of this appearance was to tell the committee the plan, of preparation of this draft treaty outline, and the purpose, which was to submit this within the next reasonable period at Geneva and to the 18-Nation Conference as the plan under which we would like to proceed toward these ultimate objectives.

It places most emphasis on stage 1, and the most specific measures are detailed in much greater degree than in the September 25 program, with which you are familiar and which has been presented to this committee before.

We had talked about the methods under which we would reduce armaments by 30 percent by the end of stage 1, in degrees: 10 percent the first year, 10 percent the second, and 10 percent the third. We had mentioned that in that kind of a reduction we could do it without the accession of China to the group, and it was felt, and is felt, by the Defense Department that this could be accepted.

All these measures have been discussed at length in the Committee of Principals, and with the exception of certain details as to exactly what you cut and how you cut it, and how you maintain enough production to keep your lines alive, we have general agree-

ment within the executive branch. These items which are still disagreed on——

SUPPORT BY THE MILITARY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When you say with certain exceptions, is it so identified by very fine print in the contract? Is there very much agreement? The military, are they enthusiastic about this?

Mr. FOSTER. I would not say, sir, they are enthusiastic. They are in agreement with these exceptions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Everybody is in agreement that we want peace, and they would like to see it arrive.

Mr. FOSTER. The military are in agreement—if we can get acceptance of these restrictions on the other side, if we can get verification measures such as we are proposing—that it is in the national interest to turn down this otherwise uncontrolled armaments race. This is true of the Department of Defense as put forth by Secretary McNamara at the NSC and at the Committee of Principals. Each of these measures has been discussed with them in detail as we have gone along, and it is not really fine print. These are fairly substantive differences, mainly of interpretation of what the effect of this would be, and I think there is difference even within the Department of Defense as to the effects.

They are very complicated measures, and we are dealing with very important things, as you so well know.

But, no, there is a broad measure of agreement on this as a proposed plan, and as an outlined treaty.

CONGRESSIONAL OBSERVERS

We have had military people with us in all of these discussions and, incidentally, Mr. Chairman, at some point if this treaty outline does get agreement within the U.S. Government and is tabled, I would hope that your committee might from time to time be willing to send some observers over in this discussion. I think this would be helpful. We would not ask you to do that right now, because you might feel that at this point it was a waste of time.

The CHAIRMAN. It is premature.

Mr. FOSTER. I do not think it is a waste of time in the long run. I think this has been one of the most useful educational processes that has ever been undertaken, and having the eight new nations there has made it clear to them that this is not something that you do the easy way, that the Soviet puts it forth and says, "We will destroy all nuclear delivery systems within the first 15 months."

This is so clearly a completely impracticable balancing of present balances within the relationships of nations, and the other thing that has become clear to the new nations is that you could not afford to undertake any measures of arms control unless it were possible to verify that the measures were undertaken.

THE NECESSITY OF INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION

The CHAIRMAN. That is the real sticking point, assuming that everything else—but I am not sure—I would assume that is the real sticking point, is it not?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir; it is. And they have accepted in the statement of agreed principles the necessity of international verification.

The CHAIRMAN. They have?

Mr. FOSTER. But they have said——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who, the Russians?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir. But they have said that this applies to armaments destroyed and not to armaments retained; that our desire to check both sides of this equation amounts to espionage.

We have said to them that it does not. It is simply that we need this in order to have the confidence to proceed, and in all relationships one must develop some confidence before one undertakes this kind of a major step.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is nothing new about that position. I do not mean that verbiage, but the Russians have consistently taken that position. They took it on the test ban negotiations; oh, yes, they agreed to the principle of inspection, but the inspection was to inspect the documents they handed you on their report that they had quit, and they would not let you in their country.

Mr. FOSTER. Of course, sir, you will recall they did agree to the 1958 plan of inspection on test examination in which we had control posts on Russian territory, and they agreed to on-site inspections. They negotiated on this basis for about 3 years up to last year, and then suddenly they reversed the field completely and said they would not have it. Now we are in the position of—we believe that they are encouraging the suggestion at Geneva that any such inspection depend on national systems which, as you know, and as the President today said, was unacceptable to the United States.

TEST BAN VERIFICATION

The CHAIRMAN. What do they mean by national system? Just because they have a closed society that we ought to respect it?

Mr. FOSTER. They say that if we would use seismic stations in India and Burma and Japan and Finland and Sweden and in our own country, we could tell whether any explosion was a nuclear explosion and where it was.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. You have shifted to the test ban now.

Mr. FOSTER. I was answering Senator Hickenlooper's query.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. FOSTER. They did accept this principle, in other words, in the test ban situation. They have never in the present Geneva Conference accepted other than the inspection of arms destroyed. In private discussions—I guess this is all right for your record—they have said, after, they understand that we need to look at more than that.

I would like to go off the record for one moment.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

ARMS BUILD-UP IN INDIA

Senator AIKEN. Is there any apprehension over the reported arms buildup in India?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir; although this was discussed in some of the meetings at Geneva by the statement that it was not only the great powers that should enter into arms control and arms reduction programs. This was also true of such countries as India which had current difficulties with China and with Pakistan.

It was also stated that this is a situation which is true between Israel and the United Arab Republic. This is not only a question between the United States and U.S.S.R.

There is this need, it would be needed, if reductions took place with the great powers.

THE NORSTAD CONCEPT

Senator HUMPHREY. One of the questions I have asked some of your associates, Mr. Foster, and I would just like to get an expression from you on, relates to the proposals of General [Lauris] Norstad. I visited at some length this summer or this fall with General Norstad over at the NATO headquarters, and we discussed these matters of arms control and policies that you were discussing in the President's speech at the United Nations, some of the proposals which had been advanced at different conferences by our disarmament officials. General Norstad discussed with me some proposals that he had relating to armed forces, well, relating to arms control.

The details of it have escaped my memory. Are you familiar with the Norstad concept?

Mr. FOSTER. In general terms, Senator Humphrey, yes. This plan was put up, actually, first in 1958. It was designed to perhaps reduce the intensity of a confrontation.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. FOSTER. It was revived again last fall to some degree as a possible answer to the Rapacki plan which, it was felt, had too many dangers of discrimination against Germany, and so on.

I think there has been a feeling that it would be wiser to confine zones to larger areas than perhaps even the Norstad plan, in view of the long range of missiles and in view of the very substantial strength of the Soviet Union now in the medium-range missiles which are trained on Europe.

I think also there has been some hesitation about a further development of the Norstad plan in view of the present Berlin situation and, of course, extreme sensitivity of the Germans to any discussion of zones within Europe.

Senator HUMPHREY. It just does not ring in my mind now what all of his proposals were. At the time I was talking with him about it, he was right enthusiastic about the suggestions. It was not related so much to the reduction in forces as it was to the sort of, I think, balance of forces.

If there was any way, for example, in which your agency could get in touch with General Norstad and ask him to put down on paper—and he does have it down on paper—his proposals as modified by recent events, and his own thinking, I would appreciate getting that, because in my visits with the General, why, he was very

concerned about the arms race and was concerned about the acceleration in Central Europe, in the European sector, in particular. He had some concrete proposals that he thought would be helpful.

They were not exactly the same as have been presented on other occasions, but he was quite set upon them. I would like to know what they were in more detail. I imagine I have some notes on it in my office, but it has escaped my memory.

Mr. FOSTER. We will be very glad to do it.

Senator HUMPHREY. It would be very interesting to have them, just for our review.

Mr. FOSTER. I would be very happy to do that.

LIMITING MONEY SPENT ON ARMAMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. Have you explored—I suppose you have—other means of approach, such as an effort to limit the amount of money you spent on armaments? Is that feasible at all, or has it been considered?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir; that is one of our plans. We have not only the outline here for general and complete disarmament, but we are approaching this on a sort of double-barreled basis, toward the end that there are certain measures which can be taken almost immediately.

For instance, the reduction of the possibility of surprise attack, this is discussed as a collateral measure at Geneva. It might be reduced by some such measures as better communications between headquarters forces on either side of a line of, well, East Germany-West Germany; by notification to the other side at the time of large-scale maneuvers, indicating what the purpose of those maneuvers is, what the location would be, and what it is expected to cover.

Measures such as an increase in military missions accredited to various headquarters. It has even been suggested that there be a purple telephone, so-called, by which Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev could be in instaneous contact with each other if there were a threat or an alarm such as took place last fall through an electronic difficulty.

CHECKS ON FALSE ALARMS

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Foster, at that point there was quite a story in the press about that. If the press story was accurate, it was rather lucky that things worked out as they did.

What safeguards do you have to make sure that this does not happen again, and that we are going to remain as fortunate as we were this last time?

Mr. FOSTER. There are many checks on false alarms of that sort. The major strike force we have today, of course, is the fleet of B-52's; a B-52 proceeds on what is called a fail-safe method of operation. They may be alerted within 15 minutes and get in the air, and they may start toward their targets, but before they are allowed to go beyond a certain point, they must have a positive new direction that tells them to go on and do this.

As you begin to get into batteries of Minuteman, which are ticked off with more automatic devices, and once underway are

somewhat difficult to recall, this becomes more difficult. But even this is not impossible, because you can crank into this kind of missile a dual target, which might bring them down into the ocean if you get the change within sufficient numbers of minutes after departure.

PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTAL WAR

Senator HUMPHREY. What do we know about the prevention of accidental war on the part of the Soviets? This is what I was interested in last year and made some talks about. I read all kinds of articles about what we do to prevent this thing from going off the wrong way, but what do we know about what Mr. Khrushchev and his crowd are doing? They have a lot of missiles and very good electronic experts; they are very good in electronics. Do we have any of those sort of things in case their radar shows we are allegedly launching an attack, they push the button, and have some kind of a system that checks the forward movement of those missiles? They do not have as many long-range bombers. They may be depending on those missiles.

Mr. FOSTER. Quite frankly, we doubt that they have as good controls as we do. This, of course, is one of the increasing dangers of this kind of an armaments race. This is the real basic reason why we must begin to get these things under control, because it is entirely possible that a war could be kicked off by miscalculation of what the other fellow is doing.

Measures to have better communications might be one of the ways in which you could reduce this danger. The best way, of course, is to begin to turn down the number of these that are in existence on either side under appropriate controls, under such agreements that neither side gives up its position of security as it cuts back. This is the philosophy of the approach that we are making and of the studies that we are directing our attention and the agency to.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I just do not know, I seriously question the advisability of telling that story about that few minutes concerning the other day. It scared everybody to death.

Senator AIKEN. That was 2 years ago.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I know.

Senator AIKEN. The Canadian Broadcasting System carried the news, that is how I got it. We even shut it off here.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But it frightens people.

Mr. FOSTER. I think these things unduly alarm, Senator, and I do think that our systems are so designed that we have many second checks, and this is what caught it. It did not get to the President, as you know.

LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET AGREEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to ask you whether you have any confidence at all that they are going to agree within the foreseeable future to any kind of verification that you would call satisfactory? I do not want to make you——

Mr. FOSTER. I think it is a perfectly fair question. I think that we should be prepared to answer that, sir, and I will attempt to do it.

I think Mr. Khrushchev's philosophy that he has been unwilling to accept some of our past requests for inspection in view of the circumstances in his country probably were somewhat justified. I think that we had asked for massive inspection before any disarmament took place.

What we have attempted to do in the last several months is to see whether there is not a way in which our security will be protected by appropriate verification. At the same time, we would not start by putting "X" tens of thousands of people on his soil before any move was made to reduce either our or their armaments.

I think the system that we have called progressive zonal inspection and random sampling is such a system, because in this you would begin to look in a very small way at their geography at the time you were beginning to disarm in a very small way. As each side disarmed more, the other side would have more and more opportunity to look to make sure there were not being hidden amounts of armamants which could make a significant difference in the relative position of security.

MATHEMATICALLY DETERMINED SAMPLES

We have spent a good deal of time, though, and most of our research money on this kind of analysis, and we think that it has real capabilities. We think that if he is honest in his statements that he does not want inspection without disarmament, this tends to provide him with a kind of a progressive verification without——

The CHAIRMAN. This is a geographical thing, a little at a time.

Mr. FOSTER. It is geographic, and it is also sampling. In other words, we do not look at everything.

On a basis of mathematically determined samples, we would take a look at certain things which their obligation and ours would be to declare. We would declare that we had "X" hundred B–52 bombers. We would not say where they are. We would then take a look at a small geographic sample, and at the time we selected that sample we would ask for a declaration of how many were in that particular piece of geography.

If we found that that was 10 percent of the area and they had said 5 percent of their particular armament was in that area—and we found it was only 2 percent in there, or I guess, on the other side, if we found that 15 percent of their declaration was there, we might suspect that their overall declaration was wrong. In this way, we could afford, perhaps, an error of 5 percent in the first cut, but an error of 5 percent if you got down to only 20 percent of the original total would be a very significant difference. But by that time we would have under inspection, perhaps, 50 to 60 percent of their geography.

It is this method which we feel is a fair method; one that we would be willing to accept. We proceed on the assumption that at some point it will become in their interest to turn this down, too. We think that time may not be too long hence, for their agricultural difficulties, with the diversion of manpower to the buildup of arms, with their attempts to do all the things they are attempting to do for their people and around the world, the pressures and

present cost must be working toward some kind of an accommodation. Perhaps as we move along that time certainly is getting nearer, and this is our hope.

I do not mention the pressure from China.

SOVIET INTEREST IN SAMPLING

The CHAIRMAN. Do they ever say anything that indicates an interest in this particular approach?

Mr. FOSTER. Never officially, but unofficially, yes, they have.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. FOSTER. They have expressed an interest in this, and some of their scientists have said this is worthy of examination. It has never been said in a formal conference, but there is some evidence of interest in it.

REGIONAL AREA DISARMAMENT

Senator AIKEN. Have they given any thought to area disarmament, even small areas?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir; we have, and we have felt that progressive zonal inspection would tend to reduce the armaments in that particular area because it would continue under inspection. Therefore the effectiveness of it would become less, and therefore the incentive would be to move the stuff out of that or to get rid of it.

Of course, once you have inspected it, and once you have an obligation to get rid of a certain percentage of stuff, the stuff you would want to get rid of is the stuff being looked at in that particular area.

Senator AIKEN. I was thinking of the example, not that we could depend on it as being effective, but if we showed it would work on a small scale.

Mr. FOSTER. We had thought that—this raises a great many problems when you begin to inspect it, because if you leave it up to the other side to determine what zone he is going to look at first, which is one of the bases of the random sampling, he might pick the very one that you wanted most to keep your factories and your armaments going in, and it might give a disproportionate effect due to that random sampling.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think what Senator Aiken is referring to—and if I understand his question, I surely would be interested in—are the so-called regional area disarmament proposals like, I think, Dean Rusk told us the other day. When he came back from Geneva, he mentioned to some of the delegates there that all the so-called non-aligned neutral powers were pouring the heat on the United States, and some of them in part, upon the Soviet Union, to get down to cases on disarmament while, in the meantime, India and Pakistan are armed to the teeth. In the meantime there is armament in the Middle East that is a constant threat to world peace. It might not be a bad idea, and I felt this for a long time and have written about it and spoken about it, that we ought to, through whatever international means we have, at least try to encourage regional arms control, to try to lessen the tension in certain areas of the world where, if that tension gets out of hand, it could precipitate a crisis between the main powers.

Mr. FOSTER. I misunderstood your question.

TALKS ON REGIONAL DISARMAMENT

Senator AIKEN. We have Antarctica under agreement, and I had hoped that Central Africa might perhaps come in next, with everybody agreeing to arms out. It may be a little late there on that.

Mr. FOSTER. We did talk to the Ethiopians, the Nigerians, and the United Arab Republic, and they said the difficult relationship was that between the United Arab Republic and Israel.

We did talk to the Mexicans and the Brazilians about a possible regional disarmament area for Latin America. They are taking some leadership in this direction.

We said—Dean Rusk said—to the Foreign Ministers of those countries that we felt that if a region, all the nations in a region, decided they wanted to reduce their arms in the region, certainly we would not stand in the way.

The reason we voted against the African situation was because there were some real questions on the part of some as to whether they should move in that direction.

Senator AIKEN. Latin Americans would be willing to disarm themselves if they were sure we had ample arms up here.

Mr. FOSTER. Yes; this is one of the factors.

Senator AIKEN. If we can get them to disarm against each other, we would have made some progress.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Rusk also said that one comment from a country was that they hoped we could go through with it because then they could buy all the arms they wanted very cheap. [Laughter.]

RELATION TO THE SPACE RACE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think Russia has this political, social problem. I think their leaders feel they cannot compete and survive in an open society. That is Communist such as they envision it, they cannot compete in an open society where they have connection and contact with the rest of the world. That is one of the reasons why they talk about their security system. I do not think they mean necessarily cloak and dagger security, but it is the security of their old system, and I think they think that security is at stake in this thing.

When they reduce inspection on the ground in depth and in numbers, and they talk about the security problem which they have which will prevent that, I think they just mean that the security of the Communist concept is at stake if they let inspectors in, and that is No. 1.

No. 2, I am concerned a little bit about whether maybe the Russians—they have learned a lot in these last tests—may have the idea that they can win this race in outer space and, therefore, do not need to make a deal with anybody. I am not so sure they are farther along on that road than we are, with their heavy thrust ability and so on. I think we will catch them.

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, do you or do you not believe that this whole matter can be controlled in outer space? Do you think it can be?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If you talk about immediate results, no; but if you talk about feasibility and what can happen in a very few years with a determined effort and the concentration of a closed society or a controlled society, it is just a question of whether they can devote all their efforts to these things. I think the danger is so much more real than most of us realize.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say outer space, are you talking about more missiles or do you mean the satellites in space?

Senator HUMPHREY. Satellites, space platforms.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just wondering what you really had in mind.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Space platforms. They are not as far away in space platforms today as satellites were when the atomic program was first begun. I am talking about a determined effort. I am not talking about a partial effort or a reduced effort; I am talking about an all-out effort on the part of either ourselves or the Russians.

LACK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO SPACE

Senator HUMPHREY. Isn't this why, Bourke, Mr. Foster, it is important for us maybe to run up against these dead-end streets we have been hitting for years and years in the conventional type of disarmament talks or talks about conventional disarmament, that we might very well want to explore one or two new areas that as yet have not been fully rejected, such as the prevention of accidental war, conferences relating to that; and, second, this matter of outer space? We do not even have a body of international law relating to outer space. This is one of the real needs today, to define for legal purposes, even if it is only for theoretical purposes, so-called international law for outer space.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever discussed this matter that these two members of the committee were talking about with the Russians?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir; we have, and one of the items which is on the agenda for collateral measures for discussion at Geneva is the control of outer space as far as weapons of mass destruction go.

COMPARISON TO ANTARCTICA TREATY

I would also like to add that the General Advisory Committee which you gentlemen were good enough to confirm a couple of weeks ago spent a considerable amount of time in our discussion, in the 2-day meeting and my colleagues had with them, discussing whether outer space was not one of the areas where so much has not taken place, but what we can get a new hold of this since it did——

The CHAIRMAN. You mean like the Antarctica Treaty?

Mr. FOSTER. Something like the Antarctica Treaty, since it does have the possibilities, which Senator Hickenlooper has referred to, of very dangerous buildups within the next 5 or 10 years.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You have to do something about it. I mean, something has to be done.

Mr. FOSTER. We are devoting——

The CHAIRMAN. That looks like the best place to start. You have the Antarctica Treaty. Why can't you start there, Bourke?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not know, it is a question of the chicken or the egg, where you start. I do not know, but we have one or two ways to go, I think. In the long pull, that is the foreseeable future long pull, whatever that may be, we either have to go out after outer space or we have to get into some kind of enforceable agreement to control it. We have no other choice in the matter.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is exactly my feeling.

The CHAIRMAN. It is much cheaper to try to control it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I know it is, but there are difficulties, too.

NEED FOR A SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL BUREAU

Mr. FOSTER. There are great difficulties, but we are devoting a good deal of time to this, which is one of the reasons we need a scientific and technical bureau, and we have a very good group in this. We are working very closely with Aerospace, which I formed for the Air Force and which I used to be chairman of before I took this job, and they are devoting some of their own money to this relationship in an attempt to help us out. They have set aside, I think, $50,000 to $75,000 to work with us in just this area.

The CHAIRMAN. In this field you would not have the problem of inspection that you do in conventional weapons, would you?

Mr. FOSTER. You always have the problem of inspection, but there are plans to run vehicles which could inspect. Such a vehicle might cost, the first copy might cost, $2 or $3 billion, but this is still something that has not yet lost the opportunity of our getting hold of it, so we are devoting a good deal of time to it.

We have also discussed with NASA this field in great detail, and they have asked the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to set aside a number of men working with us in this field.

We are in this field, we recognize the potential. I mean, we are devoting some major resources out of our very modest budget toward this end. I agree with you, Senator Hickenlooper, that if the Soviet Union or we were to devote tremendous resources to this environment, we could make a very important step toward controlling a lot of things the other fellow could do, and it therefore must be gotten ahold of early.

THE PRIMROSE PATH OF DISARMAMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not think we should devote our total energies to one or the other, to one to the exclusion of the other, necessarily, because we could be led down the primrose path of disarmament in this field, and if we neglect the other we can be bamboozled, or we could devote our energies to the outer space field and neglect some of these other things, and we could have a lot of trouble. It has its difficulties.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I am not posing as a spokesman for anybody, but the whole purpose of this tension is to force us to break through in outer space exploration and travel, and if Mr. Foster will put this into effect, get this agreed to and make it effective, I am afraid our progress in outer space would slacken some-

what. In fact, if it had not been for tension we would still be using, at best, the bow and arrow.

Mr. FOSTER. Well, this would be something good to work back toward.

Senator AIKEN. You once let us get complacent, let us be sure of what tomorrow is, and we would find progress slowed almost to the stopping point.

As I say, I am not speaking for anyone in particular.

Mr. FOSTER. NASA, of course, has very substantial funds for developing outer space for peaceful uses. This would accompany any restrictions we would be able to produce, but I still feel you would have progress that might lead to space travel.

Senator AIKEN. But I think in disarmament you still have got to nibble.

Mr. FOSTER. We have to go both ways.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS

Senator HUMPHREY. One point that might bear some investigation, since all of these things seem somewhat remote on occasion—both the United States and the Soviet Union or the respective blocs, the Sino-Soviet bloc and the Western bloc, grant substantial amounts of economic aid to so-called underdeveloped areas. Much of this aid today is consumed in what we call defense support, and then it is ultimately consumed in what you call military assistance.

It might not be so foolish, or let me put it this way, it might be good to see if you could explore with the Soviet representatives at a conference, like at Geneva, some agreement that when economic aid is granted to an underdeveloped area, the underdeveloped area to which this aid is granted signs a contract with the lender or the donor that none of this money shall be used for military purposes, nor will there be any military assistance. These countries cannot afford this stuff.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Hubert, it will interfere with their sovereignty and their sovereign rights, and they would not want any strings tied to this.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am for a few strings, and I always have been.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am for a few strings myself.

REDUCING MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator HUMPHREY. It just seems to me what has happened is that both the Soviets and ourselves are getting caught up in so-called economic assistance or foreign aid that is being adulterated, watered down, and diluted by the drain of the military upon it. This is characteristic in one area of the world after another. I do not know whether anything like this has any possibilities of success, but it is worthy of exploration. This is in indirect disarmament by preventing the armament.

You take this Middle Eastern area; talk about public opinion. We have always talked about that; we are concerned about public opinion. Even the Soviets at times have been concerned about public opinion, some people think. Is it not possible to bring the bearing of

the whole world of public opinion upon this Middle Eastern area and say, "Look, no more arms. Money, yes; but no more arms."

If you could ever get the Soviet Union to agree with us that there would be no more arms shipped into the Middle East, just that much of an agreement, it would be a substantial step forward. I would not try to say to the Soviet Union that they should not send in technical assistance or economic assistance; that would be their business if they wanted to.

I do not know whether these things have possibilities, but they are no more remote of possibility of success than some of the other proposals that are made.

When you talk to the Soviets about reducing their armed forces and reducing their missiles, which we hope that we can do, we have about as much, I think we have a greater, chance of success in getting the Soviets to reduce some of its military assistance.

Mr. FOSTER. I do not think this is impossible at all. I think this is something that might be done if they really wanted to go down this road. I would hope that perhaps we could talk to them about this kind of thing.

I do not see any immediate probability of their taking any action until we get some agreement on these other measures, but it is one we can do in parallel with the other.

MORE HOPEFUL IN PRIVATE THAN IN PUBLIC

The CHAIRMAN. Why is it, do you think, they speak more apparently hopefully in private than they do in public? It would seem to me that if there was any propaganda, it would be in public.

Mr. FOSTER. I speak hopefully in public because I think the pressure on the Soviet Union is increasing. I think it is in their interests to get this kind of an accommodation because I think then they will be able to do a better job in agriculture; I think they will be able to give their people more.

The CHAIRMAN. That is clear. Why don't they come out in public and say some of the things they say in private? Are they afraid of their people at home?

Mr. FOSTER. I am afraid so.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, you will consider this suggestion at some point, if we move ahead, of assigning a couple of your members to visit us in Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN. You let me know when you think the time is ripe to where there might be something that would warrant their being there. I am sure we can get some candidates.

Mr. FOSTER. I should be very happy to.

[Whereupon, at 6 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 9 a.m., in room 4221, NSOB.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman).

Testifying on the Congo situation, at his own request, was Benjamin Ginzburg, of Arlington, Va.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 9:30 a.m.]

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1962

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:30 a.m., in room F-53, The Capitol, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman and Symington.

Also present: Carl Marcy and Darrell St. Claire, of the committee staff.

[This hearing was published in 1962 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

* * * * * * *

STATEMENTS OF HON. PHILLIPS TALBOT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS; HON. WILLIAM S. GAUD, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT; AND WILLIAM P. BUNDY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

* * * * * * *

The CHAIRMAN. This chart on page 179 doesn't have the military assistance. Can you supplement that? For example, how much military assistance do we have for Pakistan?

Mr. BUNDY. That material, Mr. Chairman, is in our blue book, the military assistance, page 119, if you want to put it alongside. The amount is $53 million for Pakistan, which is about what it has been, a little down. We are going to take a very firm basis of sticking to past commitments for Pakistan, not adding any more.

The CHAIRMAN. There is quite an increase in Iran, $63 million.

SITUATION IN IRAN [P. 174]

Mr. BUNDY. There is an increase in Iran. And we are at the point of making major decisions in connection with the Shah's visit. Perhaps that figure will go up a little over what is shown there.

But what we are trying to do—and I think Mr. Talbot can speak more in detail on it—is to try to get the Shah to reduce the size of

his army from 180,000 down to 150,000. In order to do that the judgment was that it would be necessary to say what we were going to be able to do in the equipment lines for a considerable time in the future, subject, of course, to the availability of funds. And it is a proposal along those lines, in fact a firm position on those lines, that we will be furnishing to the Shah tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. He is very proud of his army.

There is an increase in the development loans, too, isn't there, from $40 million to $60 million?

Mr. GAUD. That is the range, Mr. Chairman. What we propose to do with Iran this coming year will depend very largely on the size and content of the third plan, which is not yet available, and we hope as a result to develop a consortium for Iran under the leadership of the IBRD.

And this figure that you see here of $40 million to $60 million is a range in which we think we are apt to end up on the basis of the best information available today.

* * * * * * *

ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM IN ISRAEL [P. 176]

The CHAIRMAN. Have you found anything out about the atomic energy program in Israel? Have you ever seen that plant?

Mr. TALBOT. No, I have not.

The CHAIRMAN. Has anybody in your outfit ever seen it?

Mr. TALBOT. Not in our outfit.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you do, just ignore it? Do you request any information about it?

Mr. TALBOT. Yes, sir, there has been information requested about it. Some Americans, I understand, have visited it.

The CHAIRMAN. Private Americans or Government Americans?

Mr. TALBOT. Americans. I am not familiar with the details.

ISRAELI PROGRAM [P. 176]

The CHAIRMAN. What are you going to do with the money that you are giving Israel?

Mr. GAUD. Our program for Israel next year will be entirely Public Law 480 and development loans. The development loans, of course, will be firmed up next year as to exactly what they will be, but the bulk of it will be what we call program loans; that is for commodities, spare parts, equipment, and the like necessary for their development plan.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you think that as long as you are making this kind of an investment there, you ought to know what they are doing in the atomic energy field?

Mr. GAUD. We would like to know.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you bargain with them a little?

Mr. GAUD. It is a thought that has never occurred to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not? Are you afraid of it politically?

Mr. GAUD. No, sir. This nuclear energy business doesn't come into the AID ambit, I am afraid.

The CHAIRMAN. It would seem to me anything they do would be of interest to you, as long as you are putting up the kind of money you are.

You are talking about working to minimize the frictions with the Arabs.

Senator SYMINGTON. They might be afraid of the Arabs politically.

The CHAIRMAN. There are lots of Arabs in this country. How many do you have in St. Louis?

Senator SYMINGTON. On this Syrian thing with Israel, the United Nations is a mystery to me.

The CHAIRMAN. They just can't understand anybody making a resolution against them.

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't see why you are so pro-Arab.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not. I am just trying to seek information.

Mr. BUNDY. On this question of the Israeli nuclear project, my recollection, which isn't as good as it should be, is that we got a fairly clear picture of the thing, but the military potential was very limited. And they did give us the assurance that it was not going to be used. Now, any country that produces fissionable material can in the end produce military material.

The CHAIRMAN. Have any of your group seen it?

Mr. BUNDY. Representatives of the United States have seen it. I think they were AEC and not Defense Department.

SYRIAN-ISRAELI INCIDENT

Senator SYMINGTON. Why is there a belief, at least in the United Nations that Israel should not have retaliated against continued aggression from Syria?

Mr. TALBOT. There has been a feeling, as you know, for some years that retaliation is going to solve none of the problems of the Near East.

Senator SYMINGTON. Suppose that Castro attacked an American ship, is the concept that we would put that in the United Nations in order to carry out our plan of retaliation against attack?

Mr. TALBOT. Well, sir, I would prefer to talk about what we are doing in the Near East, which is the area that I am familiar with.

AID PROGRAMS IN NEAR EAST COMPARED [P. 183]

Mr. GAUD. Let's compare, for example, India and Nepal. India is much better advanced economically, politically, educationally, and in terms of know-how, managerial ability and all the rest of it than Nepal. India is at a point where they can absorb aid in terms of industrial projects, schools, and so forth and so on. Nepal, relatively speaking, can absorb much less aid, because you have to start from scratch in Nepal; you have to train people to do things in Nepal that the Indians already know how to do. You have very few managers; you have very few educated people; you start with a child walking instead of running. And that is what I mean by absorption.

* * * * * * *

The CHAIRMAN. And yet you think their need is much greater relatively than India.

What is the real explanation? Is it because of the political situation in this country; is that the real reason you devote so much of your resources to Israel?

Mr. GAUD. Not in my judgment, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give any reasonable judgment or explanation of why you do it? This is much higher than any other country in the area.

Mr. GAUD. On a per capita basis.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think it isn't significant what the per capita income of a state is? We think it is one of the most important ones in this country. When we judge the relative capacity to pay or do a thing or take care of their own needs within this country, this is a matter we consider.

When you consider the educational bill, they have in it a formula based upon the per capita income of the State and its capacity to service its own development of education, of its so-called independent structure.

Why is this not applicable in your foreign aid bill?

SITUATION IN CYPRUS

Mr. GAUD. Senator, what would you say about Cyprus? Cyprus has a population of roughly 1 million people. Suppose next year we get into a couple of electrification projects or water projects in Cyprus and give them a development loan of $20 million. That is going to be $40 a head.

Now, this is of no significance, it seems to me, this per capita business; it is very misleading.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't quite know why you should be so intent on Cyprus. What is the long-term significance of putting a great deal of money into Cyprus?

Mr. TALBOT. I will speak to the political significance of it. As you know, sir, it is in an area where the neighboring countries are of very great importance to us. And Cyprus does have certain facilities which we regard as important to us, communications facilities and so forth.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the same argument you give on Ethiopia. We do get something tangible in return in the way of a communications center?

Mr. TALBOT. Certainly we have tangible arrangements with Cyprus, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This brings in a new element, doesn't it?

Mr. TALBOT. If Cyprus were to come under the control of the Communists, who at the present time are attempting to penetrate the labor unions particularly and some other aspects of society, not only would the situation in Cyprus be more unfortunate from our point of view, but the effect on the Eastern Mediterranean region as a whole would be very bad.

The CHAIRMAN. So then there is a security matter there?

Mr. TALBOT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is quite different from what we are talking about. That is the excuse you are giving for giving jet

planes to Ethiopia, because you want to please them sufficiently to preserve your communications center. That wasn't given before.

AID TO ISRAEL

Coming back to Israel, I wonder what formula you use there. You say it is estimated $60 per capita in India, and it is $1,200 in Israel. That is what, 20 times as much? The need is not as great, then, is it, by any means?

Mr. GAUD. In Israel as it is in India?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GAUD. By no means.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just trying to get at why it is we are so interested in giving so much money to Israel.

Mr. GAUD. Well, I wouldn't characterize it as so much money.

The CHAIRMAN. So much more than any other country in the area.

Mr. GAUD. By that one standard.

The CHAIRMAN. Than any other country in the area. Looking at it strategically, do we have any air bases in Israel?

Mr. GAUD. Not that I ever heard of.

Mr. BUNDY. The answer is no.

The CHAIRMAN. The answer is no, isn't it?

Mr. GAUD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the significance for the security of this country?

Mr. TALBOT. I think it is very important that Israel remain viable and an independent country.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Mr. TALBOT. If Israel were to collapse there would be fighting in that area which would destroy not only Israel but the social structures of the neighboring countries, I feel confident.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Mr. TALBOT. Because the outbreak of war in the Middle East would put strains and stresses into the area and into all of those societies in such a way that the result would be very likely chaos in a number of areas. Our whole effort in the Near East is to prevent the possible escalation of any sort of firing, or whatever it might be, to levels which would bring war in the area, because it is such an extremely fragile area.

The CHAIRMAN. Take the history in the last 10 years, which country out there has invaded its neighbors? Have the Arabs invaded Israel?

Mr. TALBOT. There have been attacks by Arab fellahins into territory which Israel controls.

The CHAIRMAN. Comparable to the Israeli attack on Egypt?

Mr. TALBOT. The Israeli attacks on Egypt have been of a larger scale, organized militarily.

The CHAIRMAN. Organized militarily. The others were just sort of guerrilla raids?

Mr. TALBOT. That is an accurate statement.

Mr. BUNDY. I think if you go back to 1956 you can argue at great length, but certainly the Egyptian military buildup with Soviet aid was made as the result of Israel's decision to go to war. They as-

serted that they believed, and I think that they had some reason for believing, that a building up was taking place directed toward them.

Mr. GAUD. Furthermore, on this basis we would never have given any aid to West Germany. The past is the past. We have to look at the present and the future.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I was seeking to do. That area was no more tense before there was an Israel in a sense, was it?

Mr. GAUD. Aren't there just some areas of the world that are just plain tense, and you have to learn to live with them? And in our judgment the best way to live with the Middle East is to preserve both the Arab States and Israel. And that is part of the way we do it.

* * * * * * *

SELF HELP IN NEAR EAST ASIA [P. 185]

The CHAIRMAN. Israel is only slightly larger in population than my State. Yet there is nothing like this amount of money being put into my State by the Federal Government—nothing like it. I doubt if it is one-fifth as much money. If you put this kind of money into Arkansas—and I guarantee we can absorb it, if you talk about absorption capability—we could build roads and dam all the rivers and irrigate every inch of the State if you put this kind of money in it.

I just want you to give the real reason why you are doing it, instead of pretending. Why don't you give the real reason? You know why it is. It is because of the political pressure, isn't it?

Isn't it, Mr. Talbot?

Mr. TALBOT. Well, sir, I would say this: Our concern in the State Department is with the stability in the Middle East, and we are straining as hard as we can to get that. And this is one factor, one part of the whole picture, of keeping the Middle East from exploding.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not responsive to my question.

Do you wish to respond to my question, is it or isn't it the political pressure situation in this country?

Mr. TALBOT. I would say our assistance program to Israel is done in foreign policy terms.

The CHAIRMAN. National policy terms?

Mr. TALBOT. I hope that is not different.

The CHAIRMAN. You know it is, isn't it? You can give no real justification for this kind of money if you look at it purely from the point of view of foreign policy and the security of the country? There is no security interest involved as in Wheelus Air Base, or you say a communications center; none of that is involved. You say keep peace in the area. You could make just as good an argument that would keep peace if you developed the surrounding countries to where everybody was prosperous and they all had a nice farm, and so on, couldn't you? It tends to make all people peaceable, doesn't it?

Mr. TALBOT. We are striving very hard to improve the rate of development, to help these countries improve the rate of development and the surrounding countries also, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There is nothing I can do about it, but I think all of this hypocrisy about this country is ridiculous. You know it is a political situation in this country that dominates that program, isn't it?

Mr. TALBOT. I will say, sir, that it is the Middle East that concerns us.

* * * * * * *

DEPLOYMENT OF INDIAN ARMY [P. 190]

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know where India does employ her armed forces; do you have any information on that?

Mr. BUNDY. I can get you something on that. The bulk of their armed forces is employed in the Punjab or the northwestern area of India. That is a short answer.

Senator SYMINGTON. That would be against Pakistan?

Mr. BUNDY. In that area.

Senator SYMINGTON. What percentage, would you say, Mr. Bundy?

Mr. BUNDY. I would guess two-thirds.

Senator SYMINGTON. Ali Khan told us here in this room last year it was 85 percent. Do you think it is that high?

Mr. BUNDY. That may be a shade high, but I wouldn't be able to tell exactly at the moment.

Mr. TALBOT. May I comment on that, Senator?

These deployments are to a large extent in the traditional centers of Indian Army deployment, which before the partition in 1947 happened to be very largely in that northwestern area of the Punjab and surrounding states. Further, the areas available for deployment against Pakistan and against Communist China are roughly the same. So that the fact that the Indian Army is deployed in a particular position seems to us not exclusively to indicate that it will be available for any one enemy as against another enemy.

* * * * * * *

U.S. POLICY TOWARD INDIA [P. 190]

Senator SYMINGTON. How do we justify giving them money they promptly used to increase their military position instead of using it to raise the standards of living of their people?

Mr. TALBOT. We are not sure how much they are using. Without the assistance that many countries are giving India, they might lose their economic development. And it is clear to us that the progress of economic development in South Asia generally, both India and Pakistan, is essential to our national security at a time when the pressure from the north is very heavy, indeed.

Senator SYMINGTON. What pressure are you talking about?

Mr. TALBOT. I am talking about the pressure of the Chinese Communists.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are you talking about pressures on Nehru from the Communist Party inside India, which the Indians have told me Khrishna Menon represents, or the Communist pressure of China?

Mr. TALBOT. May we go off the record?

Senator SPARKMAN [presiding]. That is a privilege extended to witnesses, and it is often used when they engage in personalities.

Senator SYMINGTON. We in the Armed Forces like to hear the answers. But if that is what you wish, Mr. Chairman——

Senator SPARKMAN. That has been our custom here. And while it is true the record is kept locked in our vault, at least the committee can bring later action authorizing the publication of it. I don't think there is any likelihood of that. But nevertheless we do respect the witness' wishes if he feels that he ought to go off the record.

So it would be perfectly all right if you proceed that way.

Mr. TALBOT. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

* * * * * * *

U.S. POLICY TOWARD INDIA [P. 192]

Senator SYMINGTON. Have you any knowledge as to what Khrishna Menon is doing incident to establishing people loyal to him in the Indian Army as a personal buildup for the radical left in that army?

Mr. BUNDY. Our information, Senator, is that he has certainly made efforts in this direction. On the other hand, there is considerable information that a good deal of resistance to this has developed, particularly around General Kaul, who has quite a reputation himself. There are a good many instances of friction between him and Menon. I wouldn't say that Menon had that show completely in his hands by any means at this time.

Senator SYMINGTON. When you say "show," you mean——

Mr. BUNDY. The total military establishment. It is a very strong position; this is a very tough position on the military side, and I think it would be very tough for him to take it over in any sense.

* * * * * * *

MILITARY AID TO IRAN [P. 195]

Senator SYMINGTON. I want to ask one question, since the Shah is here. We have the joint session thing straightened up, is that right?

Mr. TALBOT. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. As you know, the Shah is very concerned about the things that we have been talking about this morning around this table, from the standpoint of why wouldn't it be better for him to be a neutral, and wouldn't he get more than he would by being an ally. I read in the front page of the paper this morning—I don't know where these stories come from, but I must say I learned a lot from reading the newspapers, it is all constructive from the standpoint of increasing the knowledge, when these leaks appear—but they said in the paper this morning that he was very worried about the fact that we weren't giving him enough military support.

How do you compare that? Do you say, despite that, you don't think we ought to give him more military support; we ought to concentrate on economic assistance?

Mr. BUNDY. Senator, I talked briefly on this at the start of the hearing. We have firmed up a position to present to the Shah on this, which has two major elements. One is that we wish he would get his total armed forces strength level down from the present 280,000 to 150,000, which we think would make a more compact and effective military force, and which would also reduce the local currency required to support it, and to that extent—which is a considerable extent—assist his concentration of the proper resources in the development of uses. This has been worked out with the State Department and with AID.

The second element is that we are undertaking to supply equipment to him on a much firmer and more measured basis than we have done in past years when it has had a good deal of a roller coaster effect. And we are undertaking, subject to the availability of funds, to supply certain items of equipment that we believe meet his key military needs more effectively than has been done in the past, and which will enable him to plan his effort, to go ahead with the force reduction, and to get this, to some extent at least, off his mind, so that he will be assured of where we stand for a considerable period of time, provided, of course, that we get the funds to do it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is this the position that we take on military aid to Iran?

Mr. BUNDY. Yes, it is.

* * * * * * *

TYPE OF MILITARY AID TO IRAN AND JORDAN [P. 195]

Mr. BUNDY. We had it [B–57's to Iran] at one point under consideration. It never got further than that, I think I may say, because we didn't think that was what he needed. What he does need on the air side is a sufficient number of modern supersonic fighter aircraft. And we are prepared to include squadrons of those in this proposal that we are to make.

* * * * * * *

BOMBERS USED IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM [P. 196]

Senator SYMINGTON. The reason that I thought you might sell the B–57 was because the Air Force man told me that he was trying to sell them, and said, "It is one of the finest bombers." Finally we got that straightened away.

But based on the distances, why do we give them bombers? If this is a change in the last 4 or 5 months, I would say it would be an excellent change.

Mr. BUNDY. We are not giving them bombers in what is called the light bomber category, Senator, the B–57 category. Just refer briefly to the F–48, or the F–110—that is a marvelous airplane, and our regard for it in the Defense Department is shown by our selection of it as the principal Air Force attack fighter for the next few years. It is an awfully expensive aircraft. It runs up toward $2 mil-

lion a copy. We have been looking in these countries for an aircraft that was similar that would cost about $800,000 per copy.

Senator SYMINGTON. My point is that it is a far better defense or attack plane than, say, the Russian IL-28, which is what they compare it with. I would rather have a fighter-bomber than any bomber we could give them. Of course, it does cost more than the most expensive fighter.

Mr. BUNDY. Whichever of the two it is, it will be an aircraft well capable of coping with the IL-28.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I have been out of town, so you will pardon me if I have asked questions already covered.

Mr. BUNDY. We covered this very briefly. This will be presented very briefly to the Shah. We do think, frankly, that his concern about Iraq and Afghanistan is exaggerated. Numerically they do have a number of jets, Mig-15's and 17's—perhaps 60 in Iraq and 75 in Afghanistan—but the evidence on file on the training and proficiency is that they are not about to be able to operate those with real effectiveness. And the same with the IL-28's, of which there are 16 in Iraq and possibly 40 in Afghanistan.

Senator SYMINGTON. The more you help the Iranian Air Force, the more amenable the Shah would be to a reduction in his ground forces. And he has a perfect illustration. If you control the air out there, the Kurds are absolutely helpless. When Kassim [1] went after them from the air there was nothing they could do, because they had no air force.

Mr. BUNDY. This is one of the places where airpower has a great intimidating effect. But the Kurds haven't been wiped out.

Senator SYMINGTON. They run and hide to fight another day. They have no country; they are nomadic and brave people.

But the point I am trying to make is, I agree that you could cut their army on the basis of putting down internal insurrection, which Kassem put down with relative few and not too good airplanes, if you did help them with the modern equipment for their air force, which could be a Communist worry, that in turn would make it simpler for you to do some other things in the way of reduction.

Mr. BUNDY. I think that is true. I think we ought to get a balance and not go overboard. We should give him some, but we should not overload him. And his air force is pretty good on the flying side, but not very good on the maintenance side.

* * * * * * *

[At 12:20 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., the same day, in executive session.]

---

[1] Iraqi Premier Abdul Karim Kassim.

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1982

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 2:40 p.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman), and Senator Symington.

The committee took additional testimony from Fowler Hamilton, Administrator, Agency for International Development, and others on the bill (S. 2996) To amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

For a record of the proceedings, see the printed transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 4:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, APRIL 12, 1982

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 2:55 p.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman), and Senator Gore.

Testifying on the bill (S. 2996) To amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 were Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs, and others.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 4 p.m.]

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1962

FRIDAY, APRIL 13, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol, Hon. John J. Sparkman presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman and Gore.

Also present: Carl Marcy and Darrell St. Claire of the committee staff.

[This hearing was published in 1962 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

* * * * * * *

STATEMENTS OF HON. W. AVERELL HARRIMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS; HON. SEYMOUR J. JANOW, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR FAR EAST; AND WILLIAM P. BUNDY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

* * * * * * *

STATEMENT BY HON. SEYMOUR J. JANOW, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, FAR EAST, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

* * * * * * *

[P. 357]

We wish to call to this committee's attention, however, that in northeast Thailand's border areas Communist penetration may increase. Our programs of loans and technical assistance are designed to meet requirements of fiscal year 1963 as we now see them. If Communist subversion in the northeast should increase or other elements of instability should emerge, additional AID action in rural and village development in that area may be required.

THAILAND

[Dollars in millions]

	Fiscal year		
	1961 obligated	1962 estimated	1963 proposal
Development loans		0.9	30–40
Supporting assistance	18.4	13.2	
Development grants	6.9	9.7	9.5
Total AID funds	25.3	23.8	39.5–49.5
Public Law 480 title I (country uses portion)			

* * * * * * *

[P. 358]

There is a possibility that the weaker members of the proposed Malaysian Federation may seek assistance. We have not programmed aid funds for this purpose but think this committee should know of this possible development.

* * * * * * *

[P. 358]

PHILIPPINES

[Dollars in millions]

	Fiscal year		
	1961 obligated	1962 estimated	1963 proposal
Development loans	(9.9)	.1	30–50
Supporting assistance	9.1		
Development grants	4.1	4.2	4.5
Total AID funds	3.3	4.3	34.5–54.5
Public Law 480 title I (country uses portion)		16.4	15.0

* * * * * * *

[P. 359]

We believe, on the basis of estimated requirements and loan requests that Taiwan will be able to submit acceptable applications for $55 to $85 million in long-term dollar loans during fiscal year 1963. This includes a proposed non-project loan of about $30 million to finance imports of raw materials and other industrial supplies. The proposed development grant program totals $2.8 million.

CHINA

[Dollars in millions]

	Fiscal year		
	1961 obligated	1962 estimated	1963 proposal
Development loans	38.9	58.2	55–85
Supporting assistance	43.2		
Development grants	8.9	3.6	2.8
Total AID funds	91.0	61.8	57.8–87.8
Public Law 480 title I (country uses portion)	17.3	45.1	38.1

* * * * * * *

[P. 360]

KOREA

[Dollars in millions]

	Fiscal year		
	1961 obligated	1962 estimated	1963 proposal
Development loans	6.5	52.9	50–65
Supporting assistance	181.1	90.0	125.0
Development grants	11.6	7.1	5.0
Total AID funds	199.2	150.0	180–195
Public Law 480 title I (country uses portion)	46.7	46.8	58.5

* * * * * * *

[P. 360]

VIETNAM

[Dollars in millions]

	Fiscal year		
	1961 obligated	1962 estimated	1963 proposal
Development loan	10.7		
Supporting assistance	114.5	140.0	140.0
Development grants	13.4	12.0	20.0
Total AID funds	138.6	152.0	160.0
Public Law 480 title I (country uses portion)	7.5	32.6	18.9

The fiscal year 1963 proposal calls for $140 million in supporting assistance to Vietnam, of which the non-project portion of $130 million in essential imports is calculated on the basis of import requirements rather than the local currency budget shortfall. This is the same level as the revised program for fiscal year 1962. Development Grants for the re-directed technical assistance program are proposed at $20 million, the increase from the current year due largely to plans to complete a telephone system linking Saigon with other population centers.

* * * * * * *

[P. 361]

Approximately $9 million of the roughly estimated requirement of $40 million for aid to Laos in fiscal year 1963 would be allotted to projects in fields which reach the people and pre-empt sensitive fields of aid which the Communist powers may seek to enter if a neutral government is formed. The major project being carried forward in fiscal year 1963 is the National Development Project, which uses a flexible task force approach, concentrating on self-help projects in rural villages and somewhat larger construction projects on the provincial level. We hope to be able to continue technical assistance in such fields as teacher-training and resume police training and public administration.

* * * * * * *

[P. 361]

When a coalition government is formed, aid of this kind may be our most effective instrument in Laos. The Communist bloc countries have no record of extending assistance for general budget support, currency stabilization, or for supplying general import requirements. When a coalition government is formed there may be calls on us for assistance in these fields.

LAOS

[Dollars in millions]

	Fiscal year		
	1961 obligated	1962 estimated	1963 proposal
Development loans			
Supporting assistance	30.8	39.4	40.0
Development grants	1.5		
Total AID funds	32.3	39.4	40.0
Public Law 480 title I (country uses portion)			

* * * * * * *

[P. 361]

Comparisons between United States and Communist bloc aid activities in Indonesia, 1960–61, show the scale of the Communist effort there:

	Bloc	United States
CY 1960 and 1961: Military aid committed [1]	$485,000,000	$36,000,000
CY 1960 and 1961: Economic aid committed [1]	$419,000,000	[2] $52,200,000
CY 1961: Military advisers in Indonesia	350	21
CY 1961: Military trainees	1,500	545

[1] Not strictly comparable because of differences in terms and use of FY 1960–1961 U.S. statistics.
[2] Includes Public Law 480 country uses.

* * * * * * *

[P. 361]

Recent reports indicate its foreign exchange reserves are entirely exhausted. The military demands on the economy are pushing Indonesia toward bankruptcy—if such a term can be applied to a country.

* * * * * * *

[P. 361]

Our assistance program for fiscal year 1963 is based on the assumption that there will be a settlement of the West Irian crisis, or at least a negotiation that will return the economic and political situation to the pre-existing conditions that the President's Survey Team studied last fall.

The Team concluded that the Indonesian Government, although it has accepted credits totaling nearly $1.5 billion in Communist bloc aid, is determined to avoid Communist domination. In its long-range plan for U.S. assistance, the report recommends U.S. grants and loans concentrated upon training, education, transportation, and the institutional pre-conditions of development. We estimate development loan requirements in the range of $25 to $50 million in fiscal year 1963 and development grant requirements of $18.6 million. Supporting assistance of $2.5 million is proposed to equip a mobile police brigade with communications and transportation equipment. A substantial Public Law 480 program is planned in fiscal year 1963, which is intended to meet essential import requirements and also to generate local currency needed for loans in manufacturing, mining, and agricultural sectors.

Substantial U.S. technical assistance, development loans and agricultural commodities clearly will be needed to help Indonesia resume economic development.

We have in this program not made any estimate for assistance toward financial stabilizations, or balance of payments, or for measures to meet the economic crisis. Such measures, if any, would depend upon political decisions. Such help would fall upon our contingency fund.

INDONESIA

[Dollars in millions]

	Fiscal year			
	1960 obligated	1961 obligated	1962 estimated	1963 proposal
Development loans				25–50
Supporting assistance			5.6	2.5
Development grants	11.0	15.8	18.6	18.6
Total AID funds	11.0	15.8	24.4	46.1–71.1
Public Law 480 title I (country uses portion)	9.6	15.8	51.5	40.5

* * * * * * *

[P. 362]

CAMBODIA

[Dollars in millions]

	Fiscal year		
	1961 obligated	1962 estimated	1963 proposal
Development loans			(1)
Supporting assistance	17.2	17.3	11.5
Development grants	7.1	12.9	10.2
Total AID funds	24.3	30.2	21.7
Public Law 480 title I (country uses portion)		1.6	2.3

[1] Development lending contemplated, project applications will be considered.

Our proposal for fiscal year 1963 shows an increase in the scale of our aid to Burma for two reasons: (1) to expand the American contribution to a Burmese program for land and water resource development which has already achieved dramatic success; and (2) to fulfill a 1959 U.S. Government commitment to help finance construction on the Rangoon-Mandalay Road, subject to feasibility studies and Congressional appropriations.

Talks began recently in Rangoon with the new Burmese Government concerning the details of construction and financing; we expect shortly to have news of this project.

BURMA

[Dollars in millions]

	Fiscal year		
	1961 obligated	1962 estimated	1963 proposal
Development loans			(1)
Supporting assistance		4.8	30.1
Development grants	.4	.4	2.1
Total AID funds	.4	5.2	32.2
Public Law 480 title I (country uses portion)		13.3	

[1] Development lending contemplated, project applications will be considered.

* * * * * * *

PROPOSED ASSISTANCE TO LAOS [P. 370]

Senator GORE. In case a neutral government acceptable, at least reasonably so, to the United States is installed, what plans are there to use this $40 million of supporting assistance?

Mr. JANOW. May I answer that, sir?

Senator GORE. Yes.

Mr. JANOW. When a coalition government is formed, I would like to point out that AID may be the most effective instrument left inside Laos. The Communist countries have no record of extending assistance for general budget support or currency stabilization or

supplying general import requirements. As far as we know, the Sino-Soviet bloc has not done this.

It is appreciated that this is not a popular area with the Congress. But there will be a requirement for general government budget support in Laos, and for the support of their import requirements. Now, we do not expect the Sino-Soviet bloc to operate in this field. In addition to that, sir, we have quite comprehensive plans for individual small projects.

I should like, if I may, to review some of them with you.

In the presentation we have mentioned a few. We have some rural development projects that we think are going to be useful politically, as they have been in the past, in getting in contact with the villages, their education projects, their policy projects, their emergency relief projects that Governor Harriman has mentioned, to deal with the refugees and the demobilized soldiers, transportation, Operation Brotherhood that you know about, small roads, and cooperatives and medicine, sanitation, radio, and information.

* * * * * * *

STATEMENT BY WILLIAM P. BUNDY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

* * * * * * *

THE THREAT [P. 371]

The Communist threat is two pronged—one prong is raw Communist military power. In the Far East it consists of 3.5 million men under arms, including over 200 combat divisions, 10,000 aircraft, 4,000 jets, and 130 submarines.

* * * * * * *

THE SITUATION [P. 372]

The Japanese Government leaders take a realistic view of the world security situation. They are endeavoring to lead their people into the appropriate military posture for their own security. In the past, they have depended more heavily on MAP than their economy demanded. Now the course is changing.

Our military assistance to the Koreans is a must. Their army, the fifth largest in the world, is combat ready. Together with U.S. military forces they are ready to react effectively should the Communists violate the 9-year-old military truce. We are cognizant of the financial burden required to maintain the ROK forces. We are again examining the force levels.

The forces of the Republic of China guard a strategic position. It is athwart the main Communist sea lanes. These combat-tested and ready forces require the Peiping warlords to immobilize substantial forces. Thus, they reduce military pressure elsewhere on non-Communist countries.

* * * * * * *

[P. 372]

First, we are providing all the equipment and supplies the Vietnamese armed forces can digest. We are training and equipping an augmented civil guard and self-defense corps. The equipment we are providing includes additional aircraft, helicopters, weapons, communications equipment, vehicles, and boats, and we are even assisting with the creation of their junk force. Second, short of sending U.S. combat troops we are assisting the Vietnamese with U.S. personnel and materiel to perform tasks that they themselves could not perform during the present critical period. This assistance includes helicopter companies and transport aircraft to improve the mobility of their armed forces; communication and intelligence nets, military advisors down to battalion level, and assistance in patrolling the seas against infiltrators.

The Vietnamese forces will fight. They are reacting in shorter time. They will respond to our increased assistance. We are in a critical phase of the struggle at this period. We cannot predict the victory date.

The government forces in Laos are not capable of increasing their area of control. The introduction of Communist North Vietnam military forces has measurably increased the strength of the anti-government forces, who occupy significant and important areas of the country. United States policy is to obtain a political settlement through negotiations. With the uncertainties prevailing, we cannot count on this.

* * * * * * *

[P. 372]

On March 2, this year, a Burmese military coup turned out the civil government which was reportedly drifting to the left. Our aid program is designed to promote United States influence in the Burmese armed forces, and to preclude to the greatest extent bloc military assistance.

Strategically, Indonesia is extremely important to the Communists. The amount of their economic and military aid testifies to this fact. We do not want the Soviets to obtain air and sea bases in this vital area. Although we do not intend to match Soviet assistance, we are attempting to maintain a favorable position with important anti-Communist military leaders.

* * * * * * *

REDUCING KOREAN MILITARY FORCES [P. 374]

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask you this. We were trying to get a reduction in the Korean armed forces. Syngman Rhee fought against it all the time he was there. Has any headway been made?

Mr. BUNDY. We have been going at it very hard indeed, Senator, and we are setting the Government decision time as June to come up with a firm decision whether that force should be reduced.

It is a joint State-AID-Defense effort directed by the President. We in the Defense Department have put our own special team to work. They have been out in the area and are coming back and re-

porting to us very shortly, with their recommendations, looking at the military picture, of course, first and foremost.

Now, in considering that force, which is approximately 600,000 men, you have to weigh very carefully the threat that is posted against them. That is a real and present threat. I went up to the front, and it is something that you can see for yourself.

The North Koreans are right there, they are posted, and could attack very quickly, and, all intelligence indicates, in a very strong readiness state. Although their own forces are only on the order of 350,000, they have half a million Chinese that withdrew from Korea 4 or 5 years ago in a position to cross the Yalu from Manchuria so that they could move down very rapidly.

Moreover, you have a very strong numerical air superiority in North Korea, which has on the order of 500 aircraft as against 150 in Korea. And for this reason we have to look hard at the possibility of force reduction. We are looking hard to see what is an adequate, in place, clear deterrent level of forces. And we will have a decision on that in June.

Whatever we do, though, I think it is clear from the political judgment on the spot—and perhaps Governor Harriman will wish to expand on this, I talked at length with the Ambassador about this—but we will have to face this very carefully in order to avoid repercussions in the country, loss of confidence, and a feeling that the Government, which is still in a sensitive state, is being deserted. The political side of this will take a lot of care.

So, for the purposes of next year's appropriation, I would not, frankly, look for substantial reductions to take place within a year's time. That is anticipating the decision. We might decide that we wanted to try to reduce it very shortly. But I do not think it would be a very large effect in a year.

The committee asked about this question last year. We did not feel that we could do it with this new government right away. But we have gone at it as fast as we can, and we think that a decision by us in June, which in turn would be agreed by the Koreans in July, is the most effective way to do it.

* * * * * * *

TROOP PAY COMPARED TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO KOREA [P. 376]

Senator GORE. I can hardly square this low pay with the very large amount, $280 million a year, of military assistance in Korea.

Mr. BUNDY. There are two different accounts, Senator. The $280 million is our supply of equipment. No part of that relates to the local defense budget. The pay and subsistence is wholly a matter of the local Korean defense budget.

Now, we do, as I said, support 75 percent of that defense budget through the supporting assistance on the economic side. The $280 million is for the equipment that we give that army to keep it in effective fighting trim—and I may say, not advanced fighting trim; they are not advanced types of equipment, with very few exceptions.

This is a large and not very well-equipped army, frankly. We have kept it down to fairly austere equipment levels, but it is a large army, there is no question about that.

* * * * * * *

Senator SPARKMAN. Is it not true that we more or less inherited that from the French Indochina situation?

Mr. BUNDY. I think we did.

The French had this incentive pay for getting the Vietnamese into their forces. I think in the early years we did increase it slightly, but that is the general nature of it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Will you go on to the other two countries?

Mr. BUNDY. I will turn briefly to Taiwan, the Republic of China, where we have some problem of getting the ineffective out of the army, and so on, and getting their army organized on a more efficient basis. But on the whole, I think there has been a very effective job of utilization of the equipment, they have improved their logistics a great deal, and we have been riding herd a lot on that. And we are out of the supporting assistance business in Taiwan, as Mr. Janow already mentioned.

Senator SPARKMAN. Before we get too far away from Korea, let me ask you one question.

To what extent do we maintain forces there now?

U.S. FORCES IN KOREA [P. 377]

Mr. BUNDY. In Korea we have our own two divisions. This is the same basic structure that we have had for many years past. I think we will probably have to stay at that level, partly as a matter of maintaining command responsibility, and also because it is a vital part of their defense.

So much, then, for Korea and China.

SPECIAL SOUTHEAST ASIA RESERVE FOR VIETNAM AND THAILAND [P. 377]

In Southeast Asia I would like to explain a little of the bookkeeping for Vietnam and Thailand that shows up in your summary charts on page 51 of the blue book. We show there approximately $80 million as the program for 1963 for Vietnam. And that is a good deal lower than we are actually running in 1962, and a good deal lower than we expect to run in 1963. This $80 million was the best figure we could produce last fall, which is before we got into considerably expanded activities out there.

Therefore, we have taken care of the almost certain need of this area by a special Southeast Asia reserve of $100 million, which shows on that sheet. And that bears also on the Thailand situation.

The Thais are very nervous at the present time. On the diplomatic front, I think we have managed to reassure the Thais through the recent communication with their Foreign Minister when he was here.

But on the military side, we are stepping up our deliveries and we will probably have to increase this program as it is shown here by $10 or $20 million, with a great deal of stress on light aircraft, helicopters, and things that will enable them to deal with what we

now think is the most likely initial threat to Thailand, which will be insurgency activity up in the northeast area toward the Laos border and up in the northern area. So I would reckon that the Thai account is likely to increase.

But I did want to explain what that $100 million reserve is. Probably $75 or $80 million of it is—it is awfully hard to tell, because the Vietnam thing has been moving gradually up, because we have been increasing the local defense—about $75 or $80 million is probably needed for Vietnam; another $10 to $20 million on Thailand, from what now can be clearly foreseen, even if the situation does not get worse in one or both of the areas.

Let me refer lastly to the supporting assistance account in Vietnam. Mr. Janow already mentioned it.

The supporting assistance request which you are asked to authorize is large. I think it is $140 million for this year.

* * * * * * *

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN VIETNAM [P. 378]

Mr. BUNDY. Let me refer first to the steps that bear directly on their effectiveness in the counter-insurgency struggle. They instituted a national security council type of group to bring together the various people involved more regularly. Frankly, we have not seen great fruits from that, but at least a good deal better than the previous.

They have improved their intelligence set-up enormously. They have pulled together the various multiple organizations that were operating in this area, so that we have had within the last month a pretty good coordinated Vietnamese side set-up, and a joint United States-Vietnamese set-up, which I think is giving us a much clearer picture. The casualty picture, the reports of incidence, and the ability to respond particularly to reports of whatever takes place are very encouraging.

Those are two major ones.

* * * * * * *

[At 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a.m., Monday, April 16, 1962.]

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1962

MONDAY, APRIL 16, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:45 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Morse and Aiken.

Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

[This hearing was published in 1962 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

* * * * * * *

STATEMENTS OF HON. TEODORO MOSCOSO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT; HON. EDWIN H. MARTIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS; AND GEN. WILLIAM ENEMARK, DIRECTOR, WESTERN HEMISPHERE REGION, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

* * * * * * *

PROGRAM AND PROBLEMS IN LATIN AMERICA [P. 388]

Mr. Moscoso. The job is staggering. Within a decade the direction and results of centuries of Latin American history is to be changed. In most Latin American countries, the status quo we seek to modify is that of a society made up of the few who have much and the many who have little. Political instability is widespread, and even the best of governments is often distracted from its basic economic and social tasks by recurring threats to its political life. Illiteracy rates are high. There are only a few competent economists, engineers, and administrators to develop the necessary projects and plans. It is to these countries with their political instability, their lack of trained human resources, and their history of economic stagnation and social immobility that we attempt to bring the message of change.

* * * * * * *

ENCOURAGEMENT OF SELF-HELP EFFORTS [P. 391]

Mr. Moscoso. To encourage adequate self-help, we must be prepared to offer assistance and training—and to make clear that we will give aid only when essential preconditions have been met. For the first time, the U.S. aid program for Latin America has the amount of money at its disposal to induce—through the extending or withholding of aid—national governments to take steps they might otherwise ignore.

If we cannot make credible the promise of such business-like action on our part, we will have given away a major tool at our disposal. This tool can be used to persuade various combinations of resisting groups in the several countries. In some cases it is the legislative branch of the Government which will not be willing to make the reforms which the executive branch desires. In other countries, powerful backers of the ruling political parties in the executive and legislative branch might wish to frustrate the process of change. If we are able to help our truest friends in the various countries in convincing their conferees of the necessity of change and of the intention of the United States to render assistance on the basis of genuine self-help, we will strengthen democratic forces in these countries and given them tools they badly need.

Few, if any, Latin governments regard themselves as being opposed to self-help, but some officials in these governments are convinced that any change would lead to violent upheaval which would sweep away stable and anti-Communist governments. Others believe sincerely in reform but are fighting for their political lives through recurring crises. With these people, a hard line is unsuitable. We must help them broaden understanding of the way in which change can be brought about, and we must aid them in fending off the short-range crises which prevent long-term development.

We have also to induce self-help with training and education, the instruments of technical assistance. Too many countries presently lack the governmental administrators, economic analysts, and engineers necessary to undertake the practical job of determining basic needs, setting priorities, and taking effective measures against their problems. The shortage of trained and able human resources is a gaping hole in the development requirements of all Latin American countries. Conditions, threats, and lectures to governments will not solve this problem.

Only through a mixture of patient understanding and impatient importuning, of slow circumvention and swift, direct action, of short-term expedience and long-term programs, can the nations of Latin America be moved to help themselves and thus be able to use the men, money, and material which we can make available. We must have a great deal of tactical flexibility if we are to make these programs work. Tactics will vary but our underlying purpose will be clear: Our action must create economic and social development leading to political stability throughout this hemisphere.

* * * * * * *

DESCRIPTION OF AID REQUESTS FOR LATIN AMERICA [P. 392]

Mr. Moscoso. In addition, we are requesting for Haiti, Bolivia, and the Eastern Caribbean $15 million for supporting assistance. Funds for supporting assistance are necessary to preserve political and economic stability, and to retain our military base rights.

* * * * * * *

USE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN PROGRAMS [P. 393]

The CHAIRMAN. I brought up the possibility some time ago of using public authority for the administration of some of these projects. Has there been any consideration of, or decision or action taken on that idea?

Mr. Moscoso. We have, Mr. Chairman, particularly taken some action with respect to that specifically in the case of the Dominican Republic where we have a very critical problem of seeing how these properties are best administered. And our recommendations have been to the effect that two major public authorities and corporations be set up, one to handle the vast sugar holdings, and another, a diversified holding company, publicly owned, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. Have they been agreeable to this?

Mr. Moscoso. They have, except for the recommendation, as far as I know, Mr. Chairman, and I think that they are also going to accept our further recommendation that able management be brought in from the outside on a temporary basis until they can train their own managers and technicians.

* * * * * * *

ACTIVITIES OF FOUNDATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA [P. 396]

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you would be one of the first to favor the idea.

Mr. Moscoso. One of the things we have to do is try and convince the Latin Americans that they need this help. The first instinctive, visceral reaction is, "We know how to do it." And sometimes you have to let them stumble once, at least, before you come in and say, "Now, look, you really need some assistance, and we can give you the assistance; it can be either through a foundation, or it can be through one of the several more prominent management engineering firms, or it can be through some of the universities."

* * * * * * *

SOLUTION TO THE PERSONNEL PROBLEM [P. 397]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lingle is an example. You can understand that his position and family security was tied up in this. It was a great wrench for him to give it all up and join your organization. I admire him for it. But he is one man. You have to have a lot more like him. I think it could be done more easily if the nominees didn't have to be confirmed. I wish the Ford people would cooperate with us to make a deal and get a man on the job.

Mr. Moscoso. You know, we have been using Mr. Kaplan, and he has been discussing with Rafael Bonnelly and other representatives of the Dominican Republic in Santo Domingo the possibility of co-operatives in the Dominican Republic. I am a little hesitant at the moment in connection with the Trujillo properties as to making them full-fledged co-ops, for one reason, Mr. Chairman, and that is that one of the first things this new government did was to raise salaries considerably, and the industries which were affected by it are going to be unprofitable for a little while until their productivity goes up.

* * * * * * *

OTHER HOUSING PROPOSALS FOR LATIN AMERICA [P. 399]

Senator AIKEN. That is good. I notice that you are asking for quite a lot—is it defense supporting assistance—for Haiti, more for support assistance than there is for grants, economic assistance, $5 million, support assistance. Is that to maintain order?

Mr. Moscoso. That is right, until such time as some reasonable alternative comes up.

Senator AIKEN. And that is to help keep the President in office?

Mr. Moscoso. No, sir.

Senator AIKEN. What else is it for?

Mr. Moscoso. I would like to have Mr. Martin answer that, because I have an opinion about that which is pretty much the same as yours.

Senator AIKEN. My opinion was accentuated by some business people who tried to go down there and really establish a business, but they just gave up before they got started.

Who are we spending this $5 million supporting assistance money for?

Mr. Moscoso. I am sure, Senator, that you are aware of the proximity of Cuba to Haiti and the necessity for maintaining some semblance of law and order there. And I believe we all have the desire of not creating a power vacuum which will be filled by Castroites infiltrating over 100 miles of water. I am sure that something could be done to find an alternative.

Senator AIKEN. You say you have opinions about Haiti and its officials not unlike mine. Here is where we might have a difference. I have no solution for the Haitian problem. Have you?

Mr. Moscoso. Can this be off the record?

Senator AIKEN. I expect so.

[Discussion off the record.]

* * * * * * *

RICH AGRICULTURAL BASE IN ARGENTINA [P. 400]

Senator AIKEN. You are asking for quite a lot, I note, for the east Caribbean. Is that for Trinidad?

Mr. Moscoso. Trinidad and other eastern Caribbean islands. Chaguaramas, some of the bases around there, the tracking bases. We still have the Chaguaramas problem with us.

Senator AIKEN. They are still insisting?

Mr. Moscoso. I think we are going to arrive at an agreement with them on exactly what was meant by the amount of money we were going to provide in connection with the facilities. One of the things they want most in Trinidad is to have a university set up.

Senator AIKEN. A university on Chaguaramas?

Mr. Moscoso. A branch of it in Trinidad.

Senator AIKEN. Is Chaguaramas the location for it?

Mr. Moscoso. Of course, it would be located somewhere else. Of course, Chaguaramas is the base that we would locate for it.

Senator AIKEN. The Caribbean Federation is going down the drain?

Mr. Moscoso. I am afraid so, Senator. It is too bad. I had great hopes that that would be one way——

Senator AIKEN. And what happens to them now? Do they go back as English colonies, or does each one go into the United Nations individually?

Mr. Moscoso. If birth control isn't applied to nations we are going to have more than we would like to have, because I doubt very much if you have a viable economy there unless they integrate. Of course, the key to it, to my mind, would be integration into British Guiana, because they have a whole continent there.

* * * * * * *

EMPHASIS OF MILITARY AID FOR INTERNAL SECURITY PURPOSES [P. 406]

General ENEMARK. We have already seen one example of opposition from the right in El Salvador and we can expect, as the Alliance takes more definite shape and its effects begin to be felt, opposition from the left as well.

* * * * * * *

U.S. NAVY CONTRIBUTION TO SOUTH AMERICAN NAVIES [P. 407]

General ENEMARK. Well-disciplined and well-trained Latin American armed forces led by U.S.-trained and oriented leaders of moderate views will provide the stability and degree of internal security which are necessary to economic and social development and to the success of the Alliance for Progress.

* * * * * * *

NEED TO ESTIMATE CERTAIN LOAN REQUIREMENTS [P. 409]

Mr. Moscoso. These are magnitudes, Mr. Chairman. Between $100 million and $125 million is the estimate that we have for development lending in the case of Argentina; in the case of Brazil, between $140 million and $160 million; in the case of Chile, between $50 million and $60 million; and in the case of Colombia, between $40 million and $60 million.

These are estimates.

* * * * * * *

Mr. Moscoso. You see, the smaller figures for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia add up to $330 million, and the difference is

what we estimate, up to the $500 million, will be coming in from the other countries.

NOTIFICATION OF LONG-RANGE PROGRAMS [P. 412]

Senator MORSE. Or to the authorization of funds of the funds appropriated this year. And it further points out that he knows of no records of this committee that show that we have received any such notifications. And if we are asked in the Senate what the administration has done, and in fact it hadn't done anything about carrying out this section, you are in trouble.

Mr. MOSCOSO. I think that this refers, Mr. Chairman, to the long-term plans and programs for development assistance. And as you are probably aware, we have not yet finalized any of the contemplated long-term plans for assistance similar to those that are contemplated, for instance, in the case of the India and Pakistan and Nigeria consortia type of operations. We hope that this coming year there will be several of these long-term plans up for consideration, and that we will be able to make long-term commitments for the financing of those plans for those countries. Already the Chile plan has been examined by the World Bank, and the report of the World Bank is available, it just came in last Friday.

The World Bank also has the Colombia plan, and I hope we will get a report on that very soon. The Commission from the World Bank was in Colombia at the beginning of the year, and in a few weeks we should have that report too.

The Bolivia long-range plan was submitted to the Committee of Nine of the OAS, and in that way we hope we will be receiving for most of the countries of Latin America over the period of the next few years their long-range country plan. And we hope after that time, after we examine them carefully, consortia will be initiated by either the World Bank, as they are doing now in the case of Chile and Colombia, or perhaps by the Inter-American Bank itself.

EXPLANATION OF PROGRAM FOR MEXICO [P. 426]

Senator MORSE. The program for Mexico, as proposed, is relatively small; only $800,000 of development grants. Has Mexico sought additional aid either in the form of development loans or in some other form?

I don't know about the situation down in Mexico. I think that we have some problems with Mexico, and I am worried about some of the things that they are doing.

Mr. MOSCOSO. We will be able to give you something on that.

Senator MORSE. This takes you up to this border project that I am very careful about. I follow a neutral position on it, because for some reason the President of Mexico decided that this man Bermudez should come up here, and I should make some contacts for him—which I did, based upon my previous work in Mexico for my Government. I am not passing judgment on the border program. I am only saying that there we know the President of Mexico just this last week gave a very high order of priority to it; he isn't as interested as he seems to be. They have a lot of American businessmen along the border, who, let me tell you, are interested in it, too, because they see the advantage to this country as well as Mexico. I

am wondering whether or not $800,000 is at all sufficient for Mexico.

Mr. Moscoso. We are looking into that border program, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MORSE. Did United States pressure on Ecuador to repudiate Castro result in weakening the civilian regime in favor of the military?

I think we need a little briefing on this Ecuadorian situation, because it is going to be raised around this table. And we need it also in regard to the Argentine.

I am through with this comment, reserving the right to submit to Mr. Marcy further questions based upon our conferences on the record made this morning.

But on the Argentine I want to say this, that is a hot one, too. I never have felt we were proved more right, and so soon, as we as a delegation were in regard to the position taken by the Argentine at Punta del Este. We said quite frankly to the former Minister, "We just don't accept your analysis that you are following the course of action that the public opinion in your country wants you to follow." And we thought we knew, and he eventually proved we didn't know, that he and Frondizi were overlooking that block of votes known as the in votes. We are not pro-military and they are not pro-Peron. But they are perfectly willing to use both as the media for expressing their disapproval of Frondizi's attitude.

I happen to hold to the point of view that if that Argentine delegation hadn't taken the attitude it took on their own Foreign Minister's resolution—because he is the fellow that proposed it, that is where this so-called controversial resolution came from, it came from the Argentine Foreign Minister himself, and then he backed out on it—I am very much of the opinion that if they had supported this on that occasion, Frondizi would still be in office, and the election results might very well have been different. Who can tell? That is speculative.

Nevertheless, the attitude of the Argentine military in this whole matter, and the results of what happened in the Argentine, won't make our job any easier here around this table. I think the General can help us pretty much by giving us a memorandum on that Argentine military situation.

GROWING INFLUENCE OF MILITARY [P. 427]

I have another matter in this record that isn't going to help you very much in regard to our military problem. Remember that after our good friend Adlai Stevenson went on his tour to Latin America and came back and appeared before this committee, he presented a point of view that he thought the military was changing somewhat in Latin America; that maybe more and more support should be given to it. But before he got through, as the record will show, he told the story—which I am paraphrasing, but I can look at the record and see whether or not it is accurate—that the head of the air force had had a confidential conference with him and said that his generals had met, and that they had decided that they were going to let Betancourt serve out his term.

Mr. MARTIN. In Venezuela?

Senator MORSE. What did I say?
Mr. MARTIN. Argentina.
Senator MORSE. I beg your pardon.

* * * * * * *

[At 1:10 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, APRIL 17, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee continued into executive session at 11:20 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (presiding), and Senators Lausche and Symington.

On motion by Senator Lausche, seconded by Senator Symington, the committee approved for later report the nominations of G. Griffith Johnson, Jr., to be Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; John Kenneth Mansfield, to be Inspector General, Agency for International Development; Edward Martin, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; Clark R. Mollenhoff, to be a member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information; and Morris S. Novik, to be a member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information.

On motion by Senator Lausche, seconded by Senator Symington, the nominations of Dr. Walter Adams and others to be members of the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs were approved for report.

Without objection, the committee approved for report a list for appointments and promotions in the Foreign Service.

The bill (H.R. 10162), To amend the Bretton Woods Agreement Act to authorize the United States to participate in loans to the International Monetary Fund to strengthen the international monetary system, was passed over.

On motion by Senator Lauchse, seconded by Senator Symington, the committee approved for report the bill (S. 2919), To authorize certain retired personnel of the United States Government to accept, and wear decorations, presents, and other things tendered them by certain foreign countries.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:35 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, APRIL 25, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4 p.m., in room F–53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (subcommittee chairman).

Assistant Secretary of State Foy Kohler discussed NATO policy matters with those present.

No transcript was taken nor record kept at the meeting.

MINUTES

MONDAY, APRIL 30, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered in executive session at 11 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol. The time for meeting originally had been set for 10:30 a.m.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Morse, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

The nominations approved for report in the executive session of April 17 were informally reconsidered, and again, by unanimous voice vote, ordered favorably reported with the exception of the nomination of John Kenneth Mansfield, to be Inspector General, Foreign Assistance Program, Agency for International Development. The last nomination was held over temporarily pending advices from Senator Dodd.

The committee next considered the bill (H.R. 10162) To amend the Bretton Woods Agreement Act to authorize the United States to participate in loans to the International Monetary Fund to strengthen the international monetary system. On motion by Senator Morse, and by voice vote, the bill was approved for favorable report. Senator Lausche announced himself as passing on the vote at present. Senator Williams later advised he wished to be recorded in the negative. The Senator from Ohio (Mr. Lausche) was given the right to file individual views in opposition should he wish to do so.

The committee next considered the bill (S. 2996) To amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Doubt was expressed by Senator Morse that its mark-up could begin this morning. He said he would be absent most of the next few days. The chairman also said he would be generally absent and suggested the procedure whereby the committee, in their absence, go over the bill for unobjected-to items but reserving any item for future consideration which may have an objection of a member against it, or one which any member wishes reopened for consideration in the future. In order that not too many items would thus be reconsidered, Senator Morse suggested that the absent Senators leave memoranda on their reservations to parts of the bill, and so postpone their approval until the absent Senators returned. This was agreed to.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]

48-688 O—86——15

MINUTES

MONDAY, MAY 1, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 10 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman).

The subcommittee had an informal discussion with Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, in the Congo, on the situation in that country.

No record was kept at the meeting nor was a transcript taken.

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MAY 1, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 11:20 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Symington, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

The Chairman stated he had a request from Christian Herter, former Secretary of State, that G. Bernard Noble, Director of the Historical Office of the Department of State, who was doing a study on Herter's career, be given access to executive testimony presented by Mr. Herter to the committee in the past. It was Mr. Herter's statement to the Chairman that all material would be cleared through the Department of State and be held in compliance with any regulations of the committee. The Chairman pointed out the difficulty of separating the classified from the unclassified in any transcript turned over to Mr. Noble, and suggested that a staff member instead might go through the transcripts to pick out what Mr. Herter had said. Senator Morse pointed out that to do so would have no relation to any colloquy in the committee, and that what he said might, by inference, reflect on members of the committee unless the whole record was to be used. Senator Aiken suggested the former Secretary might be given the opportunity to refresh his memory from the record as a compromise. The Chairman then suggested that Mr. Herter be sent a copy of the rules governing use of committee transcripts, with the response that the committee would do its best to accommodate him in his request by allowing him to refresh his memory on any past question or specific problem, if he so cared to do, but that the committee judge from the nature of his future requests as to its final determination on what he would personally be shown.

The committee then proceeded to the mark-up of the bill (S. 2996) To amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:35 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, MAY 2, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:45 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Long, Lausche, Symington, Aiken, and Capehart.

The committee continued its mark-up of the bill (S. 2996) To amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12 noon.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MAY 3, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:05 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Long, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Capehart.

The committee continued its mark-up of the bill (S. 2996) To amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:20 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MAY 10, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Long, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

The committee continued its mark-up of the bill (S. 2996) To amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12 noon.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, MAY 11, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:40 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman), and Senators Humphrey, Long, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

The committee continued its mark-up of the bill (S. 2996) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:35 p.m.]

NATO, CENTO, AND SEATO

TUESDAY, MAY 15, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. John J. Sparkman, presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Morse, Long, Lausche, Symington, and Aiken.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Denney, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Newhouse of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. The committee will come to order.

The meeting this morning with Secretary Rusk was arranged at his request prior to his recent trip to NATO, CENTO, and SEATO in order to report on those meetings and the crises in Laos and Berlin.

Let me remind you that at 2:30 this afternoon we shall hear General Clay. That meeting is largely in response to a request by Senator [Hugh] Scott directed to Senators Fulbright and [Richard] Russell to get General Clay's views on whether the 13-nation international access proposal which now seems dead was too much of a compromise with the Russians.

Secretary Rusk, we are glad to have you with us this morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen.

THE CRISIS IN LAOS

I was able, with the cooperation of a number of other foreign ministers, to work out three meetings in one 12-day period rather than to have to undertake, possibly, three trips. It was a very busy period. However, I think before commenting on the three alliance meetings I migh' go into the question of Laos, which is immediately upon our table today.

The Senators will recall that in early December 1960 General Phoumi seized power. Souvanna Phouma then withdrew but continued to be recognized by the Soviets as a prime minister, as a sort of government-in-exile. He established himself at Xieng Khoang, and was supported by a Russian airlift, and about mid-January 1961 it was agreed among the United States, Great Britain, and France that an effort would be made to find a solution to

this problem through negotiations by invoking the arrangements of the Geneva Conference of 1954.

To come, then, to the cease-fire of last summer, the political object which accompanied the cease-fire was to try to find a coalition government in Laos which would have a reasonable chance of providing a neutral and independent government for that country, and to insulate the rest of the Southeast Asia governments from an organized Communist apparatus which would threaten the frontiers of Laos' neighbors.

The conference at Geneva managed to work out some arrangements which, if effective, could be entirely favorable from our point of view. One of those was the agreement not to permit Laos to serve as an avenue for infiltration of supplies or support of dissident elements of other countries. This would be policed internally by an international commission, but, of course, externally it would be reasonably easy to detect violations through ordinary intelligence means in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand.

Further, that agreement provided that foreign forces would leave Laos. This seemed to us to be of considerable importance, because the principal effort which has come from the direction of the Communist side has been the stiffening of the Pathet Lao by Vietnam cadres, artillery teams, and other forms of support, now including certain organized battalions.

We have felt that if we could get all foreigners out of Laos with the exception of a Western training team, probably French, for the Laotian armed forces, Laotians, left to themselves, would not organize themselves into a Communist state and would not have the capacity or the will to create any serious trouble for their neighbors. We base this partly on the peaceful character of the Laotian people and the difficulties which both sides have had in stirring the Laotians themselves into serious fighting capabilities.

The coalition government would expect, after due course, to hold elections. But, meanwhile, there would be a transitional period in which the armed forces would remain in place. And the present armed forces would be converted into a national police force. This meant that over a period of at least a considerable number of months there would, in fact, be a sort of partition of the country as between those forces now under government control and those forces in the east and the northeast under Pathet Lao control.

We did not believe that the formation of a coalition government would itself immediately affect the basic situation in the country.

PROBLEM OF NEGOTIATING FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT

One of our difficulties has been, throughout, that General Phoumi has been unwilling to sit down and negotiate seriously and persistently about the possibilities of a coalition government. We, ourselves, have not had a particular pattern for a cabinet in mind. It seemed to us obvious that in a situation of that sort the defense and interior ministries ought to be held and divided between the two groups of neutralists, that is, the Vientiane neutralists which are more sympathetic to the government point of view and the Western point of view, and the Souvanna Phouma neutrals who

have been up in Xieng Khoang. It was never the idea that defense would ever be turned over to Souphanouvong, the Pathet leader.

The negotiations, however, have never gotten off the ground for the past several months because, for one reason, General Phoumi has never been able to sit down and seriously talk about the possibilities. There are all sorts of variations that might be worked out. Even if the neutrals held such ministries, defense and interior, we felt that it would be possible, for example, to work out sub-ministries and army commands in such a way that the present relation of forces would be retained, that the government forces would not be simply disbanded or turned over to Souvanna Phouma regardless of what the situation or the results would be.

This process of attempting negotiations has been moving to what seemed to be a more satisfactory stage. General Phoumi and Souvanna Phouma have, as of today, generally found an agreed basis on which they would resume the talks. Souvanna Phouma has announced that he is coming back to Laos this weekend. He will go through Vientiane or Luang Prabang, call on the King, and have a meeting of the three princes. And General Phoumi has agreed to that.

MILITARY SKIRMISH AT NAM THA

The principal factor which has upset, or threatens to upset, the arrangement has been the situation at Nam Tha. This is a very distressing incident to us, because it was something that developed needlessly and contrary to our own military advice on the scene.

General Phoumi reinforced Nam Tha, up near the Chinese border, with a considerable number of troops, up to a total of about 8,000, including three of his best paratroop battalions. That was contrary to our military advice. We thought that this was an excessive force to be put in such an exposed position, away from their main lines of supply, and indeed, given the right disposition, it was more than enough to hold Nam Tha against the forces employed against it.

The reinforcement produced a reinforcement on the other side. The dispositions locally of the government forces were poor, exposed positions in the lowlands, again contrary to our military adviser who was with them. The enemy was allowed to occupy the high ground surrounding the government forces.

When the Pathet Lao attacked, for the first few hours there was a spirited defense on the part of the government troops. They manned their artillery well; they seemed to be acting competently and with a considerable degree of courage. But then they were ordered to withdraw, and the withdrawal led to a rout. The two government commanders in the area, the two generals themselves, took off without notifying anyone, leaving their troops there, including the American advisers. The orders to withdraw were not systematically worked out with any kind of rearguard protection or action.

A relatively minor amount of pursuit caused complete demoralization, and the forces disappeared into the woods, and about 2,000 of them came down and crossed the Mekong River into Thailand. In doing so, they lost contact with the enemy.

An American intelligence team remained on the eastern side of the Mekong River during this period and found no enemy. I gather that they themselves patrolled 30 miles back toward Nam Tha without running into the enemy. And that led to a return of certain government elements east of the river. They are now moving generally back toward the Nam Tha area to establish contact with the Pathet Lao forces.

REASONS FOR MOVE NOT CLEAR

We don't quite understand what was in General Phoumi's mind in this operation, against which he had been so strongly advised. The French and the Thais are convinced—and it was so expressed to us—that he invited this situation in an effort to draw American military forces into Laos. I find it, myself, hard to credit that, because in so doing Phoumi allowed some of his best troops to disappear, to be disbanded, a force of about 8,000 whose combat effectiveness is now rated by our military out there as zero. The remnents will be picked up and brought back into Laos further south to try to refit them and regroup them and see if something can't be made from them.

The present situation, particularly in the Nam Tha area, does raise the possibility that the other side will make additional moves in Laos, and that we might have to look at the critical decision as to whether we put American forces in or let that country go Communist.

There is, at the present time, no firm indication of any intention on the part of the other side to attack at other points. But, nevertheless, we can't discount that possibility.

In our contacts with Moscow we expressed a very strong reaction to the Nam Tha episode, because Gromyko had assured us that the Pathet Lao would not move pending the discussions between General Phoumi and Souvanna, which in the last few days have reached some conclusion. This seemed to us to be, despite the buildup of the government forces, a complete doublecross on that particular assurance, the sort of thing that we had to expect or had to be ready for, and certainly could not rely fully upon in any event. Nevertheless, the Soviets continue to say that they do want a coalition government, they want a solution of the problem without major fighting, and they seem to be still on the same track on which they have been for some time.

It is, again, very hard to be sure of what is in their minds, or exactly what degree of control they have over the situation in northern Laos. We believe they have a considerable amount of control, if not complete, because it is their airlift which is the main support for the operation. But, nevertheless, we will just have to find out.

SEATO COMMITMENTS IN THAILAND

One of the most important consequences of the Nam Tha episode has been the sharp increase in nervousness and fear in Thailand. The President has felt that it was necessary to reinforce American forces now located in Thailand in order to have them in position to perform, if necessary, under our commitments under SEATO. This,

in itself, is not an invocation of the SEATO Treaty, either article 41 or 42, but a placing of forces in readiness for such a contingency if it should become necessary.

The Thai Government has asked us for that reinforcement. It is a matter which has been discussed from time to time with the Thais here, in our own Government, and with other SEATO governments. We are also suggesting to other SEATO governments that, on the request of the Thai Government, they consider putting some of their own forces in Thailand as a reinforcement to Thailand.

For example, perhaps the most immediately available might be the element of the Air Cobra exercise which SEATO has recently concluded in Thailand. They would involve some air representation from France and Great Britain and some air and ground from both Australia and, I believe, New Zealand. I believe there were no Philippine or Pakistani participants in that particular exercise.

While I was in Australia and New Zealand, on the way back from NATO, I did talk to both those governments about the importance of their getting some of their own people into Southeast Asia to fly their flags in that situation. I was then, quite frankly, thinking more of Vietnam than Thailand. Both governments agreed, and we are now talking with them and the authorities in Saigon about what kind of personnel would be most suitable. We would like to have Australians and New Zealanders in uniform alongside of our people in the assistance there to the Vietnamese. And I think both governments are willing to do that—on what scale still has to be worked out.

It appears, however, that it may be possible still to revive the cease-fire and to revive the discussions for a coalition government. Certainly it would not be possible if there is any general breakdown of the cease-fire arrangements. Whether the forthcoming talks between General Phoumi and Souvanna Phouma will come to a successful conclusion, we just can't tell. We have never been able to be sure that they could reach a conclusion.

The principal point we have made is that they, at least, ought to have serious talks with each other and try to find out. Thus far, those have not occurred.

The reinforcements in Thailand would add 4,000 or 5,000 men, a marine landing team, certain air units, and the remainder of the present army battle group that is in central Thailand. They would be put in there for the time being, both as an immediate reassurance to Thailand, and as an ambiguous signal to the other side that they must not take for granted that they have it all their own way in Southeast Asia, and that the Laotian talks might be serious.

I might pause here to see if the Senators have questions on the Laotian situation, and we might dispose of that at the very beginning.

Senator SPARKMAN. Very good.

Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. I have a few questions, seeking information more than anything else, because I am very concerned about the Laotian situation.

As I understand it, General Phoumi put this garrison up near the Chinese border against the advice of the American military advisers.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator MORSE. And I understand that that advice included the warning that they might produce exactly what did happen, namely, that the Chinese over on the other side of the border increased their garrison.

Secretary RUSK. So far as we know, Senator. Intelligence has been working very hard on it. They have not been able to get any evidence that there were Chinese units involved in the Nam Tha exercise. There seemed to be some Vietnamese and Pathet Lao. But the highly classified type of intelligence tends to discount the reports that there were Chinese units involved.

Senator MORSE. Is it true that the Pathet Lao increased their concentration?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, they did.

VIOLATION OF CEASE-FIRE

Senator MORSE. My presumption is that General Phoumi's strengthening of his garrison there has created concern that he might lead into direct action against the Pathet Lao in that part of the area. And so they decided, apparently, to drive him out, which they did. That raises the question, it seems to me, as to whether or not there is a serious violation of the cease-fire. You have a cease-fire order; you have a cease-fire agreement. After the cease-fire agreement has been entered into, General Phoumi proceeds with his military action in the sense of strengthening his garrison. This would really create a military situation that would entice the Pathet Lao to take action against him.

I am asking this question, are we on the most solid ground that we can be on when we say—the press is at least saying—that there is a violation of the cease-fire order when, in fact, General Phoumi has followed a course of action that sort of encouraged a violation of the cease-fire order?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, except in the context of Laos, this certainly was a very ambiguous situation on that point. But the cease-fire has been on that sort of quagmire all along; that is, at different points each side has reinforced or shifted its troops around. We have tried to keep our eyes on what happens to particular towns or strong points or locations in terms of the cease-fire. There has been that kind of troop movement going on, on both sides, throughout the cease-fire. There are no clear demarcation lines of demilitarized zones. And it would be, I think, extremely difficult to be precise about that point.

I think the chief reason, Senator, that we have looked upon this as an unnecessary violation of the cease-fire was that Gromyko knew of the efforts that we were making to persuade Phoumi to negotiate seriously, although we told Gromyko that we couldn't guarantee what the results of such negotiations would be, and wouldn't make any commitments to him on it. He made a commitment to us that the Pathet Lao would stand still during this period.

Now, if they had concern on the other side about this buildup, they might have flagged that to us. Instead, they attacked the town and made a considerable difference in the actual geographic distribution.

I might say also, Senator, that the advice that was given to General Phoumi was given to him on straight military grounds, not on political grounds. Our military people, combat officers out there, saw that he was reinforcing a point which did not make sense from the point of view of the defense of the government terrain, that he was inviting a Dien Bien Phu kind of situation, and that his local employment and dispositions were entirely faulty from a military point of view.

But I think the character of this action as a violation of the cease-fire turned as much on what had been said among the governments about who would do what and who would not do what in this period as it did on the circumstances in Nam Tha itself.

LAOTIAN MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IS DOUBTFUL

Senator MORSE. You said that when the Pathet Lao made this attack on the town, a rout resulted and the generals abandoned their troops and fled. As we have discussed so many times in this committee, we are dealing here with people, and they offer us very little hope, or at least we have a very discouraging experience. Can we count on them for very effective military assistance when the chips are down?

Secretary RUSK. I think this has been one of the most distressing aspects of the Laotian problem from the beginning of the last 18 months. We have a situation there that is in no way like the Vietnam situation, where the Vietnamese are fighting, nor as we had in Korea, where the Koreans fought, nor in Greece, where the Greeks fought. It took us several months to get the Laotians to agree to have American combat advisers with the front battle groups. It took us several months to get them to agree to allow us—perhaps this particular point should be off even this record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Secretary RUSK. There have been some fighters among these tribesmen who have given a good account of themselves and fought well and given real resistance to the Pathet Lao.

Senator MORSE. Your off the record comments lead me to make this comment on the record without reference to what you said off the record: I am very much concerned about sending American military personnel into Laos for the purpose of supposedly assisting the so-called royal Laotians when there is this repeated evidence of the lack of will to fight.

It seems to me that there is some evidence that the King and Phoumi know we are on their side, that they feel we have no other choice, and so they have thrown one blockade after another—I don't care how you describe it—like cooperation, or insistence on materials that they knew Souphanouvong would never accept, and have prevented the formation of any neutral government. Now we get this fiasco on the part of General Phoumi.

I raise the question, what hope do we have that American unilateral action—that is what it has been pretty much up to this

moment, and I will come to that point in a moment—is ever going to save the situation in Laos so long as we continue to support a central government there that obviously has no will to fight, and has no will, apparently, to sit down and work out a neutral government?

SENDING AMERICAN COMBAT FORCES UNDER CONSIDERATION

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we have not come to the question yet in the executive branch as to deciding on the placing of American combat forces in Laos. The present reinforcement in Thailand is in central and north Thailand, which is basically a reinforcement of the Thai. But if the political talks do not succeed, if there is a collapse of the situation in Laos, then these very grave issues which you mention would have to be taken up and given the most serious consideration.

Senator MORSE. There are no combat forces in there, but we have some personnel in there.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator MORSE. It is pretty dangerous to us. It doesn't make any difference whether an American boy dies while he is on the advisory team or a combat team, if the cause of his death is attributable in part to the kind of lack of cooperation that I think we are getting from the Laotian Government. I am not at all happy with this Laotian Government, and I am not sure that there is any hope there in getting them to be an effective anti-Communist force. This leads me to raise a serious question in regard to personnel.

I am delighted—this is the first evidence we have, your testimony this morning—that some conversations are going on with the British, Australians, and New Zealanders in regard to uniformed military personnel. I need not tell you that my intention is to support my Government, but I think a warning should be issued that there is evidence of growing concern in this country as to whether this policy in southeast Asia should be supported. I am satisfied that if it remains predominantly the unilateral American policy, you will be surprised how quickly public opinion changes.

Senator [A. Willis] Robertson of Virginia talked to me yesterday, and he is very much concerned. He said, "I am not going to support American military action in Laos on the basis of such information as I have received." He said, "You are a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I think your committee had better make clear to the Senate what is really going on. We don't know."

But, he said, "I don't like it. I am not going to support the sacrifice of American boys in Laos."

I had a little visit with him about it.

I think you will be surprised how quickly the American people are going to ask how many Canadians are actually there in uniform, how many Britishers are actually there in uniform, and how many Australians and New Zealanders, and, for that matter, how many Thais and Filipinos. Because it is going to raise this whole question of SEATO. And it is also going to raise the question of whether or not we ought to be leaving this to SEATO or taking it to the United Nations.

You spoke about article 4, sections 1 and 2. But I want to call attention to section 1: "Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the parties, or against any state or territory which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations."

I understand we haven't yet got so far as to consider this attack on north Laos as involving this section. But if we start reacting to it with any American military assistance—it doesn't have to be sending troops on its soil, if you are sending planes into the area or the Navy into its waters, you are going to be in under that section, and you are going to have to go before the Security Council.

And, frankly, Mr. Secretary, up to now Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and Thailand have not given me much encouragement that we can count on them. We will do the bleeding and they will do the cheering.

UNITED NATIONS ROLE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED

I don't know but what maybe SEATO isn't the vehicle we ought to be using. Maybe we ought to take this straight to the United Nations.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I can say on that point that if this Nam Tha episode proves to be more than an isolated event, due to the special circumstances we went over earlier, we would expect to take this matter immediately into the United Nations before the Security Council, not just as a reporting matter but as an action matter.

For example, if there is an attack at Houei Sai, or down at Tanoun or any of these other places, this would go straight to the Security Council. And the United Nations would have to get into it fully and completely.

On the matter of troops from other countries, I must say that I fully agree that our allies should not get the impression in a situation of this sort that we are the gendarmes for the rest of the world. I had some very frank talks with them while I was out in that part of the world. And I think that we must press that point very well.

Senator MORSE. I am glad to hear it.

I am through, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, I myself feel that if SEATO is to continue to exist, we ought to insist upon using its facilities.

And, by the way, what about the Filipinos?

Secretary RUSK. I might just comment briefly about the several members of SEATO as they look into a situation of this sort.

MILITARY PARTICIPATION OF SEATO MEMBERS LIMITED

I think when the clutch is reached that the British, the Australians, and the New Zealanders will be with us both in policy and in troops, although the troops that they have immediately available out there are somewhat limited. There is a Commonwealth brigade

in Malaya which has been made available for SEATO, and there are some Australian and New Zealander forces and some additional Australian ground forces which could be brought into the situation.

As far as France is concerned, I would doubt very much that France would contribute any forces to Southeast Asia. General de Gaulle has made it quite clear that he did not look upon this as his responsibility. There might be some token aircraft or something of that sort in there, but as far as any substantial forces are concerned, I wouldn't think so.

Pakistan, up until fairly recently, has been an active member of SEATO, and concerned in planning, and has earmarked and committed certain Pakistani forces. Now, with their heavy involvement with India and Afghanistan both, I think the chances are less strong that they would come in with any significant number of forces.

In the case of the Philippines, they take a very strong attitude on the policy side. But I think that the most that we have been able to get them to commit, in terms of forces in our various SEATO planning exercises, has been about 300 troops. Now, they have some problems at home, too; they have some guerillas to worry about, and so I wouldn't measure necessarily the Philippine attitude by that number of 300. But I don't think we can count on them, in the first stages of any such problem, to put in very many forces.

I think it really would turn on the Thais, the Vietnamese, the British, Australians, and New Zealanders, with some help from the Pakistanis. That is about the rollcall in SEATO.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, do we have any report on casualties at Nam Tha?

Secretary RUSK. We do not, sir, unless you think of it in terms of how the armed forces normally measure casualities. The government forces at the time of the attack numbered about 8,000. About 2,000 crossed the river into Thailand. A great many others have dispersed into the hills. They would be, for the moment, technically called missing. There were not very many killed in action. There were a few wounded. In the first few hours, when the government forces were really acting quite well, they suffered some casualties, but not too many, because when subjected to artillery fire, they took cover. There was never any sort of harsh infantry hand-to-hand fighting and machine gun action, or anything of that sort.

This force of 8,000 is now rated as zero capability by our military people. It is lost, including three paratroop battalions on whom a great deal of training had been lavished—they were supposed to be the cream of the force. I can't understand what happened, except that the order to withdraw, we know now, was given in advance of the attack—that is, they were told to withdraw, and when the order to withdraw was actually given to the troops, the generals having departed, this just caused a melting away of the situation.

Senator AIKEN. Was this General Phoumi who gave the orders?

Secretary RUSK. No, this was General Folo and General La, his two generals.

Senator AIKEN. They were there ahead of him?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. I gather they are the Laotian counterpart of Gen. Jubilation D. Cornpone.

POLITICAL MEANING OF NAM THA

Do you smell the aroma of blackmail in this Nam Tha operation?

Secretary RUSK. You mean directly against us?

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. Both the French and the Thai—and I think it is somewhat more significant that the Thai think so than the French—believe that this is a deliberate effort to create a situation to force us into Laos. I, quite frankly, would be very reluctant to accept that. I have no reason to believe that General Phoumi would deliberately destroy that particular force, including his three key paratroop battalions, for that kind of a purpose. I just don't see the rationale—it would be a wholly irrational move on his part.

I am inclined to doubt that very much, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. Are any of the three Laotian princes, as they call them at present, living in Laos.

Secretary RUSK. Souphanouvong is there, but Boun Oum at the moment is visiting with General Phoumi in Formosa. Souvanna Phouma is in Paris and is on his way back to Laos this weekend.

Senator AIKEN. Is there any way of keeping them there?

Secretary RUSK. It has been difficult, and Souphanouvong has been the one who has attended to his knitting more than the others.

Senator LAUSCHE. Which forces is he in charge of?

Secretary RUSK. He is in charge of Pathet Lao.

It is just hard to get your teeth into this situation. At one stage I remember the King was to have elaborate rites extending over a period of, I think, 2 weeks, to bury his father, who died some years ago. We are afraid that if they got all the leadership of Laos up at Luang Prabang that the Pathet Lao who were nearby would take that opportunity to seize Luang Prabang with all the Communist leadership. But the King said, "They won't do that, I am burying my father." And he was right. They would take 10 days out of the war and go off to the water festival. Nothing happens during the water festival.

We get grumblings from the other side how their Laotians are behaving in similar circumstances. I am sure they are having as much trouble with their Laotians as we are in the same situation. Had it not been for a stiffening of the Pathet Lao, you would have a different situation.

Senator LAUSCHE. If there was any blackmail, it would look like collusive blackmail.

You said in your first statement that we were confronted with the question of whether we would put troops in Laos or let it go Communist.

Secretary RUSK. I say we may be confronted with that situation.

Senator LAUSCHE. The situation isn't quite as simple as that, is it?

Secretary RUSK. No.

Senator LAUSCHE. If we could put troops in Laos, and they found that the Pathet Lao, or whoever might be our opponent at the time, were being supplied from Hanoi, you would have operations in that area, too?

PROBLEMS IN DECIDING ON FEASIBLE U.S. MILITARY ROLE

Secretary RUSK. This would be one of the most critical aspects of it. The prospect of sending American forces the long way around, up through Thailand, into a land-locked country to fight under any kind of hold-the-ring concept, for people who have not yet demonstrated their will or capacity to fight for themselves, is most unpromising. I would suppose that for us to bring military power to bear out there might well involve our not doing it that way, but to use our air and sea power, and to meet the situation on the coast in some way, and specifically in North Vietnam.

Senator AIKEN. Is Hanoi the base of the Russian supply operation?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. That really would be the key to the situation?

Secretary RUSK. That would be really the important key to it; yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. If we become involved, there would be no guarantee that our involvement would entail the use of strictly conventional weapons?

Secretary RUSK. One can't give any guarantee on that, sir.

Senator AIKEN. I wish there was some way of knowing exactly what the situation is, but if you don't know I am sure the rest of us do not.

Secretary RUSK. I do want you to know that we have not given up the idea that a political arrangement can be reached which would not be unfavorable from the point of view of the Western interest in Southeast Asia. If we could just get international machinery established to root out all foreign elements there, I have little doubt in my own mind that the Laotians wouldn't cause anybody else much trouble—they might not be able to do themselves much good, but they wouldn't cause anybody else much trouble.

DETERMINATION OF THIS QUESTIONED

Senator AIKEN. There has been quite a little speculation as to whether the Thais would prove to be any more war-like than the Laotians. Have you any advice on that? I think it has been generally agreed that General Sarit would probably be willing to go all out, but would the people support him?

Secretary RUSK. I think, measured by the fairly limited performance of their small units in Korea——

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator AIKEN. The Laotians would be the poorest fighters of all in Southeastern Asia?

Secretary RUSK. I would think so.

Senator AIKEN. That is all.

Senator SPARKMAN. In that connection, in speaking of Hanoi, you have not said anything about the attitude of Russia on these various negotiations, and whether or not anything came out of Llewel-

lyn Thompson's conversation with Khrushchev within the last few days.

Secretary RUSK. Nothing came out of the conversation except a reaffirmation of the position they have taken all along at Geneva, that they would——

Senator SPARKMAN. He did reaffirm his desire for Laos to be a neutral state?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

I will say this, about the Russian side, with full awareness of the difficulties of being sure about what they might do: Over the last several months, given the conduct of General Phoumi, they have had several occasions when they could, with considerable pretext, have pushed the button with the Pathet Lao and said, "Go to it."

They have gone to considerable effort to maintain the course of the discussion, the cease-fires and the Geneva talks. On one occasion, 3 months ago, there was a meeting in Vientiane. General Phoumi could not have acted worse. He was contemptuous of everyone, including the King. He just would not sit down at the table; he woudn't get into any talks at all. And the meetings broke up. Instead of saying to the Pathet Lao, "All right, let's get going here." Pushkin, the Soviet representative, went back to Geneva and called for a meeting of the three princes in Switzerland. If they wanted to push this, they have had several such opportunities to do so.

RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNIST STATES IS UNCLEAR

I think, however, one can't be sure of what the relations are among Peiping, Hanoi, and Moscow on this particular situation. We do get information that in Hanoi the Communist authorities are quite concerned lest a buildup of the situation in Southeast Asia bring the Chinese into Hanoi. So they still have the Southeast Asian nationalist fear of the Chinese. We believe that they are concerned about that.

But, on the other hand, one of the prices which may be paid by Moscow for some sort of better relationship with Peiping may be a greater free hand for Peiping in Southeast Asia. We have no evidence of that yet; we will have to keep an eye on it.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know whether the Secretary thinks there is any signficance in the Russian sale of arms to India in this present situation. It seems to me to tie in, at least to the extent of preventing Pakistan from making any significant contribution to the Southeast Asia situation.

Does it all tie in together; is Russia making an economic matter out of this?

Secretary RUSK. I think the most interesting aspect of the talks between India and the Soviet Union about possible military planes, which have not come to any conclusion yet, is that it was known on both sides that those planes were primarily intended for the northern frontier, because of the military capability of the planes on the other side, and so forth. This looked as though the Soviet Union was considering selling planes to India in direct relation to their problem in China.

Senator AIKEN. India isn't playing the game Morocco was playing 2 or 3 years ago and saying, "If you don't give us better planes, we might buy from Russia"?

Secretary RUSK. No, they are not.

About 3 years ago they discussed buying some of our most modern planes, but they have not raised that question with us.

Senator AIKEN. I think your analysis is probably correct, but there, again, we can't be sure of anything.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Lausche?

DEGREE OF SEATO INVOLVEMENT IS SMALL

Senator LAUSCHE. What, if any, other advisory troops are in Laos beside ours? Are there any from the SEATO nations?

Secretary RUSK. There are a few French at the SEATO base who were left over from the period when the French had full responsibility there for the training.

[Discussion off the record.]

Secretary RUSK. There have not been other SEATO personnel in that capacity in Laos.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then the only personnel there are the Thailanders, a few of the French that were held over, and our people?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Which of these nations that are in SEATO do you feel are either immobilized now or unwilling to help? You say France definitely states that it does not consider the Laotian problem to be theirs.

Secretary RUSK. France will stay in the problem on the political side, but they have indicated they will not put troops in Southeast Asia.

Senator LAUSCHE. So from the standpoint of SEATO and troops, France is out of it.

What about Northern Ireland, have they shown any interest?

Secretary RUSK. That is a part——

Senator SPARKMAN. That is a part of the United Kingdom.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, the British would be with us, and with troops. Their concern has been that the possibility of a political settlement, as agreed in early January 1961, be fully explored before you go to military action in Southeast Asia.

They have put some people in Vietnam and will undoubtedly be putting some more in there. Their man Thompson, who was their chief operator in Malaya, is in Vietnam, and has had a very beneficial and helpful influence on the operations there in that country. In addition to British help, we have gotten some Malayan personnel up from Malaya to help in Vietnam. But I think the British will be with us.

Senator LAUSCHE. Which ones could you depend upon, then, New Zealand, and Australia?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I think they would be with us.

Senator LAUSCHE. What about the Philippines?

Secretary RUSK. They would be with us but with limited capacity, because they have problems in the Philippines.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thailand would help?

Secretary RUSK. We would count quite strongly on Thailand. They have four divisions, and until it is proved otherwise we believe that they have fair fighting capability in that part of the world. They would not be equally good in a Western type combat.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am looking at article 4 of this treaty. It states that whenever trouble arises in any state or territory which might endanger, in the opinion of the member nations, their security, they shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense. I don't suppose there has been any consultation in what you call a concerted action way?

CONTINUAL CONSULTATION WITH SEATO COUNCIL

Secretary RUSK. The SEATO Council is located in Bangkok, and it meets quite frequently, so we consult both through the SEATO Council and the SEATO Capital on this entire situation. There has been quite a bit of consultation by the SEATO governments about Laos, as well as Vietnam, and on this particular problem of reinforcing Thailand which we are engaged in doing today.

Senator LAUSCHE. Have you sent the troops into Thailand or into that vicinity because you fear the mental state of the Thailanders, that if they see things going against the West that they will surrender?

Secretary RUSK. It is not just psychological, Senator. We want to get some additional reinforcements in the area for its political effect on the other side.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, on the Pathet Lao?

Secretary RUSK. That is on the Communist side, on Moscow and Peiping. They must realize that Southeast Asia is important to us and could be dangerous if they want to keep playing around there. And this is important.

Second, Thailand now is threatened with exposed frontiers for several hundred miles. Their own forces will have to cover the villages, and will have to go out and try to cover the countryside, but their forces need some central reinforcement, strategic reserve, and that is what our forces would be in this situation.

CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE CHINESE INVOLVEMENT

We are concerned, quite frankly, about what might happen in the next several months if the Chinese elected to take a hand in this, because they have been building a road from Yunan Province down toward Nam Tha. If they came in and threatened northern Thailand, then we would need some forces in that area.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thailand is quite a fertile area, is it not?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, it is.

Senator LAUSCHE. And the Chinese have been looking rather avidly upon those fertile lands?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Suppose a million Chinese moved in?

Secretary RUSK. That wouldn't be a problem for American conventional forces, I am sure, in Southeast Asia; that would be a problem of another sort.

Senator AIKEN. Would Nationalist China help any?

Secretary RUSK. I think very likely, if a million Chinese moved into Southeast Asia, this would inflame at least all of the fronts in that part of the world, including Korea, and it could easily inflame the NATO front. I think that would be a very serious step toward general war.

Senator AIKEN. It is one of the possibilities?

Secretary RUSK. It is one of the possibilities.

Senator SPARKMAN. Logistically, it is not very popular, is it?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, if you take out a sliderule and look at the roads and the railways, you would think that their capacity to maintain forces in Southeast Asia would be limited. But when you remember Korea, where we knocked down every stick and every brick sitting on top of another, and where a truck couldn't move on the road in daylight without being hit, they nevertheless maintained 500,000 men on the front 250 miles from the border.

I think we can't rely upon the normal rules when we are thinking about all this vast coolie capacity to move goods.

Senator SPARKMAN. They have had a wonderful reservoir there, where they could hold their men before sending them over, and that is not true here. They would have quite a problem moving their men inside China, wouldn't they?

Secretary RUSK. I don't believe they would defend Southeast Asia on any kind of a sanctuary basis with limited rules of engagement.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am just thinking about the probability of moving in such masses, both inside China and across through the jungles.

Secretary RUSK. This would be extremely difficult for the Chinese. But I wouldn't think that we could properly advise the President, for example, that we could guarantee that they wouldn't do something just because it is difficult.

Senator SPARKMAN. I might say, we don't want another Wake Island.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is Pakistan immobilized now because of this development in India, as far as SEATO is concerned?

Secretary RUSK. As far as any large participation is concerned, yes. But this is partly, Senator, because Pakistan itself is pressing very hard for a solution of the Kashmir question now. In other words, it is not just India. The two of them have this problem in front of them, and the issue over Kashmir keeps both of their forces locked up against each other there along those frontiers.

Senator LAUSCHE. Presently, as far as SEATO is concerned, we don't have the help of France or Pakistan because of the conditions in India and Kashmir?

Secretary RUSK. I doubt that we would have more than a battalion from Pakistan in the present circumstances, unless the war got to be a very large and serious affair.

IMPORTANCE OF LAOS TO DEFENSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator LAUSCHE. If it is a fact that these troops have been sent into the Thailand area as a signal to the Communists that we do not intend to abandon the Far East, and partly psychologically to

help the Thailanders, we then at this moment feel that that area is a part of our defense? The general area, I am not speaking of Laos.

Secretary RUSK. I think that Laos is very important to the defense of Southeast Asia if we can get some settlement there which restricts Laos to the Laotians, and which does not permit it to become a base for organized efforts against its three neighbors to the south. This is the great tragedy of the roll-up from the north—the loss of the Red River Valley and North Vietnam exposed Laos and exposed South Vietnam. The loss of Laos would expose Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.

We hope very much that we can get a Laotian political solution that would turn Laos into something of a buffer state, at the minimum. What we would have to have in Laos would be a period of utter confusion over a period of years to prevent its being organized as a base against any of its neighbors.

Senator LAUSCHE. I thought a year ago that if Laos collapsed, you just unavoidably were going to have your complications in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and finally Malaya.

Now, what does the incumbent government say as an explanation for its failure to sit down with Souvanna Phouma? What reason do they give?

DEMANDS OF SOUVANNA PHOUMA

Secretary RUSK. They have wanted, that is, General Phoumi has wanted, both the defense and the interior ministries to be held by the present government people. This would exclude two groups of people that we think would be worth gambling on: One, certain of the neutralists that have been cooperating with Souvanna Phouma; and the other, and more importantly, certain of the non-government people who are now living in Vientiane, people who have not taken part in the present government, but who have demonstrated some capacity over the years. They are referred to now as the fourth group, the Vientiane neutrals. We would like to see as many of them worked into the government as possible.

One of the very important concessions that Souvanna Phouma has made in the course of these discussions thus far has been to agree that the present government people, who are a relatively small handful built around Phoumi, most of them coming up from the south with him, would be one group. The Souphanouvong group would be another group from the other extreme. But the center would be a neutral center made up of Souvanna Phouma's own adherents and some of these independents in Vientiane and Luang Prabang. We feel that that central group—it may be as many as eight or ten, as compared with three or four from each of the wings—could give us something to work on—with risks, Senator. I don't want to mislead in any way, it would be very risky, but the alternatives are so unpromising that we think this has to be tried.

Senator LAUSCHE. Does Souvanna Phouma want both the defense and the interior ministries?

Secretary RUSK. He has agreed that they should go to the neutrals, but we would expect that one of these would be in the hands of the Vientiane neutrals.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did he change his position on that? Didn't he originally want both of them?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, in the beginning he demanded that they both be directly under him, as Minister of Defense and Interior. But even then he had agreed that at the next level down you would work out an arrangement which in fact, would practically partition the country; that you would have the three elements as sub-secretaries; and that one of them, the present government group, would be in general responsible for the southern area. The present government forces would not be disbanded until an agreed new force had come into being, so that you would not immediately collapse the present situation because it constituted a coalition government. That would have taken months and months to work out.

Senator LAUSCHE. This shifting of troops by both the Pathet Lao and the government, has that become intensified since our activity in South Vietnam has been accelerated?

Secretary RUSK. Not perceptibly, Senator. We have kept a very close watch on the Soviet airlift, for example, which is the means by which they support those movements. Although they have deployed their airlift in different places and at different times, the general scale of the airlift has remained pretty constant.

Incidentally, this matter of establishing a Soviet airlift there turned out to be a very serious thing. It would be of interest to the committee to know that in Vietnam the orders are to shoot down any strange plane of any sort that comes over Vietnam, so that you don't get established any precedent there about putting in an airlift to rebels in Vietnam.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do we know what Souvanna Phouma is doing in Paris; do we know what his contacts are, who he is meeting with?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. His family lives there, and he goes to Paris fairly frequently. He is also having some medical attention. He has some quite serious medical problems, and he goes to Paris for treatment. We have been in touch with him there, and so have the French and the British and, we think the Russians, finally.

SOUVANNA PHOUMA NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR NAM THA CONFRONTATION

Now, one of the interesting things about this Nam Tha business is that Souvanna Phouma apparently did not know about the Nam Tha operation. When he heard about it, he sent a message to Souphanouvong urging Souphanouvong to pull his troops back from Nam Tha. And we think it is just possible that he lost contact with Moscow and the others at a critical point here.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then you feel satisfied that while in Paris, he was not in any way participating in this later development?

Secretary RUSK. We have good reason ~~to~~ think that he was not involved in the Nam Tha business. As a matter of fact, he tried to reverse it; he protested it.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is all.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Long.

Senator LAUSCHE. Just one further question.

Is this simultaneous outbreak at all indicative of any concerted action? I heard this morning that there have been troops landed in

West Guinea by Sukarno. I am talking about intensified activity in South Vietnam, this trouble in Laos, Sukarno dropping his paratroopers in West Guinea, Russia selling Migs to India. Can those things be put together and something made of them?

Secretary RUSK. I doubt, sir, that the West New Guinea problem fits into any general pattern. That has been a highly inflammable problem for some years. This drop of paratroopers has been tried once or twice before, a handful of them, and they were quite quickly mopped up by the Dutch. Although Sukarno is making some very inflammatory speeches about West New Guinea from time to time, he has limited military capability.

The Dutch have reinforced. There is a very long way to go over there; amphibious operations are difficult, at best.

Our own military believe that Indonesia does not have any capability except for this kind of an occasional paratroop drop or an occasional motor torpedo raid into the coast, or something of that sort, and that an attack on West New Guinea before perhaps the end of next year could not be military successful.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all I have.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Long?

Senator LONG. Mr. Secretary, how many troops does the Laotian Government have?

SUPERIORITY OF PATHET LAO FORCES

Secretary RUSK. It has about 70,000, and the Pathet Lao are rated to have about 35,000. But despite that disparity in strength, Senator Long, the estimate is that the Pathet Lao have what amounts to an overwhelming military superiority because of the combat will and capacity of the government forces.

Senator LONG. Greater willingness to fight, in other words?

Secretary RUSK. That is right. The government forces are just as well equipment, they have better logistic support in terms of transport, air drops, helicopters, and things of that sort. Nevertheless, we would have to say——

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator LONG. In other words, your military estimates of the relative capacity of the two forces is that that 70,000, just as those 8,000, could not do battle against the 35,000?

Secretary RUSK. That is the view of our military people and the people who are working with them on the ground.

Senator, I might say, this has as much to do with leadership as anything else. This is not a denigration of the individual soldier in many situations; he has fought well when he had been given a chance to and when his leadership has stayed with him and showed him how to do this. It is generally the chain of command that is so weak.

Senator LONG. If we send our forces in there, is it not likely that the Red Chinese will declare this to be United States aggression and undertake to send volunteers in there, Chinese volunteers, or something along that line?

RISKS IN COMMITTING AMERICAN TROOPS

Secretary RUSK. I think, Senator, if we put United States organized combat forces into Laos, it would be reckless of us to do so under any impression that the Chinese would not come in; in other words, we would have to take a very high risk that they would come in.

Now, whether they would or not would be up to them. They have a good many problems of their own. But if we made the decision to go into Laos with United States forces, we would have to be prepared for that next step on their side.

Senator LONG. If that happens, wouldn't you be compelled, if you had any hope of a successful operation there, to take more or less a MacArthur approach, that they may come in there——

Secretary RUSK. I think if there were a large Chinese intervention in Southeast Asia, that would change the character of the war from a local to a more general problem.

Senator LONG. It does not seem that this nation, if we had the Marines surrounding them, would take it on the chin, if we took the attitude that our national honor was at stake and we had to fight it out.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LONG. When we had these painful discussions about how far we should go when we had that war in Korea and General [Douglas] MacArthur was dismissed, the argument was that we might become bogged down there with China. But aren't we pretty well faced with the situation that if we go in there, we cannot very well afford to accept defeat as an answer, that we would have to go and fight for nothing less than a victory in that situation?

Secretary RUSK. I don't believe that if there is organized intervention from the north over Southeast Asia, we could or should limit the fighting to Southeast Asia. I think we would have to be prepared for the disruption of the front in Korea, and perhaps other fronts as well. I think this could go very far and very fast.

Senator LONG. I read a little bit about the success of Grant and Sherman, Grant at Vicksburg and Sherman marching through Georgia, and the success of both of these two expeditions was based on the ability of an army to live in the field without any line of supply behind it. Hadn't we better recognize the ability of those Chinese to march right on through and live on what they found as they came through?

Secretary RUSK. They could do a considerable amount of that, although North Vietnam and northern Laos are very short of food. Now, of course, the armies could take it away from anyone who had it. If there is any food there at all the armies could get it. Nevertheless, they do have some very severe supply problems as far as foodstuffs are concerned.

Senator LONG. About how many troops do you estimate it would take to hold Laos if we were to send our troops in to do it?

POLITICAL SOLUTION IS STILL U.S. OBJECTIVE

Secretary RUSK. Let me say, Senator, that in the executive branch we have not come up to that decision; we are still on the basis of trying to find a political settlement with the reinforcement

in Thailand and very heavy support in Vietnam. But if we were to try to hold Laos as it is now through any limited engagement within the confines of Laos, it would take several divisions.

Senator LONG. That would depend upon the two estimates: One, what it would take in the event that you don't have a heavy Chinese engagement; and two, what it would take if you had a heavy Chinese engagement?

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator LONG. If you had a heavy Chinese engagement, Laos is not the place to fight them; the place to fight them is the Chinese mainland?

Secretary RUSK. Or to bring our sea and air force to bear on this landlocked country.

Senator LAUSCHE. You made the statement that you were present at the lunch given in his honor by the President.

Secretary RUSK. I am afraid I was not there.

Senator LAUSCHE. He is of the opinion that with 7 million Chinese, you can't fight a land battle with them. It can't be done; they will swallow you up and digest you by the large numbers.

Senator MORSE. Will the Senator yield on this point?

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN KOREA AND LAOS

I think the record ought to show this. I think there is a difference between this situation and what confronted us at the time of Korea; that we are in an entirely different position than we were at the time of Korea.

The record of this committee shows that at the time of the Korean discussion General [Hoyt] Vandenberg, who was in charge of our Air Force, testified before this committee that we did not have the Air Force to meet the Russians at that time; that if we wanted to do that we would be driven out of Korea. But no one could tell the American people that we could not carry out the suggestion to go beyond the Yalu. We would have been beaten, and driven out of Korea. That is not the situation today. I think our military power and logistics were adequate, but that is not the situation here.

Some in this country think that this is the Korean situation all over. We shouldn't make the same mistake. It is not the Korean situation all over, and I think the record is clear that our top military advisers were against the MacArthur approach at that time and said frankly before this committee that we could not win the war in Korea if we followed those policies.

Secretary RUSK. The United States is a far stronger country today than it was at the end of the 1940's, at the time of the Korean war.

CONGRESS SHOULD BE ADVISED

Senator LONG. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me from hindsight that when President Truman decided to put American forces in Korea he would have been wise to come to Congress for a resolution immediately, because with the events that followed there was a great division among the American people as to the wisdom of that decision, both the wisdom of going in and the wisdom of fighting a lim-

ited war. If we are going to get involved in this situation, in a matter that might lead to a general war, I would hope that the administration would make it in terms of coming to Congress and explaining the problem and asking Congress for its suggestions or a resolution one way or the other.

President Eisenhower, as you recall would ask for an updated declaration of war, based on his discretion. I suppose some of those resolutions were too broad, not knowing what he was asking for. But he at least was in a position that when he went somewhere, he had the Congress on record with him. And while I don't care to vote yes or no right now, I am inclined to think that this country would be in a lot better shape if we went into this thing with a united effort rather than be in the position where Members of Congress, including myself, have a right to second-guess, to say whether we are together in this effort.

Secretary RUSK. I know the administration is very much aware of that matter. I perhaps ought to comment that I was present when President Truman consulted the bipartisan leadership of Congress with respect to Korea, and his advice at that time was not to take the trail of a congressional resolution but to use the then powers of the President on that. Now, whether in retrospect this was the right decision I am not prepared to say, but it was a decision reached in consultation with the leadership of Congress.

In regard to this present situation, the President is attempting to keep in close touch with the leadership of the Congress on a bipartisan basis. We have had two meetings fairly recently about this situation, one this morning, and over the weekend we have called some of the leaders of the Congress to alert them to what was in contemplation about reinforcing Thailand. So the President is trying to keep in close touch with the leadership of the Congress, and will undoubtedly have this point you made very much in mind.

Senator LONG. This silence-gives-consent business does not work too well when the thing starts going poorly. It is something good to get the yeas and nays and see where we are. Then we know where we are as a matter of record.

Frankly, I have very serious doubt that we should get deeply involved in Laos, but I suppose it will all have to depend upon the circumstances.

EFFECT OF LAOTIAN DEFEAT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

Do you picture this as a situation where, if Laos goes, then you are in danger of losing all Southeast Asia in fairly short order?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I don't want to rehash the early story, but I think in retrospect the problem of defending Southeast Asia was greatly multiplied when the Red River Valley of North Vietnam was lost. Similarly, if Laos is lost and organized as a Communist base, the problem of defending the rest of Southeast Asia is multiplied once more, many times. So it is very important that we try to get Laos at least as a kind of a buffer state in there if we possible can, and that is the object of our policy at the present time.

We don't need Laos as an ally; we don't need it as a vigorously pro-Western kind of country, because it is never going to be that

kind of country. But if we could get it organized as a neutral state and freeze Southeast Asia and the rest of Vietnam, it would be a great advantage; and, failing that, indefinitely into the future to do our best to assure that there is at least a wholesome confusion in Laos so that it cannot be considered as a base. But the target now is to get it organized as a buffer state.

[Discussion off the record.]

Secretary RUSK. I think there is vitality in SEATO, Senator, but I would make this comment: Laos has sapped it of some of the impression of vitality, and partly because the Laotians have given us so little to support. We are not formally invoking SEATO here in this situation, even in South Vietnam, because we want to have the deed precede the word. We don't want to get in the situation that we were in with Laos, where on the one side SEATO had an interest and tried to express it, and then the Laotians didn't give us anything to support. But I think that SEATO does have life in it.

I think, also, that what could be even more important is that certain of the members of SEATO, the Philippines and Thailand, are moving to try to tie to themselves, outside the framework of SEATO, other Southeast Asian countries who are not members of SEATO—Malaya, for example—who are very much concerned about the possibility of a Communist Southeast Asia. They are very helpful politically and in certain private ways very helpful. Thailand hopes very much that they will join these other three and begin to build some local solidarity in the area. The more they can do that the more there is something to support in Southeast Asia.

So we have been encouraging them to move in that direction, outside the framework of SEATO. If that should occur, then the independent states of Southeast Asia could be politically united on resisting aggression from the north. And if each could show that it is sore as a boil if any of the others are attacked from the north, then the relative importance of the SEATO organization as such diminishes, but the strength of the area increases.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DEGREE OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT

Mr. Secretary, I apologize that I wasn't here. I was substituting for Senator Fulbright on the Food Forum, but I will read the record very carefully.

What is the opinion of the Russians about this movement of the Chinese? Is there any information along those lines?

Secretary RUSK. First, Senator, we have no information that the Chinese have been involved in this Nam Tha episode. In fact, all of our intelligence—and we have some highly sophisticated intelligence, as you know—indicates that they were not involved. There may have beem some Chinese-speaking tribesmen from that area recruited into the Pathet Lao forces, but we found no Chinese units.

Now, we have felt for some months, Senator, that Moscow did in fact, for reasons of its own, want to get the kind of settlement in Laos that we have been talking about. As I indicated earlier, they

have had more than one good pretext for pushing the Pathet Lao to go for broke, and failed to take advantage of it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I saw Secretary Ball on "Meet the Press," and he said that if the Russians cooperate, a settlement could be reached.

Secretary RUSK. Well, that is true. But in this Nam Tha episode, to a degree the government forces asked for it. They strongly reinforced Nam Tha needlessly, against the advice of our own military people on straight military grounds. They put themselves in a hopeless position; they made themselves a tempting target. And so I don't believe that we can measure their general policy by this particular episode.

Senator SYMINGTON. It makes it a little confusing.

Secretary RUSK. It does indeed, sir.

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET-AMERICAN COOPERATION

Senator SYMINGTON. If you feel that the Russians are in a position where they could support us, would they support us?

Let me inject there that obviously much of their aid to North Vietnam must be coming from Communist China. That is a fair statement, is it not—through Hanoi?

Secretary RUSK. I think Communist China, by and large, has simply made certain facilities available. So far as we can tell, most of the aid has been coming really from the Russians. The airlift has been all Russian.

Senator SYMINGTON. It worries me, because if there is anything in the rift between the Chinese Communists and the Russians, it would seem that in this particular development the Russians might well be on our side, at least indirectly or surreptiously, if not overtly.

Now, at the risk of a little repetition—if the committee will bear with me, inasmuch as I went out there and looked this country over, and I have a few of my own ideas on it, which I will naturally want to check with you—are we protecting Thailand by defending at least a portion of Laos, or is the decision that we are going to defend Laos from communism?

Secretary RUSK. Let me repeat something I said before Senator Long came in.

The steps that the President is taking now to position certain forces in Thailand does not represent a decision to put United States combat forces into Laos. That is something that is still down the trail, and what we are trying to find is a settlement in Laos which will avoid the choice between putting in American combat forces, on the one side, or abandoning the country to the Communists, on the other.

Now, what we are trying to do is bring about a situation in Laos which will stop the southern movement of Communist infiltration into the rest of Southeast Asia. If we could clean Laos completely, so much the better. But this doesn't seem to be on for the immediate future, so the hope and push behind the idea of a neutral Laos is to create a buffer state there, in the interest of the rest of Southeast Asia.

U.S. MUST PREVENT COMMUNIST FROM CONTROLLING THAILAND

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand that, but I felt last fall when I went out there that Laos was pretty much gone. I wrote the President from South Vietnam and said that if we didn't hold it we would lose Southeast Asia. I think everybody would agree that we can't afford to lose Thailand. When things get like this I can assure you of my most complete and full support, as you have always had on matters of this character, but do you plan to hold Laos for her sake, or to protect Thailand?

My feeling is that Laos is a very bad place to fight, for many different reasons, lack of access, terrain, nature of people, the previous political mistakes regardless of whose fault they were, and so forth. I am quite skeptical about these bright new world concepts that some of our diplomats—not you—have brought back from Laos. I have felt for some time that Laos was in very deep trouble indeed. Therefore, are we planning resistance in Laos per se because we feel we could not hold Thailand and South Vietnam if we lost Laos, or are we planning it because we just want to defend Laos?

Secretary RUSK. The problem of defending Thailand and South Vietnam would be greatly multiplied if Laos were organized as a Communist base for infiltration attack on those countries. I think it would be fair to say that we are trying to find some arrangement by which the Laotians could be left to themselves, and on that basis they would not constitute a threat to anybody.

I think that a policy to bring about that situation in Laos is, of course, aimed at Laos and the character and nature of the Laotian people, and in that sense it is Laotian policy. And in that case it is the policy for the security of Laos and Thailand and, indeed, Cambodia.

Senator SYMINGTON. I put Cambodia in automatically. I gather we have decided to put our military troops in Thailand, but there is no decision yet to put them into Laos; is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Fighting troops?

Secretary RUSK. Yes; but I might say, Mr. Chairman, that we don't want in any public statements at the moment to make precise that under no circumstances are these troops going into Laos because that decision has not been made. And, second, we want this move to be a little ambiguous from the point of view of the Communists, so they would worry about it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand. I would join my colleague from Louisiana and say that if the decision to move troops into Laos, inasmuch as it is going to require a lot of explanation to our constituents, the closer that we can be to that situation, instead of reading about it when it happens, the better off we will be from a political standpoint.

Secretary RUSK. I will certainly report those comments of both Senators to where it belongs.

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't think that we can afford to lose our position in Southeast Asia, and there are people who are much more equipped to decide what can be done to protect that position I therefore wish you well in that.

NATURE OF PAKISTANI-INDIAN CONFLICT

There were two articles Sunday in the New York Times. One said that Nehru called Trumbull of the New York Times a liar for saying that 1,000 people were murdered in Bengal as a result of Hindu-Moslem clashes. The other article, written by the same reporter, said that the Pakistan friendship for the United States was cooling out quite rapidly.

We have had this little discussion of the Indian situation here, and I am convinced in my own mind that if there has been a cooling out in Pakistan that it is because of their apprehension of our attitude toward India.

Today I had to make this substitute address for Senator Fulbright, and I showed my notes to a reporter, on a background basis. He told my administrative assistant that the Pakistanis, in his opinion, were now very cold to the United States. He had just been out there, and he was going to write an article to that effect in the Washington Post.

This worries me for many reasons, and one particularly is Afghanistan. It is my understanding that we are not in very good shape in Afghanistan. Would you give us some comments on Pakistan? I have always felt that Pakistan was a buffer, not against India—although it is most unfortunate the way that India has acted—but as a buffer against Afghanistan and Soviet Russia and, very possibly, a buffer against the Communist Chinese.

Is there any justification in the article in Sunday's Times that our relationship with Pakistan has seriously deteriorated in recent weeks and months?

STATUS OF U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Secretary RUSK. I would be glad, Senator to speak to that, because this was a question which was obvious at the CENTO meeting in London, where we had Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Britain, and ourselves together.

I think we would have to say that the cooperation between Pakistan and the United States is not, at the moment what we would like. But I think I can truthfully say that this is because the Pakistanis have tried to draw us into their specific problems and policies as to neighbors other than the Communist powers, particularly with Afghanistan and with India. Pakistan has moved to try to precipitate this Kashmir problem. They know that we have been sympathetic with their general line on Kashmir for many years, and in the United Nations we have consistently supported them on it.

In the case of Afghanistan, we and they have a different appreciation of what is required there and what is needed there. The Afghans have pushed this unfortunate issue as much as Pakistan. As far as the Pakistanis are concerned, they feel that this is all that counts. We feel that we must have the Afghans and the Persians and the Turks as a counterbalancing influence to the Soviet Union. But we have not been able to get Pakistani cooperation in our presence and activity in Afghanistan. They are trying to build a wall between us and Afghanistan, without regard to, we feel, its longer range consequences.

Similarly, in the CENTO discussions. Our association with CENTO—you see, we are not a member, we are simply associated with them—has always been for the specific purpose of helping the CENTO countries deal with the problems of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Now, Pakistan is alienating even its own regional members of CENTO by trying to draw CENTO in the Kashmir question, for example, and directly into the Afghanistan problem. So we are concerned about the attitude of President Ayub Khan at the present time. This has moved over into a lack of cooperation on some very sensitive military problems where it is beginning to hurt us. We have gone to great lengths to try to move closer with them on these matters, but they are being extremely difficult.

On the communal rioting and the story about Mr. Nehru's calling a reporter a liar, there have been recently, in both the Indian part of Bengal and in east Bengal, some communal rioting on both sides which has been quite serious. There were more Hindus killed over in east Bengal than there were Moslems killed in west Bengal. But if I were Ayub Khan and Nehru, I think that I would, as a matter of necessity, call these stories lies, because if that prairie fire gets started in either or both of those countries, the communal rioting there could destroy tens of thousands or even worse before it could be brought under control. It is a highly explosive situation.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand. Pakistan is the only country that is a member of both CENTO and SEATO; is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. My impression is that we are in very serious trouble in Afghanistan, that Afghanistan is very close to being a Soviet satellite. Now, my question would be this: Suppose we lose Pakistan—and these stories worry me, just like they worry me if we had to face the loss of Turkey or the loss of Iran for any reason—if we lose Pakistan, isn't our situation in the Middle East and South Asia a desperate one?

Secretary RUSK. I don't believe we would lose Pakistan, in that sense, to the other side. Pakistan might draw somewhat away from us for a period while we try to sort these questions. But I believe it would be a mistake to say that Pakistan has backed us up against Afghanistan. They have really made things very difficult for us in Afghanistan.

Senator SYMINGTON. What I am thinking about is, who can profit by the success of India and Afghanistan against Pakistan except the Russians?

IMPORTANCE OF PAKISTANI-INDIAN COOPERATION

Secretary RUSK. The tragedy of that situation is that that there are so many, to us, obvious reasons why Pakistan and India must cooperate that it has been one of the great tragedies of this postwar period that this Kashmir issue has gotten in the way of what would be, from the point of view of the West, a fine collaboration there. But this interferes at every point. We are, in effect, carrying the burden of the arms race between Pakistan and India.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is right.

Secretary RUSK. Both sides of it. And Kashmir is the reason why this arms race goes on.

Senator SYMINGTON. Isn't it true that Pakistan has been much more willing to negotiate the Kashmir question than India? In fact, isn't true that India simply said, "We have it, we are not going to give it up, and we are not going to negotiate about it"?

Secretary RUSK. India will talk only with a third party present. I think that the readiness to talk is the same problem, talk on what basis and in what direction. We have tried, as you know, to get these talks started. India turned down the suggestion we made that Gene Black [1] come into the picture and take a hand. And our ambassadors in India have been making regular efforts to open up this question for further discussion, so far without success on that particular point.

The United Nations effort has not gotten anywhere over the years.

Senator SYMINGTON. If I may ask just one more question, why is India so intransigent, if this is the first real start to get some kind of understanding between these countries, why do they feel this way, especially since we have given them so much support? We have also given them the opportunity to develop an army and air force which in my opinion can conquer Pakistan without too much difficulty. I think they would have a lot of trouble because of the terrain, but they are militarily infinitely stronger than Pakistan and Afghanistan. Why wouldn't they sit down and talk about Kashmir? Is it because Nehru is weak in his country, or because Krishna Menon is influential against Nehru, or Nehru is obstinate and dreams of being the king of that part of the world? Won't they sit down and talk about it?

Secretary RUSK. It is one of the great pieces of unfinished business left by those who negotiated the partition of those two countries. The question of Kashmir is not settled. It is a highly inflammatory issue in both countries.

SIGNIFICANCE OF KASHMIR

The key argument really turns over the Vale of Kashmir itself. The Indians are not pressing to get the Pakistanis out of that part of Kashmir occupied by them, and the Pakistanis are not particularly concerned about Jammu and some of the other areas of Hindu Kashmir. But the Valley of Kashmir is the key issue.

Now, this is something that is highly inflammatory on both sides. Mr. Nehru himself, as you both know, feels himself a Kashmiri in his tradition. His family came from there. I am not trying to defend either side here, but it is the kind of issue on which neither side feels that they can yield, and this makes it extremely difficult to get the kind of negotiations that would give satisfaction. It is a kind of stand-off at the present time, at the moment being pressed by the Pakistanis for a solution.

We have had continuing talks with both governments, but so far we don't see any answer that would bring them together. Yet this is a desperately important thing, to pursue and try to get them together, because there are so many other reasons why they would be cooperating—the northern frontier problem, and even in their

[1] Eugene R. Black, President of the World Bank.

economic development plans they should be in touch with each other, giving the general flow of trade and the nature of their resources. They should be in touch with each other in their central planning commissions as to how to do what, and there are the water supply problems and other matters where they could and should cooperate.

We have been hoping, suggesting that they might reconstitute some of that joint machinery they had at the time of partition that would give them some basis on which to talk out certain common problems, such as the defense of their northern frontier. They had a joint defense board there for 2 or 3 years at the time of partition. But so far these highly sensitive issues just haven't yielded to the policy of diplomacy.

Senator SYMINGTON. Just like it is very difficult for me to see where Mr. Khrushchev isn't anxious to make a nuclear test arms control agreement for four major reasons, so it is very difficult for me to see why they are not willing to make some kind of settlement with the Pakistanis. I think Afghanistan would be well enforced by this situation in the long run, which would be bad from our standpoint if the people who succeeded were unfriendly to our country even more than is the case today. I don't think Nehru would necessarily be worse at all if he negotiated on Kashmir. I don't see where you could get anywhere even if he were willing to negotiate. And I am pretty gloomy about the situation that involves these three countries and their neighbors.

U.S.-PHILIPPINE RELATIONS NEED CLARIFICATION

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask the Secretary very quickly to comment on another problem.

I am concerned about this Filipino difficulty. I am very sorry that the President of the Philippines decided not to come over here. I think he has greatly damaged the prestige of the United States, and a lot of people don't like that kind of performance.

But my question goes to the merits of the issue. You have this House action in regard to these so-called war claims. This can get out of hand if the people get the idea that the Philippines are seeking to collect war damages from us in a war that was their war as much as it was our war. Whether or not this is a reasonable request on the part of the Philippines, I don't know the facts, but there is some move in the House now to modify this action by providing that the funds will be made available on condition that they be reinvested in the Philippines for some particular type of development.

I think we ought to have your judgment as to what this Philippine situation involves.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, having just returned, I am not fully briefed on the details of the present suggestions to be taken before the House, although it is my understanding that the primary thought in the new House bill would be to limit the total amount that might be given to any particular individual or enterprise, so that the war damages would be paid more to the smaller interests rather than to a few of the dominant interests there.

But to the Filipino this does look like a flat commitment on the part of the President of the United States made in time of war, and it is an obligation of ours.

Now, this has been a running sore of a problem for 16 years, and we have had great difficulty in getting it settled. We think that the present arrangement on the general order of magnitude of the funds involved would be equitable under all the circumstances, but it has gotten to be an increasingly difficult problem in the Philippines because with the passage of years it becomes more and more in their mind an element of injustice and a refusal on the part of the United States to meet an obligation undertaken during the war.

I regret very much that the President of the Philippines handled it as he did, because at the time that he made his speech he knew that a new effort was being made, and knew that the administration had been supporting this right along. I don't believe that he should have handled his relations with the President of the United States on the basis which he did.

I do hope that we can find some reasonable basis on which to clear this matter out, because President Macagapal has a good administration. He is working hard to clean out corruption and get the country moving in terms of economic and social development. He has a good vice president and foreign minister, Mr. Palaes, who is working very well with the West. We have had great hopes for the Philippines under this administration, and I am very sorry that we were not able to get this war damage bill out of the way and finished.

Senator MORSE. I think we have to be very careful, Mr. Secretary, that we are not put in a position where we are doing an injustice to our own President. We must not follow a course of action that will be interpreted as a slap in the face to our own President. He cancelled his trip. I am for doing justice to the war claims, whatever they are, but as far as I am concerned I hope his trip stays cancelled. If we get a fair settlement of these war claims, let him stay in the Philippines for a couple of years. I don't think he ought to be seen here, because if we settle the war claims he will go back to the Philippines as a hero against our President.

These psychological things are important. I don't want to be a party to a protocol procedure here that might be interpreted by some people as a slap at President Kennedy. President Kennedy didn't initiate this. And I want the President of the Philippines to get whatever the merits show the settlement of the war claim should be.

I don't know what that is, but my whole feeling is that in view of the rather petulant course of action he has followed, to let him settle these war claims and then go parading down Constitution Avenue as a victor over the President of the United States—although the President isn't involved in it, many people are going to be interpreting him as being involved in it—I don't think you ought to give this fellow any encouragement to come to the United States.

Secretary RUSK. I hope the Congress would see fit to enact the plan proposed by the President.

Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

CLAIMS SHOULD BE SETTLED

Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, Mr. Secretary, as I understand it, these claims have already been checked and approved by the Philippine War Claims Commission; haven't they?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, this is not just a promise made by the President, but Congress ratified it by setting up the Philippine War Claims Commission.

Secretary RUSK. They have been gone into in great detail. I think there was some concern about certain claims which were adjudged to be valid claims that seemed to be——

Senator SPARKMAN. They picked out two, a brewery and a race track. If that was property owned by Philippine citizens and destroyed by the war, and we had assumed war damage, it didn't matter, as I see it, what kind of property it was.

Another thing that I think we ought to keep in mind is that the Philippines were part of the United States at that time, or at least they were still under suzerainty of the United States. We incorporated their fighting forces into ours and paid them. We assumed war damage.

I think by all means Congress ought to act on it. And I believe there is a bill of the same nature pending before this committee. I see no reason in the near future why we should not start moving.

There are many other things that we would like to discuss. I want to add my word to what Senator Long and Senator Symington said: I always felt that in the Korean situation it would have been much better, certainly later on, if a congressional resolution had been requested. I remember Senator Taft saying on the floor of the Senate that he approved the action but he would have preferred that the President send a resolution to Congress; saying he felt certain it would have been approved overwhelmingly. I think it makes for a better record later on for such to be done.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will the Senator yield there on just one point?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. It prevents an awful lot of second-guessing on the part of people who are in there.

Senator SPARKMAN. Monday morning quarterbacks.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, and it doesn't go too well, because we don't know how it will go in the country's interest.

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me that the decision here is whether or not we are determined that Southeast Asia shall not be lost to the Communists. If we are, I think the drawing of the line is correct. I always felt that we made a great mistake by not intervening at Dien Bien Phu. My friends may not agree with me on that, but it seems to me that this was the turning point for French Indochina, and had we helped out at that point, the situation might have been different. North Vietnam might not have been lost.

Senator AIKEN. Sometimes we get the cart and the horse mixed up. We ask what would happen if we lost Laos, Pakistan, or Thailand; the question is what would happen if they lost us?

Senator SPARKMAN. You can't arouse much interest in them.

Secretary RUSK. I am afraid I really didn't get to my trip.

Senator SPARKMAN. That was it; this was wholly incidental.

BONN GOVERNMENT BEING CONSULTED ABOUT BERLIN

Secretary RUSK. There was one point—before you leave, if I might just take a moment—on this Berlin matter.

I do want to assure the committee that the noises about Berlin which have come out of Bonn recently far exceed the realities of the situation. In other words, we have been working very closely with the German Government. I had luncheon with Mr. Schroeder [2] in Athens, and we went over these matters in great detail. We have been in touch with them almost on a daily basis.

We cannot find any explanation for the nervousness that comes out of some of these press stories, except in terms of the factual problems that are now arising around Adenauer's looking toward the future. There are some personal rivalries with respect to Mr. Schroeder, the Foreign Minister. He is not getting the support of some of those he is entitled to have supporting him. There is some jockeying for position underneath the Chancellor, which means that the Chancellor himself is getting divergent advice, and he is hearing rumor and story from different directions. These things add to his unsettlement.

Every time we have a good talk with him, as we do every week, he is with us, but it sometimes comes unhooked again from the point of view of public impression. But we have not been going off on our own leaving Germany aside on these matters.

On the one point that has flared up a bit, this question of whether East Germany should have some role in an international access authority, this is not something that is new with us. The Germans have proposed a series of technical commissions of West Germans and East Germans to handle transportation all over Germany, cultural exchanges, and things of that sort. Brandt [3] has proposed a West Berlin-East Berlin commission to help sort out the problems and try to punch holes in the wall. If there is anyone who is doing business with the East Germans, it is not the United States, it is West Germany, France, Britain, Belgium—all these countries have trade agreements with East Germany.

Now, a trade agreement goes far beyond participating in an access authority in terms of employment recognition. East Germans handle today 95 percent of the access to West Berlin. And we were naive enough to suppose that if you had an international access authority, you ought to have associated with it those who handle 95 percent of the access. This doesn't imply recognition of East Germany as a state—we propose that West Berlin and East Berlin have representatives on this arrangement, you see. But in any event, it is sort of a hypothetical problem, because the Soviet

---

[2] West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder.
[3] West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt.

Union provides what we would actually prefer in their proposal, and that is a four power arrangement, so that the four occupying powers would have the ultimate responsibility.

Well, that is fine. We may get off this particular hassle, but we were taken completely by surprise, given the nature of the relationships of everybody else with East Germany. To say that involving them in access somehow implied the recognition of East Germany—it is one of our differences—is almost like the minuet of the demonology of this subject over the last 15 years. That is a very bad figure of speech, but it has become so artificial in its phraseology as compared to the existing realities of the situation.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could I ask a question there?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SPARKMAN. Any further questions?

Secretary RUSK. I am at the committee's disposal to return at any time on these matters.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. You know, of course, that General Clay is coming in this afternoon.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., on another matter.]

THE SITUATION IN BERLIN

[Editor's Note.—On May 8, Gen. Lucius D. Clay ended an 8-month mission as President Kennedy's special representative in West Berlin. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer took the occasion of Gen. Clay's departure to criticize United States-Soviet negotiations over international access to Berlin. "I consider the entire plan unworkable," Adenauer told a press conference. As a sign of its opposition to the plan, the West German Government also leaked the American negotiating postion to the press, an act protested against by the Department of State as a "breach of confidence."]

TUESDAY, MAY 15, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room F-63, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. John Sparkman presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Symington, Long, Lausche, Aiken, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Denney, and Mr. Kuhl, of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. General Clay, we are glad to have you.

General Clay does not have a prepared statement.

General, you understand the nature of these meetings. They are transcribed, but they are not published. They are kept in our files. If there is anything that is particularly sensitive, that you would rather not put on the record at all, if you will just let us know, we will stop the record at any point.

Senator LONG. This is to be a classified record.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, it is.

If you will just proceed as you see fit, sir. We are interested in the Berlin situation, the German situation generally. We are interested in your ideas regarding it.

STATEMENT OF GEN. LUCIUS D. CLAY

General CLAY. As you know, sir, in September I returned to Berlin at the President's request as his personal representative. This was approximately 1 month after the erection of the wall between East and West Berlin, which had been a shock to the West German and West Berlin population.

I think it was primarily because it had been done by East Germans themselves. It would not have been quite as much of a shock if it had been done by the Soviet personnel.

However, the effect on the morale of West Berlin was quite serious, and there was the beginning of an exodus from the city. Money, as represented by bank deposits, was being pulled out. And it looked like there might be an economic collapse of the city,

which would make our remaining there a very hollow victory indeed.

It became necessary to take some action so as to restore confidence in the allies. This was made very simple for us by the East Germans, who began to harass the allies and the Americans.

This was, of course, an attempt to show the West Berliners that the allies were not prepared to defend Berlin. We were able to meet these harassments with counteractions and countermeasures. The confidence of the West Berliner came back to a considerable degree. Money has come back into Berlin. The economic and industrial life of the city is in excellent shape. And I believe that as far as the crisis caused by the wall is concerned, the morale of West Berlin has been restored, and that it will take a very severe blow indeed to shake it again.

In this interval, there has been some improvement in allied planning for joint actions in the event of further harassments—although these are based upon rather serious actions against us or against West Berlin.

DIFFERENCE IN THINKING OF BRITISH AND FRENCH

I think it is a very important thing to say right here that there is a considerable difference in the thinking of our own people in Berlin as compared to the British and the French. The British do not believe in meeting harassments. They believe in holding to a firm principle, and if the city is overrun, to fight, but not to counteract any measures that take place in the interval. The French are even less inclined to act when their rights are trespassed on the ground, and this puts us in the unfortunate position of either acting unilaterally or taking no action at all.

It becomes essential, however, for us to be willing to move unilaterally, because frankly the West Berliner places all of his confidence in the United States, and a failure to react by either the British or the French does not concern him in the least. A failure to react by the United States, however, has a very disastrous effect on his morale and, of course, if his morale is lost and the economic situation does deteriorate, then we will have lost Berlin regardless of whether or not we keep our troops there.

The situation is increasingly difficult because the conditions under which we might negotiate are conditions that have not yet been clearly defined among the allies. But the possibilities are very alarming to the West Berliner and have a very serious effect on his morale.

STATUS OF RELATIONS WITH EAST GERMANS AND SOVIETS

At the present moment, I would say that our situation vis-a-vis the East German and Soviet Governments is one of returning to the status which existed prior to the construction of the wall. At the time that I left there, there were no harassments; the Soviet guards on the Autobahn were being very polite, very circumspect, and even the East German policemen were behaving properly.

I think that this may continue, because their efforts at harassment did not destroy the morale of the West Berliner. They were met sufficiently on the ground to make the Soviet Government re-

alize that in provoking these harassments they were running the risk of starting a war themselves. Since they were gaining nothing from taking these risks, it just didn't make sense for them to continue them.

How long this interlude will last is anybody's question. In my opinion, when it ends, it will not be resumed in the same form, but will undoubtedly be resumed in the form of harassments against German personnel. I would doubt that this would occur in the immediate future, because the East German economy is in bad shape, and it is basically dependent on the trade with West Germany. Of course, the movement of West Germans in and out of West Berlin is a part of the trade agreement between technical commissions of East and West Germany. Thus, any interference with German traffic or transportation in the near future would immediately result in the stoppage of West German goods going into East Germany, and I think it could even bring about an economic collapse in East Germany.

In the interval, however, the Soviet Government is aiding the East German Government and making a very determined effort to reorient the East German economy from West Germany to the Warsaw Pact countries. And this movement, if it can be successful, would enable them to pursue harassing tactics against movement of goods and people in and out of West Berlin. I think it is the most likely next interlude, if we have not reached any kind of an agreement in the interval.

CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS

The four conditions that were established in connection with the possible negotiations for discussing among the allies, and which were prematurely published in West Germany, did not create alarm in West Berlin. They created much more alarm in West Germany than they did in West Berlin. The West Berliner does not want to see a recognition of the East German Government, but I think he has learned to distinguish between a definte recognition and a practical reality of having to live with something that exists.

It is, of course, inconceivable that we can reach a final agreement which does not involve an East German Government. Therefore we must find a point at which our relations with such a regime is within a framework which can be accepted by the Federal Republic. But the Federal Republic must also recognize that the alternatives are even worse.

If, in fact, the Soviet troops were replaced on the highways by East German troops, and these East German troops behaved properly, it is very difficult for me to conceive of the use of force to simply get these guards out of the way. And yet if this did happen, it would be certainly a recognition that there is a regime of some sort or other in East Germany. I cannot see that the international authority necessarily implies a greater degree of recognition than would be the acceptance of East Germany in supervision over our documents and passes.

Nevertheless, this is a psychological matter of great moment to the West Germans. If handled improperly it could cause a turnover in government. And therefore whatever we do decide, it has to be

something that is acceptable to the Federal Republic, or all of our efforts would have been thrown away.

Of course, our situation has not been made any easier by the fact that the French have not wanted to participate in these negotiations at all. Only recently have they been willing to participate in the talks that were taking place. This gives the Federal Republic an opportunity to lean both ways at the same time, which General de Gaulle will certainly use to his advantage if he can do so.

CONCERN OVER DIVISIONS IN THE ALLIANCE

When I left, I was not the least bit concerned as to the ability of West Berlin to see this thing through, nor am I concerned that the Soviet Government is prepared to risk war, which is the only way in which they can at the moment drive us out of Berlin.

I think our main worry is that if the differences between our allies continue, we will be giving the Soviet Government what has always been its great aim, the opportunity to drive a wedge in the alliance and to play one ally against another. I think that the answer we need now is to bring the alliance back together, thinking in terms of a unified approach to the problem.

All in all, I think our position has strengthened steadily through the last 8 months. Determination has been made evident. The attempt to harass us in the air corridors was met with the flight of additional planes. And I feel that for the moment the Soviet Government is convinced that we are prepared to defend our interests on the ground and with force if we have to. If we can maintain this position and if further harassments develop, meet them accordingly, I have no fears whatsoever about the Berlin situation.

CONTROL OF ACCESS ROUTES

Senator SPARKMAN. General, it is your feeling, is it not, that any settlement we work out, if we work out a settlement, will involve some kind of international control of the access route, whether it be by the four occupying powers or by some other international group?

General CLAY. Your choice is either to continue Soviet control, to accept East German control, or else to set up an international authority in control. Of those three choices——

Senator SPARKMAN. The Soviets don't want to continue control.

General CLAY. They have said they don't want to continue control.

Senator SPARKMAN. And we don't want the East Germans.

General CLAY. And we don't want the East Germans. So as the alternative some form of international control seems to be the only possible solution.

Senator SPARKMAN. Does East Germany actually control it at the present time, although it is in the name of Russia from our standpoint?

General CLAY. From our standpoint, no, sir. The Soviet Army controls it from our standpoint. The checkpoints through which we go are manned by Soviet personnel, and, of course, Soviet troops are stationed nearby. However, for all Germans——

Senator SPARKMAN. I am not speaking about to and from West Germany.

General CLAY. I am talking about to and from West Germany, yes.

The movement of all Germans to and from West Germany is controlled through checkpoints manned by East Germans, and with documents checked by East Germans.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, they are perfectly willing to have themselves checked that way, even though they might object to our doing it?

General CLAY. The answer to that is that this is a result of a trade agreement which has been arranged through technical commissions and therefore does not involve governments.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is something that they have accommodated themselves to.

General CLAY. That they have accommodated themselves to.

On the other hand, if we permitted the East Germans to supervise our exercise of our rights, we would be permitting the transfer to a party which we do not recognize as the original party to the agreement. And this, of course, we cannot accept.

The question of who should compose the international authority I think is the important question. I don't believe there is anybody in Germany that seriously questions the desirability.

ADENAUER'S FEARS

Senator SPARKMAN. Yet that seems to be the thing that Adenauer centered on this week, wasn't it? At least that is what the press and radio played up, as I saw it.

General CLAY. He has two fears, and neither one of the them, in my opinion, are shared by the German people. His two fears are, first, that if we transfer the authority from the allies to an international authority, we will therefore void ourselves of it, and if any trouble develops, we will not stand behind it with our military strength and our strength as a nation. This, of course, is not visualized in any establishment of an international authority. The second fear is the implied degree of recognition of the East German Government.

Actually, I think the first fear is his greatest—that we would be simply trying to get out of our responsibility by passing it on to an international authority, and if the international authority didn't work successfully, we wouldn't step back in and exercise our responsibility. This is inconsistent with our commitment.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Aiken has to leave shortly. Senator Aiken, do you wish to ask some questions now?

EAST GERMAN CONCERNS OVER COMMON MARKET

Senator AIKEN. One question. Is East Germany very much concerned over the Common Market?

General CLAY. Well, its concern is shown this way. Since it does not belong to the Common Market, but has been dependent on trade with West Germany, it shows its fear by the fact that it is trying desperately to reorient its economy to fit in with the Communist countries instead of with West Europe.

Senator AIKEN. I asked that question because, discussing the matter with the Poles, I find they are very much concerned that they may be forced to swing more and more into the Soviet orbit, and apparently they are not anxious to do that. I wondered if East Germany had the same idea.

General CLAY. East Germany is definitely doing that, except that the Poles have a lot more freedom to express themselves than the East Germans do.

Senator AIKEN. I expect that is so. Also, the Yugoslavs are very much concerned.

I don't think I have any other questions. I know you will bring out anything that ought to be brought out, Mr. Chairman. I am glad to have heard the General's statement.

I do have one more question.

THE POLISH BOUNDARY

To what extent, if any, is the Polish boundary matter entering into this picture? You know, Russia wants to recognize East Germany. What about the boundary—in case everybody should suddenly decide to recognize East Germany?

General CLAY. I think that the present West German Government would be very hesitant to accept as a condition in a Berlin settlement the final recognition of the Oder-Neisse as the boundary line between Germany and Poland. They have already renounced the use of force to change that line, but I am sure that they could not afford to accept it in the context of a settlement of the Berlin problem.

Senator AIKEN. I have had the feeling that West Germany is as much concerned with that boundary as East Germany.

General CLAY. Yes, sir. It is now a matter of record that West Germany has not accepted the boundary. And in view of that, for any German government to accept it as part of the Berlin settlement would probably result in that government's being overthrown although, in spite of that, there is a rather complete recognition throughout Germany that this is the way it is going to be.

Senator AIKEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Long.

POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS

Senator LONG. General Clay, you don't foresee any solution to the Berlin situation, I take it. In other words, about the best you can see from where you are sitting at this moment is that this situation will continue to drag along as it has, with a crisis occurring now and then.

General CLAY. I am not sure of that, Senator. I thought that some 3 or 4 months ago. But I am inclined to believe that the economic situation behind the Iron Curtain is not too good now, and that the Soviet Government is looking for a relatively long interlude in which it will have an opportunity to recover economically and move forward in its economic program. If that is true, they might accept a reasonable solution to the Berlin problem, just to get it out of the way.

I have always believed, too, that they would be very reluctant to sign a peace treaty which would give the East Germans any kind of supervisory powers over our rights, in the fear that the East Germans would get them into a difficult situation, which might even get them into war. I think that prior to any such peace treaty, the Soviet Government would like to have the conditions spelled out and accepted by the Western powers included in that peace treaty.

For these two reasons, there is a possibility that these talks can lead into negotiations, and that the negotiations can be fruitful. However, I would say that that was certainly not an overwhelming probability. I would think it would be a rather remote one. But it is there—there is that possibility.

AGREEMENT ON LAND ACCESS TO BERLIN

Senator LONG. Do you see any possibility of agreement for the occupying powers there to obtain some sort of arrangement for a land access to Berlin, of which they would have exclusive possession?

General CLAY. I doubt that, and I am not too sure that would be a solution to the problem.

West Berlin, to live, must have considerable freedom of access by all highways and canals. The prime importance of an internationally controlled highway is that it provides means of entry and exit over which people can travel with safety. They would not be subject to arbitrary arrest and disappearances, which now sometimes happens to Germans who travel the Autobahn. At the present moment, no German can feel completely safe going from West Berlin to West Germany unless he goes by air.

Senator LONG. Of course, if we could get some agreement that we could have possession of a highway between, the highway having certain overpasses and underpasses for East German traffic to cross that highway, it would seem to me that might give us the kind of access that we need to feel secure in our position there.

General CLAY. There has been some thought given to such a highway being constructed, a new one, with a railroad alongside it, and held exclusively for the use of West Berlin, people going to and from West Berlin. Again, it would only be a partial solution to the problem, and you could not keep West Berlin alive by one artery. But you must have at least one artery of entry and escape through which people can travel with safety. Otherwise, they would lose their courage, and West Berlin would fall of itself.

FLEXIBILITY OF THE AMERICAN POSITION

Senator LONG. Has this nation been inflexible with regard to the position it has taken as to the possible future settlement of the Berlin issue?

General CLAY. Our Nation?

Senator LONG. Yes.

General CLAY. I don't think that we have ever been inflexible. In fact, I suspect that most of the time I have felt that we were too flexible. I think, however, that in recent months, our position has been very hardened, and at least we have very definitely fixed in

our minds and in our positions and in our commitments those things which we cannot accept.

Senator LONG. Would you mind spelling out some of those things that this Nation cannot in any event accept in this situation?

General CLAY. One is that we cannot accept the transfer to a third party, by unilateral action of the Soviet Government without our approval, of the rights which we earned to go in and out of Berlin.

Two, we must maintain a highway and an air route in which there is complete safety for the passage of any and all who want to go from West Berlin to West Germany and back.

Three, that there will be no formal recognition of the East German Government. This, of course, would be contrary to the agreement which we made with the Federal Republic when it entered into NATO, that it alone would be considered the voice of the German people until there was a German government which could speak for all the German people.

Fourth, and perhaps the most important of all, the right to maintain our troops in Berlin.

Now, we do add to that a fifth one which is expressed in rather general terms, which is to maintain the viability of the city of West Berlin. And this means that we would not allow it to be frightened to death, or strangled to death by a blockade, or by other efforts to destroy its economy.

NO SURRENDER OF WEST BERLIN

Senator LONG. All of those conditions seem to be based on the fundamental premise that under no conditions should the people of West Berlin be surrendered to communism against their will.

General CLAY. That is correct, sir.

Senator LONG. They must have their freedom and their independence to decide what form of government they choose to live under.

General CLAY. That is correct, sir.

Senator LONG. That is something on which we cannot negotiate.

General CLAY. That is right, and we have so stated.

Senator SYMINGTON. What was that point? I didn't get that.

Senator LONG. That the freedom and independence of the people of Berlin to choose under what form of government they shall live is something that we will not under any circumstances negotiate. And so long as they desire to remain under our form of government or our type of government, we propose to support them in that.

General CLAY. That is correct.

Senator LONG. With war, if necessary.

General CLAY. In fact, sir, we have committed ourselves to the people of West Berlin that we will maintain our troops in West Berlin until there is a reunified Germany or the people of West Berlin have stated they no longer want us.

Senator LONG. Yes.

A BUFFER ZONE

You are familiar with the final settlement with regard to Austria. That, in effect, leaves Austria as a buffer zone, relatively unarmed, between East and West; does it not?

General CLAY. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. What is your reaction toward the possibility of developments along that line with regard to Germany?

General CLAY. With respect to Germany as a whole, I think it would be impossible. If we tried to create a neutral nation out of the 60 million West Germans, and added to them 17 million East Germans, we would be in fact creating a vacuum in the heart of Europe, composed of something like 80 million people. If so, they would also have to leave the Common Market and the political union which is now visualized from the countries belonging to the Common Market and with that, our hopes for a unified Western Europe would disappear.

Senator LONG. In other words, you think that a small military vacuum the size of Austria can perhaps exist, but a larger vacuum the size of Germany cannot exist?

General CLAY. That is correct. We have had neutral countries the size of Austria, like Switzerland, that have been able to live in the midst of wars and keep out of them. But a great industrial country of 80 million people in the heart of Europe could never be neutral.

Senator LAUSCHE. How many people are there in Austria?

General CLAY. I think about 7 million.

Senator LONG. Just one little item that occurs to me, General Clay.

NOTHING LESS THAN VICTORY

I notice in some small things, such as the international Olympics and sports competition, that this nation seems to be satisfied to lose supremacy and see itself defeated before the entire world. It doesn't look like Army is satisfied with getting beat by Navy year after year. With an LSU staff, they will beat Navy, just as sure as I am sitting here, next year. The thought occurs to me whether this nation shouldn't undertake to take the attitude that we won't settle for less than victory, and where we are being defeated even in small matters, see if we can undertake to see if we can't start winning.

General CLAY. Senator, I think one of the problems we face is that we have allies. If this free world is to continue, we have got to maintain our alliances. And we have got to deal with the nations that are in these alliances as nations.

The actions that we might take as the strongest nation in the world worry these smaller nations a great deal. therefore, we have to temper a great deal what we might do and what we would like to do to get the agreement of our allies and to try to present a common front.

I thing this is an extremely important thing, although I expect that when the chips are down and the final decisions have to be made, we will have to act unilaterally anyway. But certainly up to that time, we have to make every effort to get allied agreement in

the actions that we take. This has been particularly true in Europe, where we not only have a great interest in resisting further Communist expansion, but at the same time are trying in every possible way to bring about Western European unity. If we began to push too heavily on the one, we might indeed lose the other.

Senator LONG. You do not see, though, that this nation should ever leave itself in a position that it has to rely upon our allies for our ultimate defense.

General CLAY. I would hope never to see the day when the United States wasn't capable of fully defending itself. In the broader sense, though, in its defense of the free world as such, then indeed its alliances are very important.

Senator LONG. Thank you very much, General Clay.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Symington.

Senator Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Symington, you were here first.

PROVOCATIONS THAT MIGHT LEAD TO MILITARY FORCE

Senator SYMINGTON. General, it would be very difficult for me to express to you what I think you have done for our country in your work in Berlin—having stayed with you in 1946 over there, and again last fall. I hope you realize how much respect and gratitude the members of this body have for the work that you have done.

General CLAY. Thank you, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. In my humble opinion, you and General MacArthur are the two men living today that this country owes a great debt to, at least as much as anybody else.

I would like to ask a question with respect to the relative formality or informality of the East German setup. Do you think we should fight rather than pass control over to the East Germans, if the Soviets put it on that basis? In other words, could we agree to East German control without having it a formal control that would require military action?

General CLAY. I am of the view that if the East Germans behaved properly, that it should not be a cause of war. But I am also equally of the view that with the arrogance of power which would result, the actions that they would take would be so provocative that they would most likely lead to military force.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then, as you see it, if we cannot maintain Soviet control, it would be better to have international control than East Germany control?

General CLAY. I believe that, yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. That international control would be what, as you visualize it?

General CLAY. As a matter of fact, the proposal of our Government was 13 powers. Personally, I would rather see a much smaller authority set up, because I think it would be much easier to control. I would think what with three, perhaps, of the Communist countries and three of the free countries, with three neutrals, a nine-country board, it might be very affective in the handling of this situation. I would not even object to a board, an authority, that

was composed entirely of neutral countries, if we could agree upon the neutral countries.

PROPOSED ARBITRATION BOARD

Senator SPARKMAN. Didn't Russia at one time propose a control by the occupying powers?

General CLAY. They proposed an arbitration board of five powers which would sit over the East German authorities and intervene if the East German authorities violated the agreements. This is not enough.

Senator SYMINGTON. Didn't they sort of do that on the basis of what is mine is mine, and what is yours is negotiable? I am not trying to oversimplify it. But wasn't that sort of a nose under the tent?

General CLAY. I think this is the way such an agreement would work out.

ADENAUER FEELS NEGLECTED

Senator SYMINGTON. We have been disturbed recently, naturally, by some of the political news. I would like to ask you this question, because although you are a military man, nobody has had more experience in the political field than you have had in Germany and other places in the world.

Do you feel that Chancellor Adenauer is pulling away from this country and the British, relatively speaking, in favor of the French, or what is the picture on that?

General CLAY. The day before he had his press conference, I spent 2½ hours with him, and while he was rather bitter, primarily over having been accused of leaking the four points, he told me that as a result of the von Brentano [1] visit over here, and of the meetings of Foreign Minister Schroeder and Secretary Rusk at Athens, he was satisfied and that he felt that everything was all right. Twenty-four hours later he made that statement.

I think we have to remember that we are dealing with a man who has aged a great deal. He is a very proud, old man. The friends that he knew have gone from the scene. He feels sort of neglected and isolated. But he has been a very good friend of the United States. He has followed our lead in the movements of Western Europe for the last 10 or 11 years. I am sure that he does not really mean what he said, and I am sure that with a little attention and careful handling, he can be brought back into friendship and understanding with our people.

Senator LAUSCHE. What four points did he leak—if I may interrupt?

General CLAY. The four points that he leaked were, these points we were proposing to put in a package: The international authority composed of 13 members, with both East and West Berlin on it; accepting the present lines of demarcation of boundaries, or at least accepting that there would be no use of force to change these lines of demarcation; the establishment of——

[1] Heinrich von Brentano, leader of the West German Christian Democratic Union parliamentary majority.

Senator LAUSCHE. Demarcation of Poland?

General CLAY. That would be the Oder-Neisse line. Also the line between East and West Germany.

The other points are the non-aggression pact between NATO and Moscow and the Warsaw Pact countries; and the international air authority.

TAKING THE PULSE OF WEST BERLIN

Senator SYMINGTON. Now that you have retired from your preeminent position over there, as our No. 1 citizen, are you going to stay in the position of advisory capacity to this Government and Germany in general?

General CLAY. The President has asked me to be available, to be an adviser on Berlin. He has also asked me, and I have agreed, to go back every 2, 2½ months to keep in personal touch with the situation and to be able to feel the pulse of West Berlin. This, of course, I am going to do.

Actually, with the morale of the city back and its economy back, and with no harassments from the Soviet personnel, and with very competent American personnel there in the normal routine jobs, there is no longer any real purpose to be served by having a representative of the President available there to report each day. For the moment, at least, the settlement of the Berlin situation is not in Berlin; the play is out of Berlin. Whether it will ever come back, and we will have another serious emergency situation in Berlin, is, of course, just a guess. But if such a situation develops, I have also promised the President I would go back immediately, dropping everything.

Senator SYMINGTON. Good.

I have one or two more questions that I would like to get myself up-to-date on, and have a meeting of minds with you.

ARE THE SOVIETS ANXIOUS TO AVOID WAR?

We had Mr. Rusk here this morning for some time with respect to Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand, Southeast Asia.

Before I saw you last fall, I was out in that part of the world. My impression has been that we should defend Thailand, and we should defend South Vietnam. The question of trying to defend Laos, people who just have no interest in defending themselves have literally almost thrown away hundreds of millions of dollars of military equipment, et cetera, in the past—it is very hard for me to understand. We are in executive hearing, and so I do not mind being frank with you.

My impression, however, is that a great deal of what might happen down there will depend upon whether or not the Soviets are willing to risk what might be called a general war. My belief is that President Kennedy has convinced Khrushchev that there are certain conditions under which he would fight regardless of the consequences.

Do you feel confident in your own mind, based on the economic status of the Soviet Union—and I talk to you now as one of the few people that have had great diplomatic experience, as well as mili-

tary experience—do you feel the Soviets are very anxious to avoid a general war?

General CLAY. Yes, sir, I do. I think that from all we can hear their economy this last year not only made no gains, it actually went backwards. Their agricultural production was not good. The same was true with Poland. East Germany is in very bad economic condition. Perhaps only Czechoslovakia is in any kind of decent economic shape. And I am sure that this is worrying them a great deal, and they feel very desperately in need of time to get this economy of theirs on the upgrade again. Therefore, I am quite confident that they not only do not want war, but that they would like a few years relatively free from the these tensions.

I would suspect that the Soviet Government would like to stop the Laos trouble as much as we would, if they can find a way of doing it. I am not too sure they have control there.

Senator SYMINGTON. My next question would be this:

HALTING CHINESE EXPANSION

Granting that they are bright people, which I think we will all agree their leaders are, they might not be willing to see us, in effect, take on the Chinese Communists to some extent. They must know that they have no basic danger to fear from this country, physically anyway. And economically, Mr. Khrushchev seems to be quite assured of his position.

Wouldn't they be therefore perhaps more than a little willing to see us call a halt to expansion of the Chinese Communists toward the south, or would they feel that if that happened, it would take the pressure off of their borders farther north?

General CLAY. I do not think they could afford to let it happen, particularly if the Chinese were losing. Even though they may have their differences with the Chinese, in the interests of the Communist front they could not afford to let Communist China take too much of a beating at this stage of the game.

In addition to that, I think they are a rather practical people, and they know you cannot have a general conflagration in Asia that is not sooner or later apt to wind up in another world war. I would rather doubt if they were ready to play that kind of a dangerous game yet, Senator. They may be at some time, but I would rather doubt it at the moment.

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator SYMINGTON. Then whatever President Kennedy decides to do with respect to Southeast Asia, he will always have to take into consideration the possibility of Soviet participation; will he not?

General CLAY. I think that is correct, because without Soviet participation, and at least without the provision of Soviet equipment, Soviet supplies, it would not last, it would not have any strength or any validity. The Chinese Communists are unable to support a long war on their own military production. They would have to be supplied with substantial equipment by the Soviets for it to amount to anything.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then let me ask you this military question.

When I was out there, I became convinced that they were infiltrating North Vietnam through Cambodia. The story was they had regular units billeted in Laos that were going into South Vietnam. I also became convinced that if we really wanted to stop it, that the best way to stop it would be to hit the marshalling yards at Hanoi, which you could do with a package carrier strike force of land, sea, and air. It would be a totally different problem than the problem that is presented by Laos, where there is no seacoast of any kind, et cetera.

AIR STRIKES ON HANOI

Do you think that if we, instead of just resisting, resisting, resisting—if we hit the Hanoi marshalling yards, that we would risk a general war to a point where it would be inadvisable to do it?

General CLAY. I think that if we do reach the point where we, the United States, are actually going to fight a war over there with our own troops, then, indeed, we should take the type and kind of an action that you have mentioned, attacking Hanoi or the airports around Hanoi, and using the great air and naval strength which we have there, instead of trying to fight on the ground.

As long, however, as this war is being fought by others, under the advice and guidance of the two principal countries, I think I would let it rest that way. But the minute we have to go in on the ground if we then make that choice, when we have such great strength in the air, and with our Navy out there, I think we would be making a real mistake.

Senator SYMINGTON. A reporter called me up this afternoon and said that we were landing 1,800 Marines in Thailand at 10 o'clock tomorrow. With that premise, we might get into some ground problems. If we did hit the Hanoi marshalling yards, if the Chinese Communists decided to intervene, they would probably do so, as a guess, by putting their air up from the Island of Hainan. And if we took care of that with our carrier strike task force, planes, et cetera, do you think we would be running the risk of the Soviets coming into a war?

General CLAY. I think we would be running the risk, but I think it would be a relatively small risk. I do not think that we are ever going to get out of this without running the risk of war. But I think that perhaps the more that we are willing to run the risk of war, the quicker we are going to get out of it.

Senator SYMINGTON. One final question.

FIGHT A WAR TO WIN IT

If we do get into a form of war over there, which at least to some extent would be comparable to the Korean activity, would it not in the long run, in your opinion, be more saving of our treasure and blood if we were decisive about it and took the risk you are talking about, than if we just continue to maintain a holding action?

General CLAY. I have to go back to being a soldier on this.

Senator SYMINGTON. I premised the last few questions on the basis that you are a very great soldier.

General CLAY. I think you fight a war to win it. If you once get in it, I would fight it with all the means I had, wherever it was.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General CLAY. I just do not think that limited war is ever going to provide an answer to our problem.

Senator SYMINGTON. But your answer would not necessarily mean that you would use nuclear weapons.

General CLAY. Be prepared to use them.

Senator SYMINGTON. But not necessarily to win in that particular locality; is that correct?

General CLAY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Lausche.

THREAT TO U.S. PRESTIGE

Senator LAUSCHE. You made the statement, General, that we cannot accept the transfer of the Soviet's responsibiltiy in maintaining our rights in the corridor and allowing them to be transferred to East Germany. Why can't we?

General CLAY. We won these rights as a matter of victory in war. They are rights which we hold equally with England and with the Soviet Government. We permitted the Soviet Government, by agreement, to exercise certain checks on the way in which we use these rights, to be sure that we did use them within the agreement. But to permit the Soviet Government to transfer those rights to a regime which we do not even recognize as a government would be extremely damaging to our prestige everywhere in the world, and particularly in Europe.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why do we place greater reliance in the receipt of our rights through the protection given by the Soviet than through the protection that might be given by East Germany?

General CLAY. The Soviet Government is a responsible goverment, and while its acts are sometimes unfriendly and hostile, they are controlled acts of a responsible government. The East German Government has not as yet demonstrated that it is a responsible government, and we see in the actions of its police and its military forces an assumption of power and an arrogance in acting against our troops that I am sure would cause great trouble if they had any rights over the Autobahn.

SOVIET RECOGNITION OF AMERICAN RIGHTS

Senator LAUSCHE. No. 2; we must maintain the means of egress and ingress into West Berlin, what has been the Soviet's position on that? Does it recognize the legitimacy of that claim on our part?

General CLAY. Of course, they did at one time blockade us and try to keep us from using these rights, except in the air. With the lifting of the airlift, however, they did sign a paper which restored conditions to those that existed prior to the blockade. Since that date, they have never denied our right of access on the highways and Autobahns. Even today they do not deny these rights.

I do not think that there would ever be any further attempt on their part to deny that these rights exist. What they say is that they no longer want to be responsible for their supervision. They want to transfer this to the East Germans. The rights themselves they are not questioning.

RECOGNITION OF EAST GERMANY

Senator LAUSCHE. No. 3, that there shall be no formal recognition of East Germany, we are resolved on that proposition?

General CLAY. We are committed to it, yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. But based upon the circumstances, we take the position that an informal recognition is inevitable.

General CLAY. Well, we do not say that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Or implied recognition.

General CLAY. We do not say that, Senator, because those are words that would be alarming to the West Germans.

On the other hand, we do say that even under the conditions which exist today, it is an established fact which we recognize that there is a regime in East Germany which has certain responsibilities. Even the Federal Republic recognizes this. Our problem in determining what constitutes de facto recognition is one of reaching an agreement with the Federal Republic, rather than reaching an agreement with the Soviet Government.

SOVIET OPPOSITION TO ALLIED TROOPS IN BERLIN

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. Getting to the fourth point, the right to maintain our troops in West Berlin until there is a reunification of the two Germanys, what is the Soviet position on this matter of troops in West Berlin?

General CLAY. They are very much opposed to any further continuance of allied troops in West Berlin. They say that it is time for the occupation status to end, and that they are completely happy to make West Berlin a free city, without allied troops, or even a free city under some sort of international military garrison. So they are completely opposed, at least up to date——

Senator LAUSCHE. How do we answer the Soviet's argument on that?

General CLAY. We answer that it is not anything to talk about, because this is a military right, and we won the right to be in Berlin by victory in war, and we ourselves will determine when we give up those rights.

Senator LAUSCHE. And although some 17 years have passed, the present circumstances do not warrant our giving up that acquired right.

General CLAY. Certainly it would not, when we are surrounded by 20-odd divisions of Soviet troops.

Senator LAUSCHE. I concur with that.

In answer to Senator Long's question, you affirmed that all of these four points are related to our determination to maintain the independence of West Berlin. Now, I want to get down to these four points that caused the trouble with Adenauer.

AN ALLIED-RUN HIGHWAY

Is it your position, General, that an international authority would be far better than a transferred authority to East Germany, and the next best substitute for the authority that we expect the Soviet to exercise?

General CLAY. Yes, sir, I would say that that was my position. Of course, I would rather see, as Senator Symington suggested, the highway taken over and run completely by the allies, but I do not consider this a practicality. And since it is not a practicality, I think the international highway is the next best solution.

Senator LAUSCHE. Just for the purpose of the record, and my information, why is it not a practicality under the circumstances that prevail?

General CLAY. This would be tantamount to carving out a piece of territory from so-called East Germany, which I do not think its government or regime could ever accept.

Senator LAUSCHE. Would it be violative of the rights of the Soviet?

General CLAY. I do not think the Soviet Government would have the right to enter into this agreement without the approval of the East German Government, because they have at least gone through the form of recognizing this East German Government. And you would never get the East German Government to consent to such an arrangement.

NO USE OF FORCE TO CHANGE DEMARCATION LINES

Senator LAUSCHE. The acceptance of the present lines of demarcation that is, between East Germany and West Germany, what does Adenauer say about that?

General CLAY. He is very much opposed to it.

Actually, we did not say that these were accepted in terms of permanency, but we did renounce the use of force to change them. In other words, the point we made was that force would never be used to change the present lines of demarcation.

This is one of the things to which the Chancellor objected. I do not think that he objected because he expects force to be used. I think that he objects because he does not think that it is wise to tell the Soviets that you will never use force.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did we at any time participate in the confirmation by way of agreement, either expressly or implicitly, of these lines of demarcation?

General CLAY. Yes, in two senses of the word.

We originally agreed in a European advisory commission to establish the boundary zone for the occupation forces in Germany, and in each boundary zone the Commander in Chief was to be the Supreme Commander, and it was under that agreement that the Soviet Commander turned the Soviet zone into East Germany. But this did not apply to Berlin, which was a quadripartite city to be governed by all four powers, and not by each zone commander.

Then, of course, at Yalta, we did agree to Russia's taking over from Poland the land east of the Curzon line in Poland, and for Poland to be compensated by additional territory in East Germany. We did not agree as to what that additional territory would be. And the line, as picked, was far in excess of anything that we had ever visualized. However, at Potsdam we did agree that this land east of the Oder-Neisse line would not be included in the occupied zones of the allied powers, but would be given to Poland to administer as an occupying power until the question was finally resolved.

Senator LAUSCHE. It has not been resolved?
General CLAY. It has not been resolved.

NON-AGGRESSION PACT

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then, No. 3—that there shall be a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Pact countries and Moscow on the one hand, and the Western nations on the other; what does Adenauer say about that?

General CLAY. His objection to that is that East Germany is a member of the Warsaw Pact countries, and that therefore this pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries is indirectly a higher degree of recognition of the East German Government than he would want to accept.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has there been any discussion about the impact that such an agreement would have upon the people of the captive nations which are all members of the Warsaw Pact?

General CLAY. It is very difficult to analyze——

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, I am talking about Rumania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the others.

General CLAY. It is very difficult to analyze as to the real interest of these countries. They are not members of the Warsaw Pact, so it is very difficult to analyze what the general effect would be.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did you say they are not members of the Warsaw Pact?

General CLAY. I am not sure of that.

Senator LAUSCHE. All of the captive nations are members of the Warsaw Pact.

General CLAY. I am not sure of that. Is that correct?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

General CLAY. I think they are very remote members, because the Warsaw Pact countries actually maneuver together, and their armies maneuver together—Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, and the Soviet Union—and they hold joint maneuvers every year, have a single commander for the army, and operate very much on the same basis as NATO.

Now, I do not know that anybody attaches too much significance to this non-aggression pact. I think that it is put in as a device to draw public attention in all of the countries, as you get at the basic roots of this problem.

Interestingly enough, Germany has renounced the use of force except as a member of NATO; so that the signing of this non-aggression pact would simply be a reconfirmation, as far as Germany is concerned, of what they have already agreed.

Senator LAUSCHE. I do not know whether there are any exile governments of these captured nations. Has there been any reaction from them about this proposal to further cement the captivity of satellite nations?

General CLAY. Actually, I have heard of none. In point of fact, this particular proposal got very little publicity in the East German or in the Soviet press.

AIR CORRIDORS TO WEST BERLIN

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the fourth item—the international air route—that is an air route leading into West Berlin?

General CLAY. At the present moment, we have three air corridors leading into West Berlin, which have been operated by ourselves and the British ever since our entry into West Berlin. These have been accepted as air corridors which we could use with complete freedom. However, the only airplanes that can use those corridors are our own, the British, and the French.

If we are to make West Berlin into a truly airport center, and a city that will grow, the type of city we want, it does need to have other airlines able to enter there. For example, the West German Airline at the present moment cannot go into Berlin For this reason, I would think that an international authority controlling the airlines from Western Europe into West Berlin, making these routes accessible to all approved nations, would be a forward step, provided that in so establishing this international authority, we do not give up our basic right to have free access to Berlin by air.

SOVIET STRENGTH

Senator LAUSCHE. You mentioned the fact that the depressed economic conditions, the lack of food, in the Soviet bloc is one reason why they want a breathing spell and want at least a few years of peace.

What is, in your opinion, the long-range view of the Soviet? Your statement would imply that if they had the strength right now, they would not be talking the way they are.

General CLAY. I do not think there is any basic change in the Communist doctrine to penetrate and extend communism throughout the world. I do not think they have given that up at all. But they are willing to vary the vigor with which they pursue it, according to the situation which exists behind the Communist bloc.

Now, of course, there is always the chance that as they do move forward, become better off economically, they will begin to feel a little less the urge to push forward to the conquest of the world. This, of course, is only supposition. There is certainly no evidence on hand at this time to lead us to believe that their ultimate goal of world domination has ever been dropped.

Senator LAUSCHE. That brings me up to this point: Doesn't the proposal of these four conditions imply that our country is willing to combat with the Communists in the future, not in war, but on the basis of demonstrating which of the two systems of government will triumph because of its inherent strength? Non-aggression would seem to imply to me that there will be no trouble there, but we will fight it out on the basis of which of the two systems of government is better.

General CLAY. I think that this is our aim and purpose, and one in which we cannot lose.

On the other hand, we have given to the Communist world the initiative in the use of threat and intimidation and force. As long as they do have this initiative, they do create, through fear and intimidation, a certain strength throughout the world that is very difficult to overcome. People are afraid of them. People are not

afraid of us. Well, I am very proud that people are not afraid of us but, nevertheless, I do not want to see the world lost bit by bit because of people who are afraid of the Communists. And this is what we have to fight against more than anything else.

I would not care much about Laos; but if Laos puts fear into Vietnam and Thailand, and we began to lose those countries through fear, then indeed we would have failed in our purpose.

Senator SYMINGTON. Amen.

IMPROVEMENT IN COMMUNIST BLOC ECONOMIES

Senator LAUSCHE. If the Russian economy and the satellite nations and Chinese economy become better, won't our relative position to deal with this problem become worse?

General CLAY. I think——

Senator LAUSCHE. In 2 years or 4 years?

General CLAY. I do not think their economic situation can improve so rapidly in relation to ours as to have that cause us any great deal of worry. I think we do know, though, from very real experience, that those countries that have the greatest prosperity are the least anxious to waste it in pushing communism further in the world. I suppose that Czechoslovakia is probably the most prosperous of the Communist countries, and I am sure the least concerned with extending communism throughout the world. I think that the Poles are the next.

Now, when you get into those countries that are also Communist and have not advanced economically at the same time, then you get a more determined effort to push and exploit communism throughout the world than you do in the more prosperous countries. Therefore, I do see in improving economies, if they ever materialize behind the Iron Curtain, a chance that they would lose their enthusiasm for the pushing of communism.

On the other hand, I do not believe they can truly improve their economies behind the Iron Curtain. I think this is where they are going to break down.

Senator LAUSCHE. Neither do I. I do not think they can.

I want to say to you that you have given the most lucid discussion on the German situation that I have heard since I have been in this room.

General CLAY. Thank you, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. General, we thank you. This has been a most interesting session. We appreciate your presentation.

General CLAY. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, MAY 21, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 2:10 p.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Dodd, Humphrey, Morse, Lausche, Symington, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Capehart, Carlson, and Williams.

The committee continued its mark-up of the bill (S. 2996) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 5:10 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MAY 22, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:45 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Morse, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

The committee continued its mark-up of the bill (S. 2996) To amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

[The committee recessed at 12:30 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee continued in executive session at 3:15 p.m. in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Lausche, Hickenlooper, and Capehart. Senator Gore and Senator Aiken later joined.

The committee continued its discussion of the bill (S. 2996) To amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

After discussion, the Chairman directed the roll to be called on the passage of the bill, and the Members responded, as follows:

YEAS	NAYS
Senator Sparkman	Senator Long (proxy)
Senator Humphrey (proxy)	Senator Capehart
Senator Mansfield (proxy)	Senator Williams
Senator Morse (proxy)	
Senator Gore (proxy)	
Senator Church (proxy)	
Senator Symington (proxy)	
Senator Dodd (proxy)	
Senator Hickenlooper	
Senator Carlson (proxy)	
Senator Fulbright (Chairman)	

The Chairman directed the staff to poll the absentees, and Senators Lausche, Wiley, and Aiken were all recorded in the affirmative.

So the bill was reported, as amended, 14 to 3

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 4:55 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MAY 24, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee proceeded into executive session at 10:35 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Humphrey and Aiken.

On motion by Senator Humphrey, the nominations of Lucius D. Battle, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs; Mrs. Eugenie Anderson, to be Minister to Bulgaria; Admiral Alan G. Kirk, to be Ambassador to China; Wymberley DeR. Coerr, to be Ambassador to Uruguay; Seymour M. Peyser, to be Assistant Administrator for Development Financing, AID, were approved for report.

The committee agreed to report a resolution which would return to the President, as requested by him in a message to the Senate on May 21, 1962, the cultural convention between the United States and Brazil (Executive X, 81st Congress, 1st Session).

The committee discussed the advisability of printing and distributing a Disarmament Subcommittee staff study on the economic effect of disarmament. It was informally concluded to print 150 copies of same as a confidential committee print, and hold the distribution to members of the committee and a select list of recipients.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 11:40 a.m.]

48-688 O—86——17

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MAY 24, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4 p.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Fulbright and Hickenlooper.

Edwin Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, briefed the subcommittee on the current situation in Latin America.

The subcommittee adjourned following his briefing. No record was kept nor transcript taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

FRIDAY, MAY 25, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 9:30 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman).

The subcommittee was briefed on his recent trip into Africa by G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

No record was kept or transcript taken at the meeting.

THE SITUATION IN INDIA

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 6, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice at 10:45 p.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. Albert Gore presiding.

Present: Senators Gore, Mansfield, Lausche, and Aiken.

Also present: Mr. Carl Marcy and Mr. John Newhouse of the committee staff.

[William C. Battle, nominated to be the Ambassador to Australia, appeared on his own behalf.]

Senator GORE. The committee will be pleased to have your report, Ambassador Galbraith. We welcome you back to the United States on a visit, and certainly we are grateful for the opportunity to have this first-hand report of your service as Ambassador to India.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO INDIA

Mr. GALBRAITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I present myself ready for your questions, and without any prepared tedious statement. These are difficult times in India, on the whole, and it occurred to me that by coming up and speaking in some confidence to the committee, I might add to your appreciation of some of the problems we are dealing with here.

I referred to the matter of confidence because the Indian Parliament had a lengthy discussion yesterday of some of my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator GORE. The House?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Some of the Communists seemed to have thought that I was too versed in the military details of the Indian defense establishment. I may say those details are things that I would like to pick up with my own eyes, and I was glad to see they were reassured by the Defense Minister that I seemed to have had no access, no visible access to secrets.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN INDIA

The problem in India at the moment is not economic basically, but political. From an economic point of view, the situation in India is not at all discouraging at this particular time.

The standard of living is still very low, and it is still a race between population and income, but the basic fact is that as a result of the development program and as the result of agricultural development, the gross national product is increasing substantially, the per capita income is increasing moderately, and one consequence is that most people in India compare their situation this year with their situation a year before or the year before that and find on the whole, that it is better. In my own view this is the basic formula for political, economic, and social contentment.

If people find their situations deteriorating they are going to do something about it. If they find their situation is improving, they will generally attribute this to the beneficence either of their own efforts or that of the government or both, and this is a moderately encouraging and important factor.

STRENGTH OF THE CONGRESS PARTY

I was talking, Senator Lausche, a little bit about the economic background of the situation in India, which at this time I would be inclined to characterize as, on the whole, pretty favorable. The standard of living is very low, but it is an improving standard of living, and one of the manifestations of this, of course, were the elections last February which returned the Congress Party to the power with approximately the same majority as before, and with very little more reaction at the extremes.

There was somewhat more right-wing revolt against the Congress. The Communists and the Socialists, particularly the Socialists, lost some strength on the left. The Communists just about held their own.

But for all practical purposes, India continued to be dominated by the Congress Party, the party that has had responsibility for carrying on development, responsibility, ever since independence. This would not have been true in free and unmanaged elections if there were any great amount of economic discontent.

AMERICAN ASSISTANCE TO INDIA

I say this because I think it means that, on the whole, India is one of the reasonably successful examples of economic development, and one of the reasonably successful examples of the use of our assistance. The money is spent in accordance with a pretty carefully worked-out plan. A lot of thought is given to what the money is spent for.

The Indians have long had the rule that when they get foreign aid it will have to be associated with internal resources. They won't take, for example, any technical assistance money that isn't matched by local money, so that they don't have a feeling that they are getting free dollars or free aid from abroad. The higher echelons of the Indian Government, the Civil Service, the people who are handling the money are honest.

I must say that working in underdeveloped countries as I have in recent years I am prepared to say that the first of virtues is honesty. If you have an honest government I forgive almost anything else, and this is true in the great body of Indian administration.

If you get on the very bottom of the Indian administration, where you have a very poor people doing minor administrative tasks, you have a certain amount of minor corruption.

Senator GORE. This is very encouraging because unless the aid plans which we contribute, and which are matched by the local government, and honestly administered, then we can have no confidence that we are contributing to an over-all betterment of the situation.

Mr. GALBRAITH. You are absolutely correct in that, Senator.

This is one of the things on which we must be constantly insistent. There is never enough money if it is wasted.

CHINESE AGGRESSION

Senator GORE. I hasten to another matter.

When I was in India, visiting in the home of Prime Minister Nehru, he appeared to be greatly concerned with possible major aggression by China. He made the statement at least two, perhaps three, times—and I think I am quoting him correctly; "Whenever China has been strong, she has been aggressive."

Though the news from over there and public statements of others seem to place some apprehension of conflict with Pakistan, I got the impression that Prime Minister Nehru was concerned far more with the possibility of aggression of various types from Red China. I would like to get your assessment of that situation.

Mr. GALBRAITH. There is no question about it in my mind. Can I go over to the map for a minute?

Senator GORE. Yes.

CLASSICAL FRONTIERS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE

Mr. GALBRAITH. What he says as a historian, which he once was, about the tendency in Peiping is historically correct. Whenever Peiping has been strong, it has tended to go out to what it has deemed to be the classical frontiers of the Chinese Empire, and here, this is run down an indefinite area here into Kashmir, and along here you have had what were and has run into this area of India here. These states here, Nepal, and particularly Sikkim and Bhutan, were anciently tributary states. They are inhabited by people of Tibetan origin and the ruling houses here are semi-Indian states.

I might say parenthetically, Senator, I was up in here about a month ago, the first time any foreign ambassador was ever allowed, permitted to visit these particular communities.

And this pressure toward, what a thousand years ago in past dynasties have been the boundaries, is currently very much in evidence. The particular place of pressure is up here in the area of what is called Jammu. This is the world's most formidable country, and there is a good deal of misunderstanding, even in India, about the nature of the conflict that is going on.

Senator GORE. You mean the physical premises?

Mr. GALBRAITH. It is a combination of military warfare and mountaineering. The terrain is 15,000 to 17,000 feet high, going up above that. There are elevations in which people from the plains, who have been moved, suffer all sorts of disabilities and all sorts of

psychological handicaps, quite a lot of psychoneuroses in people who stay at those altitudes for any length of time.

What the Chinese do is establish posts here, here, and here, 25, 50 men sort of come in, and then the Indians establish counter-posts. Sometimes the Indian posts, as is presently the case, are behind the Chinese posts.

This, in turn, precipitates or raises the possibility of conflict of one group encountering the other group, fighting taking place. There have been episodic clashes of this sort.

On the other hand, it is perfectly possible, and indeed it has happened, for one of these posts to be established for weeks, sometimes for months, before it is discovered by the other side. When one gets down here to the plains this tends to be thought of in terms of a continuous line, something like the western front in World War I. Actually you have to think really in terms of two blind men sort of stumbling toward each other, neither quite certain where the other one is.

But each time the word comes down to the capital of a new post—these are all areas strongly claimed by the Chinese.

THE STATE OF ASSAM

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the area on the right with the rust color?

Mr. GALBRAITH. This is the state of Assam. This, Senator, is one of the great tea growing states in India. This is Assam here. It is a very rich state. This was the frontier area in World War II. This was the high water mark of the Japanese advance, and that is part of India.

Senator LAUSCHE. How is it connected with India?

Mr. GALBRAITH. There is a small highway system or railroad that runs through here.

Senator LAUSCHE. I see.

Now, with Nepal and Sikkim—there is a third nation usually linked with that.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Bhutan.

Senator LAUSCHE. Bhutan, yes.

Will you point them out?

Mr. GALBRAITH. There is Bhutan, this is Sikkim, and this is Nepal. These are all areas—Nepal is an area with a good deal of political pressure. It is not so evident to me that the Chinese are pressing very hard on these yet. I might say that Bhutan is possibly the most primitive country in the entire world. It is the only modern state that still hasn't reached the stage of development where it has post offices.

NEHRU'S CONCERN ABOUT CHINA

Senator GORE. Mr. Ambassador, do you have a feeling or do you not, that the concern which Prime Minister Nehru expressed about possible aggressive designs of Red China is still held by him?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes, there is no question about it. The Chinese have become—there has been an enormous change in Indian attitudes in the last 5 years. When I was first there in 1956 for any length of time, the mood was then still of a Bandung conference,

and the two great Asian powers getting together and cooperating. This tension on the northern frontier has destroyed that, and there has replaced it a deep-seated sense of concern about Chinese pressure.

I don't think, Senator Gore, that anybody imagines that the Chinese are going to march down here and take over the Ganges plain. If they were going to do so, it would be a poor route over those mountains. But what there is fear of is the pressure of this great population mass in this very dynamic and aggressive country, in this disputed territory.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do the mountains extend through Nepal? They do, I know. What about Bhutan and Sikkim?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes. This is very rugged country. This is the only—there is one place in the world, Senator Lausche, where the mountains in a sense detach themselves from the earth and soar to the heavens, 25,000 feet, 27,000 feet. And you look at mountains as though they were not related to the earth that you live on.

Senator GORE. Senator Aiken.

REFUGEES FROM CHINA

Senator AIKEN. What is your explanation of the on-and-off exodus of refugees from China, particularly by way of Hong Kong? From this distance it looks rather inestimable.

Mr. GALBRAITH. I spent a day or two in Hong Kong, and I might say—put this entirely off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

INDIA'S EXPANDING AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY

Mr. GALBRAITH. India, following an essentially Western pattern of development in its agricultural, fully Western pattern of development of peace and proprietorship, has an expanding agricultural economy. It is not expanding nearly as much as it should, but it is expanding, whereas China has a declining agricultural economy. In an economy where 75 percent of your consumption is food and fiber, this means there is a difference between a rising standard of living and a falling standard of living.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think you partly covered what I had in mind. You stated that no government can regiment this agricultural activity. Why will the peasant not be regimented?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Because he has an alternative which permits him, Senator, to defeat the government. That is not to produce.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why is he unwilling to become Communist? That is the instrument through which he carries out something that is within him, that demands that he not conform with the regimentation.

Mr. GALBRAITH. I think the fact of the matter is he wants to own his land and he wants to have the product of his land.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, inherent with the man is his purpose to be the owner of his creation.

Mr. GALBRAITH. I think there is no place in the world, Senator Lausche, where people do not want to own land and do not want to be in possession of their own product.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

SHORTAGE OF FOOD

Senator AIKEN. The exodus is really caused by hunger then, lack of food or desire to get away from it all?

Mr. GALBRAITH. If there is any doubt, there is a shortage of food. I mean, all of these things are a package, aren't they?

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. GALBRAITH. The impression is that the farmers are not producing, the food is not becoming available for the cities, and therefore your alternative is to get out.

Senator AIKEN. Would you say the refugees are encouraged by the Chinese Government?

Mr. GALBRAITH. I don't think so, no.

Senator AIKEN. When they get hungry, they want to go where there is something to eat.

Mr. GALBRAITH. I have seen that in the newspapers, but it seems wholly implausible to me.

Senator AIKEN. It doesn't make sense?

Mr. GALBRAITH. No government on earth would want to advertise this sort of thing.

Senator AIKEN. But India has no real food shortage at all. I don't mean they don't have malnutrition, because they do.

Mr. GALBRAITH. There is no widespread hunger in India. The difference between a tolerable situation and hunger is made by Public Law 480, there is no question about it. I think it is an interesting point, incidentally, that both of these countries are being margined out by Western food supplies. If China were not getting Canadian and Australian wheat, the starvation there, of course, would be much worse than it is.

WHY NEHRU REFRAINS FROM MILITARY ACTION

Senator GORE. If I may go back a minute to Prime Minister Nehru's position, how does he justify to himself and to his own people the presence within the boundaries of India of a Chinese military contingent, even though this contingent may be in a valley in the Himalayas? Would it not be possible for Indian planes to bomb the sites, and if it is possible, why does Nehru refrain from trying to expel the aggressors from his own country's territory?

Mr. GALBRAITH. I can only speak generally. I am an Ambassador who must always remind himself that he is the spokesman of the President of the United States and the representative to the country to which he is accredited.

But I can say what the explanation that is offered in Parliament always is, namely, that to open up a front, to open up active warfare in this formidable country, this formidable terrain, by a country which is as poor as India and which would have to invest the money and resources that would be required in supporting an army in combat up here, is just something which they haven't yet faced. The result is that they are attempting by establishing their forward positions, hopefully at some future time by diplomatic action, to shove the Chinese back.

Senator GORE. This was the same explanation given to me when I was there. This is something which is impossible for me to rationalize.

As you know, or as I believe, it wouldn't matter how difficult, how cold, how far away, how inaccessible the fjord might be in the Arctic Circle, in Alaska, if one enemy soldier had his foot on our soil, our people would rise up unanimously to throw them off.

Why is there no such reaction on the part of the Indian people?

Mr. GALBRAITH. To say there is no such reaction would be too strong. There is a great deal of bitterness and tension, and I suppose there is no question in Indian life and foreign policy which is as acute as this. But it is quite true the Indian reaction is not the same as ours.

Now, partly this is Gandhian tradition of non-violence. Gandhi had an enormous influence on Indian tradition and feelings, and it was his position that there is nothing you can accomplish by violence that you can't accomplish by firm determined persuasion. It may take longer, and I think this is probably one of the differences in the national psyche as between Americans and Indians.

Senator GORE. That is as good an explanation as I have heard.

INDIA'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Let me ask you one other question, and then I will yield to my colleagues.

Is the armament that India is now undertaking, in your opinion, spurred primarily by this apprehension of, and reality of, Red Chinese aggression or apprehension of possible military conflict with Pakistan?

Mr. GALBRAITH. It is a hard question to answer. If I may say that I yesterday had a long talk with Senator Symington as a result—and he asked me to mention this to the committee; he had to be at the Stockpiling Committee this morning.

He has raised a question of the large armed forces of India. This is a position which, with all respect to Senator Symington's military knowledge—I think I have learned of these matters from Senator Symington more than most people—I would say this is a position from which I would dissent.

Given this tension along this enormously long and difficult frontier, it is hard for me to understand how the Indians could avoid maintaining a military establishment of about its present size. There was some complaint in the Indian Parliament yesterday because I estimated to the House that the Indians had an armed force of about 500,000 people. If you distribute 500,000 men along this frontier, they are pretty thin. You have a lot of passes here, and they have to be covered by quite a force.

My own estimate would be that the major deployment of the Indian Army is in relation to this frontier. When you get up here, it is hard to decide, because here are the Chinese and here is Pakistan, and the same forces are related to both countries.

When you get down here, you have another situation. There is an ethnically distinct tribal group here, the Nagas, who are in a state of sort of perpetual revolt against the Indians. There is quite a force there for security purposes.

I wouldn't say that the ancient tensions between India and Pakistan minimize the deployment up here. Certainly their troops are here. But I would say, on the whole, the major orientation of the

Indian forces is toward the Chinese; certainly that is the major concern of the Indian people.

It is very hard for me—it would be very hard for anybody, I think—to argue that the Indian defense establishment should be smaller than it is. I would have great difficulty arguing, with respectful disagreement with Senator Symington.

Senator GORE. That was primarily the basis on which I ventured to determine my position with respect to the amendment offered by Senator Symington.

INDIAN TROOPS IN KASHMIR

Mr. GALBRAITH. I want to make one thing clear so there would not be any danger of misleading the committee.

The Indians do have a strong concentration of troops in Kashmir, coming down to the Punjab, which are certainly related to Pakistan, no question about it.

Senator GORE. Senator Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. The Ambassador from Pakistan made a speech about a month ago—I think it was he; if not he, it was someone in the higher echelon of the Embassy—and he said that 75 percent of their strength is facing Pakistan.

Would you comment on that?

Mr. GALBRAITH. This is a calculation which would have to allocate these troops here.

Here is the area where the Chinese are moving. The Chinese are not active here, here in a military way; they are up here.

This is the cease-fire line dividing Kashmir, the disputed area of Kashmir, between India and Pakistan.

Now, a division of troops here, Senator Lausche, is it related to this or is it related to this?

If you relate it here, you get a very low percentage. If you relate it to this frontier, you get a very high percentage.

I would, myself, not feel justified in entering into this argument, because 75 percent to me does seem to be rather high. It would seem to be high.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Senator GORE. Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. I don't have any questions.

INDIAN PURCHASE OF SOVIET FIGHTER PLANES

Senator LAUSCHE. I would like to ask questions about the acquisition of planes by India. They are dealing with Russia, and recent newspaper reports indicate they were going to acquire these Russian planes.

Would you discuss that subject for a moment?

Mr. GALBRAITH. The newspapers have been full of accounts of the purchase of Russian fighters by the Indians. About a month ago, in response to these reports, I want to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and asked them about this.

I may say that I protested rather strongly. In the past, India has relied on the British very largely for its military supplies, and the Russians were offering to sell planes for rupees. I pointed out that this was as much a subsidized purchase—as much the acceptance

of military aid—as the acceptance of our food, because we also sell for rupees; and the acceptance of Soviet military aid would have a very poor effect on American public opinion, and we worried sometimes about Indian public opinion on nuclear testing and so forth; it was the task of Indians to concern themselves with American public reaction.

This led to a long series of discussions that I won't trouble you with, and one consequence of that was that the goal was postponed. This is not generally known. This was put in abeyance and it still is.

It won't stay indefinitely in abeyance for two reasons. First, there is a sense of military competition with Pakistan. Pakistan, too, has some modern high performance fighters. The Indians have nothing that is less than 10 years old. There is also the feeling on the part of defense people if they ever have trouble up here the Chinese have a string of airfields here—they must have something which would keep Chinese aircraft from attacking Delhi, attacking the cities in the plains.

What will be the outcome of this I don't know. My hope would be that before they acquire the Soviet planes there will be at least an occasion to consider alternatives.

INDIA'S LEADERSHIP OF THE ASIAN AFRICAN BLOC

Senator AIKEN. At the United Nations a year ago I got the distinct impression that India was undertaking rather vigorously to extend its sphere of political influence, in other words, she was trying to assume the leadership of the Asian-African bloc. As far as Africa was concerned she didn't appear to be having too much success, because they are split in all directions, but to what extent is India undertaking to extend her economic influence, her political influence, to these other countries, particularly Africa? Is she trying to do it by immigration as in the case of British Guiana, or what?

Are they putting a lot of effort into that as you see it?

Mr. GALBRAITH. There is no immigration.

The Indians have always set great store by their position in the United Nations and their prestige with the Asian-African bloc, and they cultivate those people.

Senator AIKEN. They would like to be the leader of the largest bloc.

Mr. GALBRAITH. That is right, but the basis of this effort is to use the prestige of Nehru and to cultivate these people to Delhi, to treat them sympathetically, and to be very careful of their feelings in New York. It is very largely a diplomatic and evangelical effort.

They also provide some teachers. They also do a little bit by way of technical assistance, but in the main, it is of the sort that I say.

INDIA'S POSITION ON LAOS AND VIETNAM

We have sometimes wished that they would do more in this part of the world. One of the strong arguments we have made all of this year, in fact one of the things I have devoted more energy to, I think, then almost anything else, is in saying, "We have settled on the policy of a neutral Laos, a policy that takes this unhappy coun-

try outside these power blocs, outside. We don't want it for an ally. And we don't want Laos to go Communist. In other words, we are willing to settle for a neutral solution.

"Now, a neutral solution in Laos is your policy, not ours; it is yours. Therefore, we should have your support, we should have your compassion and active assistance in this."

Senator LAUSCHE. Whom are you talking that to, India?

Mr. GALBRAITH. India, to Prime Minister Nehru and the head of their foreign office.

And in recent times, I must say that in both Laos and South Vietnam we have managed to get good working support from the Indians.

Senator GORE. What do you mean "good working support"?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Arthur Lall, who was the Indian's opposite number in Geneva during the Laos Conference, came eventually to be one of Governor Harriman's very good allies in working out that agreement.

Senator GORE. Good.

Mr. GALBRAITH. And in South Vietnam, we have come to have, particularly since Prime Minister Nehru came over here last fall, a very sympathetic position by the Indians on the problem of subversion in South Vietnam. This has been one of the encouraging changes from last year, and this year is full of encouraging features.

DANGER OF CHINESE AGGRESSION

Senator GORE. Sensing this preoccupation of Prime Minister Nehru with the aggression and with the danger of greater aggression on the part of Red China, which you now say is the prime consideration in Indian foreign policy——

Mr. GALBRAITH. I say a prime consideration.

Senator GORE [continuing]. I reached the tentative conclusion, not only by reason of this conversation but several others, and observations over a period of time, that Mr. Nehru was consciously trying to drive a wedge of—whether it is friendship or how you describe wedge, he was trying to assure himself and assure India that in the case of real major trouble between India and Red China, that Russia would not be on Red China's side, and that they were willing to use the United States as a foil in the promotion of that goal.

Is this in any way a valid conclusion?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes. The first, I think, is wholly true. I think all countries, including our own, combine both hope and conviction in their foreign policy.

Senator GORE. And fear?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes.

For the Indians, it is a fundamental matter of hope—and it is hard to say where wishful thinking stops and conviction starts—that there will be enough difference between the Chinese and the Russians so that the Chinese will not get the support of the Soviets. But as they look at this enormous mass of population here, it becomes depressing if you have to add the whole weight of Russia to it, too.

So it is very fundamental in Indian thinking to hope that there will be enough of a split between these so there won't be a united front. There is no question—as long as we are talking here within the family—that one of the things which has been behind the purchase of the Mig's has been the thought of this implied Soviet support against China.

BOUNDARY WITH EAST PAKISTAN

Senator AIKEN. Has India evidenced much concern along the boundary with East Pakistan?

Mr. GALBRAITH. No.

The geography of Pakistan is probably the most unfortunate of any country in the world. The largest population which is here, the largest area is here, and the government is here. Pakistan is a country which has been very close to my heart. For a good many years I have had a good deal to do with its development work.

The Bengalis here, on both sides of the line, are not people who go naturally into armies. Macauley in the middle of the last century made a famous comment; I don't quote it exactly, but he said, "In all of the armies that serve Her Majesty in the Indian Empire, there serves not one single citizen of Bengal."

It is a relatively strong pacifist tradition in this part of India. Bengalis go into the Indian Air Force and some of them go into the Navy, but there are still very few of them in the Army. This part of Pakistan provides very little military base for the Pakistan Army, and it is not part of Pakistan policy to base troops here. The Pakistanis deploy their forces along this front here.

Senator AIKEN. That is all.

Senator LAUSCHE. I have a few questions.

COMPLEX INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION

Mr. GALBRAITH. I would like to make just one sort of general observation about the internal political situation for about 5 minutes.

Senator GORE. Yes. Could we hear that now, Senator Lausche?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Mr. GALBRAITH. One of the things that I would hope we might all keep in mind about India, one thing that impresses me very much, is that like all countries you have a complex internal political situation. People speak of the United States and know that this is a government of, a community of, intense political conflict. There may even be differences of opinion in the Democratic Party. I think the Republicans are always agreed on things, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. They always agree among themselves. [Laughter.]

Mr. GALBRAITH. The Indian Government is a community of intense political conflict. I think it is fair to say that this political conflict is at the moment particularly acute. The older generation which presided over independence and the first years following is passing from the scene. The President—President Prasad just retired—was one of the great leaders of the free independence period. Prime Minister Nehru is 72, not in very good health, and the succession, the problem of the passage of power, is now very much in process.

Within the Indian Government, including the Cabinet and the Civil Service—and this is also extremely important as regards the army—the dominant mood is strongly pro-West, strongly pro-United States. The Finance Minister, the Minister of Food and Agriculture, a great many of the middle group ministers, are very close, strong friends of the United States.

KRISHNA MENON'S FOLLOWING

The Defense Minister, Krishna Menon, is by contrast an articulate critic of the United States and a vehement critic of the United States. I understand he is also a vehement critic of the American Ambassador.

He has his supporters. They are not numerically strong. Krishna Menon is not a popular man.

Senator AIKEN. Outside his district?

Mr. GALBRAITH. I beg your pardon?

Senator AIKEN. Outside of his own province?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Outside of his own sort of community, he is not a popular man. He is at the present time, in this period of political maneuver, attempting to make himself the indispensable link to the Soviets, and by tightening that bond at the time when the change comes he will be able to say, "Well, I represent this link."

Since he is the most articulate man, there is danger of identifying everything that happens in India with Menon.

PRO-WESTERN GROUP IS STRONGEST

It used to be said around Harvard by some of the graduates that it was imagined there were only two economists in the Harvard Department of Economics, Seymour Harris and Galbraith, because we were doing all the talking. Well, there were a lot of good, sound conservatives and liberals who were always heard from.

To some extent, if you will forgive the parallel, the situation is similar in India. While there are the conservatives, the middle-of-the-road, pro-Western group is by far and away the strongest. It is also the least articulate.

I am terribly concerned that we do not play into the hands of the anti-American group at this juncture; that if seeming to turn a cold shoulder on India, we turn our cold shoulder on the pro-Western group in the Cabinet, we turn our cold shoulder on the pro-Western group in the Civil Service and the military, this enables the others to say, "Well, God, you can't get anything out of the Americans anyway. They are unreliable. They are fair-weather friends."

In spite of everything we have done, this argument will be raised. Therefore, in this particular juncture, I think it is very important that we show the wisdom and the patience, to some degree, even the tolerance, that we would exercise as regards a similar political struggle in our own country, where we would say, "Well, this was a political situation which we have to sort of wait out."

I think you will understand my uneasiness in talking about this, because it could easily make it impossible for me to go back to New Delhi. But I think it is a bit of background that the committee should have, and I hope that you won't mind my leaving it with you.

Senator GORE. Thank you very much.

MENON'S ANTI-CHINESE STATEMENTS

To what extent has Menon demonstrated a hostility to China? His affinity with Russia is not only plain but, as you say, it is part of his political strategy.

Mr. GALBRAITH. It is hard, it is unfair to interpret another man's motives. He has been talking an anti-Chinese line the last 2 or 3 years. I am sure, in my own heart, this was forced by events, and I am sure that Menon under any ordinary circumstances, given the choice between attacking the Chinese and attacking the United States, would prefer the United States.

Senator AIKEN. Menon went up to Peiping a few years ago on a visit, but he didn't get a very warm reception at that time.

Mr. GALBRAITH. The Indians and the Chinese are really at odds and, as a matter of fact, they might even have a break in diplomatic relations, which is not out of the question. The Indian Ambassador in Peiping is hemmed in. He can't travel. It has become a post that very few Indians want to take, incidentally. There is real friction here of the most acute sort.

Senator AIKEN. After he got back from that visit, he was over here, and he has his talkative moments, you know, and he is just like a human being. He would talk to me about his visit to Peiping, and he said one thing that he came to the conclusion while he was up there was that the Chinese people liked the Americans better than they did the Indians, which I thought was one of the few concise statements I ever heard him make. So I concluded he didn't get a reception which he regarded was his due.

Mr. GALBRAITH. This is a very bitter situation, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. Can I ask a question?

Senator GORE. Senator Lausche.

Senator AIKEN. I don't believe he has been up there since, has he?

Mr. GALBRAITH. No.

Senator AIKEN. Never went back?

Mr. GALBRAITH. As a matter of fact, the curious thing about Menon, he much prefers the company of the United States than he does to go to the Soviet Union.

Senator AIKEN. He comes here because he can argue and we will take it.

INDIAN CONCERN ABOUT AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask whether there may not be present the psychology with the Government of India that they can tolerate the attacks that Menon has been making upon us, and that we will suffer the flirtation which the Indian Government is having with Russia, and for that reason they are doing it, feeling that they want to establish a friendly relation with Russia even though they are required to offend and affront us, because we will take it docilely?

Mr. GALBRAITH. I wouldn't say so; no, I wouldn't say so. I would say that the Indians want to be friendly to the Soviets and they want to be friendly to the United States, and that there is a good

deal of concern in India at the present time about American public opinion, more than there has been at any time since the war. I may say it is something which I think is a very healthy sign, because I think Indians should worry about American public opinion.

Let me say one thing at one point where I would agree, and this is true of India and it is true in every country in the world. If you want to read a lecture to somebody, to some government on how it should improve, you read a lecture to a government which you think you will influence. You don't read a lecture to the Russians, because you don't assume for a moment they are listening, and you don't assume if they are listening it is going to have any effect.

But if you read a lecture to the United States—Senator Aiken, just said—we listen, we argue, we have some reaction.

Senator AIKEN. We have television, too, and Menon likes that.

AMERICANS ARE WILLING TO LISTEN TO AN ARGUMENT

Mr. GALBRAITH. One of the consequences of this simple fact, Senator Lausche, is that much of the criticism in the world that is addressed to the United States is addressed to us by virtue of the fact that we are an open society and listen to everybody. I would go so far—it sounds Pollyannaish, but I have asserted this and I have written this, that in some degree the amount of discussion of American policy that one hears elsewhere in the world and the amount of discussion of American policy one hears elsewhere in the world is a manifestation of good will. The fact is that they know that Americans are civilized, receptive people who will listen to argument, and therefore we get it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, but we get more than argument. Menon has taken positions that have been hostile to us. He represents the government. Repeatedly we have delegations coming in from Africa affronting us at the very time that they are asking for help, and my position with regard to aid to India has been founded on the proposition that they feel that we will suffer their offenses and still give them aid.

Mr. GALBRAITH. I am not excusing this entirely. I said I don't want to seem to be Pollyannaish in this answer, but I am saying I think we should face it, that being the kind of country we are and being open to discussion the way we are, people are going to address many more complaints to us than they will to the Soviets. I would even go so far, as a believer in democracy, a believer in the open society, and say this is one of our strong points.

Senator LAUSCHE. Good enough.

FOOD AID TO CHINA

Now, then, this question: Food is one of the great problems confronting the Chinese Government now. If they are compelled to suffer famine and lack of nourishment, will that solidify the position of the incumbent government or will it likely lead to its destruction again?

Mr. GALBRAITH. I am not an expert on China, Senator. As I say, I am responding out of the general flow of information out of India. I cannot think for a moment that famine solidifies or strengthens the government.

Senator LAUSCHE. That brings us down to the next question. You can answer it if you want to, or not. It is advocated that we extend Public Law 480 aid to Red China, to the Chinese starving people.

Do you want to express an opinion on that?

Mr. GALBRAITH. I would be expressing a purely personal opinion, but one which I have no hesitation in expressing.

In 1921, at the time of the great famine in Russia, we, through the Hoover Relief Commission, gave very large assistance to the famine-stricken areas, and we took the position that we shouldn't separate, we shouldn't identify political considerations with the human requirement to keep people alive. It was a very lovely and very Christian and compassionate view for which one can have a great deal of sympathy.

George Kennan said, commenting on that period, that one thing that the new Soviet regime would have understood was a bargain: We would help them with the food, but they must agree on the other side to the foreign policy objectives that we were seeking at that time or which the Western European countries were seeking at that time. I would have difficulty reconciling my conscience with denying food that was available to somebody who was starving, but I would certainly want to bring up with the Chinese the question of relaxing the tension on South Vietnam, on drawing off their support to the Viet-Minh in Laos, and to taking steps to stabilize the situation in the Western Pacific.

It would seem to me to be elementary that we should, before we enter a bargain of this sort, that we try to see what we can get by way of stabilizing and making more peaceful the situation in that side of the world.

I must say, speaking without license from the State Department and purely as an individual.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

All right. I suppose that there are military men who would say that we are in a war, and while your humanitarian impulses cannot be completely set aside, you have to view what the eventual, the ultimate impact may be upon our own youth if the Communist government in China grows. That would be the other side of the argument.

Mr. GALBRAITH. This is an argument. It wouldn't be my argument, but I would certainly recognize the legitimacy of that.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think President Truman, when he decided to use the atomic bomb, concluded that what seemed to be the most destructive and inhumane thing was in the end humane because it saved American lives. And I think that same principle would apply here.

INDIA'S POSITION TOWARD LAOS

One further question and I am through. Why should India have to be begged to give support to the proposal of establishing a neutral government in Laos?

Mr. GALBRAITH. They were initially very suspicious of us on this issue, and not without reason. As Governor Harriman has said, and I think it is a matter of record, we at one time gave support to General Phoumi in the creating of a government that would be

allied with us. I had to persuade the Indians that we had modified that policy and that we were genuinely committed to the idea of taking Laos outside of the power blocs, leaving it outside of the cold war, and letting it develop peacefully without interference from either side. This took some argument and, in light of history, I am not sure that that should be surprising.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why did India not want Laos oriented to the West?

Mr. GALBRAITH. If it were oriented to the West it would have been presumably with some sort of a military alliance and that has been against their policy. This would have—it is not that it is oriented toward the West. India is oriented toward the West. The question was a military alignment.

APPLYING ETHICAL PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICAL PROBLEMS

Senator GORE. Your answer to me earlier with respect to the rationalization of passivity of certain elements in India toward the presence of Communist troops in their country, really related to the basic religion and philosophy of the Indian people. This was something that struck me when I was there as something wholly new. They have indices for conclusions which are quite different from ours.

Would you concur with that?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes, I would, Senator Gore. And yet I must say that I am persuaded that one of the fundamental sources of affiliation, of bonds, between India and the United States is the conviction that ethical principles can be applied to practical problems.

After all, this is a widespread conviction in the United States. It is part of the Judeo-Christian ethic, which probably has as strong a manifestation in your part of the world as any. I think that there is, if I may speak philosophically for the moment—just as the good practicing Tennessee Christian says, "If you applied these principles to your life and adhered to them, then this will force other people to conform, either by example or by the righteous impact of God," so you find the same rules governing the behavior of a follower of Gandhi. One of the reasons that people can, missionaries, move from one community, from the American community, to the Indian community is that this conviction that ethical principles govern practical affairs is strong in both countries.

Senator GORE. Even though the standards of those ethics may differ in considerable respect.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Differ widely, and that also the whole religious pattern is totally different.

INDIA, CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION

Senator GORE. I have one final question and perhaps it is the most difficult that you have had propounded to you. Is it, in your considered opinion, in the long run, to the best interests of the United States that India succeed in establishing a relationship to the Soviet Union which would separate the Soviet Union from Red China in the case of trouble between India and Red China? If you do not wish to answer that, you need not. It is a long term proposition, and it really is based upon whether our principal difficulty in

the future is going to be with Russia or with a movement out of the area north of the Himalayas.

Mr. GALBRAITH. I don't know that I could answer it, Senator. I myself hold to the view that over the span of the next 50 years, more of the world's troubles are going to center, are going to originate, in China than in Moscow.

This happens to be my estimate of the prospect. There is a more revolutionary, less rational regime, more determined to evangelize in the rest of the world. Therefore, in the way the hope of the Indians that the Soviets will be a restraining influence is paralleled by my belief that, on the whole, the Soviets will be less drastically revolutionary than the Chinese—but having said that, I have always had the feeling that the Indians were somewhat wishful on this issue. That is, the Indian Government discovers schisms as between the two countries, discovers conflict where it may not exist, because the existence of that conflict is so extremely important to its sense of survival.

COMPARISON TO U.S. RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

Senator GORE. You have some doubt then that the schism, though apparent and existing, may not be of sufficient severing quality to depend upon?

Mr. GALBRAITH. One doesn't know what these schisms mean. We have our difficulties with de Gaulle, don't we? And yet the notion of an affinity between France and the United States is something we take for granted; it is fundamental, it has lasted for 200 years.

Senator GORE. And when the chips are down, it will be there.

Mr. GALBRAITH. It has lasted for 200 years. In the short run, Americans and Frenchmen can say disagreeable things. I can imagine somebody sitting in Moscow saying, "By God, the French and the Americans have come to the parting of the ways and they will never be able to agree again." They would be quite wrong.

I have a feeling that while Peiping and Moscow may trade some criticisms—and they are not like we are, they are more disagreeable, it is part of the Communist tradition to use harsh language—we might bear in mind that when the chips are down, there may be affinity there in political organization and commitment to the Marxian system which parallels that between France and the United States.

Senator GORE. Mr. Ambassador, it is an even 12 o'clock, and we thank you very much. It has been very enlightening and very helpful, very pleasant.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, I am very glad I came to the meeting. Thank you very much.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Thank you. It has been a pleasure to be here.

Senator GORE. The committee is recessed.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee stood in recess.]

[Following adjournment, the committee was polled and 13 members were recorded as in favor of reporting the nomination of Mr. Battle favorably to the Senate, with none negative.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 9:15 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman).

The subcommittee was briefed on the proposed Port of Monrovia settlement in Liberia by Henry J. Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

No record was kept or transcript taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered into executive session at 11:35 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, and Hickenlooper.

George W. Ball, Acting Secretary of State, appeared to discuss the bill (S. 3252), To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to permit the President to authorize a foreign government to operate a radio transmitter at or near its mission in Washington when that government has provided reciprocal privileges to the United States to operate a station within its territory. He was followed in his presentation by Admiral M. E. Curts, Department of Defense.

Consideration of the bills (H.R. 8982, H.R. 9883, and S. 3238), authorizing the construction of bridges across the Rio Grande River in Texas, was postponed temporarily.

Consideration of the bills (S. 2380, and S. 3329), Authorizing war damage claims payments to the Government of the Philippines, was postponed until the next meeting.

Consideration of the nomination of Matthew H. McCloskey to be Ambassador to Ireland also was put over.

The committee discussed a communication from Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, Minority Leader, expressing concern over press mention of an executive policy planning document prepared under the direction of Walt W. Rostow, counselor, Department of State, after which it was decided to call Mr. Rostow before the committee.

The committee discussed an informal inquiry from Ambassador Stevenson at the United Nations proposing that congressional delegates to the U.N. sessions might be named advisers instead of delegates as such. After consideration, it was the consensus that the congressional participants at the United Nations should continue as delegates.

The committee concluded to explore further a proposal from members of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. to meet with them on the same basis as the Congress holds other meetings with parliamentarians of the world.

For the record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[Whereupon, the committee adjourned at 12:50 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, JUNE 22, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 9 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Morse and Church.

The subcommittee heard G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, review the situation in the Congo.

No record was kept or transcript taken at the meeting.

BRIEFING ON GENEVA DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

FRIDAY, JUNE 22, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. John Sparkman, presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Denney of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order. I am sorry to be late.

I am glad to be here, glad to see you gentlemen.

Mr. Dean, why don't you just give us a rundown on what has happened and what the present situation is.

STATEMENT OF HON. ARTHUR DEAN, AMBASSADOR ON GENEVA DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. DEAN. I thought you might be more interested if I first gave you some of my general impressions of the conference and where we stand on it.

As you know, the plan that President Kennedy presented to the United Nations on September 25, we have now worked out in considerably more detail an outline of the treaty. We had the benefit of the Joint Chiefs and the Defense Department and a lot of experts on it.

In the course of it, I think that we all found that it paid off to try to draft a complete outline of a treaty, because I think it was the first time we ever really thought through all of the problems that you really would run into on the assumption that you really could carry out general and complete disarmament.

In the past, I think we all know that the Russians were not really truly interested in disarmament. But they have gotten away with a tremendous amount of propaganda throughout the world on the theory that they were the one nation that was interested in peace, and we were the so-called imperialist warmongers because we used phrases like arms control or arms limitation, or something, but not the phrase general and complete disarmament.

We also felt that while you were carrying out the disarmament, you had to maintain the present military mix. That is the makeup

of your air power, your sea power, your missiles, your rockets, submarines and so forth.

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

So we, with the advice of the Joint Chiefs and Defense, worked out this plan where you carry out your general and complete disarmament in three stages, with a 30-percent cut across the board in your nuclear weapons delivery vehicles—that is, airplanes and submarines and ships and missiles and rockets—and your manpower, and in your conventional weapons. And then you don't proceed from that stage to the next until you are satisfied that everything that has been agreed to be done has been verified by proper inspection methods, and under our plan you have to verify not only what you have to start with at the end of each step as you go forward, but what you actually reduce, and what you have left.

If you look at a map of the United States, and you see the Atlantic Ocean on the east and the Pacific on the west and the Arctic on the north, and you look at our commitments in Japan, Korea, Formosa, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, Europe and NATO, and the Organization of the American States in Latin America, you will see that we are essentially an air power, a sea power, or a missile power. The only place we could get anyplace is by one of those three means; that is the only way we could carry out our commitments.

If you look at the Soviet plan on disarmament, what they do is to say that you have to get rid of all your nuclear weapons delivery vehicles—that is, your airplanes, your missiles, your ships and subs, and all your foreign bases—in the first stage, and all nuclear weapons in the second stage. So that if their plan were carried out, we would absolutely be unable to depart from territorial United States; we would be unable to carry out any of our commitments.

EIGHT NEW NATIONS

In addition to tabling this outline of a treaty, which spells out in considerable detail how we would carry out disarmament, we tried, in a very non-controversial way—because you have these eight new nations there—Brazil, Mexico, India, Burma, Nigeria, Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic and Sweden—we tried to expound this thing to them in as careful and as precise and as persuasive a way as we could, without getting into any name-calling tactics, or without indulging in any attacks on the Soviet Union, because our experience in the past has been that is a much more effective way of doing it.

On the whole, I think that we convinced the eight nations that we had a good plan. I think we convinced them of the necessity of maintaining your current military mix. I think they have been persuaded, not in every respect, but I think they have been persuaded that the U.S. plan is a sound plan and a good plan, and they have not been persuaded that the Soviet plan is anything other than propaganda.

Of the eight nations, we spent an enormous amount of time with them outside of the conference. We had them over in the afternoons, and we explained the purpose of the U.S. plan on general and complete disarmament, and we explained our commitments.

We explained how we had to keep ourselves armed in such a manner that there won't be any imbalance while you are carrying out disarmament, in such a manner that we can carry out our commitments to the free world.

I think when the eight came there, most of them felt that all there was to disarmament was to say, "Boys, let's have disarmament," and the next day you dumped everything in the ocean. I think we have now convinced them that, in many respects, trying to carry out disarmament is much more complex than arming, because in arming you also order two, three or four times as much as you need because you never know where you will need it or when war will break out. But in disarmament, you have to make a list of everything that you have and the various types of weapons, and then destroy them in accordance with a plan. And as I say, you cannot do it in any way so that if at some point the other fellow were to say "Well, very glad to have known you, we have enough, because I now think I have an advantage, and I am not going forward with disarmament." You have to be sure you are never in that stage.

REPORTING OF THE CONFERENCE

I think as far as reporting of the conference around the world is concerned, and certainly in the governments of the eight—although there hasn't been any agreement and I don't think anybody expected it; that man, having arms for 10,000 years, was going to work out a plan for general and complete disarmament in 3 months. But I think we have gained a great psychological advantage over the Russians in the world, because they now think we have a honest and real plan, and I think we have pointed out the insincerities in the Soviet plan and the fact that there is no real inspection in their plan.

A great many people have been dissatisfied because of Khrushchev's saying you can have all the inspections you please, but when you read their plan, you will find that you can only come in and inspect that which is destroyed. You cannot inspect that which you start with, or you can't inspect that which you have left. So you might put 5,000 bombers on a bonfire, and you might be able to inspect those, but you won't know how many they had in production or whether they had replaced those particular bombers by something else—all of which we have carefully pointed out, and have pointed to contrary provisons in our own plan.

You might well ask why bother with general and complete disarmament when you have conflicts in Cuba, Laos, Berlin, and when they are still seeking to carry out worldwide communism by subversion and infiltration.

I think even though world opinion may not help us any in an actual war—if you had war with the Soviet Union, it might not help us any in actually supplying men and arms—nevertheless the fact that you do now have 104 members of the United Nations, and in all probability in the next 10, 15, or 20 years, colonialism will be completely terminated and you probably will have another 20 members of the United Nations—I think one of the problems that the United States has to be very careful about—and all of them

came and complimented us on this in Geneva—is the fact that we don't give the impression that, just because we are a very powerful and a very wealthy and a very strong country, we don't care a hoot about what we do affecting other people, or what they think. I think over any long period of time, any such concert of opinion among the newer countries of the world would not in the long run react to our advantage, entirely apart from the morality of it. So, as I say, we have taken great pains to try to explain all of the complications of this.

THE RAPACKI PLAN

In the conference itself, we met every morning at 10 o'clock in a so-called plenary session. We were supposed to adjourn at 1 o'clock, but practically every day Mr. Zorin would start to speak at 1 o'clock and generally talk until 2 o'clock. Then we had separate meetings on the nuclear test ban subcommittee of this conference, which met at 3 o'clock.

Then we set up two other committees. One was a committee of the whole, which is non-voting committee. We set that committee up with the idea that possibly we could explore and put into effect certain limited agreements, but without having to wait on general and complete disarmament. And the items that we wanted to discuss in that committee were the non-transfer of nuclear weapons from one nuclear power to a non-nuclear power, or these nuclear-free zones in Europe or Africa or Latin America—the one in Europe originally put forward by the Polish Foreign Minister, generally known as the Rapacki Plan—and a plan for eliminating the possibilty of nuclear war destruction by surprise attack or by miscalculation or by surprise.

Curiously enough, although Gromyko, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, had submitted a memorandum last September 22 to the United Nations in which he said that short of general and complete disarmament the Soviet Union was very much interested immediately in working out some plan to stop nuclear war by surprise or miscalculation or mistake. He suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union might exchange inspectors at air forces and railroad stations and so forth but when we tried to get that item put on the agenda of the committee of the whole, Mr. Zorin, the Deputy Foreign Minister, backed away from it. He didn't want to discuss that item at all. No matter how many times we would bring that matter up, he always had some involved and long explanation as to why it wasn't a good idea to bring it up.

BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS

You know this conference started off on March 14, with the foreign ministers of each of the 17 countries being there. France was invited, but has never come. Secretary Rusk was also having conversations with Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, on Berlin. For a while, he suggested to me that I should without saying so, lay off of putting on the agenda for the committee of the whole this item of the nontransfer of nuclear weapons, and the non-aggression pact between the members of the Warsaw Pact and the NATO countries, because he wanted to use those two items in

his negotiations with Gromyko on Berlin. He thought they might be more useful in the Berlin negotiations.

Also, as you will recall, beginning about the middle of March and going well on into the end of April, they were having their Italian elections. Mr. Segni, the Italian Foreign Minister, who was at Geneva, was at the time running for the Presidency of Italy.[1] He wanted to get the support of the many Socialists in Italy, so he privately asked me not to put on the list this idea of the nuclear free zones in Europe, because if I put that on the list, he wanted to support me, but he didn't want to support me, because the Socialists in Italy were for it.

So we finally decided, rather than get into a long-winded discussion as to what the order of the items should be on this committee on the whole, to take up this item against a declaration of war propaganda.

REGULATING WAR PROPAGANDA

When the Soviets first started in on that, they had a draft that war propaganda was a crime punishable by 10 to 20 years in prison. Anybody who indulged in it would have to lose all of his offices, and every country subscribing to it would have to regulate the press and its citizens. So I explained to Zorin at these meetings about our article I of our Constitution, that we could not regulate the free press, nor did we wish to regulate the utterances of our citizens. And also under our system of government, the executive could not instruct the legislative branch what to pass.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You made that categorical statement, just that flatly?

Mr. DEAN. Just that flatly, yes, sir. If you would like to see it anytime, Senator, it is in the verbatim.

Anyhow, a lot of these discussions on this declaration against war propaganda may seem somewhat silly and futile to you over here. But the Brazilians have some such provision in their constitution, and their delegate there, Senhor Mello Franco, who has been one of the leaders of the Brazilian Senate, has been the author of this document in the Brazilian constitution. The Italians had some similar provisions in their constitution, and the Indians had some similar one in theirs. So they kept coming to me and saying, "We regard your conversations with Zorin on this war propaganda as sort of symbolic of what you can do, of what the West can do with the East."

I continued these meetings over a period of 6 weeks. One Saturday they lasted, without lunch, for about 7 hours, but they often went 3 or 4 hours a day. Finally I drafted something which Zorin finally said he would take, which simply said they would admit all books, radios, television and newspapers in the Soviet Union. There wasn't any provision that said that war propaganda was a crime. And there wasn't any requirement that anybody adopt any legislation.

The way I drafted it, and he finally said he would take it, it said within the constitutional limitations of each state, each state may

---

[1] On May 6, Antonio Sengi was elected President of Italy.

adopt such legislation as it deems appropriate—that is, within the constitutional limitations of each state, each state that thinks it is appropriate can adopt such legislation as it thinks appropriate. There wasn't any obligation.

I said to Zorin, "Are you positive that your government is going to subscribe to this?" He said, "I will telephone Chairman Khrushchev and Gromyko this afternoon, and I will let you know in the morning."

He came in the next morning and said, "Yes, this is agreeable."

SOVIET REPUDIATION OF THE AGREEMENT

As I say, the eight regarded this as symbolic of our being able to work something out. I had finally worked this thing out. It didn't mean anything, because it didn't obligate anybody to do anything, but the eight all regarded it as great evidence of good will.

So in this committee of the whole, the non-voting committee, on Thursday, May 25, Zorin got up and said he now regarded this declaration as binding on his government, and he thought it was a great step forward, and a great lessening of tensions. He thought it was wonderful, and he wanted to know whether the United States accepted it, and I said yes, we did. He said, "I don't need any further instructions from my government and I understand Mr. Dean doesn't from his government." I said, "That is correct."

Well, sometime we were to meet in the plenary committee on the following Tuesday. At 8 o'clock Monday night he got written instructions from the Central Committee. They had met and apparently decided that because of Laos and our landing of troops in Thailand and our toughening of our situation in Berlin, that it was unwise to have this lessening of tensions. And he came on Tuesday and completely repudiated the agreement that he had made on Thursday.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did he do that in a public statement?

Mr. DEAN. Oh, yes, a long statement which he circulated.

REASONS GIVEN FOR REPUDIATION

Senator SPARKMAN. Did he use any reasoning for it? Did he admit it was a repudiation?

Mr. DEAN. Yes, he admitted it. The reason that he gave was the Stuart Alsop article in the Saturday Evening Post in early March, where President Kennedy had said in reply to a question that if the forces of Western Europe should be overwhelmed, or were about to be overwhelmed by Soviet forces, would you make a nuclear response, and President Kennedy had said yes. And he said that that was a statement by the United States that we were in favor of a preemptive war, we were in favor of initially using nuclear weapons.

Then he used an article by [Franz-Josef] Strauss, the Defense Minister of Germany, which he said showed that Germany wanted to be rearmed with nuclear weapons. In fact, it was an article written 3 years ago, which had been picked up by some military publication in Paris that is an unofficial magazine of NATO, and rerun, without any indication that it was written 3 years ago. Then he

mentioned our tough attitude on Berlin and the landing of troops in Thailand.

I turned to my deputy and I said, "Well, this is wonderful, we are out of a declaration we never wanted, and we got about $1 million worth of propaganda against the Soviet Union."

All I said was, "We worked on this thing now for 6 weeks, about 3 or 4 hours a day. They made a solemn agreement it was binding on Thursday, and they break it on Tuesday. So I just hope this shows to the rest of you what kind of a problem the United States is up against in trying to deal with the Soviet Union."

ZORIN'S EMBARRASSMENT

Zorin was very embarrassed that day. The Foreign Minister of Poland came to me afterwards and said that Zorin himself had nothing to do with this thing, that this had been decided in the Central Committee, and he had been reversed, and Gromyko had been reversed—because they invited Tito of Yugoslavia up to Moscow, and they just felt this was not the time to announce any lessening of tensions.

Senator AIKEN. Has Tito accepted that invitation yet?

Mr. DEAN. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. When is he going, do you know?

Mr. DEAN. Some time within the next few weeks, but I do not know precisely what date.

SOVIETS THINK INSPECTION IS ESPIONAGE

In addition to the committee of the whole, there is also another informal committee where Zorin and I, as the two co-chairmen of the conference, meet every day. Those meetings sometimes last several hours. The advantage of those meetings, with the two co-chairmen, which in some respects are the most valuable part of the conference—there is no record kept of them, there is no verbatim of them. But Zorin has told us at these two co-chairmen's meetings that what they are really worried and concerned about in connection with disarmament is the United States' only real interest in disarmament is that somehow or other we want to get inside the Soviet Union. They don't care whether you call them inspectors, or the international disarmament organization—that is the new body we set up under our proposed treaty—or whether you call them inspectors of the United Nations or what you call them.

They think all we are interested in is getting in there and looking at what is taking place inside the Soviet Union, and then we would make a preemptive nuclear strike and wipe them out. And they think every inspection is espionage. This so-called progressive zonal inspection, which we tried to work out to ease the Soviet fears about inspection, where if you destroy 10 percent you inspect 10 percent—they couldn't inspect the entire United States or we couldn't inspect the entire Soviet Union before they started to destroy—they are not interested in that. They not only are not interested in it, they don't want to read any literature on it, they don't even want to discuss it. They don't want to know anything about it. They just say it is espionage, and "you are trying to wipe us off the face of the globe."

EFFECT ON SOVIET ECONOMY

But in the course of these discussions, we have found that the amount of money that they have spent for space, and the amount of money that they are spending for armaments, and the amount of money that they apparently are going to have to spend for armaments is worrying them a great deal. They are worrying about the overall effect on their economy of the amount of money they are having to spend for armaments. And they are concerned about the fact that they had to increase the price of meat 30 percent, and they are worried about the sums of money that we apparently are going to continue to spend on both armaments and space, the Moon, and so forth.

I think, as I say, nothing tangible has come out of these meetings of the two co-chairmen, but I think we have established a method of trying to find out in some respects what is bothering them, and trying to get on a more informal basis of discussing things.

At first I was somewhat, myself, concerned about setting up these co-chairmen's meetings, because I was afraid they would concern our allies. But the English and the Italians and the Canadians like them very much, and the eight like them very much. I, of course, always report to them on what takes place. And they all seem to feel that this part of it is very valuable.

As of the present time, we have completed our exposition of our plan, how we carry it out in stages 1, 2, and 3. The Russians have tabled their treaty, and they have completed their exposition, what you might call a first reading of it. And the eight new nations were somewhat tired. This has been a long, continuous session. They all felt that they would like to go home and take this matter up with their governments. And so we would come back to Geneva on July 16. Then I think they probably will want another adjournment. After the fall meeting of the General Assembly opens up, they will probably want an adjournment while their foreign ministers are at the General Assembly, from September 17 on, and while disarmament is being discussed in the first committee of the United Nations.

The eight all feel that we have made a good impression, and that the Soviets have been set back.

APPRAISAL OF THE EIGHT NEW NATIONS

You might be interested in an appraisal of each of the eight nations there, how they have reacted.

Burma has been represented by a man [James] Barrington, who is their Deputy Foreign Minister. He has been very intelligent, very helpful, and very constructive.

Nigeria has had an exceptionally able and intelligent young man there, named Atta, and he has been most intelligent and most helpful. He asks very pertinent questions and has studied both our plan and the Soviet plan. I think he is very well convinced with respect to our plan.

However, with all these countries—most of them are non-military, and certainly non-nuclear powers—none of them, of course, have at the present time any ability to make nuclear weapons, or they don't have any nuclear weapons—they are all very scared

both of continued nuclear testing and of nuclear weapons. And, of course, they would like to eliminate nuclear warfare as early as possible.

To that extent, they probably like the Soviet plan, which eliminates all nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in stage 1, and all nuclear weapons in stage 2, whereas ours carries it across the board for the three stages. It doesn't eliminate nuclear weapons until you get to the end of general and complete disarmament.

But on the whole, the Nigerians have made a real contribution. They have studied the plan, and studied disarmament very carefully and wisely.

The Ethiopian delegation has changed several times—the head has changed several times—and they have not taken a very active part, one way or the other.

The Swedish delegation posed some very pertinent questions about disarmament, and we studied them for about 10 days, and we answered them. And again we have taken the policy over there that no matter what questions are asked, we have answered them very honestly and very forthrightly, even though it might show up what might appear to be a weakness in our plan. I think the Swedes and the other eight have appreciated that.

The United Arab Republic have played a very constructive role. The No. 2 man in their delegation has been studying for a doctorate at Columbia University. He was given this 5-foot shelf of books by the SANE nuclear committee that always works on disarmament, and he has mastered all of the books in that 5-foot shelf. And they got up a very cogent set of questions, again which we answered very frankly.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You say the UAR. You mean Egypt?

Mr. DEAN. United Arab Republic. Their official name is still United Arab Republic, even though Syria backed away. Apparently now Syria is coming back. They stick technically in the United Nations, and their official name is United Arab Republic.

The Brazilians have played a very helpful role. Padilla Nervo, who is the permanent chairman to the United Nations Commission on Disarmament, has played a great role. Mello Franco of Brazil has played a helpful role. Both of them have played a very helpful role, I think.

INDIAN CRITICISMS OF AMERICAN POSITION

Arthur Lall of India has played about the role, I think, that you might expect of a deputy of Krishna Menon. He is a highly intelligent man. He generally prefaces most of his statements by very high-sounding, rather religious sentiments, but he somehow or other always nevertheless seems to manage to end up with a great deal of criticism of the American position.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is completely consistent with his actions over the past good many years.

Mr. DEAN. He purportedly is very friendly to us, and he purportedly wants to help us. But somehow or other, it doesn't seem quite to come out in practice.

On the nuclear test aspect of it, we continued to present this treaty, with which you are all familiar, of April 1961, except that we——

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Dean, I have to go. In fact, I am 15 minutes late for an appointment I had. I hate to leave this very interesting discussion. I have enjoyed it very much. I certainly want to commend you and the people who have been working with you in the effort that you have put forth. I sometimes marvel that you are able to give to it the patience and the attention that it requires.

Mr. DEAN. Thank you, Senator Sparkman.

I had just finished describing the work of the plenary committee on disarmament, Senator Humphrey, which is the final voting committee, and then a half a dozen subjects we have been discussing in the committee of the whole, which is a nonvoting committee, but where we might be able to work out certain subjects, such as agreements on surprise attack or the nontransfer of nuclear weapons or nuclear-free zones or things like that, short of disarmament. And then I just finished discussing the completely informal meetings that I have every day with Zorin, as the two co-chairmen of the conference, which I think have established a rather useful method of establishing what is in their minds, trying to find out what troubles them, even though there are just the two of us there discussing it.

MEMORANDUM OF THE EIGHT NEW NATIONS

Going back a moment to nuclear testing, I am sure you know the eight new nations, we are sometimes puzzled as to—I am somewhat puzzled as to what to call them. They don't like to be called neutral nations. We ourselves don't like to call them non-alliance nations, because Brazil and Mexico are each a member of the Organization of American States. So we finally hit upon the phrase eight new nations, which seems to be a phrase that irritates the Soviets a good deal. But they got up this memorandum which, in effect, urged us to use it as a basis for negotiations.

We interpreted this memorandum as meaning that we still had to have some kind of an international commission, that you still had to have some kind of supervision of this international commission on the national control posts, and that if an unidentified event were to occur, that it would be the international commission that would decide whether it had the right to go in, and that the state where the suspicious event did occur would be obligated to invite them in.

The memorandum is very badly drafted, and it is very vague, and it is very inconsistent. It talks in one paragraph about the obligation of the state where a suspicious event occurs, of being obligated to invite people in. And in the next paragraph it talks about the state where the suspicious event occurs evading the international commission.

Naturally, the Soviet Union looked at this memorandum and said that all you had to do is have national commissions, and you didn't need to have any obligatory on-site inspection. As I said, we interpreted it the other way, and we were advised by several of the

eight that our interpretation of it was what they really had in mind.

LANGUAGE PROBLEMS

You have to be a little bit careful about what you say, because, as I am sure you know, there is no definite article in the Russian language. There is neither an "a" nor a "the." So when the Russians say that they would take this as the basis for negotiations, you can't come back and say—it sounds a little long-winded—but you can't come back and say, "We won't take it as the basis for negotiations, but we would take it as a basis for negotiations." That comes out in Russian as, "we won't take it as basis for negotiations, but we will take it as basis for negotiations." So you have to say that while we will take it as one of the basis for negotiations, we won't take it as the exclusive basis of negotiations.

Senator HUMPHREY. Both sides should speak French, I guess.

Mr. DEAN. Or Latin.

NATIONAL SYSTEM OF DETECTION

So we have carried on these nuclear test negotiations with the Russians. We still are insisting we want something like our old treaty of April 1961, with an international system of control posts, an international system, and obligatory right of inspection for those events you can't identify. The Russians insist there is no distinction between atmospheric tests and underground tests, and that you can distinguish them all by national systems.

We are somewhat handicapped, sometimes—not always—in making the most effective case for the American position of our secrets. As I think you know, when we talked about a national system of detection, at least here in the United States, we don't really mean a national system of detection, because we have some [deleted] countries around the world using equipment that we put in there, with United States scientists in there. So when we talk about the detecting and identifying—as you know, we may be able to hear something, that is, to detect it. But you still can't identify whether it is a nuclear explosion or an earthquake.

Now, when we said our national systems detected the Soviet underground test of February 2, we didn't actually pick it up by any station in the United States. We picked it up by one of these stations around the world. But we don't announce to the rest of the world we have these stations. Also, this Soviet test was up around [deleted] kilotons, and we don't announce the size of these tests, again, because we think it would give away our system.

So that sometimes it sounds somewhat contradictory for us to be saying publicly over there on the verbatim that you cannot both detect and identify underground tests, and then pick up the American newspaper the next morning and say the United States announced that it both detected and identified the Soviet underground tests.

Senator HUMPHREY. It does get a little complicated, doesn't it?

Mr. DEAN. I think, as I say, we might profitably study sometimes whether we couldn't let up a little bit on some of our secrecy, because sometimes it doesn't make for a very effective presentation

to other people. People finally just don't believe you when you say you can't do certain things, when the American newspapers are announcing you are doing them. But then we don't announce how we are doing them.

SOVIETS AGAINST IMPROVING DETECTION SYSTEMS

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Dean, am I correct that the Soviets did turn down any further study of the technical ways and means of improving detection systems?

Mr. DEAN. Absolutely.

Senator HUMPHREY. They rejected.

Mr. DEAN. Rejected it flatly.

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, that which had been started in 1957 and 1958, I believe that was the time, Mr. Fisk and others, that sort of joint study has been rejected.

Mr. DEAN. Flatly rejected.

The delegate from Brazil, Senhor Mello Franco, again proposed that we set up a technical group to find out—to come to Geneva and advise the conference as to what was the present state of knowledge with respect to both detecting and identifying seismological or atmospheric events, and the Soviets turned it down flatly. They say that they know that you can do it all with national systems, both in the atmosphere and underground, and under water. And they don't want any part of any study.

WEAKNESSES OF THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY

I said, Senator Humphrey, before you came in, I think we have gained a great deal throughout the world by having for the time completely outlined our theory, and talked through all of our steps as to how you carry out general and complete disarmament, and very patiently explaining our treaty and the various steps, and explaining why you have got to prevent any imbalance occurring while disarmament occurs and why you have to have necessary verification and control. And I think we have exposed the weakness of the Soviet draft treaty and the weaknesses in their theory of verification and controls.

I think that this fall, when this whole question of disarmament will be aired again in the first committee of the United Nations, that we are going to be in a very strong position as far as the merits of our plan are concerned and as far as our exposition is concerned.

NO CHANCE OF COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Now, if you asked me, "Are you going to get anywhere on general and complete disarmament," my answer to that is unfortunately no.

I don't see how the United States can, while carrying on disarmament, give up its present military mix of air force, naval forces, and missiles and rockets, which under our plan you continue in the three stages, cutting across the board.

As I said before you came in, under their plan, they want you to give up all nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage, and with our

commitments in the Far East and Australia, New Zealand, NATO, the Organization of American States, we couldn't leave the continental United States. We would be absolutely crippled under their plan.

I don't see any possibility of getting them to give up their plan or outline on nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage and all nuclear weapons in the second stage. So I don't see how we can possibly accept their provisions.

POLITICAL OBSTACLES

Senator HUMPHREY. Isn't it fair to say, then, that the main obstacles to any successful disarmament proposal or program are political rather than technical in nature.

Mr. DEAN. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. And no matter how much you may discuss the techniques of disarmament—which I believe is worthwhile within itself, of course—until a political decision has been made on the part of the participants in the disarmament conference that disarmament is a desirable objective, and actually is to be sought as a way of securing national security and improving the position of the respective countries in the world, there isn't going to be much disarmament, is there?

Mr. DEAN. I think you put your finger on it. They think all we want is to get on to their territory and inspect and then to destroy. They think no matter how carefully we work out an inspection, it is espionage.

Unfortunately, although we don't trust them for one second, I think they don't even trust us for a split part of one second. They have far less confidence in us, I think, than perhaps some people here would have in them. They don't trust us at all. They don't believe that we are sincere about disarmament. They don't believe anything we say about disarmament. They just think we are out to destroy the Soviet Union. Until somehow you can get some better method of approach between the Soviet Union and the United States, I myself don't see any possibility of working anything out on disarmament.

IS IT WORTH THE EFFORT?

Senator HUMPHREY. The point that I think the public would want to know more about is whether or not these efforts that our government makes in disarmament, the activity of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, are actually producing any gains vis-a-vis our country and its position in the world, and whether or not the policies and proposals of the United States in the field of disarmament lend themselves toward any improvement in the international situation. In other words, it is worth the effort? I think that is one of the questions that we obviously need to ask. There are some real fundamental questions here that some of these days we want to go into and discuss at some length.

I think, too, we have to ask ourselves if the obstacles to disarmament are essentially political and not technical in nature; then is there any way that you improve the political climate, directly and indirectly, overtly and covertly, so that ultimately, or somewhere

down the road, a political environment has been established in which there can be some sane and reasonable talk and discussion on the subject of disarmament.

Now, this is something that has interested me. I must say that one can get very discouraged in this field.

Let me put it this way: I have felt that possibly the only approach to the improvement of the political situation, outside of a major break in policy on the part of the Soviet Union, was the slow and tedious and almost unnoticed processes of the functional contacts, the approach in science and education, cultural contacts, trade, economics, the innumerable international conferences in which we engage with the Iron Curtain countries. Maybe in a decade or a generation, if you keep the world from being destroyed during that time, there might be a climate of political opinion created in which at least the seeds of disarmament could begin to blossom or grow. I don't say that you could reap the harvest. But at least to grow. Right now it is like planting seeds on barren rock.

I don't say that we shouldn't keep at it. But one of the purposes of the subcommittee in the years gone by was to try to condition the American people to the cruel facts of life in this area. This wasn't its only purpose; but namely, to point out that no matter how much you hope for it, ask for it, and urge and pray for disarmament, there was political as well as technical—but primarily political or social factors which had to be changed, some way, if you were ever going to make any reasonable progress in this highly complex, difficult, and sensitive field of disarmament.

ARMS CONTROL AGENCY

Mr. DEAN. I think what you say is exceptionally interesting. I would say yes. I would say the creation of the special agency on arms control has been a very useful thing. The American people, as well as other people, have always had their hopes and aspirations in disarmament. But I think this is really the first time that we have brought together in a single agency real experts and people charged with studying disarmament and nothing else.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you think there is any danger that that separatism, that kind of exclusive study, will so condition the thinking and the actions of the people in the field of disarmament that there will be a lack of sensitivity and appreciation of the overall international difficulties and the overall international policies of the United States? In other words, is there a possibility that you can become so deeply involved and enmeshed in the intricacies and the problems and the difficulties of disarmament, that you think of disarmament almost as a separate activity unto itself, and not thinking in terms of the overall basic foreign policy, political and economic, military, of the United States?

Mr. DEAN. I wouldn't think so, Senator Humphrey.

As you know, when we were working on the drafting here, when Mr. [Adrian] Fisher was working on this with Mr. [John] McCloy, and at that time I was working on it with Mr. McCloy and Mr. Rusk and with you, there was a theory at one time we should set this thing up as a completely separate agency outside of the Department of State. And then it seemed to us that all your diplomat-

ic relations would still have to be through the Ambassadors, and under the supervision of the Secretary of State, and that you would have to have a very close liaison with the Department of Defense.

They have this very able general advisory committee, which met 2 days the early part of this week. Mr. Fisher and Mr. Bunn and I were with them. Mr. McCloy was down. We had the advice of such men as Herbert York and Robert Lovett, among others. And I think that the way the bill has been drafted, and the tie-ins that we have with the other department, I don't believe that it will become so interested in disarmament alone, without relation to our overall foreign policy.

PROBLEMS OF PROMOTION

One of your troubles, as you know—one of the reasons why I thought it was so helpful to have this separate agency, when I was at Korea and the Law of the Sea Conferences, I would have delegated to me over a period of 5 or 6 months, exceptionally able officers from Defense and State, and then I would discover the fellows had given me wonderful service but were not being promoted. Why were they not being promoted after they had done such a wonderful job? Well, because they hadn't been to sea, or hadn't been in command of a submarine, or hadn't been on an aircraft carrier. So when they came up before the Board of Promotion and Control, the fact that they had done brilliant work on a special commission was used against them rather than for them.

So that here, by pulling all of these people together, that was one of the things that Mr. Fisher and Mr. McCloy and I had in mind.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That has been characteristic for a good many years. That is one of the problems.

Mr. DEAN. We were trying to avoid that. I think the way the thing is set up within the Department, with the head of arms control being an Under Secretary, ranking with the other under secretaries, and reporting directly to the Secretary and to the President—I think it is a very wise setup.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me preface what I say by saying that I think the disarmament effort, disarmament organization setup, is meritorious and useful. But my fears have been that with the publicity and the fanfare which we have given the so-called disarmament committee agency and all that sort of stuff, that the great danger lies not so much in what you people will do—although I admit when you set up a committee with a mission, the committee wants to produce something at the end of the mission and that is always a danger—that we produce a result regardless of what the result is. I don't say you are doing that, but that is a human tendency.

The danger that we are always skirting in this thing is that we create in the minds of the American people and a lot of other people that we are going to create disarmament, and that that is going to occur here, just given a little bit of effort and so on, which I think is a very dangerous thing.

SOVIET AIM TO DOMINATE THE WORLD

Now, I approach this and have for a long time—and I will put it rather crudely, but for the saving of time I will put it this way: We approach the Russians, the Soviet Union, from the standpoint of a sovereign state. I think that is an utter mistake. I think the Russian sovereign state is secondary to the ultimate complete and controlling objective of that movement which is international dominion of the world by international communism. Russia is a geographical entity which is the springboard furnishing them power and supplies for the furtherance of their overall and controlling purpose, which is international Communist control.

I know you understand much more about this than I do. I am not trying to educate you on this thing at all. But we have failed to have the American people understand, in my judgment, that we are not dealing with a sovereign integral geographic area when we are dealing with the Russians. We are dealing with an international Communist movement of which—well, yes, a lot of them love mother Russia, there is no question about that, and the big bulk of the Russian people do, maybe 80 percent of the Russian people do. But we are dealing with a controlled movement which has its objective, not the sanctity of Russia, not the integrity of the Russian geographical area, but the promotion and the ultimate success of complete world dominion by international communism.

That is why I have never been convinced that, at least in our time, as long as they control the machine guns there and control that group there in the Kremlin—as long as they can control it, we will not make any startling progress toward disarmament.

I think Senator Humphrey put his finger on something here a minute ago which is about the only hopeful area, and that is that education, understanding, a little more familiarity with the world and so on, will create such a pressure of public demand within Russia of one kind or another, over a long period of time, that the ruling philosophy in Russia will have to be changed in accordance with the up-swelling of human demand within Russia. Now, that is not going to occur overnight. Of course, that will never occur until the dominion of this particular philosophy is eroded away.

DANGER OF CREATING THE WRONG IMPRESSION

The big danger that we face, I think, in this country and in other parts of the world is that we create—I don't mean we designedly create—but the connotation of these activities in the mind of a great many people is, well, if we created this disarmament commission here in this country, that we are making progress toward the ultimate goal, which is the dream of everybody, and that is disarmament. And the real fly in the ointment is the international world dominion centered in Moscow, and the fact it is paramount, rather than Russian sovereignty.

I know people dispute that, and say Russians are Russians, and they are going to protect Russia. But I am pretty well convinced that Russian sovereignty and loyalty to Russia as a political entity, while very strong, of course, and bound to be powerful, traditionally and otherwise—but basically in the thinking of the whole Communist complex is that it is in fact a secondary thing, world domin-

ion being first. The integrity of Russia is a matter of necessity—I was about to say convenience—to furnish the basic strength from which they can promote their ultimate overall objective, which is world communism.

Everything that I have ever seen about the Russians—they have no hesitancy about repudiating today what they said yesterday. They said yesterday black is black, but today they say black is white. They have never failed to do that on any of their arguments and operations.

I think your conversations are helpful. I think they are on the plus side. I would continue them. I am encouraged to think that as you proceed, as you have been proceeding here, that little by little we create just a little bit more acceptance on the part of a lot of undecided people in the world that maybe we are pretty decent people after all, and maybe the Russians—maybe the fallacies of the Russians and their weaknesses and perfidy, and all that, becomes a little bit more. It is like knowing a man for a good many years in your hometown. As the years go by, you will finally decide little by little by his actions that he is a scoundrel or a decent guy. You become pretty convinced in that. Sometimes it takes a long time for you to fully make up your mind about a man or a woman, an individual.

I think from that standpoint we are making progress. I also want to join in congratulating you on your patience and the great ability you bring to this negotiating process.

NO DELUSIONS OF MAJOR CHANGES

I may be wrong, but I am not deluded into thinking that the Russians are going to agree to a single thing that in any way erodes or chips away the forward movement of international control. They may put some frosting on the cake here, a little there, try to create a little propaganda. But basically I have not seen that they have moved the slightest microfraction of a millimeter from their basic purpose. I think the only thing is time, and the only hopeful thing we have is probably the pressure of people there who will say, "Well, we are getting fed up with this nonsense," and little by little they erode away that basic philosophy of international Communist control which is indoctrinated into the Russians.

On the other hand, we have the constant up-coming of the new generations which they try to indoctrinate with that, from the time they are able to talk at all. It is a very difficult thing.

But I do think one great danger that we constantly face—we have not failed entirely and it is nobody's fault, I am not saying that—but there has been created in the minds of a great many people in the country that we are really making progress toward disarmament. If we just keep the push on, one of these bright sunny days we will get to a deal. Well, now, I hope we do at some time in the future, but I don't think I will ever live long enough to see it, if I live out a normal span. But I think we can keep creating a little better acceptance in the minds of doubtful people in the world, keep creating the idea of our own sincerity, or own basic good intentions, on the one hand, and probably continue to expose little by little the perfidy of the Russians, or their lack of sincerity

toward the purposes which we and so many people direct our efforts.

DISARMAMENT GROUPS

Mr. DEAN. I think there is great force in what you say. I think, on the other hand--naturally there are a great many church organizations and this SANE Committee for Nuclear Policy, and Quaker organizations, and organizations from England, France, Japan. Very often people, of course, say that the Lord said you should beat your swords into plowshares and so forth, and that is what the Lord said, and that is what you have to do. I find that---

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is what we are willing to do, if the other fellow will beat his, too.

Mr. DEAN. I see all these people—sometimes 3 or 4 hours with them, whenever I can. I find that they feel, when they generally come there and think the U.S. Government is a warmonger, and that we are in favor of war, and we are in favor of killing the Russian people—that when you give them our plan, our treaty, and give them our pamphlets that we put out, and explain what we are trying to do, and you explain our setup, they go away feeling that this is a much more complicated problem than they thought it was, "But at least my government is trying to do something about it."

One of our problems—the Minister of Internal Affairs for Canada, Mr. [Howard C.] Green believes literally in the fact that all weapons are bad, and it doesn't make any difference what is going to happen to you, even though you should be overrun by communism, you should destroy them, and destroy them this minute.

I think even he—we have been able, by working out this plan and by pointing out the problems of inspection—he came to me, when he first came to Geneva, and he said, "You said last fall that the Russians were against inspection and that is wrong, because Khrushchev says he will accept inspection." I just took the plan, and took him through the plan for today for 4 or 5 hours, and showed him there wasn't any inspection in the Russina plan. He finally said, well, he still thought I was too technical, but nevertheless he admitted I was correct.

BRAZILIAN DELEGATE HAS CHANGE OF MIND

I don't say any of this is necessarily going to pay off, but let me tell you one thing. The head of the Brazilian delegation—if he were here today, you would be very much impressed with him and you would like him—he has been a Senator in Brazil, he is one of their leading law professors, and a man with a good deal of scholarship. He told me he had come to Geneva feeling that the Russians were more for disarmament than we were. He is now completely sold on our plan and on our exposition.

He said to me, "I know probably your people think this is a waste of time and a waste of money. But one of the things that you have accomplished here with us, and with us in our home papers, and throughout the world, and this is, I think, maybe one of your great problems in the United States. Most people have very little

money," he said "and they naturally look to the United States with great envy. And they have military or economic power."

He said, "I now know why you have tested, because you explained. But prior to the time I came here, I thought the United States was a big bully, a wealthy powerful bully, and they decided for their own security they didn't care a hoot if they injured children in Brazil." He said, "Now you have explained this thing to me and I think one of your big problems is that as you go on with your war against communism, you have to be very careful that you take the time and the trouble to explain to the rest of the world what you are doing and why you are doing it. Otherwise people will just think you don't care for other people's opinions. Maybe when you are wealthy and powerful you don't need other people's opinions."

EXPECT A HIGHER STANDARD FROM THE UNITED STATES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What does he say about the Russians? Does he say they care for other people's opinions?

Mr. DEAN. No; but he said the great mistake he thought we made about the Belgrade Conference was when we said we didn't care a hoot because the people there didn't denounce the Russian tactics. He said in every country—he said, "In my country there are a lot of Communists. We are scared of communism, so we are in fear of communism. We don't make a denunciation because we are in fear of them. But the United States people, you are a moral people, and we do have a double standard, because we do expect a higher standard from the United States."

He said, "But that also is your great asset. Many and many a time when it looks as though the vote is going to go against you in the United Nations, you take the time and trouble to come around and explain these things to us and work with us, and it doesn't always go for you but nevertheless, you still are regarded as a great moral power. I know it is irritating," he said "that people denounce you and don't denounce the Russians. But they denounce you because they expect high moral things of you."

He said, "I think that this type of conversation here is useful in explaining. I can now go back to my Brazilian Senate. A year ago I would have sat silent when criticism was made of the United States. But I can go back today and explain this thing, and explain it with some knowledge."

SUBCONSCIOUS ASPECTS

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Ambassador, of course I immediately react as my colleague Senator Hickenlooper did here: Don't they ever criticize the Russians? We get pretty tired being selected out as the whipping boys. But not long ago, just to show you how this whole attitude gets over into other areas, the Mexican Ambassador of the OAS denounced American movies. He denounced them on the basis that all the good men are always Anglo-Saxon looking types, and all the bad men are the swarthy, brown-eyed, black-haired looking types. And you know something, it is a fact.

He said, "It is just plain obvious what you think about us. When there is law and order and righteousness and intelligence and generosity and what-have-you, you are always a nice looking Anglo-

Saxon-Nordic type of man. Whenever there is a thief and a crook, a murderer, a burglar, or a character that is the devil, the fiend in the play, he is one that looks like us." And let's face it, this is exactly what we do.

We don't even think about this but the other guy thinks about it. The other fellow thinks about it. This is why, for example, even in movies I have heard people—and I know the movie industry is somewhat conscious of this—when they have religious movies, they have to be careful they don't have them all looking like they are one religion. You have to be very careful you don't say things in these plays that irritate a particular cultural group—in our own community—when they are selling the film here.

Now, these are the subconscious things that we don't quite understand.

DIFFERENT MENTALITY OF THE SOVIETS

I have watched these Russian characters. By the way, I think Senator Hickenlooper's point a while ago is certainly very true, and I want to say that, Bourke. I think that when we deal with the Soviets, we are dealing with an entirely different apparatus and different mentality. And I would subscribe very much to what he has said.

But it also appears to be that what the Soviets have been able to do is in a very real sense what many local politicians are able to do. They identify themselves with the needy, with the poor, and they make the kind of identity that is so direct, because they say that is what we are. When Khrushchev goes around and makes these speeches and says, "Sure, we are behind the Americans, we know that. We are not producing as much as the Americans, but in 1975 we will be ahead of them."

Now, whether there is any truth in that or not is relatively unimportant for the political propaganda purposes. What he does is to identify himself with the three-fourths of the population of the world that are behind us, or the 90 percent of the world that is behind us, or the 95 percent that is behind us. He identifies himself with that group.

American politicians went around here for two centuries, identifying themselves with the log cabin. You couldn't find anybody that said he was born in a hospital. And anybody that ran for office that was ever hoping to get there didn't go around saying he had a governess or that he had a private nurse. It has only been in recent years you have been able to get by with that, because of a higher standard of living or some unusual circumstance.

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES

It seems that we, of all people, ought to recognize the psychological importance of what the Soviets are doing. They identify themselves with the needy, the poor, the unwashed, the backward. But they say, "Look what we have done in a short time; why don't you try it with us?"

And what do we identify ourselves with?

It is true our church organizations and our volunteer organizations, many of them identify themselves, very rightly, with compas-

sion and charity and helpfulness. But the main identity of this country in the world today is money, power, big business, high priced labor, luxury, surplus of agricultural commodities, huge deposits. It is all in the affluent, as we say. The Communists work on this strange contrast. The contrast is not as real, sometimes, as they make it. But they surely work on it.

I feel, as has been said here this morning, that the efforts that are made in the slow, tedious, sometimes undramatic process of the explanation of our position, is worthwhile. I think it is also very worthwhile that somewhere along the line we ask ourselves whether the emphasis upon general and universal disarmament, which is our plan and our program, precludes the consideration of some limited types of activities.

CONSIDERATION OF LIMITED APPROACHES

May I just put it this way. Some people feel, that our identification is with general and universal and complete disarmament, and the broad proposal we placed before the conference at Geneva precludes the possiblity of our interest in limited efforts, such as maybe a regional type of arms control, or a treaty on the ban in the atmosphere of nuclear tests.

Now, is it the policy of this government to stay away from or exclude consideration of limited approaches?

Mr. DEAN. No. It is the policy to explore all of these limited approaches, and in this committee of the whole we are exploring all of these limited approaches. And in our plan itself, there are various provisions for a nuclear test ban treaty, and for this nuclear-free zone, for the non-transfer of nuclear weapons, and so forth, and the non-transfer of those things.

While I have been at Geneva, I have gone to NATO every 2 or 3 weeks to brief the entire assembly of NATO on all of these problems. And although France is not there, I generally take the afternoon off and work with the French Foreign Office. This problem that we have with the French largely comes down to the fact that they say, although they admit that we are more powerful and that you can have a much better defense if you have a worldwide system, yet, what it really comes down to is the fact that they think that if the Soviets were to make a threat to wipe out France, for example, and Khrushchev were to say to the United States, "You keep your forces home and we won't touch the United States," the French believe, either through pressure of the American people or newpapers or the Congress, that despite the fact that we assure them we regard an attack on any country of NATO as an attack on the United States, they don't believe it.

Senator HUMPHREY. Isn't this just about what de Gaulle told the President?

TEST BAN IN THE ATMOSPHERE

Mr. DEAN. Therefore I think we have to spend an enormous amount of time trying to make sure we don't have to respond to a nuclear attack by something they initiated. But in answer to your question, we are working on all kinds of limited things. On this particular thing of a test ban in the atmosphere, which is still a

very complicated question, we are exploring that. We have scientists working on it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I have to leave.

Mr. DEAN. It is something we may be able to work out.

It isn't quite as simple to pick up tests in the atmosphere in small yields—as is sometimes announced in these anti-missile missile tests—some of the tests in the atmosphere of very small yields can be very important. We are working on this. We are working on the more limited agreements, and that is what we are trying to take up in the committee on the whole.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think I am going to recess our discussion here.

[Discussion off the record.]

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered into executive session at 12 noon in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Symington, Gore, and Lausche.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, seconded by Senator Lausche, the nomination of Philip Dodson Sprouse to be Ambassador to Cambodia was approved for report.

The nomination of Matthew H. McCloskey, to be Ambassador to Ireland, was put over until Senator Williams could be present at a meeting of the Committee.

Consideration of the International Wheat Agreement (Executive D, 87th Congress, 2nd Session), was postponed until a further meeting.

The committee amended, and approved for report without objection, the bill (H.R. 8982), Authorizing the Dow Chemical Company to construct, maintain, and operate a bridge across the Rio Grande at or near Heath Crossing, Texas.

The bills (H.R. 9883) Authorizing the San Benite International Bridge Company to construct, maintain, and operate a toll bridge across the Rio Grande near Los Indios, Texas, and (S. 3238), authorizing the Starr-Camargo Bridge Company to construct, maintain, and operate a toll bridge across the Rio Grande at or near Rio Grande City, Texas, were combined into one measure by unanimous voice vote, and ordered to be reported favorably to the Senate.

The bill (S. 3329) Authorizing payment to the Government of the Philippines was put over.

The bill (S. 3252) To amend the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, also was put over.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 12:10 p.m.]

STATE DEPARTMENT POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

[Editor's Note.—In the fall of 1961, President Kennedy's concern over structural and personnel problems in the State Department led him to initiate a major reorganization. In the shuffle, Walt W. Rostow, deputy special assistant to the President, moved to the State Department as counselor and chief of the Policy Planning Council. The Senate confirmed Rostow's nomination on February 19, 1962.

On April 4 and 5, former Army Major General Edwin A. Walker testified before the Senate Special Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee that he believed that Rostow, Secretary of State Rusk, and other Government officials were part of a "hidden control apparatus" that was bending the United States to the will of international communism and leading to a "no win" policy. On June 17 and 18, Rostow again came under fire in two articles published in the Chicago Tribune by that paper's Washington correspondent, Willard Edwards. The articles claimed to present Rostow's draft of a "master plan" to change U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. Senate Republican Leader Everett McKinley Dirksen raised alarm over charges made in the articles, and he suggested that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigate the matter.]

TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:30 p.m., in room F-53, the Capitol, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators, Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Dodd, Wiley, Aiken, and Williams of Delaware.

Also present: Senators Dirksen, Saltonstall, and Goldwater.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Denney, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse, and Mr. Tillman of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The meeting this afternoon has been called at the suggestion of the Minority Leader, Senator Dirksen, who has expressed concern over two articles which have appeared several days ago in the Chicago Tribune under the byline of Willard Edwards.

The articles amounted to a critical discussion of a paper that was prepared under the direction of Mr. Walt W. Rostow.

The Department of State has described that newspaper account of that document prepared under Mr. Rostow as inaccurate.

Mr. Rostow is the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State. He has agreed to appear this afternoon to answer questions regarding the preparation and distribution of the document in question, as well as the role of the Policy Planning Council under his guidance.

We also have with us the Under Secretary of State and Acting Secretary of State, George Ball who, in view of the implications of this meeting, had requested to appear, and Mr. Chayes, the Legal Adviser, whom everyone knows.

Before starting, I will ask the reporter to include in the record, in order that we have the background, a statement by the Minority Leader, Mr. Dirksen, appearing on June 18, page 9966, of the Congressional Record.

[The document referred to follows:]

[From the Congressional Record, June 18, 1962]

WALT W. ROSTOW'S DRAFT OF STRATEGY

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, over the past weekend there appeared in the Sunday and Monday morning editions of the Chicago Tribune two lengthy stories under the byline of Willard Edwards purporting to digest the so-called Rostow draft of a blueprint for future strategy in the struggle against communism.

For many months now we have been told that this document has been in a state of preparation under the guiding hand of Walt W. Rostow, State Department counselor and chairman of its Policy Planning Board.

On several occasions there have appeared in the press other stories discussing this draft of strategy, but none has presented so much in such detail as Mr. Edwards' story and I am impelled to believe that it is probably accurate.

Many of us who are not unfamiliar with Rostow's thinking have awaited the birth of this new master strategy with considerable trepidation. Mr. Rostow has never been a very devoted disciple of the tough policy line toward Russia. It now develops, on the basis of the Chicago Tribune articles, that Mr. Rostow holds some unique ideas about the Soviet Union that are considerably closer to the fuzzy thinking of the late and lamented "Liberal Papers" that even the most liberal Member of this body would be willing to accept.

The core of Mr. Rostow's proposal is an assumption that the Soviet Union and its Communist masters are "mellowing;"; that Russia is becoming a mature state; that if we are only nice to the Soviets they will drop all of their suspicions of the free world and peace will finally bloom.

The most amazing Rostow thesis is this: That both the United States and Russia are losing power and authority in their respective worlds and that an area of "overlapping interests" is developing in which meaningful agreements may be concluded between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

Mr. Rostow sees no victory by the United States over the Soviet Union. Mr. Rostow sees no victory by capitalism over communism. In fact Mr. Rostow is a man of little hope and the last person in my opinion who should have been chosen for the all-important task of directing the continuing review of our foreign policy.

The basic philosophy of successful conflict is always to pursue a winning course and always change a losing game. Every high school coach, every big league manager knows this. But apparently our State Department planners do not.

If Mr. Rostow's assumption that the Soviet Union is softening is correct, then what may I ask caused it to mellow? To me the answer is obvious. The only times we have ever gotten anywhere with the Soviet Union—the only times the Soviet Union has ever mellowed—have been when the United States was tough.

So logic would say that if Mr. Rostow's basic assumption were correct and that the Soviet Union is softening, Mr. Rostow is recommending a course exactly diametric to American interests.

But the disconnecting part of the whole picture is this: Our intelligence agencies say there is little or no evidence to support any such assumption as that made by Mr. Rostow.

How does Mr. Rostow explain the recent Russian course of breaking the moratorium on nuclear testing? How does he explain their recent announcement that they are now going to test a 100-megaton bomb in retaliation for our resumption of testing?

Does the presence of our Armed Forces in Thailand indicate the Communists are mellowing? Does the presence of our Armed Forces in Vietnam indicate the Communists are mellowing?

I think the Senate is entitled to know—perhaps through questioning by the appropriate committee—what intelligence information Mr. Rostow possesses to support his basic assumption. Mr. Edwards' articles indicates that Mr. Rostow has held this

opinion for at least 10 years. If it is only opinion, I would suggest that it is not proper ground on which to stake the entire future of the American people.

I ask unanimous consent to include as part of my remarks Mr. Edwards' articles, so that the Senate may examine them in detail.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Chicago Tribune, June 17, 1962]

Draft Foreign Policy Revision Bowing to Reds

(By Willard Edwards)

Washington, June 16.—A master plan for historic changes in U.S. foreign policy has been readied for President Kennedy's consideration.

It embraces the theme that the Soviet Union's domestic and foreign policies are mellowing and the way is open for meaningful agreement between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

This proposed guide for future decisions by the President and the National Security Council, the Nation's highest strategy group, advances these theories:

Russia's leaders are beginning to realize that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can defeat the other in the world of the future.

FIND NO BASIS FOR IT

Both the United States and Russia are losing power and authority in their respective areas and an area of overlapping interests is developing in which mutually profitable agreements may be negotiated.

Envisioning, as it does, Communist abandonment of the goal of world conquest, this blueprint for future strategy has aroused heated dispute from military leaders and intelligence agencies who can detect no evidence to support its assumptions.

They quarrel with the contention that conciliation can be as important as a strong defense in future relations with the Kremlin.

Leading sponsor of the plan, which has been more than a year in preparation, is Walt W. Rostow, State Department Counselor and Chairman of its Policy Planning Board. He acknowledges that a strong educational campaign will be needed to sell Congress and the public if the proposals are given official sanction.

SHAPED CAMPAIGN SPEECHES

Compiled under Rostow's supervision, the strategy plan represents the work of many officials in the White House, State, Treasury, and Defense Departments. It has been steadily revised and edited down, from an original volume of 285 pages to a shorter draft.

Despite a host of contributors, the plans bears the Rostow stamp. A former member of the faculty of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Rostow, 45, is the President's top foreign policy adviser. He played a major role in shaping Kennedy's foreign policy speeches in the Presidential campaign and was deputy special assistant to the President until he took over his present State Department post last December 6.

Rostow's brand of philosophy, not concealed in books, articles, theses, and speeches in recent years, has always envisioned the "evolution" of Soviet Russia into a "mature" state which will come to realize the outdating of the Marxian theory of the class struggle as the moving force in history.

FOR A NEW YOUNG PRESIDENT

As long ago as 1956, he voiced confidence that Communist leaders in the next decade would mend their ways and in 1958 he was depicting Russia as about ready to enter "the age of high mass consumption" reached by the United States a quarter century earlier.

He has now translated this optimistic conviction into a blueprint for basic national security policy, designed to govern future decisions at the highest levels.

Is it a conception calculated to stimulate and enthuse a new, young President who could insure a secure place in history as the American leader who brought peace to the world, ending not only the dread potentialities of nuclear conflict, but the harassments of cold war conflicts which drain the economy.

NOT A SHRED OF PROOF

It is also a theory which has stirred many in the Government's intelligence agencies to alarm. They report not a scrap of hard data to support the roseate assumptions of the State Department planner.

They note no lessening of Communist intransigence nor of grim determination to "bury" the free world. They see in the Rostow recommendations a total misconception of the nature of the Communist conspiracy; a native brushing off of its treachery as evidenced in a long history of broken treaties and agreements while steadily pursuing the goal of world conquest.

Rostow believes that Premier Nikita Khrushchev of Russia and his associates do not want a major war. He concedes their desire for a total victory for communism but he glimpses changes beneath the surface of old Communist objectives and a willingness among some in Russia to modify old ideological formula in the light of changing reality.

UNITED STATES ON WANE, HE SAYS

Neither Russia nor the United States is going to dominate this century, he contends. To those who speak of a "victory" or "win" policy in the cold war, he retorts that neither of the great leading nations will win over the other. Capitalism will not triumph over socialism. Rather, the victory will be one of "men and nations" voluntarily cooperating under the principles of the United Nations Charter.

"And we deeply believe this victory will come—on both sides of the Iron Curtain," he concludes.

The policy outline pictures the United States and Russia as two aging combatants, both showing signs of waning prestige and power. There is a diffusion of power away from Moscow within the Communist bloc, it asserts, and away from the United States within the free world.

In lesser degree, the "evolution" theory is also applied to Red China and the same conciliatory tactics are advocated. The Chinese Communists can be encouraged to "evolution" into a peaceful state by showing them we have no aggressive intentions.

Possibilities should be explored for expanding contact with Red China, placing it, according to one objector, in the same position as Yugoslavia and Poland.

CAN'T PROMOTE A SPLIT

There is no final bar to entrance of Communist China into more normal relations with the United States if they are prepared to modify present policies, the policy paper asserts. In the meantime, unnecessary provocations should be avoided and informal negotiations pursued.

There is little that the United States can do to promote a Sino-Soviet split, the paper contends.

The proposed foreign policy guide book does not suggest any weakening of national defense and includes recommendations for a greater buildup of the nation's capacity to wage conventional warfare.

It estimates Soviet policy as designed to avoid any actions which would bring about a nuclear war, ruling out the belief of many military leaders that the Communists will strike whenever they think they can destroy us.

WE WILL WAIT TO BE HIT

Any idea of the United States contemplating a "first strike" is ruled out. Planning in that direction is not relevant since the United States does not plan to initiate a nuclear attack on Communist nations. Military men assail the section as against all sound principles of war for which planning against all contingencies is essential.

Despite all rebuffs to date, strenuous efforts should be continued to get an agreement on limited arms control, the policy paper recommends. It is suggested that the United States might advance a program not requiring formal negotiations.

Again, objectors to this recommendation argued, the proposal totally disregards the nature of the Communist enemy. Any information furnished to Communists will be used against us and any such action will never change their basic aims.

REDS GOING PEACEFUL

Since both arms control planning and research and military planning are directed toward national security, the strategy outline asserts, they should be integrated. General and complete disarmament is a goal which must never be obscured.

There was objection from military men to inclusion of this section. They argued that the nature of communism is disregarded in a process of reasoning which contends that the United States will be secure in a disarmed world.

In seeming answer to these contentions, the proposed policy emphasizes the assumption that the Soviet policy will evolve into a peaceful state.

Even if Communist leaders are unwilling to share the U.S. image of the world's future in the degree necessary to negotiate major arms reduction programs, they may come to realize the dangers of accident, miscalculation, and failure of communications and thus be willing to join the United States in limited measures to reduce those dangers.

[From the Chicago Tribune, June 18, 1962]

SOFT RED LINE MUST BE "SOLD"—ROSTOW

(By William Edwards)

WASHINGTON, June 17.—A systematic publicity campaign will be necessary to sell Congress and the American people on the merits of a bold new foreign policy advocating conciliation of Russia, a State Department planner has advised.

The problem of this gap between Government and popular thinking is tackled with candor by Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's policy planning board in his draft of a master plan which awaits President Kennedy's consideration.

The new policy, the work of a number of experts in Government under Rostow's supervision, is based upon the theory that Russian domestic and foreign policies have mellowed during the post-Stalin period. It holds that the way has been opened for cooperation between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

EDUCATION IS NEEDED

Since the evidence in the form of deeds and words by Soviet leaders, runs directly contrary to this assumption, Congress and the people, the Rostow outline confesses, must be educated to acceptance of a fresh approach.

In typical State Department parlance, this can be accomplished by "systematic exposition in forms appropriate for public presentation." The term "indoctrination" is avoided.

One of the appropriate methods of public enlightenment, favored highly by the Kennedy administration, is the newspaper "leak." This involves funnelling of selected information to favored reporters.

CITE "OUTMODED" POLICIES

Although the Rostow document is presumed to be confidential and described by a State Department spokesman as a "working draft," hints of its contents have been leaked in the last 3 months to three newspapers, a news magazine, and a syndicated column. The resulting articles in the main, feature it as "a premise, balanced, and complete master plan of global objectives and strategies" which would replace "old policies," manufactured under crisis conditions.

These inspired stories lacked detail, in most instances, but stressed the need for replacement of policies "left over" from the Eisenhower administration. The existence of "ambiguities" had permitted dispute between partisans of different concepts and contributed to varying interpretations of policy, they noted.

HINT ON A-STRATEGY

One "leak" was definite, however, in reporting a provision that the United States would never strike the first nuclear blow unless it were faced with a massive conventional assault, such as a full-scale invasion of Western Europe.

Another revealed proposed new policies for dealing with the problem of the "two Chinas" on the mainland and Formosa.

Speeches and statements by administration spokesmen to condition Congress and the public to the new policy are also suggested in the Rostow document. Rostow has set a good example in this respect. In a number of addresses, he has stated his conviction that neither the United States nor Russia can win the cold war, that capitalism will not triumph over communism, and that the fate of the world will be settled by forces now at work on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

SEES NEW LINEUP

In a speech June 3 at Minneapolis, Rostow said:

"It is sometimes asked if our policy is a no-win policy. Our answer is this—we do not expect this planet to be forever split between a Communist bloc and a free world. We expect this planet to organize itself in time on the principles of voluntary cooperation among independent nation states dedicated to human freedom. We expect the principle that 'governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed' to triumph on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

"It will not be a victory of the United States over Russia. It will be a victory of men and nations over the forces that wish to entrap and to exploit their revolutionary aspirations."

In another speech to the special warfare school at Fort Bragg, N.C., he voiced the same sentiments and added: "It will not be a victory of capitalism over socialism."

Two years ago, in a California speech, he outlined Russia's fears that other nations would get the nuclear bomb, calling the prospect of nuclear weapons in Chinese hands "a latent nightmare" for the Kremlin.

RUSSIA OUR ALLY

He saw in this a possibility that Russia might find "the only logical course is to make a common cause with the United States to establish a minimum framework or order."

Thus, Rostow's policy draft contains few surprises to students of his record. He is aware of the initial lack of popular acceptance which will greet its unfolding. Suggested in the draft is a shifting of emphasis, particularly in the public consciousness, from the problem of opposing Communist aggression to exploiting opportunities in building and extending "a community of free nations."

These "opportunities" are described in the document as growing from a gathering historical trend toward fragmentation in the Communist bloc and some relaxation of internal controls in the Soviet Union and its satellites.

Thus, Communist regimes and peoples are to be dealt with in terms of "overlapping interest," a phrase which is also popular with Rostow in public statements.

The United States Information Agency must be used abroad to define and dramatize the "limited but real areas of overlapping interests" between the United States and other governments and peoples, the paper asserts.

Students of Communist policy eye this alleged intertwining of interests with strong doubt, noting that Communists have never admitted any interest which lies outside world domination.

One theme is consistent in the proposed strategy plan—continuing communication with Russia, informal and formal, direct and indirect, must be maintained in order to dispel its fears of the United States, and give it a clear understanding of our peaceful intentions.

Rising tensions or the pleas of our allies or of the American public must be ignored in any crisis with Russia. The temptation must be avoided to prolong or expand any crisis in an effort to degrade or embarrass the Soviets in the eyes of the world.

The Soviet Union, the paper advises, must be granted its status as a great power and induced, by word and deed, to fuller participation and influence in the community of free nations if its leaders show a genuine interest and will for such constructive consideration.

EASY ON SATELLITES

Gentle treatment of the satellite nations is advocated. No official attacks should be made against their regimes, whatever the provocation, and even criticism should be softened. Western Europe, at the same time, must be encouraged to closer relationship with the satellites and urged to furnish aid to them.

East Germany, the policy draft says, cannot be forever insulated from dealings with the United States and business must be transacted with them.

Above all, no encouragement or support must be given to armed uprisings in eastern Europe. This is a continuance of policy in existence for several years.

These proposals, one critic noted, will in effect recognize the satellites, including East Germany, as legitimate regimes, disregard the principle of self-determination, and cause the captive peoples to lose all hope or freeing themselves from Communist rule.

A POPULAR WORD

The plan is concerned with the promotion of rapid industrial growth and full employment in the United States. Unless there is great prosperity here, it noted, it will be extremely difficult to obtain congressional and popular consent for allocation of resources to international purposes or liberal trade adjustments.

The word "modernization" appears frequently in the plan in relation to the development of nations. The strength of international communism, it states, can best be sapped by strengthening the performance of the free community through "modernization." Opponents of the policy draft have suggested that "modernization" may be a synonym for "Democratic socialization."

The United States must expand its participation in institutions and organizations "which transcend the independent powers of the nation-state," the outline proposes.

It seeks progressive moves toward a legal order which lays down and enforces essential rules of conduct in interstate relations which will "provide sure and equitable means for the settlement of international diputes."

Again, in arguments over this proposal, it was noted that it presupposes Communist submission to the law. One expert recalled the sardonic comment made by the late Andrei Y. Vishinsky, chief delegate to the United Nations. He once told the U.N.:

"What laws? We make our own. We do not abide by bourgeoise laws."

SEEKS MODERN ALLIES

On balance, the draft asserts, American interests will be better served by leaning toward nations with modern ideas rather than sticking to old allies with outmoded notions. The paper identifies neither the modern states nor the old friends, conceding no general rule can cover this situation.

As a final touch, the policy paper suggests that denial of foreign aid can be as useful as supplying it. In Laos, where aid was withdrawn to force a coalition with Communists, this policy has already been implemented, it was noted.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I might add, as a postscript, that I believe a great deal more will be said about this subject because without doubt it will be one of the most important challenges before the American people and this country as we deal with this comment upon the so-called policy or strategy that we are to employ in the days ahead.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, with the indulgence of the distinguished Senator from Louisiana, may I address an inquiry to the distinguished minority leader?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania for that purpose, without losing my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SCOTT. Every further adumbration of the views of Mr. Heller is useful to the security of the country, because if Mr. Heller and the other mellow-minded persons in the Department of State seriously feel, as apparently they do, that one should expect a change in Russian attitudes tending toward accommodation, which I suppose means accommodation to our views, does the Senator from Illinois receive any consolation from anyone else in the State Department who is upholding the other view, namely, that the Russian Communists cannot be trusted? Has the Senator searched to determine whether anyone has advocated a strong view or a tough view against Russia?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes; I think that in the Pentagon a strong view is well supported by a good many persons. But with respect to the belief that the Soviet Union is mellowing, only last week Minister Khrushchev was in southeastern Asia, and there he proclaimed all over again one of his famous phrases, namely, that he still believed he was going to "bury the United States." That does not sound to me like mellow or pacific language.

Mr. SCOTT. The fuzzy mellow mindedness of Mr. Heller and those who follow his theory reminds me of a story I heard a long time ago concerning a man who was somewhat inebriated, and who walked up to a very long bar and was desirous of engaging in conversation with someone, because he thought he had very sound views. He approached another similarly inebriated gentleman and, tapping him on the shoulder, asked, "Have you heard the rumor?" The gentleman said, "No," he had not, and advised his newly found inebriated pal to go away. So then the drunken man moved to the center of the bar and asked the bartender, "Have you heard the rumor?" The bartender said, "I'm too busy to talk to you."

So the fellow went to the other end of the bar and asked an even more—if possible—inebriated gentleman, "Have you heard the rumor?" as he clasped him firmly by the lapels and looked at him eye to eye, and nose to nose, with the alcoholic friendship that one associates with such an action. This man, unlike the first, removing the hands of the questioner from his lapels, said "Yes, but never with such detail."[Laughter.]

Mr. DIRKSEN. Perhaps inebriety is one of the ways to blink reality; but if it is reality with which we are dealing—all these reports of the strategic blueprint as now examined and as have appeared in other sources—I think it is high time we familiarized ourselves with the implications. To go down that road very far may possibly spell disaster for our country.

Mr. President, I am grateful to the distinguished Senator from Louisiana for yielding the time.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, will the Senator from Louisiana yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield such time as he may desire to the Senator from Ohio, provided I do not lose my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, perhaps, it would be proper for Mr. Ball to start.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE W. BALL, ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY WALT W. ROSTOW, COUNSELOR AND CHAIRMAN, POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL; AND ABRAM CHAYES, THE LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. BALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a statement which I would like to make to the committee, and if the committee would like, I have some copies which could be distributed.

The CHAIRMAN. May I announce for the benefit of our guests, the Senators who requested to be here that this is an executive, session, and under the rules of the committee, executive records are executive—that is, they are not to be given to the press. I hope our guests, as well, of course, as the members will respect that, otherwise we cannot expect the members of our executive branch to speak freely to the committee.

Mr. BALL. Mr. Chairman, we will abide by whatever rules the committee prescribes.

The CHAIRMAN. I might ask, is this statement that you prepared considered executive.

Mr. BALL. We regard it as executive unless the committee cares to release it.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have no objection to its being released?

Mr. BALL. We have no objection to its being released, and we are not requesting it be released. It is up to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. BALL. As far as we are concerned we do not intend to make any statement to the press at all, and we will abide by the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope everyone who requested to come here understands that this is an executive meeting.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Certainly. I did not hear all you said, but you asked us not to say anything.

The CHAIRMAN. All committees have executive meetings, and in this particular committee we have always, I think, very well respected this. Otherwise, we cannot expect the members from the

executive branch to speak frankly to us and we would just have to close up.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Ball.

Mr. BALL. Mr. Chairman, during the past 2 or 3 weeks there has been discussion in the press and the Congress of a comprehensive planning document on foreign policy, now in the process of development within the administration. As the Acting Secretary of State in the absence of Secretary Rusk, I have requested the opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss this document, to tell you its history, and to describe the role that the State Department, and particularly the Counselor of the Department, Mr. Walt W. Rostow, has played in its preparation.

It is important that this committee have this information. Misunderstanding of the nature and purposes of this document and what it represents has tended to generate an atmosphere of uneasiness and suspicion. Such an atmosphere should not be allowed to persist, since public trust and confidence are the essential bases for policy and action in a democracy.

THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The document in question has a history which began almost a decade and a half ago, when Congress by the National Security Act approved July 26, 1947, created the National Security Council. The members of the Council prescribed by statute are the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning. Other officials, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency regularly sit with the Council at the invitation of the President.

The function of the National Security Council as prescribed by the National Security Act is "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security."

The integration of policies—covering a spectrum that includes diplomatic, military, economic, intelligence and information activities—necessarily requires careful planning. From the beginning, it has been recognized that the Council—the NSC as it is called—must look beyond day-to-day problems requiring immediate decision. It must seek to anticipate the problems, crises, and opportunities that may arise over the longer term. With an eye to the future, the President, through the Council, has sought to pull together the bits and pieces of policy designed to meet particular problems within a coherent and comprehensive framework in order to give an adequate sense of direction to the decision of issues that arise from day to day.

PAST PAPERS ON BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

To provide this framework it was decided, early in the history of the Council, to set in train the preparation of a paper embodying what it called "The Basic National Security Policy." The first such

paper was approved in 1948. As has been the case with all succeeding papers of this kind, it was developed for and by the NSC acting through its constituent agencies which mobilized their resources for this purpose. The State Department played a major role in the drafting of the document, but the preparation of the Basic National Security Policy then, as now, was not exclusively, or even primarily, the work of any single department or agency.

The first Basic National Security Policy paper dealt with the overall objectives of the United States with respect to the Soviet Union. That paper remained substantially unchanged until it appeared that the Soviet Union was on the way toward ending our monopoly of atomic weapons. Faced with this prospect, President Truman in 1950 directed the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to re-examine the paper in the light of the probable and possible Soviet capabilities for nuclear aggression. The report of those two Secretaries was referred by the President to the National Security Council with the request that it consider the implications and conclusions of the report and the recommendations and programs it envisaged. The results of these deliberations were embodied in the new Basic National Security Policy paper approved in September 1950. This new paper was expanded within a short time to take account of the requirements of the Korean conflict.

Shortly after President Eisenhower was inaugurated in 1953, he directed that the existing policy paper be fully reviewed—a task which extended into the third year of the administration. During this period our overall policies were under continuous examination, and four successive Basic National Security Policy papers were adopted. Thereafter, the document was subjected to annual review. The policies and programs set forth were reexamined in the light of new development in world affairs and new information available to the component agencies of the Council.

PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PAPERS

As you will recognize, what I have been describing is not so much a document as a process of study and planning within the framework of the National Security Council. President Eisenhower established procedures for the protection of that process. Under those procedures it was understood that papers in preparation for the National Security Council or approved by the Council should not be made available outside the NSC itself and the agencies of the executive branch working under its direction.

In a letter dated January 25, 1958, to then Senator Lyndon Johnson, President Eisenhower wrote:

> Never have the documents of this Council been furnished to the Congress. •

In declining to permit the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations to see documents of the NSC or other documents referring to NSC papers which it had requested, President Eisenhower wrote on December 2, 1960:

> . . . The President must be free to receive the confidential advice of his officers in the Executive Branch. Such documents as these have traditionally not been disclosed outside the Executive Branch and in my opinion such disclosure would be contrary to the national interest.

This practice and tradition have not prevented useful congressional inquiry. For example, the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery under the chairmanship of Senator Jackson, which began its work during the Eisenhower administration and completed its penetrating and comprehensive report last year, performed this complicated task without access to any documents of the NSC.

KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION REVIEW OF NSC POLICY PAPER

When the Kennedy administration took office in 1961, it found that, while the Basic National Security Policy paper had been annually reviewed, it had not been substantially revised since 1959. As President Eisenhower had done 8 years before, President Kennedy, therefore, directed that a fresh look be taken at the whole Basic National Security Policy. The rapid pace of events made such a review desirable. Many changes had occurred within the preceding 2 years—growing missile capabilities on both sides of the Iron Curtain, major break-throughs in the technology of space, the economic recovery of Europe, the gathering strength of the European Economic Community, further strides toward the dissolution of the great colonial systems, new trends in the underdeveloped countries, the emergence of Castro communism in our own hemisphere, and the incidence of guerrilla warfare at various turbulent spots around the globe.

This task of re-examination and review was begun within 2 months after the new administration took office. The President vested responsibility for supervision of the preparation of a new draft policy paper in the Department of State, as the agency having the primary responsibility for advising him on foreign policy matters. Within that Department, the work was assigned to the Policy Planning Staff, then under the direction of Mr. George McGhee, who is now Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The preliminary work of reviewing policies continued through the summer and autumn of 1961.

The first draft of a new Basic National Security Policy paper was completed in November 1961, while Mr. McGhee was still chairman of the Policy Planning Council of the State Department. The work he had begun was carried on by Mr. Rostow after he was sworn in in December of last year.

The work was carried on under the same general procedure that had been followed in the preparation of past drafts of Basic National Security Policy papers. The chief planning officers of the constituent agencies of the Council sat as a committee to supervise the development of drafts and revisions for ultimate consideration by the Council. This involved the close and regular consultation of the planning officers of the State Department, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other departments and agencies having national security responsibilities. Within the State Department itself, members of the staffs of all the regional and functional bureaus took part in this combined operation.

From November 1961 to the present time this paper has gone through a number of drafts. Each has reflected the suggestions and

criticisms of the departments having principal responsibility for the national security. The Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency have carried a major share of this effort and have provided a major portion of the material.

PRESENT PAPER STILL IN DRAFT FORM

The paper is still in the process of development. It has not yet been considered or acted upon by the National Security Council. The officers in the various departments and agencies who have borne the initial responsibility for developing the draft are not yet satisfied that it is in shape for formal submission to the NSC.

What has been referred to in rather mysterious terms in the press as a comprehensive foreign policy document is, therefore, a working paper still in the process of preparation in the ordinary course of business of the NSC. What will emerge at the end of this process—after the President and his National Security Council have considered the paper—I do not know, nor does anyone else.

So far in this process neither the President nor the Secretary of State has had the opportunity to study any of the successive drafts of this document. The Secretary has advised me by telegram that he intends to review the current draft fully when he returns from Europe at the end of this week. I know that, after completing his study of the paper, he plans to talk with this committee. I know also that he will wish to be as forthcoming as possible regarding the policy issues involved.

Mr. Walt Rostow is here with me today and is available to the committee for questioning. While, in fairness to the Secretary, I have asked him not to discuss the contents of the document, I can assure the committee that the reports regarding it, which have been of concern to this committee, have been grossly inaccurate and have not fairly reflected its content or purpose.

Mr. Rostow is entirely free to state his own views on policy questions of interest to the committee. I am, of course, also prepared to answer any questions that the committee may have with regard to our present or prospective policies.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rostow, do you have a statement that you would like to present, or do you wish to proceed to questioning?

Mr. ROSTOW. I am at the disposal of the committee. I think it would be wisest if you would put to me the questions you felt appropriate, sir.

LEAK OF INFORMATION ABOUT SUBSTANCE OF PAPER TO PRESS

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman, do you have any questions?

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any questions at this point except one: These articles that were quoted from the Chicago Tribune seem to be rather detailed and fairly lengthy.

The thing that puzzles me is how did this reporter for the Chicago Tribune get the information that induced him to write these articles?

Mr. BALL. I will say, Senator Sparkman, that this would suggest either a major indiscretion or a possible leak, breach of security, on

the part of somebody who had access to these articles. But the report, as I have stated, is not an accurate statement of the article, of the Basic National Security Policy paper as it exists in any of the drafts.

Now, these drafts, in the nature of things, because they have been subjected to staff work by many agencies, have had to be given circulation through a number of different departments and agencies of the Government.

This means that while we have endeavored to be circumspect in protecting the security of the United States, as represented by this paper, there is always a chance that someone in some one of the agencies may be indiscreet.

This is a risk that we run. It may be more than indiscreet. In fact, it may be actually a breach of security because this is a classified document.

This is a matter not only of regret to us, it is a matter which is of real concern to us.

We have taken steps to try to ascertain the source of this very distorted leak.

Now, this is a hard thing to find, to trace a leak of this kind, as you know, sir. I am hopeful that we will be able to ascertain if there was a security breach and, if so, by whom.

Senator SPARKMAN. You use the term "leak." Oftentimes we think of a leak as being purposely done in order to send up a trial balloon. I take it that you are saying this certainly was not the work of the Department of State or any agency connected with it purposely to give the leak?

Mr. BALL. Certainly there was no intention on the part of the Department of State or, so far as I know, any other department or agency of the Government, to send up a trial balloon or to leak this.

Our intention was to keep these drafts, according to the tradition which has always safeguarded their security, while this whole planning process was going on, because it is essential to the planning process that there be the greatest opportunity for the expression of ideas as a means of subjecting them to criticism as a means out of that to fashion a policy.

What we have here is a paper which has a long history, the Basic National Security Policy paper, which has been revised many times.

This is an effort to revise it again, an effort to do a little more than the normal revision. It is an effort to make the kind of reformulation of the paper that was attempted at the time when President Eisenhower came into office.

Now, in this process a great many people have had a hand, because this is an attempt to distill the thinking of the various departments and agencies of the Government to try out of this combined effort to fashion a paper which can then be submitted through channels to the Secretary of State, to the secretaries of the departments that are the component, the statutory members, of the NSC, and ultimately to the President.

This paper is in midflight, so to speak, in that it has been through a number of drafts, but it has not yet been studied by the Secretary of State and it has not yet been studied by the President.

CORRECTNESS OF CHICAGO TRIBUNE STORIES ABOUT THE PAPER

Senator SPARKMAN. Would it be completely erroneous to assume that the report given in these articles by the Tribune was correct?

Mr. BALL. An extremely distorted report. We cannot tell from internal evidence in the articles whether Mr. Edwards actually saw the document, whether he heard someone describe them in a very loose and careless way, whether he manufactured a great deal of the material in the articles, whether he simply picked up bits and pieces of information around town and tried to fit them together.

It is not at all the kind of informed piece of writing that one would have done if he had had access to this paper in any of its drafts, and had wanted to try to report to the American people what they contained.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Rostow, you are engaged, as Mr. Ball said, in preparing this report. I understood from him that this report has not been finally formulated; is that correct?

Mr. ROSTOW. It has not been fully studied by the President and the Secretary of State, sir. A great deal of staffing has gone on on what you might call the Indian level of the government, but it has not been studied by the President and the Secretary.

Senator WILEY. It has reached a form for them to study?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes, it has, sir.

PERSONS PARTICIPATING IN PREPARATION OF REPORT

Senator WILEY. Who participated in arriving at that document's form?

Mr. ROSTOW. The men who form what you might call the planning community of the Government.

Senator WILEY. Please name them so we can get them on the record.

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes, sir. We have representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator WILEY. His name?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, it shifted in mid-passage. General Ted Parker was in on it at one stage; Admiral [Herbert] Riley, who is the head of the Joint Staff, participated very actively in its late stages. For the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we had Mr. [Paul] Nitze, Mr. [Carl] Rowen, Mr. William Bundy connected with us; for the Treasury, Mr. Henry Fowler.

Senator WILEY. When you use the word "connected," do you mean that these people you are about to enumerate sat down together hour after hour, or just for a few minutes?

Mr. ROSTOW. They themselves sat down for successive hours at our Tuesday meetings whenever this came up. But when I say connected, what I mean is that the staffing of the document was not wholly done in the Treasury, for example, by Mr. Fowler. He submitted drafts of the document at the appropriate stage to experts in the Treasury.

Admiral Riley did not do the staffing in the Joint Chiefs personally. It went through the whole staffing procedure. And I do not—when you do a document of this kind in the Pentagon they request

anywhere up to 30 copies, because so many people have to do their specialized staff work on it.

In the Department of State, sitting with us, are not only Mr. Alexis Johnson, and Mr. George McGhee in his new capacity, but this draft has been gone over by each of the assistant secretaries who bear operational responsibility, and beneath them by their experts.

So that the group that meets on Tuesday, which is really the NSC planning staff, in the old nomenclature, is a connecting link to each of the departments, and a document of this kind goes through the hands of many specialists before we get back a department's net judgment as to where——

TOPICS COVERED BY THE DRAFT PRIVILEGED

Senator WILEY. Do you want to give us what you might call the topics that you divided the document into before you discussed with the group what should be under that particular topic? Where did you start and where did you conclude? Could you give us a sort of outline?

Mr. BALL. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could make an observation at this point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BALL. We are in the position where this document, since it is a document which is for submission to the National Security Council, and which has a history of being a document of the National Security Council, is not in the control of the State Department as such.

This is a document which is under the control of the Council, and the Council is under the control of the President of the United States. The Council is an arm of the President of the United States.

We hope that we can be as forthcoming as possible about discussion of questions of policy.

I think that the record that I read to the committee today shows that so far as discussing the document itself, this is a matter which would have to be decided by the President of the United States as to whether he would want to take the position which President Eisenhower had taken in the past.

This matter has not come before the President because there has been no formal request for the document, as I understand it.

It is not our intention to try to be legalistic about this because we want to be as helpful as we can to the committee, but I think if Mr. Rostow attempts to describe the document and to discuss it, then we are in a position where we would have to ask the President as to whether this would be within his instructions to us, and whether we should do this or not, because this is a decision which he would have to make, taking into account the tradition which has been built up with regard to the protection of this particular document as a document of the National Security Council.

Senator WILEY. Was there an objection to my question?

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand the Secretary, he thinks it is improper to discuss the subject matter of the document itself.

Mr. BALL. Without instructions from the President, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Without instructions from the President.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, do I understand the question to be what were the topics that were discussed and studied and acted upon, and the answer to the question to be that it is privileged as of this time?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. We have the testimony at this time that there was general discussion among the so-called leaders of the departments. I am not asking specifically as to what was said. What I am trying to get at is what particular headings or what particular topics or items were under discussion because we get nowhere unless we know what was under consideration, without going into the final recommendations.

Let me illustrate. In recent days we have seen a lot in the paper to the effect that Russian communism is on the wane. Did you discuss communism?

Mr. BALL. May I answer that, Senator Wiley, by saying that what this paper was, again following the tradition of the basic National Security Council paper, was an attempt to integrate our various policies, in an attempt to reach a kind of synthesis which would express the broad directions of policy in the area of security policy which includes not only foreign policy, foreign political policy, but military policy, policy with respect to intelligence, policy with respect to information, in other words, the whole broad spectrum.

Now, in the course of the preparation of this paper, I think it went through a number of different changes so far as the actual outline or method of approach was concerned. But we find ourselves here today in this dilemma, Senator Wiley, that while we want to be as forthcoming as possible, with regard to the policies of the United States and, as I say, I think it is entirely proper for Mr. Rostow to state his views on any policy about which you wish to ask him, I do not think that, without the instructions from the President, we would be in a position to discuss the paper itself. Once you begin to discuss the outline of the paper, then you begin to discuss the content of the paper.

I do not want to be legalistic, but I find myself in, and I think Mr. Rostow does also, because I have instructed him that so far as the State Department is concerned that he has to observe the quality and character of this paper as an NSC paper, and he is in the same situation.

If there is any matter which is a source of concern or anxiety to the committee with regard to the views of the State Department or of Mr. Rostow, we are entirely at the services of the committee to state our views. Mr. Rostow can state his personal views as fully and as freely as possible.

To discuss the content of the paper is another matter.

Senator WILEY. I think I have your limitations, sir, I shall try to comply with them.

ATTITUDE TOWARD ATOMIC WEAPONS

What are your views in relation to the atomic weapons?

Mr. ROSTOW. As I said the other day, sir, in a talk at Pittsburgh, at Carnegie Tech, we live in a world in which the most dangerous possible position would be one in which we assumed that nuclear war was unthinkable.

If nuclear war was unthinkable, we would then be tempting the other side to probe against us, and we would have to react late and convulsively.

Therefore, the first charge on our national security is to build a nuclear force, and to maintain it, which cannot be taken out in a sudden surprise attack, and which would have the capacity to impose on any enemy devastating damage if we were attacked.

Senator WILEY. Would you be in favor of surrendering those weapons, whatever you want to call them, to an international force?

Mr. ROSTOW. Of course not, sir. I would like to say more about this, sitting where I sit. I do not work in the Defense Department. I think I understand the defense policy of our government, but, from where I sit, what I see is that behind almost every diplomatic act we take there are two questions: first, does the United States have the necessary nuclear force—and other military force—to back its play; second, does the United States have the will, which is a quite different matter, to back its play?

I think that the possibilities of successful diplomacy in this world, and the possibilities of protecting our interests and the interests of the free world without war, hinge directly on the scale, quality and flexibility of our military forces and on the self-evident will to use them, if necessary.

STRENGTHENING U.S. COMPETITIVE POSITION IN WORLD

Senator WILEY. Would you recommend a permanent commission which would determine all wages and prices in this country?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. Have you ever said anything like that in the past?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, sir.

What I have said in the past about our economy is that we face a situation where in order to maintain a balance-of-payments situation on the world scene which will permit us to exercise our global responsibilities, we require a capacity to generate a big export and service surplus on current account.

The maintenance of the surplus is the very heart of the ability of the United States to maintain itself as a world power and to maintain the interests which depend on us.

I have, therefore, been troubled by the tendency of wages, money wages, to rise faster than the average level of productivity.

I have been disturbed also by the slow development of productivity in certain of our industries. I have been disturbed by the aging, the relative aging, of our industrial plants compared to some of the plants in Europe and in Japan; and I have, therefore, advocated that we take measures which would produce a surge of productivity increase in this country, partly by tax measures, which would make it more attractive to invest, but also by other means to try to

get modern research and development techniques into our older industries.

We have only three industries in this country with really first-class research and development: electronics, chemicals, and aeronautics in its widest sense.

I think one of the great pioneering efforts we have to make if we are to maintain ourselves as a front runner is to get new modern research and development techniques applied to some of our old industries.

Now, to come back to wages and prices, I think it is important that we create an environment in which money wage increases are kept within the bounds of the average increase in the Nation's productivity, and that we take measures to increase the rate of productivity of our total industrial establishment.

Senator WILEY. You say take measures. Do you want to be specific?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, one of them, and the most obvious, is the kind of tax bill which we have put before the Congress now, which would make it much more attractive for firms to invest.

The other thing that I would like to see is some of our industries take steps to improve their own research and development facilities.

I was a consultant for A. D. Little in Boston when I was a professor, and I used to talk with the men who work with our industry about weaknesses in the handling of modern research and development in some of our older industries that are not hooked in, as chemicals and electronics are, and others, to new technology. I think this is a real problem.

I have no pat formula for it, but I think it is something we ought to think about.

Senator WILEY. Have you any formula that will tell us how we can live in peace with the Russians?

VIEWS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA

Mr. ROSTOW. No, sir; I do not have a formula, but I have something to say of our policy toward the Russians, if you want to hear it.

Senator WILEY. What is it?

Mr. ROSTOW. I would say that we are living at a time in which there are very important changes going on in the free world, and very important changes going on within the Soviet Bloc, and if we persist with our efforts to maintain the free world strong and united, we may see very substantial changes in the strength and the threat represented by the Communist Bloc.

Let me be specific. There has been a good deal of talk, Senator Dirksen, about mellowing. This is not a word of my choice.

It is quite true, it is absolutely true, that since 1953 there have been some changes in Soviet society. The secret police is somewhat less powerful than it was; the degree to which Western ideas are permitted discussion in Soviet society is somewhat greater than it was. The young Soviet poets are now writing in a more humanistic vein than they were.

But these things do not affect current policy. They may in the long run, as Secretary Dulles used to point out. But right now the fact is that we have been through, and we are in the midst of, a situation where we face a life and death crisis of direct confrontation in Berlin; we face a direct confrontation in South Vietnam, and in Laos; we face a Soviet system which commands very powerful missile and nuclear technology. And so the changes that might come under the heading of "mellowing" have nothing to do at this moment, in my view, with our day-to-day policy.

If we can do small things to encourage this tendency—sending Benny Goodman or having wider contacts, that is all right. But "mellowing" in that sense does not affect, has not affected Soviet policy, and it should not affect ours.

CHANGES AFFECTING SOVIET POSITION

There are, however, some changes going on which affect the power status of the bloc which, as a planner, I feel that we have a duty to study. These are not sentimental, these are power changes.

FRAGMENTATION OF CONTROL

First is the tendency toward the fragmentation of control which Stalin exercised in the bloc. This is reflected by the Sino-Soviet split which is, by no means, a complete split, but has weakened the bloc and bedeviled every Communist Party in the world.

It is represented by the tendency of Poland, and certain other countries, to pull to a degree against the center. It is represented by the Albanian defection.

Let me say again this factor is not working automatically our way. As I said in a talk at Purdue, this struggle in the bloc, which goes quite deep, can make our life more dangerous when, for example, Moscow and Peiping vie for influence in Hanoi over Ho Chi-Minh and compete to try to show which one can most powerfully press Ho Chi-Minh's interest in South Asia. Nevertheless, the tendency toward fragmentation in the bloc and the troubles that have grown from it are a power factor on the world scene, and justify serious attention.

AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS

Second, we are now seeing in the bloc a demonstration—a progressive demonstration—of the incapacity of the Communist system to grow food efficiently.

This stems from the very simple fact that a peasant will not do the things needed to do to grow food efficiently unless he has the ownership of this own land, and unless he feels that the sweat of his brow is going to return to his own family. This is an old problem in communism, but it has become extremely acute.

The greatest crisis arising from this factor is, of course, in China, and I can come back to that if you would like.

When I was out with General [Maxwell] Taylor in South Vietnam, one of the interesting and hopeful things out there was the status of Ho Chi-Minh. We feared that Ho Chi-Minh, because he had been the leader of the movement for national independence

back in 1954 and had driven out the French, would have great political support in South Vietnam.

I talked to as wide a range of people as I could out there, including some of the intellectuals and others who did not like Diem, and none of them wanted to join with the North. And why? Because this is a hungry, third-rate police state, which has no power of attraction. One of the reasons we have a fighting chance under very great difficulty and, I believe, are going to hold South Vietnam, is this failure of agriculture in North Vietnam.

But that is not all. In East Germany, one of the fundamental weaknesses in the Ulbricht regime is that it cannot grow food and cannot supply a decent diet, and so also, to a lesser degree, in Czechoslovakia.

Finally, in Russia itself: Russia has to keep 45 percent, roughly speaking, of its working force in agriculture. We have something like 7 or 9 percent, I guess nearer 7 percent. The Russians, with 45 percent of their people in agriculture, cannot give them a decent diet. They have enough grain, but they cannot give them the higher grade foods they want, nor can they even supply to their satellites surplus food at a time when they desperately need it, which would strengthen Moscow's hands if they could do it.

So what you see in Moscow now is that under the pressure of the arms race and commitments in space, their weak food policy is accentuating their inability to hold the bloc together, and it is weakening their power base.

IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH

But none of these forces which, I think, are moving our way in the bloc, are going to produce a really decisive result unless our military strength is kept up; unless we prevent the Communist international movement from picking up real estate and expanding; unless we can mobilize the enormous potential power that the free world has in Western Europe, the United States, and Japan, which constitute a power grouping which would make the bloc a minor, relatively minor, power in the world if we mobilized effectively as far ahead as we can see; and unless we protect the underdeveloped areas in this period where they are highly vulnerable to the Communist techniques of subversion and guerrilla warfare.

I think, however, that if we do our job militarily here, if we go on and build up the Atlantic Community Alliance with a Western Europe we have helped to revive, and bring Japan into relationship with it, if we can devise ways of working with the underdeveloped areas which protect them in this period of vulnerability then, against that kind of background of strength and unity in the free world, these deep inner forces within the bloc will progressively work to our advantage.

DEVELOPMENTS IN LAST 17 MONTHS

Where do we stand now on this? I think we have a long way to go, but I would point this out to you: When we came to responsibility 17 months ago, you had a crisis running in Laos, and one in Vietnam, one in the Congo and Cuba, and the Berlin ultimatum was over our heads.

The Southeast Asian crisis had the potentiality of resulting in the loss of all of Southeast Asia down to Djkarta; the situation in the Congo could have given the Communists a war base down there in a place where the boundaries are fuzzy, in which the tribes overlap. From the point of view of Mao's theory, and Che Guevara's, that would have been a dream base for guerrilla warfare.

There was a real momentum in Castro's revolution, and it looked as though he might get South America inflamed and pick up strength on the mainland.

Now, none of those crises is yet solved. All are still dangerous, but we have seen the momentum go out of them.

I do not think anyone in Southeast Asia now feels that the whole of Southeast Asia is at the moment in danger. I think we are still not settled in the Congo, but the danger has seeped away of a Communist base down there.

Castro is still a very serious threat in the hemisphere, and we have been working to minimize that threat. On the other hand, he looks a lot less dangerous in the future than he did awhile ago.

In the meanwhile, the crisis in Communist China has worsened, and the full weight of Khrushchev's failure in agriculture has come home.

We have upped our own military strength, and this has put a strain on Khrushchev. I think we may have passed through a very important turning point in the last year, but I would wish to make clear that I do not think that history is going to work automatically our way unless we work with it; and this longer run picture of the forces working our way in no way detracts from the imminent danger to which we must be very alert at all these points of crisis that I mentioned.

Senator WILEY. Did you discuss the plan of the future? How do you handle all these situations?

Mr. ROSTOW. I do not have a plan for the future, sir.

Senator WILEY. All right.

PRESENT DANGER OF WAR

One other question: Napoleon said if you have trouble at home the answer is a foreign war. Russia is having trouble. What do you think about that saying?

Mr. ROSTOW. I think we would be very irresponsible, notably in the case of China, if we were not alert to the possibility that they might try to break out.

The Chinese Communists are in a deep box of their own contrivance. They painted themselves into a corner there. On the whole, the evidence is at the moment that their dispositions are defensive. But I, for one, would by no means rule out the possibility of their trying for some foreign adventure, and I think prudent American planning should keep that contingency very much in mind.

Senator WILEY. My question related to Russia.

Mr. ROSTOW. With respect to the Soviet Union, every day we have to start with the possibility that they might try a salvo. All our military missions must have built into them the habits and routines which never for a moment would leave our retaliatory power vulnerable to a Soviet first strike.

At the moment I would say that there is much less evidence of desperation in the Soviet position than in the Chinese Communist position.

What we must do is, I think—and this is one way of defining American military policy—what we have to do is, by a safe margin, continue to make military action by the enemy irrational.

We can never rule out the possibility of an irrational act, but what we must never do is to tempt men by our military dispositions to try, in a desperate mood, to take us out.

Senator WILEY. I thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Rostow, your title in the State Department is Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it your job—the job of your associates and you—to consider all and any possibilities a period of time ahead?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is right, sir.

CONDUCTING THE PLANNING PROCESS

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you, when you work your papers up—and I assume while some may start in your particular segment of the State Department, others would start in Defense, Treasury, and elsewhere and be passed around—raise objections or make additions as the times indicate?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is right, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. As times and conditions indicate?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is right, sir. Perhaps I might try briefly to give you a picture of how we are now conducting the planning process, if that would be acceptable. Would you like me to do that, because it might clarify what we are trying to accomplish?

Senator MANSFIELD. Briefly, yes.

Mr. ROSTOW. I will do it briefly.

Out of this exercise in doing the staff work looking toward the Basic National Security Policy paper, we used the occasion—and this, I might say, is the one real innovation in the job we have done—to try to define the major problems where we think forward planning is necessary if the total purposes of our policy are to move forward.

Where we came to points where we did not have a lucid policy, instead of trying to find language we could agree around the table or to get the departments to try to redetermine the answer, we frankly said: This is a planning problem. We now have allocated these problems to various bureaus in the State Department and to various agencies of the government. They will have the principal responsibility for carrying forward these policy planning tasks. A few of these center in the Planning Council of the Department of State. Others go to the bureaus which have operational responsibility; a good many go to the Pentagon.

What we are now doing is trying to weave together around these major problems where we feel forward planning is necessary the work of all the related branches of the government. So we now have a fairly orderly working procedure, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is there a definition which covers your position as Chief of the Policy Planning Council of the State Department, of your responsibilities—what areas you should cover, and the like?

Mr. ROSTOW. The definitions have been general. I have them along here and I could read them.

But the way it works at the present time is as follows: My own concept of planning, which derives rather more from a period as an air planner during the war than from being a professor, is rather practical. What I have been trying to do is to work with my colleagues in the State Department to isolate concrete problems looking to the future, where a planning effort may be helpful.

When those lists are established, men from my Council work with their opposite numbers who bear operational responsibility—and sometimes with men from other agencies or from the intelligence community—and they work forward as a team on each problem.

They are working to a definition of planning which is roughly this: Planning is the process of thinking in ways which permit you to begin doing something now which will make the future better. We feel that this is a period in our history where the burdens on our operational colleagues, who bear responsibilities for particular regions and functions, are so great that the Planning Council ought to be a kind of a task force to be thrown in to work with them to try to give our policy a bit more forward thrust. Thus we are working to very concrete problems.

When you work on such problems you may want to speculate quite a long time about the future, and let your imagination run, but in the end we apply a hard test in the light of this question: What is it that we ought to begin doing now that we are not doing? A decision that flows from that question is, of course, not one for the Planning Council to make by itself.

We work that kind of practical result out with our operational colleagues, and then it moves up to the Secretary of State or, if necessary to the President. But that is how we are operating.

ANTICIPATING FUTURE SITUATIONS

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it your duty and responsibility to anticipate?

Mr. ROSTOW. It is, sir. And, in addition to the major planning tasks, we have just set up in the State Department a special procedure to try to do two things:

One, better to anticipate crises or head them off or prepare for them; and

Two, more quickly to exploit perhaps momentary occasions of opportunity. We are setting this machinery up, again, in very intimate collaboration with the operating bureaus, the Planning Council and the intelligence community. We are going to start with a list of crises that look as though they might be down the road and see if we cannot begin to do things to head them off; and if not, to try to put ourselves in a better position to handle them.

I remember that when I came over to take the job and talked with Secretary Rusk, he described the way in which these crises

that arise distort our energies away from the main stream of policy, and create situations of danger.

I have no cheap hopes that some organizational gimmick is going to clean the crises out of the world. But we feel that we would be doing a good and useful work for the Secretary and the President if we can get a bit ahead of the game with respect to these inevitable crises which are likely to be thrown up.

SITUATION IN LAOS AS AN EXAMPLE

Senator MANSFIELD. To be specific, when the situation worsened in Laos recently, did you and your colleagues in the various departments have a plan ready which called for the dispatch of 5,000 Marines and soldiers into Northern Thailand?

Mr. ROSTOW. There were, sir, in existence a whole series of alternative contingency military plans for that region.

Senator MANSFIELD. Was this one of them?

Mr. ROSTOW. I am trying to think back to my days in the White House.

Mr. BALL. I think I can answer that, Senator Mansfield. This was a variant of one of them.

Senator MANSFIELD. I did not understand.

Mr. BALL. This was a variant of an existing plan which had been well discussed. It was decided that, for various reasons, at the last minute to change it, to alter it slightly. But it was a variant of an existing plan.

Senator MANSFIELD. I want to say I thoroughly approve of what happened, but what I am trying to find out is this: Was the sending of the Marines a result of the planning of the Policy Planning Staffs of these various departments. I understand the answer to be that it was a variant of the main theme but fundametally this was one of the possibilities.

Mr. BALL. Yes. I would not say this was a plan specifically of the Policy Planning Staff. This was a plan which had been developed by the military, but with political advice being given by the State Department.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. Will you let me clarify that?

Senator MANSFIELD. I will yield to the Senator.

VARIANTS OF EXISTING PLANS

Senator GORE. I wanted to clarify it. You say it was a variant of a plan, and then you further qualify it as a military plan. Was this a new variant with which the Department of State——

Mr. BALL. We participated in working out the variation in the light of the circumstances, precise circumstances, as they then presented themselves.

Senator GORE. This is what I am trying to get at, Mr. Secretary, if the Senator will yield 1 minute further—is this kind of ad hoc variant the sort of thing on which the Council would work, or is this more directly the work of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense's department?

Mr. BALL. The situation—if I may answer this—is a very frequent one, and is that the Policy Planning Staff in connection with

the Pentagon or other agencies will develop a plan to take care of a particular situation.

Now, when that situation arises, it arises in a form which cannot be anticipated with complete precision, that is, there will be some circumstance which no one had foreseen or circumstances will be slightly different from what had been foreseen.

The decision with regard to that plan is made, in a matter as important as this is made, by the Secretary of Defense, the President, the Secretary of State, and so on, looking at these available plans and saying, "Well, let's take this plan but in the light of this circumstance let us vary it in this way," and that is precisely what happened in connection with this troop movement.

Senator GORE. Thank you.

GOVERNMENT BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

Senator DODD. May I ask the Senator to yield for a clarifying question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator DODD. I know you are on a new job as the Chief Planner and Counselor— but am I right in my understanding that you were in planning back in the Eisenhower days, as well? You have a continuity about it?

Mr. ROSTOW. I had the great privilege, Senator Dodd, of being a consultant to the Government from 1951 roughly to the time this administration took over.

Senator DODD. That is what I wanted to make clear.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Vermont.

Senator AIKEN. I have no questions. I am really intrigued by the usefulness of that word "variant," however.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee.

AFFECT OF SINO-SOVIET SCHISM ON INDIAN SITUATION

Senator GORE. Mr. Rostow, you said that we must always be aware of the possibility that China might seek to break out. I do not in any way wish to ask you any questions about your paper or the subjects upon which you have reached decisions or what your decisions are. From your personal standpoint, however, is it, in your opinion, necessary to contemplate the possibility and the effect upon the security of the United States, some years from now of any deepening of the schism between Russia and China? Should the United States follow policies to encourage such a schism; and, if so, to what extent would this affect our attitude toward India's purchase of military equipment from the Soviets?

Mr. ROSTOW. I can say this much about the Council's work in planning, which is a fairly tender subject: We have had going, I think, a first-rate exercise involving the planners, the intelligence people, the operational people, on all aspects of the Sino-Soviet split for many months now. They meet regularly, turning over the situation and trying, not only to follow it but also to explore ways in which we could act with respect to it [deleted].

It is not easy. The split has arisen out of the dynamics of the bloc. Every inch of the way they hoped they would not do this because they weaken themselves, but the forces they are wrestling

with have compelled them to get into this posture of a not quite complete split. [Deleted.]

The Indian situation is, as you know, a situation of great complexity. One of the factors in the Indian situation is, indeed, that they have in recent years come to square off more openly on the frontiers with China. At very high altitude and under awkward logistical circumstances they are fencing around on those frontiers, and that is one consideration that obviously we must take into account.

There are others, of course. The acquisition of supersonic fighters from a Russian source presents certain kinds of potential dangers. And also, of course, there is the whole problem of tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.

But certainly one of the most important changes that has taken place in recent years is a dual change in Indian attitude toward China.

One change is that they now quite openly regard the Chinese as an enemy or a potential enemy.

The other one, which is equally important, is that they no longer regard the Chinese as having in communism the right technique for developing an underdeveloped area. I was talking about this to Ambassador [Ellsworth] Bunker last night. We both recalled in 1958 the attitude of many Indians was: "We would like to be humanistic, but that is not good enough. We have to have a totalitarian regime and collectivization like the Chinese." The Chinese failure and the considerable Indian success have altered that attitude a lot.

Senator GORE. Please understand that in posing this question I am in no way reflecting my own attitude. I have expressed my own feeling to Prime Minister Nehru about the possible acquisition of Russian Migs and the relationship which such a deal would imply.

Three times during the course of the evening with Prime Minister Nehru he said in these words, "Whenever China is strong she is aggressive." I came to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, although he talked publicly about Pakistan, his obsessive fear was about China.

Would it be in the nature of the work of the Council to examine the motivation of Indian policies and the policies of other countries, friends, foes, and neutrals?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is our business, sir; yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Then this is something to which you have given study?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. I have one other question, and then I will not trespass anymore upon the time of my colleagues.

In contemplating the possibility of a Chinese break-out, would it be within the nature of the work of the Council to examine the possibilities or needs to break out? For what purpose would China desire to break out?

Mr. ROSTOW. It would, sir.

We are studying this with our colleagues in intelligence and our colleagues in the operational end of the department—of the Far Eastern Bureau.

DIRECTION IN WHICH RED CHINA MIGHT BREAK OUT

Senator GORE. Aside from the work of your Council, what is your opinion of the most likely motiviation for a desperate military move on the part of China? Would it be to acquire rice lands in the Thai or Vietnamese delta, or would it be to move militarily against East Pakistan or India? What are your views about those possibilities or others?

Mr. ROSTOW. I would be glad to tell you my views. They are speculative, and——

Senator WILEY. What was that word you used?

Mr. ROSTOW. Speculative, sir.

Mr. BALL. Like the stock market, Senator Wiley.

Senator WILEY. I guess we are all guessers.

Mr. ROSTOW. I say speculative, because this has a particular meaning. The most important quality in this business I learned during the war was that when you do not know, not to be confident—not to mistake your best guess for a reliable basis for policy.

So let me begin by saying that I think we must be militarily and psychologically and politically prepared for an attack on Quemoy and Matsu, or a break-out in Southeast Asia, or an attack through the very awkward route over and through Tibet.

POSSIBLE BREAKOUT THROUGH SOUTHEAST ASIA

Having said that, I would say that I have been skeptical that the Chinese Communists would try to break out and go for the rice bowl in Southeast Asia. They might, and we have to have plans, but I am skeptical, partly for logistical reasons.

The logistical routes on Southeast Asia are not like those that link Manchuria to Korea. This is way down at the end of the line.

When I was in Bangkok and was briefed there and looked at the routes into Thailand, there were three. One of them cuts across Burma and down into Thailand, and that can carry about one division, but it is a long route. It would be subject to interdiction, strafing, and so on.

The other two routes out run through Hanoi, and run, among other things, across a 1,500-foot bridge on which the Seventh Fleet could, with present precision techniques, which we did not have during the war, do quite a handy job.

My fear, in Southeast Asia on the military side is not so much of a massive break-out of the kind we had in Korea, although it could happen, but of infiltration of guerrillas and that kind of smaller scale operation.

As I say, my conclusion is partly logistical.

The other thing I am skeptical about is that they would judge that they could get much rice by capturing a country and making it Communist.

Now, this rice does not sit around there in warehouses ready to be captured and carted off to Canton.

You might get a little surplus, but the one thing they know for certain is if they put these areas under Communist rule they will kill the surplus. They did it in China, they have done it in North Vietnam. They might go for Thailand, but it would not be a highly

rational policy for them to try to capture the place for its food surplus.

Moreover, these surpluses are limited in relation to the total short fall in China's grain requirements.

Nevertheless, if I were making an array of the relative attractiveness of a break-out, I would say Southeast Asia is the most attractive.

A serious break-out over the mountains into India presents even tougher logistical problems than the attack on Southeast Asia. They are putting pressure there and, of course, we have to be prepared if they should try to mount a big operation through there. But that one looks even less likely than the Southeast Asia.

QUEMOY AND MATSU

The Quemoy-Matsu operation is logistically the easiest. But it is a tough nut to crack. It proved a tough nut to crack in 1958 when they failed to interdict the islands. We supported the flow of supplies, and the underground shelters held up. It would take an awful lot of men to capture them, an awful lot of dead men to capture them, if indeed they could be captured.

This would be so even if we did not go into it, and they know very well that we would take it as a most serious matter if they were to try to capture Quemoy or Matsu.

Those are the three options. I think we have to be prepared for any of them.

I think they feel inhibited so long as they are acting rationally on any one of the three. But these are men who have painted themselves into a corner, and my responsible advice would be to be prepared for all three. My feeling is that they may not break out.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am not prepared to ask any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

POSSIBLE CHANGE IN CHARACTER OF COLD WAR

There is considerable talk that because of the developments which you described earlier—fragmentation of Communist unity, lack of food, problems in different places, and especially the supposed breach between Red China and Russia—we are moving toward a policy of intending to compromise with Red Russia, and in doing so forget the satellite nations of Europe and the other nations of the would which have stood at our side.

Will you comment on the talk that is current?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, it is not current where I work, sir. I do not know of anyone who looks at the relationship with the Soviet Union at the present time who sees it as possible for us to come to an agreement on any one of the great vital issues that would really radically change the character of the cold war.

Let me be specific.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then there is no purpose as of this time to change the general trend and purpose of the cold war?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, there is not, sir, not to my knowledge.

POSSIBLE NUCLEAR STRIKES

Senator LAUSCHE. In your recitation of the new developments of the last 1½ or 2 years, you mentioned primarily our obligation to watch our military strength. Will you repeat briefly the military approach that you have in mind? I think you said, that we should not take any action that would give cause or motivate the bloc to strike with nuclear power. Did you say that?

Mr. ROSTOW. What I said, sir, was we should never by our military dispositions leave them with the temptation, to think it might be rational and possible to take us out.

Senator LAUSCHE. To strike?

Mr. ROSTOW. To strike.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is your position on announcing to the world our resolve or lack of resolve not to strike an initial blow?

Mr. ROSTOW. We are committed now to initiate the use of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances which the President has specified.

He has specified that we, of course, would use them if we were attacked with nuclear weapons, and he has also said that we will defend vital positions in the free world with nuclear weapons if our positions are being overwhelmed on the ground.

Those are the two great cases that the President has enunciated as the cause for our use of nuclear weapons.

Senator LAUSCHE. [Deleted.]

Are they expressive of your views as the President has announced them?

Mr. ROSTOW. They are, sir, expressive of my views.

Senator LAUSCHE. In your planning, do you define what you understand to be major problems, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and so forth, and then you work out a plan?

Mr. ROSTOW. Right.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you, in connection with those individual problems, apply principles which evolve out of an approach to the whole problem confronting us?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is one of the virtues, we hope, of having come to our planning list out of this review of total policy.

The group that directs the definition of these tasks and assigns them is the Tuesday luncheon group that represents every interested part of the government. Those papers, when they are done, will come back to this interdepartmental group.

So we hope that the policies that are suggested will be related to a perspective which reflects all of the arms of U.S. policy.

CHANGES IN U.S. RELATIONSHIP TO RUSSIA

Senator LAUSCHE. Again I put the question—based upon the changes that have occurred, what is your view of any contemplated changes in our relationship to Russia?

Mr. ROSTOW. Let me be concrete in answer to that. That is a rather general question.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Mr. ROSTOW. In the field of disarmament, there is just nowhere to go until these fellows are really prepared for effective international inspection.

Senator LAUSCHE. Right.

Mr. ROSTOW. And this is an enormous block in the way, of course. But this is the fundamental issue in the field of disarmament.

In other areas, where they are having difficulties or we have generated some pressure, what we look for are occasions where it might be from their point of view and ours advantageous to make an agreement.

There are not many of these. The classic one, of course, was Austria where, for whatever reasons, they decided in 1955 they were prepared to get out and let that country be a free, democratic country. It was to our interest.

We are prepared in the present situation to look for places where we can make arrangements which are, from our point of view, to our net advantage when they feel, for whatever reasons, they are willing to do it, too. But there is no sense in taking risks with our military position, taking risks with our allies in the free world to do this sort of thing.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Rostow, have you proposed or is it your view that since we cannot negotiate with the Red bloc on nuclear testing and disarmament, our new policy should be a gradual unilateral action on our part so as to demonstrate to the Red bloc that we are beginning the banning of nuclear tests and disarmament?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, sir. That is not my policy?

Senator LAUSCHE. That is not your policy

Mr. ROSTOW. That is not my policy, and it never has been, sir.

U.S. RELATIONSHIP TO CAPTIVE NATIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. What is your position on our obligation, if any, to the captive nations?

Mr. ROSTOW. My interest in the Eastern European countries, goes back a long way.

I was in the German section of the State Department just after the war, and I felt, and in the book which Senator Dirksen has (The United States in the World Arena), I wrote later—but not with the benefit of hindsight, what I felt at the time, namely, that if we had been willing to be as tough about the Polish election as we were about Northern Azerbaijan, that it is quite possible that we could have avoided the cold war; and I tried in the book to go into the reasons to why this did not happen in the immediate postwar years.

I have always felt a second thing, that this empire that Stalin built is not an historically workable empire.

I have no cheap illusions that it is going to fall apart tomorrow. But, as an historian, I think I understand what kind of empires stand the test of time and which do not, and I do not think this is a very good one.

Now, it has never been the policy of this Government since the war, and it would not be my policy, to initiate a nuclear war to free Eastern Europe.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Mr. ROSTOW. Within that limit I have never ceased to be interested in anything that we could do that would not damage our vital

interests in the West or our military power to try to lift from these peoples the burden of what is essentially the occupation they have been under; and this is something in which false toughness is not good enough, because it is no good our making tough speeches and then if they revolt, if we do not back our play——

Senator LAUSCHE. Has it been your view that in order to reach an agreement with Red Russia we should give up our responsibilities to these captive nations, that that is their right of choosing their own government by open and free elections?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, sir. I do not believe that policy would even get us much of an agreement with Red Russia.

I think that even though we do not intend to go to war to enforce them we should keep the Yalta commitments of Russia part of the legal record.

I think that with respect to Germany we should continue to look forward to the unity of Germany under free elections.

In fact, with respect to the unity of Germany, I think it would be most dangerous to the whole stability of the West if we were ever to take a stance which abandoned support for German unity.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield?

Does anyone wish to ask the Secretary any questions? He has to leave. I do not mean Mr. Rostow.

Senator LAUSCHE. I have only one question and I will be through.

U.S. PROPOSALS ON BERLIN AND GERMANY

In the recent supposed rift between our Government and Adenauer, the newspapers talked of one factor that caused a division, and that is the proposal made by our Government to establish an international commission to control ingress and egress into West Berlin.

The second proposal was that there be a non-aggression pact signed with the West, on one side, Red Russia on the other, and the Warsaw Pact nations, which would include East Germany; third, that the present boundaries established in Europe be declared permanent; and, fourth, some international control of the airways.

Are you familiar with these proposals?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, I will have to turn to Mr. Ball for part of this.

The only proposal of which I myself know is the proposal that was floated in an exploratory way about an international control commission which would guarantee access to West Berlin.

But I have not followed the details of the Berlin negotiations enough to tell you whether there is any substance in these other proposals and what they are.

Would you like to speak to that?

Mr. BALL. Yes, I would be very glad to speak to that, Senator Lausche.

The situation in which we found ourselves during this whole discussion of Berlin has been one of constantly trying to find out if we can preserve the vital interests of the free world, which we have defined roughly as three in the Berlin situation.

One, the completely free right of access to Berlin.

Two, the ability to maintain Berlin as a viable city, which means the ability to keep it economically alive as well as secure militarily.

Third, the right to maintain Western troops in West Berlin.

Now these, by general agreement of the nations which are concerned with the Berlin situation, the British, ourselves, the West Germans, the French, too, because there has been no disagreement on general objectives as far as all of us are concerned, these have been the vital interests which we have tried to protect.

Now, what we have tried to do in this constant probing is to see if in this very narrow area between the outside limits of the protection of our vital interests, and what the Soviet Union wants, there might be some kind of a possibility of a modus vivendi, some kind of understanding by which we can live together without having this thing constantly recur as a source of pressure and a source of tension. We have not been able to find that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Let me interrupt. Did we make the proposal of a non-aggression pact and a declaration that the present boundaries shall be accepted as they are?

Mr. BALL. No; formal proposals have not been made to the Soviet Union. They have been discussed——

Senator LAUSCHE. Were they made to Adenauer?

Mr. BALL. They were discussed within the Committee of Ambassadors which we have had in Washington, as possibilities. But nothing has been suggested to the Soviet Union beyond the possibility of international access provisions.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was it proposed to Adenauer, and is that what he choked on when it was said that we sign a non-aggression pact?

Mr. BALL. With respect to that, Senator Lausche, dozens of things have been proposed to the Germans. I mean every conceivable kind of idea has been tossed into this hopper. It has been considered and rejected or it has been considered and no action has been taken.

A very significant point is that so far as any conversation with the Soviet Union is concerned, this has only been done on the basis of complete agreement in which the Germans have fully participated.

Senator LAUSCHE. Let me ask this question. If it was proposed to Adenauer that we sign a non-aggression pact with East Germany and declare the present boundaries to be permanent, would that be a change in the policy that we have had in the past?

Mr. BALL. We have had a policy of not recognizing the East Germans, and we do not propose to vary from that policy. We have had no consideration of a change in policy with regard to that.

Senator HUMPHREY. Will the Senator yield?

EXPLAINING U.S. POLICY TO AMERICAN PEOPLE

Senator LAUSCHE. Just let me finish this for a moment. I would just like to leave this thought. In the Cuban situation a top man of the Central Intelligence Agency made a speech in San Francisco. At the end of his speech when the Central Intelligence Agency man opened himself to questions, one man in the audience of a thousand said, "Are you training troops in Guatemala to send them into Cuba?" And the Central Intelligence Agency man said, "I cannot answer." I want to point out that by making too many speeches you are going to find yourself in the position that you are

in now of having to deny what is published by Edwards and Kirkpatrick and others. You cannot keep making speeches day after day without revealing what is within you and what is going on in the Cabinet, and then having to explain the way you are explaining right now.

Mr. BALL. Senator Lausche, I would like to comment on that, if I might, and I think I speak for all of us in the State Department.

In the first place, we do not make very many speeches. It was very interesting in connection with the hearings which Senator Stennis had, when we looked at the number of speeches that the State Department had made and cleared during the course of a period, it was about a fifth or a sixth of the number that had been made during that same period by the Pentagon.

Now, we have had a feeling that possibly we did not make enough. We have had a feeling that we were not doing an adequate job of trying to explain American policy to the American people, that part of the difficulty and the misunderstanding of our policy which has so often arisen is because we have not come clean with the American people; that we have not tried to explain what we are trying to do.

The fact is that I have felt myself a need to interrupt a very busy schedule, as frequently as I could, when I was asked to make a speech to a responsible audience and try to explain as carefully as I could what we were attempting to do.

Senator LAUSCHE. I agree with that. Yet when you have things in a nebulous state and you say that they are not to be communicated to us because they have not yet been distilled, and if you keep making speeches on the periphery of those subjects, you finally are telling what you claim is privileged.

I have no further questions.

Senator HUMPHREY. I wanted to ask the Senator to yield.

PROPOSALS ON BERLIN AND GERMANY

Maybe I am misinformed, but was it not at least tentatively offered in 1958 during the Berlin crisis at that time that a non-aggression pact be signed between the East and West?

Mr. BALL. I think it was considered in this Geneva——

Mr. CHAYES. I cannot say for sure whether it was. I think there was some form—when you talk about a non-aggression pact, I think there was some form of declaration, non-aggression declaration, which was to be considered in the Geneva Peace Plan. But I can supply the committee with that information.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am sure it was because I have it in my office. I do not have it here. Also, I have heard repeatedly there were suggestions made that there be a non-aggression pact between the East and the West by the French and by the British and by the Germans and by ourselves over the years.

I would like to have you supply the information that you referred to. I think it would be good for this record. In fact, I would like to have supplied for this record the information on the proposals made by American representatives vis-a-vis the Berlin situation with the Soviets.

Mr. CHAYES. Well, there was a four-power peace plan then.

Senator HUMPHREY. There was a proposal made and, as I have understood it, that plan is still the fundamental—I mean it is still the underpinning, of our basic policy concerning Berlin; is that true?

Mr. CHAYES. That is correct.

Mr. BALL. Actually that is true, although we have tried to improve the Western position.

[The information referred to follows:]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 3, 1962.

The Honorable J.W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee.

Dear Mr. CHAIRMAN: At the hearings on June 26 you requested information on the point whether the Department had considered the concept of a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union or the Soviet bloc in connection with the 1958–1959 Berlin crises. You also requested a copy of the Western Peace Plan put forward at the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting in 1959.

A non-aggression treaty as such was not considered either in the Department or in talks with our allies or the Soviets at the time in question. Western thinking developed along the lines ultimately reflected in paragraph 3 of Stage I of the Western Peace Plan, which reads as follows:

"3. In a common declaration, with which other interested European states would be invited to associate themselves, they would undertake to:

(a) settle, by peaceful means, any international dispute in which they may be involved with any other party;

(b) refrain from the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations;

(c) withhold assistance, military or economic, to an aggressor."

The full text of the Peace Plan is set forth at pages 55–60 of the enclosed volume pertaining to the Foreign Ministers Meeting.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK G. DUTTON,
Assistant Secretary.

Enclosure:
Foreign Ministers Meeting, May–August 1959, Geneva.

Senator HUMPHREY. You have not scrapped that plan?

Mr. BALL. No, but we would not want to start a negotiation on the basis of that plan. In other words, we are trying to get a forward position rather than anything that is a qualification of that, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Missouri.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT NSC PAPER

Mr. Secretary, my first question is to you. As I understand it, someone violated his oath of office by leaking information to a newspaperman; is that correct?

Mr. BALL. Yes; as I said before you came in, Senator Symington——

Senator SYMINGTON. No, I was here.

Mr. BALL. I am sorry, I had forgotten.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is all right.

Mr. BALL. We could not tell from the internal evidence. It has been extremely indiscreet.

Senator SYMINGTON. The second question was the resulting article is so inaccurate that you are not sure whether the author of the article did or did not see the secret paper that somebody betrayed his oath to show or talk about?

Mr. BALL. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Nevertheless, this paper is the reason we are here, am I correct?

Mr. BALL. That is correct, Senator.

WITNESS RECORD OF ANTI-COMMUNISM

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, on the floor of the Senate a statement was made about what Professor Rostow thought, and I would like to get on the record how he does think about some of these things. It said:

"Mr. Rostow has never been a very devoted disciple of the tough policy line toward Russia."

It is my recollection that of all the people who went to that Pugwash Conference, Professor Rostow, that you came back the least impressed, and it was so stated in a national magazine article not too long ago, is that correct?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes, sir, I wasn't much impressed.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you care to comment on the statement that you are not a "devoted disciple of the tough policy line toward Russia"?

Mr. ROSTOW. Let me say a word about being tough.

I have been clear since the mid-1930's as to what the Communist conspiracy was. I do not regard it as much of a trick to understand that these people are out to do us out of everything we value.

When I was an undergraduate at Yale, among the first things I published were anti-Communist materials.

I decided when I was 18 that when I learned enough I was going to do an alternative to Marxism because I knew a lot of people in the world were taken in by this theory, and I finally took my shot at it.

I am quite clear that we stand, because of the Communist conspiracy, in mortal peril, that we have got to put up enormous resources to protect ourselves and our friends from them militarily.

As I said in a book on Communist China I once wrote, communism is never a self-containing phenomenon. It will expand wherever it can find weakness, and I think I understand tolerably well the particular dimensions of the Communist strategy.

But I come of a generation that grew up in the Second World War.

All of us who went through that war knew what it was—in 1942, 1943—to be in a tough spot.

I was with the Air Force. I saw a situation in which what we committed ourselves to do—what we committed this Nation to do—which was precision bombing in daylight, almost failed, and earlier I had seen a situation in the Battle of the Atlantic when we damn near got isolated from Europe and could not make that lifeline stick.

Being tough out of my experience does not consist in going around saying how tough you are. It consists in deciding what it is you have to do about it and sticking with it.

None of the things that I have ever seen my country achieve in my time, neither the victory in the war nor the success of the Marshall Plan nor the victory in Greece, which was a tough one to win,

nor the Korean war, nor the beginnings of victory hopefully out in South Vietnam, none of these are problems which are going to be solved by my coming in here or anybody coming in here and proclaiming how tough he is.

What you have got to do is decide that here is the problem, here is a part of the job. You have to mobilize everything this country has within it—and when this country decides to mobilize what it has, it has plenty—and then stick with it.

From my limited experience, toughness consists in not merely taking a tough stand, Senator Symington, because that comes cheap, but in deciding what you have got to do and then sticking with it through the hard times and persisting.

And so, as I say, I do not take much pride in the fact that I have been an active anti-Communist since the 1930's. I was a well-brought up boy, with a good father, and he understood these things, and that was easy. But the job for all of us is to stick with the things we have to do to be effective anti-Communists.

DISCUSSION OF "FUZZY THINKING"

Senator SYMINGTON. My next question, and I continue what was said in the Record because I would like the record to show it.

"It now develops, on the basis of the Chicago Tribune articles, that Mr. Rostow holds some unique ideas about the Soviet Union that are considerably closer to the fuzzy thinking of the late and lamented 'Liberal Papers' that even the most liberal Member of this body would be willing to accept."

As I understand it, again, based on its contents, you cannot be sure the reporter ever saw this NSC document; is that correct?

Mr. BALL. That is right, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Rostow, what are your comments with respect to that assertion?

Mr. ROSTOW. I would hope that I am not fuzzy minded. I have never thought that these small changes, hopeful changes, which you see in Soviet society, and which I welcome, which are good, they are good for human beings, are a substitute for the maintenance of the power we need to deal with this situation.

In the long run I hope they will be helpful. But I think it would be grossly irresponsible in any way to identify minor hopeful changes in Soviet society which, I assume, this fellow was referring to—with fundamental changes in Soviet power.

U.S. AND U.S.S.R. POSITIONS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE WORLDS

Senator SYMINGTON. The next statement in the Record is:

"The most amazing Rostow thesis is this: That both the United States and Russia are losing power and authority in their respective worlds."

I remember a statement made recently in Foreign Affairs Magazine by John McCloy, life long Republican, former Assistant Secretary of the Army under Henry Stimson, former head of our set-up in Germany, former President of the Chase National Bank. This is what he said on that particular subject:

"The Soviets could reasonably conclude that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by West Germany and by Communist China or,

indeed, by anyone else would substantially take out of their control the decision of whether or not to go to war. In somewhat different degree the same danger exists for us."

To me, when I read it, that made sense. It would seem that the more countries that have nuclear weapons, the less the chance of what we decide, or the Russians decide, being the decisive decision.

Would you care to comment on this? Let me read again what it says in the Record:

"The most amazing Rostow thesis is this: That both the United States and Russia are losing power and authority in their respective worlds."

Mr. ROSTOW. This is certainly happening to a certain degree and to a certain extent.

After the war we had a Western Europe that was wholly dependent upon us for its protection and for its economic support. It could not earn enough dollars to feed itself or get its raw materials.

We had a Japan that was wholly dependent upon us. Now we have had in the 1950's probably the most extraordinary period of growth in all of European history, and the same thing with Japan; and that I say not as a planner but as an economic historian.

Undoubtedly, these people are going to take an increasing part in determining their own destiny and their own policy. I think it is perfectly obvious that we stand in a different relationship to Western Europe and Japan than we did immediately after the war.

With respect to some of the underdeveloped areas, they are getting pretty confident, too. They are deeply nationalistic, they are pursuing their own policies in terms of their national interests.

The degree of ways in which we can influence them to do things that we would like them to do, given our responsibilities, are limited.

This does not mean we do not have all the power we need to protect ourselves or to cope with the Russians.

But it means that the political problem of running the present world has changed its character in this decade.

Look at Nasser, look at Nehru, look at de Gaulle. This is a part of history, and it does not scare me because we have great gifts out of our own history.

We know, out of the way we run our own society, how one weaves together diverse interests around common purposes.

If we exploit this innate part of our skill derived from our history, I think we can make an asset out of this new assertiveness, and these new resources. We can make a free world that really protects our interests and is a proper framework for our kind of society.

We never wanted to be a world power. We did not want to dominate the rest of the world. That is not necessary to us.

We do need an environment for our kind of society in which it can be safe, and in which it can continue to develop the way we want it. This is what I had in mind. There is a sense in which power has, to a degree, moved away from us, and it changes the terms of our diplomacy in important respects.

For the Soviets this has happened, too. But for them it is a different matter. Their whole system, based on the way Lenin conceived of the Communist Party, is rooted in conspiratorial dictatorship.

As power moves away from Moscow, this is a very serious disruption.

Stalin and Lenin understood that the only time you really controlled another country is when you controlled its secret police and its party and its army; and that is exactly what Stalin tried to do with Tito.

Tito did not break with Stalin because he liked us in the West. He broke because Stalin tried to take the instruments of power. Within the Communist world this diffusion of power goes right to the guts of their concept of how they organize themselves, and it is much more disruptive than it is for us.

That is my comment, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am impressed by your statement. It is incredible to me that it would not be clear the rise of Communist China, at least to some extent, would attenuate the importance of Russia among the Communist nations; and increase the problems of this country in the pursuit of world peace.

CHANGES IN POWER

I agree with you about the change in power. When I left the Air Force in March 1950, if attacked, this country could have wiped the attacker off the face of the earth.

At the time I left, there were many people who felt that our Armed Forces should be cut, including, unfortunately, the administration in office at that time.

If those reductions had not been supported by then General Eisenhower, at an open hearing which everybody can read, March 29, 1950, before the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Senate would never have approved that incredible reduction in our military establishment. They did; and then later we got into this business of the Secretary of Defense saying "I am going to take $5 billion out of the Air Force and give you a better Air Force." This remark was made in the spring of 1953.

Senator Russell, chairman of the Armed Forces Committee, then made his famous observation, "Why don't you take $10 billion out, and give us a much better Air Force?"

There is no use really in asking further questions about this article because, as I understand it from you, Mr. Secretary, the article is so inaccurate you do not know whether the reporter ever saw the paper, is that right?

Mr. BALL. We do not know that he saw the paper or was told about the paper in a very distorted way or under what circumstances he got it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I have always felt this country could only remain free by remaining strong. My record verifies that thinking in both branches, executive and legislative.

Mr. Rostow, you and I had many hours' talk in South Vietnam when you were out there last fall with General Taylor. Do you remember?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have your opinions in any way changed since we talked at that time?

Mr. ROSTOW. They have not, sir.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I want to say for the record that I have never heard anybody emphasize the importance of the United States staying strong to stay free more cogently and more definitely than Mr. Rostow did at that time.

As a result of his opinions out there, which I thought were as wise as any offered, I wrote the President from Saigon.

While we are at all this I notice former President Eisenhower made a little speech last Friday night in which he said—I will read two sentences:

"Here I must record my personal beliefs that substantial amounts in our defense budget reflect unjustified fears."

I asked on the floor that he tell us what fears were unjustified. He continued in this talk, "Plus a reluctance in some quarters to relinquish outmoded concepts. Accordingly, I personally believe that the defense budget should be substantially reduced."

I looked up the word "substantially" in the dictionary. It means, "considerable, large", therefore, I have asked him to enlighten us, with his experience in this field, recognizing the problems now in Korea, Formosa, Laos, South Vietnam, and West Berlin, where he believes we can make a large reduction in our defense budget.

NO REDUCTIONS POSSIBLE IN DEFENSE BUDGET

Now I ask you, Dr. Rostow, do you know anywhere we can make large reductions in our defense budget?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, sir; I do not. I felt for some time in 1950's, on the basis of such knowledge as I had then, and within the real limitations of my competence in judging the budget, that we needed a larger effort with respect to Minuteman, Polaris, hardened base missiles; that we needed somewhat larger conventional forces; that we needed greater sea and air lifts; and that we needed a counter-guerrilla capability.

I do not make up the military budget of this administration, but I would say this from where I sit: If you take on the kind of problem we took on in Berlin after President Kennedy was at Vienna and faced what was awfully close to an ultimatum, if you take on what we have taken on in Vietnam, you do not want to go into such situations unless you are prepared to back your play.

This is a world in which, despite all the cleverness of diplomacy, what is really behind a move you make is clear. I am glad our military budget had gone up. I am respectful of General Eisenhower, but, perhaps, if he had been at Vienna or, perhaps, if he had been out at Saigon when we were there, Senator, he might feel a bit different.

Senator SYMINGTON. Right. Several more questions.

DISCUSSION OF "MASSIVE RETALIATION" POLICY

You heard of a theory that was enunciated, formally promulgated in January 1954, the theory of "massive retaliation"?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. In effect, that theory said we could not afford to wage all types and character of war, and that we reserve

the right to retaliate in manner and methods of our own choosing. This theory was then used as justification to make further deep cuts in our military establishment. Do you agree that this country should have a policy of only being able to wage nuclear war, as was promulgated at that time?

Mr. ROSTOW. I do not, sir, and for this reason:

The Communist tactic has been systematically, since the end of the war, to put its planners to work on the most sophisticated possible study of weaknesses in the Free World.

It is no accident that we have trouble in Laos. Those northern provinces are the most awkward places to get to logistically that you can imagine.

It is no accident that they have probed twice hard on Berlin, which is in an awkward situation.

It is not an accident that they took a risk in South Korea because at that time our ground forces were weak, we were out of South Korea, we had a couple of under strength divisions in Japan, and no lift. They are constantly searching for weaknesses.

Now, in the face of these limited probes, it has been the instinctive reaction of our country not to reach for nuclear weapons even when we had a predominance, but to work up ad hoc some kind of a limited response, whether it was the response in Korea or the response in the Greek Civil War or the Berlin airlift or these other things that we do. That is the way, in fact, we have responded.

My feeling has been that, if we start from the beginning with a full spectrum of deterrents, so that the other side perceives that we have the capability and the will to cope with little as well as big ones, that we minimize the chance that we will get these probes.

Senator SYMINGTON. The truth of the matter is that when we did have nuclear supremacy, far more than nuclear superiority, on June 26, 1950, despite that supremacy, we got hit hard in Korea, did we not?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is right, sir.

CHARGES OF "PRO-COMMUNISM" DISCUSSED

Senator SYMINGTON. Now I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we do not again get into what we did get into some 10 years ago, when at the same time some people were attacking the Democratic Party as being pro-Communist, many of these same people were slashing the guts out of the military defenses of the United States.

I hope we do not get back to anything like that, because I agree with Dr. Rostow that the one thing these Communists, whether Russian or Chinese, respect most is power, all forms of power.

On the other hand, I also hope that we do not get to a point where every time someone studies the various alternatives the ifs, when, ands, and buts of a particular situation, somebody runs around and leaks an internal paper; and then once more he or she gets attacked as being pro-Communists, just because he carries out his instructions to present the various alternatives.

I have great respect and affection for every one of my colleagues in this body. But I think when we make such a big thing out of an internal NSC paper, with the President of the United States striving to maintain our position of leadership in the world, we are

doing great harm to what we cherish. The nuclear setup has changed relative power. We now have this type and character of a hearing about a paper which the Under Secretary of State, an able and experienced man, says he cannot tell even after reading the article whether the author could have ever seen the paper. I have been all through this once before since coming to the Senate and, I pray to God, from the standpoint of my children and their children, that in these serious days we do not have to go through it again.

Those are all the comments I have to make.

The CHAIRMAN. Inasmuch as the distinguished leader of the minority requested this meeting, I think it only proper that he be invited to ask questions of Mr. Rostow and the Secretary if he desires.

DEFINITION OF "DRAFT"

Senator DIRKSEN. Mr. Ball, let me get one thing anchored now that we have gone around Robin Hood's barn a little. You used the word "draft" both in the singular and the plural. I want to anchor this point.

There is a draft, is that correct?

Mr. BALL. Senator Dirksen, there has been a succession of drafts.

Senator DIRKSEN. Yes. But I am speaking about now.

Mr. BALL. Well, there is a draft at the moment.

Senator DIRKSEN. There is a draft?

Mr. BALL. But this is not an approved paper. But this is a draft. Last week there was a different draft. This is a paper that is in a constant state of process of development.

Now, after the Secretary of State has studied it he may have a number of changes. I have not studied it myself in any great detail, in the kind of detail which I expect to study it. I will have suggestions, and he will have suggestions.

Senator DIRKSEN. Except that I want to be satisfied on this record——

Mr. BALL. There will be other drafts.

Senator DIRKSEN. There is a draft of a strategy policy paper?

Mr. BALL. There is a current draft.

Senator DIRKSEN. Yes. Very well.

Mr. BALL. Yes.

"REVISED" OR "NEW" DRAFT

Senator DIRKSEN. No. 2, you spoke somewhat about revision, and you used the word "new" a number of times.

On page 5 you say, "Preparation of a new draft policy paper."

Mr. BALL. That is right, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. I would gather that "new" is something that is a little different from a revised draft. So are we speaking now about a draft that is new?

Mr. BALL. As I pointed out when President Eisenhower was inaugurated, there was at that time a Basic National Security Policy paper. He directed that that be reviewed. The period of review covered 2 years, almost into the third year of his administration.

At the conclusion of that time there was a new paper produced. It was, in a sense, a revision of the old paper. It was, in a sense, a new paper.

This is what has happened here, that when President Kennedy was inaugurated he asked that a revision—that this be completely revised, and it has been completely reviewed, and the drafts of a new paper, which is at the same time a revision of the old paper, I mean these are not mutually contradictory, these two expressions.

Senator DIRKSEN. So, No. 1, there is a current draft?

Mr. BALL. That is right.

Senator DIRKSEN. Now, No. 2, it is a new draft?

Mr. BALL. Yes, both of those things are true.

Senator DIRKSEN. Yes.

NUMBER OF COPIES OF VARIOUS DRAFTS CIRCULATED

No. 3, if you can answer it, and if there are any questions I ask that you cannot answer, feel free to say that you cannot do so. What is the circulation or diffusion of this paper throughout the agencies of Government? I would assume it goes to the Pentagon?

Mr. BALL. Yes.

Senator DIRKSEN. It would go to State?

Mr. BALL. I think I can answer that in this way, Senator Dirksen. We will give you all the agencies to which it goes.

Senator DIRKSEN. Just generally.

Mr. BALL. But I want to point out not every draft goes to all these agencies, because when a draft is completed then it is decided that certain parts need further examination, those parts, and there are a number of criticisms which are received with respect to those parts, and those parts were sent to the agencies to which they are relevant, so that not every draft goes to each agency. But I will ask Mr. Rostow to indicate what the agencies are.

Mr. ROSTOW. The agencies which have looked at it are the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, the White House staff, including such components as General Taylor, the Bureau of the Budget, as well as Mr. McGeorge Bundy's office, the Treasury, and the Office of Defense Mobilization, or what is it now called? OEP, Office of Emergency Planning. Those are the constituent members of the NSC.

In addition, because of certain of the trade statements made, we sent a copy at one stage to the Department of Commerce, which had a special interest in this.

Senator DIRKSEN. How many people, as a guess, would you say have had to look at the current draft?

Mr. BALL. At the current draft, I think it is eight.

Mr. ROSTOW. For the present draft, eight.

Senator DIRKSEN. Let us take the draft before the current draft.

Mr. ROSTOW. I think I can be helpful. I do not know whether I put it in here, but I had my office get up a listing of the number of people. Here we are.

For draft one there were 24 copies, draft two there were 127; draft three, that was when I took over, there were 28; draft four there were 20, and then a big one, 253, and 29, 29, 25, and 8.

NO COPIES MADE AVAILABLE TO CONGRESS

Senator DIRKSEN. No draft ever went to any Member of the Senate?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. And no draft ever went to any Member of the House?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. I think when the House Committee asked, you refused?

Mr. BALL. We have never been asked.

Senator DIRKSEN. I thought you were asked by a House Committee to see it.

Mr. BALL. Not to my knowledge.

Senator DIRKSEN. Government Operations.

Mr. BALL. That was the previous administration. That was Mr. Eisenhower.

Senator DIRKSEN. OK.

Senator HUMPHREY. That was the previous administration.

Senator DIRKSEN. It is not too important.

Let me ask, has it ever been leaked to any newspaper or any press association?

Mr. BALL. Not within our knowledge. This I can say very emphatically, Senator Dirksen. There is always a risk when you have this number of copies out that someone, either deliberately or inadvertently, will violate his security pledge.

Now, I think it might be useful for us to explain why so many copies come in.

The copies that went to Defense, for example, this was at the request of Secretary McNamara, Mr. Nitze and the Joints Chiefs of Staff so that the staff work could go forward and be done down the line.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DRAFT

Senator DIRKSEN. Every plan has to have an architect. They do not get up plans in all these agencies de novo, so to speak, and send them in. There has to be some kind of a top plan that goes out from your shop to the agencies.

Is it fair to say that you are the chief architect of the plan?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, it is not, Senator, and let me explain why.

I inherited a job from my distinguished predecessor. I then sat down with my colleagues in this planning group and said, "How do you think this ought to be changed? Where do we go from here?" That was what I said.

The structure that then emerged from a communal enterprise was the one I then worked to, and out of that additional guidance I produced a draft, the architecture of which was communally arrived at by——

Mr. BALL. That is an unfortunate word.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a bad word.

Mr. BALL. Communally.

Mr. ROSTOW. It was arrived at in committee.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is worse. [Laughter.]

Mr. ROSTOW. To be clear about this document, Senator Dirksen; there could hardly be in the Government a less personal document. In the end it will be the personal document of the President, and I am quite confident that he will leave his mark on it in a number of ways. But when you are covering the waterfront on issues which deeply engage our military people, our intelligence people, the men who bear responsibility for regions of the world in the bureaus, the Treasury, it is not for some bureaucrat in my slot to try to mastermind this thing.

It is not that I am shy about such ideas as I have, but in this capacity I am the servant of the group.

Senator DIRKSEN. You do not have to amplify your answers. I am just looking for short responsible answers.

Mr. ROSTOW. Right.

Senator DIRKSEN. I would guess—and this is a question that I would ask you—the chief planner makes a deep impress on the draft; yes or no? You are the boss man?

Mr. ROSTOW. In this capacity I am not the boss man. The Chairman of the Planning Council in this particular document is the servant of a group.

Within that group I express my ideas, but it is not my business to try to impose those ideas, and I tell you in all candor that this is not a draft which is in any sense really a personal draft.

Senator DIRKSEN. Now, two questions about the document, and you do not have to answer them if you so desire.

DISCUSSION OF DOMESTIC ECONOMY IN DRAFT

The first one is this: Does the draft deal both with matters in the foreign policy field and in the domestic field, and by domestic I mean our domestic economy?

Mr. ROSTOW. What is your guidance on that?

Mr. BALL. I think you can answer that.

Mr. ROSTOW. I would be delighted to answer that. There is a section in it on the domestic base which is mainly devoted to the problem of our maintaining the kind of economic and balance of payments position which is required for our world position.

Senator DIRKSEN. Is it limited to that or does it go further? Does it deal with other questions in the economy, domestic economy?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, sir; it does not.

USE OF WORD "MELLOW" IN DRAFT

Senator DIRKSEN. Now, one other question, and this one you may not want to answer. Does the draft contain the word "mellow" or "mellowed"?

Mr. BALL. This puts us in a very difficult situation.

Senator DIRKSEN. You do not have to answer it.

Mr. BALL. We are not trying to be evasive, but there is a principle that the President may, decide to alter in this case, but he has not instructed me to do it yet.

Senator DIRKSEN. There is a reason for asking the question. There were two editorials in the Dallas Morning News which carried the word "mellow," the Edwards articles carried the word

"mellow," there was one other article that came to my attention that carried the word "mellow."

I do not believe they were all of the same wire services. But this morning in the Washington Post, Mr. Murrey Marder wrote a very expository article and he used the word "mellow."

So the word "mellow" or "mellowed" with respect to the Soviet Union has appeared and reappeared five times, and I am not going to press you for an answer, but if you care to say whether that word appeared in the copy, all right, for the record.

Mr. BALL. I think with respect to that specific question that I will have to instruct Mr. Rostow not to answer that.

Senator DIRKSEN. All right, I won't press it.

Mr. ROSTOW. I never liked the word "mellow" myself.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is that?

Mr. ROSTOW. I said I never liked the word "mellow" myself. I don't think you will find it in any speech of mine.

POSSIBLE CONFLICT BETWEEN PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL VIEWS

Senator DIRKSEN. You are in a position where sometimes your personal opinion, as either expressed in one way or another or in this very substantial book which you wrote, "The United States and the World Arena," and your official views might come into conflict. But I have discovered over a long period of life, I am infinitely older than you, Mr. Rostow, that so often your personal views will assert themselves whether or not.

Let me ask you these specific questions with respect to your views and aside from the draft. You see I have been paying court to your book.

DISCUSSION OF ADVOCACY OF AUSTERITY PROGRAM FOR U.S. TO MEET SECURITY NEEDS

Do your personal views include an austerity program for our country in order to modernize Africa and other countries, a program, let us say, running over a period of 10 years?

Mr. ROSTOW. I have never conceived of any order of magnitude of foreign aid which would involve an austerity program for the United States.

Senator DIRKSEN. I am not talking about foreign aid. I am speaking about an austerity program for the people of the United States which will make it possible to extract more taxes, impose price fixing, reduce private consumption—which is the thesis of Mr. Galbraith, in his "Affluent Society"—the driving of smaller cars through a horsepower tax, which I found on page 526 of your book, possibly a sales tax, and a general austerity program to be able to finance industrialization and modernization in other countries on earth?

Mr. ROSTOW. The passage that discusses that problem was not merely a discussion, if you will check back on it, sir, of the problem of aid, which is a relatively small component in our total security outlays; it was also a discussion of the possibility of a radical increase in our military and security budget and——

Senator DIRKSEN. Is that included in the word "modernization"?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. You used the word "modernizations" and "modernization".

Mr. ROSTOW. I used the word "modernization" to refer to the underdeveloped areas. But this is discussion of a domestic policy that was generated in 1950's, when this book was written.

Senator DIRKSEN. This was written in 1960.

Mr. ROSTOW. It was published in 1960. It was written between 1955 and 1959. It included a discussion of the measures that we might have to be prepared to take in order to increase the military budget and, to some extent, the foreign aid budget, and if you look at the figures you will find that the orders of magnitude that were substantial were, almost wholly, in the military realm.

What I used there were the Panel IV figures of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Panel, and the security outlays have priority. When we have unemployed resources, as we did at certain times in the fifties, and as we do at the moment, there is no need for restraining consumption. At the moment we have radically increased our military budget and foreign aid without restraining consumption.

But if it ever came to a choice between our vital security needs and our domestic consumption, I would be prepared to advocate—to put a priority on—our vital security concern.

GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF U.S.

Senator DIRKEN. Now, in any planning that you do, quite aside from this document which admittedly does exist, you still regard the United States as a continental island off of the land mass of Eurasia, which are the terms you used?

Mr. ROSTOW. It is a geographical term, and there are other ways of looking at it. But I would be prepared to defend that as a legitimate way to look at our position in the world.

Senator DIRKSEN. So, in a geographical concept, when you are doing this work, you still take the position that we are a continental island off of the land mass of Eurasia?

Mr. ROSTOW. That it one way of looking at it. As I say, there are other ways, too.

For example, I am deeply engaged now in some of the aspects of Latin American policy. Looked at from that perspective, you can say Latin America is an extension of the continental island or part of that region—the Western Hemisphere—of which we are a part. But for certain purposes I think this is a quite illuminating way to look at our strategic position, yes, sir.

PERSONAL VIEW OF FIRST "STRIKE POLICY"

Senator DIRKSEN. Have you a personal opinion that has been uttered heretofore with respect to a first strike policy?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes, sir, I have.

Senator Dirksen. What is it?

Mr. ROSTOW. We have never had a policy of initiating war in this country. My opinion was, therefore, that it was very dangerous for us, a country which by tradition and political institutions, was unlikely to strike first, to dispose our military resources in a vulnerable form. By a vulnerable form I meant either aircraft on airfields or soft missile sites. I felt, and I still feel, that it was essential for

us to develop a second strike capability, that is, a capability which could strike the enemy even if he attacked first.

But let me be absolutely clear about one thing. A second strike capability, Polaris, Minuteman, hardened bases, does not mean you deny yourself the possibility of striking first, for example the instances that Senator Lausche raised.

Polaris, minuteman, and hardened bases give you a double option. I felt it was an unsound position for the United States to have as its only second strike capability the possibility of keeping SAC in the air. That has been my view.

Senator DIRKSEN. Is that your present view?

Mr. ROSTOW. It is, sir; yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. Is it likely that that view would impress itself on the strategic document with which you might be dealing?

Mr. ROSTOW. The answer to that question very simply is: No, sir; because the military dispositions of this administration are firmly in the hands of the President, Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and their documents, whatever they may be. I assure you, have been developed quite independently of mine.

Senator DIRKSEN. You are Chief of the Planning Council?

Mr. ROSTOW. I am the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State.

Senator DIRKSEN. And in that respect you do have influence?

Mr. ROSTOW. Some influence, yes.

AIDE-MEMOIRE ON FIRST AND SECOND STRIKE POLICY

Senator DIRKSEN. Is it true from the Pugwash Conference, you sent the President an aide-memoire for him to forsake the first strike policy?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. You did not?

Mr. ROSTOW. I sent the President a memoire.

Senator DIRKSEN. A 3,000 word memoire, was it not?

Mr. ROSTOW. The content of that memoire is a privileged communication to the President-elect and to the Secretary of State about to assume his responsibilities. But what I said in that memoire was just what I have told you, which is that no matter what the prospects for disarmament might be and I rated them very low in that memoire—whatever the prospects might be—we should proceed with the development of our second strike capability, which means Polaris, Minuteman, hardened bases; and we should proceed with the build-up of our conventional forces.

Incidentally, the Soviet scientists were very honest with me at that time—they said, "We may be interested in disarmament, but be clear that we are going to give you hell in the underdeveloped areas." I flagged the problem of the crossing of frontiers with Communist arms shipments, and I warned the President-elect and the Secretary of State-designate that that whole Pugwash exercise could have been a blind designed to lull people connected with the administration with respect to a possible Soviet strike.

Senator DIRKSEN. That aide-memoire was never published?

Mr. ROSTOW. What purported to be that aide-memoire was, I think, partially published—I do not know whether it was completely published—in some newspaper.

Senator DIRKSEN. I got the impression that you sent the President this aide-memoire and you said, "You should forsake a first strike policy."

Mr. ROSTOW. I said he should build up our second strike capability.

I want this absolutely sure for the record.

Senator DIRKSEN. Let us forget the second strike capabilities. Did you say abandon the first strike, yes or no? You can answer that.

Mr. ROSTOW. A second strike capability——

Senator DIRKSEN. Let us forget the second strike. I am interested only in the first strike.

Mr. ROSTOW. I never suggested that we build a military force that would be incapable of a first strike.

Senator DIRKSEN. That is an irrelevant and a non-responsive answer.

FIRST AND SECOND STRIKE POLICY DISCUSSED

Did you, in the aide-memoire say to the President to abandon the first strike policy of this country?

Mr. ROSTOW. I did not.

Senator DIRKSEN. You did?

Mr. ROSTOW. I did not, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. Let me just conclude. You do stand up on that answer?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. If the minority leader would be kind enough to yield, I have studied this deterrence problem for a good many years. If you build up your second strike capability you are automatically, if you want to get it into the mathematics of it, in or out of context, reducing your first strike necessity, are your not?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is right.

The point I would like in the record—because it is easy if you are not in this deterrents business to get confused—is that a second strike refers to a dual capacity.

There is nothing in the Polaris or the Minuteman or hardened bases or SAC in the air that prevents you from a first strike if you wanted to.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is what I was trying to get at.

Mr. ROSTOW. I want the record to show that.

Senator DIRKSEN. Mr. Rostow, I am not interested in the reason about first and second strikes. I was just asking a simple question. Did you send a 3,000 word aide-memoire to the President from the Pugwash Conference stating that he ought to abandon a first strike policy, and I'm not arguing whether it is good, bad, or indifferent, I am just asking it.

Mr. ROSTOW. If I had to give you a flat answer the answer would be no, I did not urge the abandonment of a first strike policy because we have never had one in this Government.

Senator SYMINGTON. Wasn't your aide-memoire prior to the inauguration of the President?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is right, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Wait a minute, will the Senator yield? I thought Eisenhower pledged at Geneva that he would never strike first.

Senator DIRKSEN. I am not getting into an argument.

Senator HUMPHREY. I just want to get this straight. If you eliminate something it has to be there.

Senator DIRKSEN. George, I am having an awful time. I thought I was a pretty good lawyer but, by God, I do not think I am.

I was asking a question and I was trying to get a very simple answer.

PERSONAL VIEWS ON NONRECOGNITION OF EAST GERMANY AND RED CHINA

Now, I'm going to ask Mr. Rostow this very simple question: Do you advocate or do you believe in the recognition of East Germany, either directly or indirectly?

Mr. ROSTOW. I do not believe in the recognition of East Germany.

Senator DIRKSEN. Do you believe that there must be a revision in our China policy?

Mr. ROSTOW. I do not believe there must be a revision in our China policy.

Senator DIRKSEN. You go along with the idea of a nonrecognition?

Mr. ROSTOW. Fully, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. And of non-admission to the United Nations?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is quite true, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. You have a conviction on that subject?

Mr. ROSTOW. I have a conviction. There are no grounds whatsoever for our changing our present policy of trying with every means at our disposal to keep them out of the United Nations.

EFFECT OF "OVERLAPPING INTERESTS" OF U.S. AND U.S.S.R. ON U.S. POLICY

Senator DIRKSEN. With all these accounts going around, the word or words "overlapping interests" appear, overlapping interests between the United States and the Soviet Union; and this, of course, is only a postscript of my own, and a matter of opinion. But I would guess that if one concluded that there were overlapping interests that might be regarded as a mellowing on the part of the Soviet Union, and might involve a change in policy.

Mr. ROSTOW. I took some pains earlier, Senator, to distinguish between changes of Soviet society which, perhaps, soften some of the harshnesses of the police state and its austerity, and changes in the power capabilities of the Soviet Union.

On this point let me read you a statement of Secretary Rusk which bears on this.

Senator DIRKSEN. But I would rather have your answer.

Mr. ROSTOW. I would be delighted to give you my answer, although I was talking in terms of existing policy.

I do not rule it out, as inconceivable that as this process of fragmentation increases, and as the pressures within the bloc increase, that certain areas of limited overlapping interests might emerge.

I cited as one example of this the Austrian Treaty. Both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy tried unsuccessfully to see if there was an area of overlapping interest with respect to a test ban treaty, and that failed on the issue of inspection.

We are not discussing the possibilities of a very limited area of overlapping interests in the exploration of space.

What has thus far happened with respect to overlapping interests is relatively minor. But I should say all administrations since the war have been prepared to make agreements where they found there was something which was on balance in our interest which the Soviets were willing to do.

I would only add that no such agreements made are ever going to be self-enforcing. Just as it is going to take endless vigilance and strength on our side to hold access to Berlin, it is going to take endless vigilance and the will to make it stick to hold this rather tenuous agreement in Laos, but I would not rule out for whatever reasons—not, I should say, reasons of mellowing, but changes in the power position of the Communist bloc—that might find in the future limited areas of overlapping interests where we might make agreements.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield? What exactly do you mean by overlapping interests?

Senator DIRKSEN. I am trying to find out.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean a common interest in a certain objective? Is there any other way that you can describe what overlapping interests mean? Can you describe your concept of it? Would the Antarctic Treaty, which was negotiated by the previous administration, be an example of this?

Mr. ROSTOW. Precisely, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. "Overlapping" seems to me a rather awkward way to put it. It is a common interest, is it not?

Mr. ROSTOW. A very limited area of a common interest.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Antarctic Treaty would be an example of that?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is right, sir.

ATTITUDE TOWARD QUEMOY AND MATSU

Senator DIRKSEN. Do you believe that we ought to pressure Chiang Kai-Shek to give up Quemoy and Matsu?

Mr. ROSTOW. I should say certainly not, sir, at the present time.

Senator DIRKSEN. At the present time?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is right. The history of this, as you in the Senate know very well, is that the Treaty of 1955 left an ambiguity about the area of our responsibility and, as you know, there is an honest military debate which has been running as to whether these islands are a net asset or net liability.

I myself do not have a firm opinion on this.

What I would say is that in any advice that I would give from where I sit, we should take very much into account, in any move we make with respect to this matter, the effects on the psychological and political position on Formosa itself, and on the whole position in Southeast Asia. At the moment, as nearly as I can peer

ahead, we are in a situation where these political and psychological factors are of very high importance.

Now, if the responsible military advice was that it would be a net advantage militarily to concentrate those forces and get them off the islands—and if the political and psychological environment was very different from what it is now, I would not rule out the possibility of an alternative position.

But, as of now, I would certainly not support applying pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to get off the offshore islands.

ATTITUDE TOWARD RS-70 AND NIKE-ZEUS ANTIMISSILE MISSILE

Senator DIRKSEN. Since you have been emphasizing military strength at different times this afternoon, did you recommend against the RS-70, and also the Nike-Zeus anti-missile missile?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, sir. I have never had anything to do with those.

Senator DIRKSEN. You made no such recommendations?

Mr. ROSTOW. Not to my knowledge.

Senator DIRKSEN. You expressed no opinion on the subject?

Mr. ROSTOW. No one has ever asked me, so far as I know.

Senator DIRKSEN. Well, it came up somewhere or other—it could not have come up in this book here.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where do you get all these papers? You seem to be closer to the administration than the administration.

Senator DIRKSEN. I just do my homework.

Senator SYMINGTON. Slip them to me some time, I would like to see them.

Mr. ROSTOW. Nobody asked me about those.

BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION

Senator DIRKSEN. Do you go in for bilateral negotiations with the U.S.S.R., quite aside from "old friends," and you know what I mean by "old friends"? I am thinking of de Gaulle, of Adenauer, and probably others. Do you think we ought to carry on such negotiations unless they are parties to it?

Mr. ROSTOW. I think it would be disruptive of everything we are trying to build in the Atlantic Community if we were to go into negotiations on issues vital to Germany and to France without their participation.

I am quite clear that the dialog our Secretary has been conducting with the Russians in no way involves a negotiation without the knowledge of or contrary to the interests of our "old friends."

VIEWS ON UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT

Senator DIRKSEN. If you believe that the Soviet Union was mellowing, do you have an opinion with respect to the unilateral disarmament?

Mr. ROSTOW. I sure do.

Senator DIRKSEN. What is it?

Mr. ROSTOW. I think this is as unwise a policy as I could conceive of in the world in which we live.

VIEWS ON A "FEDERALIZED WORLD"

Senator DIRKSEN. Did I gather from your book "United States and the World Arena," that you do favor somewhat a federalized world?

Mr. ROSTOW. In the quite technical sense that there are certain kinds of problems that we have to handle on a basis larger than a national unit, as through NATO or other treaties, I am sure that the nature of interdependence requires that we deal with certain kinds of problems on an international basis. But this is a small "f," I have never been a World Federalist.

I think we are a very long way from, if indeed we ever come to, any such concept. But the facts of interdependence in this world, the interdependence between what we do and what the Vietnamese do, between what we do and the Thais do; between what we do and the Chinese Nationalists do; between what we do and the people of Berlin do; and what we do and what all of NATO does, make it essential that on all such international problems we try to work out international solutions.

Senator DIRKSEN. Didn't you utter the view that the ultimate end was a federalized world with the United Nations playing a very large role in the whole field of foreign policy?

Mr. ROSTOW. I do not know what passage you refer to. What I have envisaged is that the point to which you get through the cold war and through the many other stumbling block—is a world organized in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, which is a very reputable document.

But this, I think, you will find, in the context, is a vision very far down the track. It would come only after the most radical kind of internal and external changes in Russia and in China. This is a long run vision of a world which really lives by the charter, which I would like to see or I would like to see my children see. But it is a long way down the track and has very little to do with the problems for which I now bear responsibility.

Senator DIRKSEN. Did I read in the book that you had the view we should be very cautious about not humiliating the Soviet Union in any time of crisis, which I sort of spun out in my mind as a kind of no-win policy?

Mr. ROSTOW. I do not remember any such passage. But I do think that when you are in a crisis, and you are dealing with an enemy who has nuclear weapons, you want to make sure that when you are bringing force to bear you are doing so on the grounds where you really are prepared to back your play, and I think that you have to protect your vital interests with all the strength at your command, and you have to bring to bear a judgment of where your vital interests are, and for what things you are prepared to go to war.

The problem, as I see it, is the problem of knowing where your vital interests are and backing them.

DEFINITION AND VIEWS ON NATIONHOOD

Senator DIRKSEN. What do you mean when you use the word "nationhood"?

Mr. ROSTOW. Nationhood?

Senator DIRKSEN. Yes.

Mr. ROSTOW. Nationhood is the concept we bring to bear in looking at the underdeveloped societies which have developed out of some kind of traditional structure, where they did not have much consciousness that they were a unified nation, the people of Laos, for example.

Senator DIRKSEN. But we are in that respect then a unified nation?

Mr. ROSTOW. We are indeed, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. But didn't you say or didn't you write that it would be in the interest of America that our nationhood should end?

Mr. ROSTOW. Could you read me the passage? This may have been looking far down the road to a very distant world. You might move toward a federalized world in the very long run. I do not recall the passage.

Senator DIRKSEN. Doctor, it is a terribly important thing in my book, because I go back now to the thesis that I have, how do you disassociate your opinions, convictions that you have had and that you have uttered as a professor and as a planner, and how do you shuck them all to one side now when you start working with a strategy document? Now, you can see that we have some concern about this document.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you quote the passage?

Senator DIRKSEN. I do not know where it is. I have 30, 40 pages marked in there. It would take me quite a while to find it.

DISCUSSION OF ROSTOW'S BOOK "UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD ARENA"

Mr. ROSTOW. Senator Dirksen, that whole book is built around the concept of the U.S. national interest. I defined that national interest in an appendix in which I state the fundamentals on which I think our military and our non-military policy should be based.

I spent a lot of time tracing through the whole history of our concept of the national interest. That is not a book about the giving up of nationhood. That is an account of how this country has defended its national interest over the years, and it ends up with a prescription of military policy and foreign policy in terms of that national interest.

I just do not accept the image of that book as being some sort of a fuzzy federalist view of the future of my country that you are trying to imply.

Senator DIRKSEN. But I have been reading some of your most current speeches, wherever they were made——

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield to me for just a moment? I did not intend to bring this in, but what you read reminded me of this paragraph, and I quote:

"We should keep that distinction in mind. The time may come—I believe it will come—when Russians of stature will patriotically put first their national security and the welfare of their people. They will be unwilling to have that security and that welfare subordinated to the world-wide ambitions of international communism. If their point of view should prevail, then indeed there could be a

basis for worthwhile negotiation and practical agreements between the United States and the new Russia. Then there might be reactivated the historic friendship between our countries and our peoples."

That is quote from a speech of John Foster Dulles on February 16, 1955.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is very unfair to bring it up at this time. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me what you are getting at here is that Mr. Dulles, as Mr. Rostow and others, very likely, have envisioned the hope, at least, that at some point in the future some accommodation could take place, whether the Soviet Union or others. Many people have indulged in such dreams.

Senator DIRKSEN. The question is how is it accomplished?

The CHAIRMAN. He does not say.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I contribute a bit? I simply cannot agree that you can, by declaration or fiat, eliminate nationalism, and you cannot eliminate the nationalism of the Russians. It makes no difference how they have tried to internationalize them, their Volga and their vodka, their Pushkin and Dostoievsky, and their hunger will keep them united as a nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Neither of those statements say that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Dulles says their nationalism will emerge, come to the surface, and with that they will throw overboard international communism, and that is what is going to happen.

The CHAIRMAN. What I meant is he envisions at some time there may be some slackening of the cold war. That is about all it means, and I assume that was what you meant there, Mr. Rostow.

Senator DIRKSEN. I will read to you from your book.

Mr. ROSTOW. Sure.

Senator DIRKSEN. "Put another way, it is a legitimate American national objective to see removed from all nations, including the United States, the right to use substantial military force, to pursue their own interests. Since this residual right is the root of national sovereignty and the basis for the existence of an international arena of power, it is, therefore, an American interest to see an end to nationhood as it has been historically defined."

Mr. ROSTOW. This is precisely the long-run position we take in our disarmament proposals. Down at the end of the road what we would like to see is the disciplining of the nuclear weapons in a world under law.

This is the officially enunciated policy of two administrations.

This was the end of a long book, and it looks down the track of our disarmament treaties.

I myself do not expect to see soon such disarmament treaties because, as I pointed out earlier, of the Communist attitude toward inspection and, as the quote——

Senator SYMINGTON. You can hope for it.

Mr. ROSTOW. You can hope for it, and if you are drawing a large vision, as we do in our disarmament proposals, we talk about a world under law where nuclear weapons are disciplined. But this has nothing to do, as it had nothing to do in this book, with the prescriptions for policy in the world as it is now.

Senator DIRKSEN. I have one more question.

Senator HUMPHREY. Before you leave that topic, will you yield? If it is not contrary to any recent rulings of the court, I might add that there was even such a hope voiced in the Scripture lessons where nations shall not make war upon nations. You shall beat swords into plowshares.

The CHAIRMAN. That is unconstitutional. [Laughter.]

Senator DIRKSEN. I think operationally as well as idealistically that we are concerned with an operational approach to problems that confront us at the present time.

WHEN WAS BOOK WRITTEN?

Now, one other question: When was the last chapter of this book written? It was copyrighted in 1960.

Mr. ROSTOW. It was written in 1959—no, sorry, sir, 1958 before I went on sabbatical leave to Europe. The publisher then wanted me to shorten the first part of the book, so the published edition of the book was postponed a year, and 1958 was the time, I should say, when that was written.

Senator DIRKSEN. Does that include appendix A, the national interest?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. What intrigued my curiosity was that Cuba is not mentioned in this book.

Mr. ROSTOW. I do not know the date of the take-over of Cuba.

Mr. BALL. December 1958.

Mr. ROSTOW. I left for England in September 1958.

Mr. BALL. December 1959.

AVAILABILITY OF NSC DRAFT PAPER

Senator DIRKSEN. Now, the question is when do we get a look at this document?

Mr. BALL. I think I will have to answer that. I will tell you what the situation is. If the committee wants to make a request to the President, he will make that decision, and I do not know what decision he will make. But this is a document which is under the control of the National Security Council, and this is a document for him, and so I am not in position where I could release the document.

Senator DIRKSEN. George, I always respect executive privilege. I always have. But I add one postscript. The Senate of the United States and the House also, but the Senate particularly, has a real constitutional interest in the whole question of foreign policy, and I am not a member of this committee, but I would like to be advised before we ever get too far down the road to be able to make my own determination, whether we are on the right or the wrong road. If it is the wrong road, I want to raise unexampled hell. If it is the right road, I am willing to stand up for the President any old time, and I have stood up with him on occasions when I caught unshirted hell, as you well know.

Mr. BALL. Senator Dirksen, let me say this. In the statement I submitted earlier I pointed out that the Secretary of State will be back this week. I know he had intended, as a matter of fact, he has cabled me that he looked forward to the chance to come up and

talk with the committee, and I think he wants to talk as fully and as freely as possible about all of our policies, both contemplated and for the present.

This document does not reflect those policies necessarily. This document is a document at the moment with no status in a sense that it has not been approved as policy by anybody.

This is a document within the planning process. The Secretary has not studied it carefully, I have not studied it carefully, and the President of the United States has not studied it carefully.

Senator DIRKSEN. But its very purport is to be a foundation for policy.

Mr. BALL. That is right, and we are always prepared to come and discuss policy, and this is something we not only are prepared to do, we feel an obligation to do.

The CHAIRMAN. You do do it all the time—every time we request it. We hardly have time for anything else.

Mr. BALL. I must say that so far as Secretary Rusk and I are concerned we consider the opportunity of consulting with this committee as something which is of enormous value to us, and we want to be as forthcoming as possible because we feel we get a great deal out of this.

Senator DIRKSEN. Suppose we call this a first round.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all? Senator Humphrey.

IMPORTANCE OF IDEALS

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to take much time. I have not asked many questions particularly because this is an opportunity to learn. I do not want my silence on this matter to be interpreted as indicating a lack of interest or disinterest or of complete agreement.

I think the testimony we have heard has been brilliant. It has been informative. It surely has been comprehensive.

I have a feeling, however, when witnesses are cross-examined by those who are critical of your policy, there is a tendency to underplay what I think is a very important aspect of foreign policy, as it is of life itself, namely ideals.

I want to say, Dr. Rostow, I surely thought your statement on being tough, as you described it, was splendid. The Congress of the United States knows how to be very tough, and many private and public citizens know how to be "tough" because we do not have to make the tough decisions. But every man speaks for himself. In my limited experience in life, most of the success that I have had has not come from being tough but from being good, kind, and considerate. I still think people are people whether they are in the Soviet Union or they are here. I happen to believe that one of the great mistakes of foreign policy over a long period of time is our inability to project the real ideals and the real spirit of this country. I believe that those ideals and those objectives have to be backed up by the kind of power you have talked about.

DISCUSSION OF UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT

I also was much impressed with your statement on unilateral disarmament. I have been chairman of the Subcommittee on Disarmament. I have never believed in unilateral disarmament. I have attempted to make it clear. This whole subject matter of disarmament is a difficult subject, but there are two ways to get unilateral disarmament. One is by a policy decision to disarm unilaterally, which we have been opposed to as a Government and as a people.

The other way is by budget philosophy. I have long believed that during preceding years in the name of fiscal responsibility we have conducted a policy of unilateral disarmament. I thoroughly agree with what you said in reference to balanced forces and being able to have many alternatives or many selections to make from our whole arsenal of power.

But one of the weaknesses, I feel, in recent years has been the fact that we did have a budget philosophy which, in a sense, had limited unilateral disarmament built into it. In other words, we had a fiscal policy here, that made it possible for us to pay for whatever armament we had without hurting anybody, without any austerity at all. The Russians could also pay for it without too much pressure. Today they have to do some double takes. In other words, they have to make decisions today, whether they are going to maintain the arms race with us or whether they are going to have to reverse themselves and ask for some reduction in armaments. I fully concur in the policy that we are now pursuing. I say that on the power aspects.

But I do not like to hear my people whom I admire greatly, and the administration that I support, ever duck away from being, as some people call it, a do-gooder. I think to do good is the best power in the world. I have been brought up to believe that, and I believe it is really the power. I think that one of the real things that we need to do in our foreign policy is to emphasize that we are not ashamed of being somewhat sentimental, that we are idealistic. If you have strength you do not need to tell anybody about it. Joe Louis did not have to flex his muscles when he went down the street saying, "I am champ." They knew it. If you have the goods to deliver they understand it. John D. Rockefeller does not have to stand up and say, "I am rich." People know it. The only ones who talk about being rich are the paupers or the Billie Sol Estes, and the rest of the phonies.

I yield.

Senator SYMINGTON. You mentioned ideals. You would also want in a Department of State various ideas, would you not?

Senator HUMPHREY. Indeed. I do not think you can have any ideas without ideals.

CHANGES IN RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE U.S.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would ask the Senator if he does not agree that ever since 1945 the relative strength of this country as against the strength of the Communists has been going down, the relative strength, because the strength of the Communists has been going up, all the time. That Communist strength will naturally be fur-

ther increased if and when the Chinese Communists become a nuclear power; isn't that a fair observation?

Senator HUMPHREY. It surely is, to my point of view.

Senator SYMINGTON. I remember sometime back when some felt we could not afford, and said so frankly, the military establishment the Joint Chiefs felt was essential to security. We cut our defenses up. I can remember going to Berlin in 1958 during one of the periodic crises to find our troops were using World War I weapons—not World War II, World War I weapons—facing the Russians in West Berlin.

So I am sympathetic to what the able Senator from Minnesota says about not getting over-budget conscious.

I hope we do not get back to a position where we first are cussing out the Communists all the time—implying you are not a good American unless you are constantly cussing at them—but at the same time cannot afford adequate defenses, so cut the military budget. Clearly the growing rift between the Russian Communists and the Chinese Communists is a matter that should be considered by those who have the responsibility of formulating the foreign policy of the United States. To that end, as I see it, we should not be attacking them both all the time.

ANSWERING CRITICISM

Senator HUMPHREY. My only point in raising what I did is that I sense in this country a tendency on the part of those who have responsibility for policymaking always to attempting to answer the criticism that may come from the political right—there is not any political left in the United States that amounts to anything. I recognize that one has to answer this criticism, and I am not saying that has been the criticism here today. But I know that if people get to pounding away with criticism, it is entirely possible that policymakers or advisers to the President can get themselves into a position where they have no real flexibility.

I think it is the duty of a counselor and adviser to the President to state very frankly, as has been said here today, that you do change your views when there are new figures which come in, new information. I hope so. There is the book that you have written, and if there are things wrong in your book you ought to be the first to admit it. It does not mean you are wrong. I hope the military changes their views once in a while. I think it would be good to get some general over here to find out what their plans are for a possible attack or whether they are still going on the basis of "Remember the Maine," or "Remember the Alamo." I cannot imagine it.

My point is that I am getting a little fed up with criticism coming from one side and the Government always having to answer that criticism. It is the same with the business world today saying that this is an anti-business administration. This is sort of political blackmail so that everybody has to prove that we are not.

What about being anti-people? Maybe the people ought to find out something. I do not believe it is, do not misunderstand me. But I happen to be a fellow who forms policy two kinds of ways. I think the big weakness has been that we are afraid of ourselves.

That is my speech for today. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. That was a good speech.
[Discussion off the record.]

STATEMENTS OF EISENHOWER AND DULLES

The CHAIRMAN. On the record. I want to complete this record, Mr. Reporter. I want to insert for the record certain statements that I have prepared which are from President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles, which are very much along the lines of many of the statements that have been discussed here.

[The document referred to follows:]

COMMENTS OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND SECRETARY DULLES REGARDING SHIFTING ATTITUDES AND REVERSALS INSIDE THE COMMUNIST BLOC

I. EISENHOWER

(1) "They changed their policies very markedly. They were depending on force and the threat of force only. And suddenly they have gone into an entirely different attitude. They are going into the economical and political fields and are really wearing smiles around the world instead of some of the bitter faces to which we have become accustomed." (Informal remarks to American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 21, 1956.)

(2) ". . . In foreign affairs, the new (Soviet) regime has seemingly moderated the policy of violence and hostility which has caused the free nations to band together to defend their independence and liberties. For the present, at least, it relies more on political and economic means to spread its influence abroad." (Also to American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 21, 1956.)

(3) ". . . Yet the Kremlin itself, coming to recognize some of the deficiencies of extreme centralization, has just embarked upon a drastic re-organization of its massive bureaucracy. Soviet rulers have felt compelled to allow some small part of government to gravitate closer to the people." (Speech at the Governors' Conference in Williamsburg, June 25, 1957.)

(4) "I want to make clear I believe they (the Russians) are as earnestly desirous of finding peace as we are." (Extemporaneous remarks made at Geneva Summit meeting in July 1955 and quoted by James Reston in the New York Times.)

(5) He is also quoted by Barry Goldwater in *Why Not Victory* as being "misled into proclaiming the 'dawning of a new day in world relations'" during the Geneva meeting in July 1955.

* * * * * * *

II. DULLES

(1) "The Government and the people of the United States want to develop better relations with the Soviet nation. Our hope for the future derives from *our belief* (underscore added) that the Soviet Government will, sooner or later, come to see that the advantage to it is better relations with the West is far greater than the local and passing advantages which it could gain at the price of forfeiting the good relationship, which, at the summit conference, the Soviet rulers seemed to want." (Closing statement to Foreign Ministers Conference, November 16, 1958.)

(2) ". . . I think they (the Soviets) made very little progress in the last few years, and the proof of it is that at this very moment, in Moscow, they are having to revise their whole program. If we had to go through such a revision and change of our whole program as they are undergoing, it would be advertised all over the world that we had failed. The fact is, they have failed, and they have got to devise new policies . . .

"Those policies have gradually ceased to produce any results from them. The free nations have banded together, shown their strength, shown their unity to an increasing degree, so that that policy was not producing any positive results.

"The result is, they have got to review their whole creed, from A to Z. It is a tremendous process for them, because they have got to undo the teaching of many years and get onto a new basis. What that new basis is going to be, I do not know, because their Congress is still sitting, as we are sitting here today. But one thing that is absolutely certain is that the unity and firmness and resolution of the free

nations during the past few years have caused the old Soviet policy to fail, and today they are trying to figure out how they are going to get a better one." (Comments made during exchange with Senator Fulbright at Foreign Relations Committee meeting, February 24, 1956. These comments caused George F. Kennan to remark: "I don't recognize the world Mr. Dulles is talking about.")

(3) (There is) "some reason to believe that the Soviet Union itself would welcome relief from the present burden of armament" because of the Soviet population's "very considerable dissatisfaction with low living standards." (Facts on File quote from appearance before Senate Subcommittee.)

(4) "Undoubtedly, we see an elemental, personal struggle for power. But also one can perceive the outlines of a basic policy difference. There must be those who are primarily concerned with the welfare, security, and greatness of the Soviet Union and its people. There are others who would have the Soviet Union and its power serve primarily as a tool of international communism and as a means of achieving its worldwide ambitions. These two ends, the one symbolized by the State, the other by the Party, do not always coincide.

"To us, the Party and the State in Russia usually seem indistinguishable, because many individuals serve in dual capacities. but Lenin and Stalin constantly emphasized the distinction between the two. 'The Party,' said Stalin, 'is not and cannot be identified with the State power.' "

"We should keep that distinction in mind. The time may come—I believe it will come—when Russians of stature will patriotically put first their national security and the welfare of their people. They will be unwilling to have that security and that welfare subordinated to the world-wide ambitions of international communism. If their point of view should prevail, then indeed there could be a basis for worthwhile negotiation and practical agreements between the United States and the new Russia. Then there might be reactivated the historic friendship between our countries and our peoples." (Foreign Policy Association, New York Speech, February 16, 1955.)

(5) ". . . I was very glad to note that Mr. Chou En-lai quoted with apparent approval one statement which I had made to the general effect that whatever were the differences which divided countries it should not be sought to resolve that difference by use of force, and I thought in general the tone of the speech indicated his going further in the renunciation of force than anything he had said before." (News conference of August 2, 1955.)

". . . The release of the fliers, the release of the civilians, if it comes about, such statements as are made by Chou En-lai, if I interpret them right and if they are sincere and permanent parts of policy, might mark the beginning of a new phase in Chinese Communist relations with the rest of the world." (News conference of August, 1955.)

The CHAIRMAN. Last, I want to compliment you, Mr. Rostow and the Secretary for, I think, a very interesting and informative session. I think you both did a great deal of good to the committee.

I called on you, Senator Williams, when you were away. Do you wish to ask any questions?

Senator WILLIAMS. Neither speech nor questions. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Neither one.

QUESTION OF "LEAKS"

The last thing I want to say is this is the second time we have had in recent years the case of security leakage. You had one in the Secretary's memorandum on the Department of Defense, which was very embarrassing. If there is anything that needs to be done, it is something needs to be done, about security.

Mr. BALL. We are working very actively on this.

PUBLISHING THE HEARING RECORD

The CHAIRMAN. Here we are faced with the difficulty of publicizing this record. I am not at liberty without the authority of the committee to make the record public. With a few emendations I

rather think it would be helpful if it were. But this matter will have to be submitted to the committee as a whole.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I have one question. Did you sign this circulated document?

Mr. ROSTOW. Only as the dispatcher.

Senator SYMINGTON. Does this document have your signature or just a covering letter?

Mr. ROSTOW. A covering letter.

Senator SYMINGTON. Not a signed document of yours?

Mr. ROSTOW. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman is not authorized to make public these executive hearings. I think this has been a very informative discussion. But the committee will consider at a later date as to whether or not it should be printed. If it is I would certainly think that it should be edited by you gentlemen.

As so often happens, we have some of our most interesting meetings under the unusual circumstances. When we have a regular meeting there is nobody here, and the questions are uninteresting and dull. Today I think the committee performed extremely well. The Senator from Missouri and the Senator from Minnesota and everybody else, I think, asked extremely pertinent questions, and the answers were very enlightening. It is one of the best meetings we have had under the very unusual circumstances.

I personally would think it would be useful if your statement and the responses could be made public, but I cannot do it at the present time, and I do not know whether we will do it at all.

Senator SYMINGTON. We will bring it up at a later meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. We will bring it up at a later meeting. If it is, of course, for security reasons and others, you will have the opportunity to edit it because that is necessary, but we will think about that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, questions were asked against a book. I am sure the Chairman agrees that, if Dr. Rostow believes there is anything out of context it would be proper for him to go to any length he desires in further explanation of the thoughts expressed in that book.

The CHAIRMAN. That is certainly right.

Under the rules of the committee, I have no right to make an executive record public. If the committee votes that it should be, as a matter of public interest, and that will be determined by the committee, then I am certain they would also agree that for security reasons it ought to be edited. But whether or not that is done depends on the future. As of the moment it is my purpose not to make either the statement or anything public other than just an observation which I have to make to the press in describing the meeting this afternoon.

The record is over and is closed.

[Whereupon, at 6:45 p.m., the committee adjourned subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, JUNE 29, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered into executive session at 11:40 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Church, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Williams.

On motion by Senator Hickenlooper, and without objection, the committee approved for favorable report the nominations of William H. Orrick, Jr., to be Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration; Charles Edward Rhetts, to be Ambassador to Liberia; William M. Rountree, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Sudan; Samuel D. Berger, et al., to be Career Ministers in the Foreign Service; and Sverre M. Backe, et al., for promotion and appointments in the Foreign Service. On reconsideration, and at the request of Senator Lausche, the last list was held over.

The nomination of Matthew H. McCloskey to be Ambassador to Ireland was held over for future consideration.

On voice vote, and without objection, the committee approved for favorable report the International Wheat Agreement (Executive D, 87th Congress, 2nd Session).

At the suggestion of the Chairman, and by unanimous consent, the committee approved for report the nomination of Leonard Unger to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Laos. The 6-day rule on nominations was waived.

On motion by Senator Lausche, and without objection, the committee favorably reported the bill (S. 3252), To amend the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.

The committee next considered the printing of the presentation made by Walt W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, before the committee on June 26. The Chairman stated that the rule of the committee was that no executive hearing should be made public without the affirmative action of the committee. The Chairman pointed out that executive hearings with General MacArthur and in the U-2 case were printed for public information after editing, and by approval of the committee, and that to print the Rostow testimony under the same conditions constituted no precedent. The Chairman then suggested that the State Department go over the presentation made by Mr. Rostow, with the purpose of editing, and if the Department

then had no objection to publication, then each member look at his own testimony for the purposes of coherence and correction.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 11:45 p.m.]

THE WORLD SITUATION

TUESDAY, JULY 3, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J.W. Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Lausche, Symington, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Denney, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Newhouse of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased this morning to have the Secretary of State who has just returned from a trip to Europe and has come to report to us upon the results of his meetings with the various important leaders of the free world.

[The committee informally discussed the proposed printing of executive testimony previously given by Walt W. Rostow, Counselor of the Department of State.]

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, may I say by prolonging the other matter, it would be my inclination not to object to the publication of that testimony. But there would be one or two matters such as the discussion of a first strike we might want to withdraw.

The CHAIRMAN. For security?

Secretary RUSK. I would like to speak to the President.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, let me say based on my past experience in a matter of this character for some 8 or 9 years if I may respectfully say so, it is mighty important for the standpoint of the future of the State Department and foreign policy that this testimony be released at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I would like very much to rely wholly upon the executive character of this meeting because in connection with my trip there is no middle ground between some bland generalizations and some extremely candid discussion of individuals and personalities, because that was the essence of my visit, and I would like to speak in the frankest terms. Perhaps if the committee would be good enough to let me take certain personality allusions out of the record or go off the record when I discuss certain aspects of it——

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is proper.

When we are dealing with personalities, we are very sensitive and the committee usually honors the request of the Secretary when he gets into personalities and we certainly want you to be frank about it for our information.

I think our committee will respect that this is executive in every respect and even to the point of where you feel that the personal references shouldn't be on the record at all, I think that would be perfectly proper.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ELIMINATION OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH FRANCE

First, let me comment on how the idea of this particular trip arose.

At the NATO meeting in Athens I had private conversations with both the French and the German Foreign Ministers, and both of those conversations indicated that an early visit to those two capitals would be a very good thing.

In the case of Mr. Couve de Murville, we both felt that our relations were showing unnecessary strain because of misunderstandings which have been kicked up by press speculation, public speculation, rumors, whispers, and gossip at cocktail parties in Paris and in Washington, and that we ought to take this problem on systematically and try to work it out.

We agreed that we should undertake a thorough bilateral tour de raison looking broadly across our entire relationship, registering that wide range of problems on which we are, in fact in agreement, eliminating the misunderstandings that simply have grown up on the basis of misinformation or misinterpretation, and where we found ourselves in disagreement to try to make those disagreements extremely precise, narrow them as much as possible, and then consider how to manage them in such a way as to not infect the general range of our relationships.

As a result of that I had three meetings here in Washington with the French Ambassador before I went on the trip and then followed it up with meetings in Paris with Mr. Couve de Murville and General de Gaulle.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN GERMANY

The situation in Germany was somewhat different. I think that you will have to bear in mind in the months ahead that the Chancellor is now moving toward the end of his public service. Just when has not beem determined.

The CHAIRMAN. What is his age now?

Secretary RUSK. He is now 86. The result of that is that there is a good deal of maneuvering and jockeying just underneath the Chancellor with respect to the future leadership of the Federal Republic.

This means that men who have ordinarily worked very closely together tend now to be eyeing each other a little cautiously. It means that leaks, distorted leaks have become a part of the political process. It means that the Chancellor himself is exposed to gossip and rumor and the odd and passing remark which he is not

always in a position properly to evaluate in his rather isolated position.

The foreign minister felt that it would be important if I could come to Bonn, never having been there, and talk about some of the central problems of the alliance, particularly Berlin, and the nuclear position in the alliance, with the leadership of the several parties, CDU, the FDP and the Socialist Party, to try to help them build a national approach to these great issues, and also to have a further talk with the Chancellor.

Having decided to go to those two capitals then certain other things inevitably followed. It was felt although I had not planned to go to Berlin myself because I didn't feel I could spend a great deal of time there and I thought a short visit might be looked upon with dismay, I was strongly advised both by Mayor Brandt and the Germans in Bonn that even a visit of 3 hours would be better than no visit at all so I included a short visit to Berlin on that trip. Then I found that Rome was extremely insistent that I could not go to Paris and Bonn without paying a visit in Rome, too; so I put in a day and a half there.

I wanted to go by Lisbon to have a talk with Dr. Salazar and the Prime Minister there because of the forthcoming negotiations on the Azores base which have already been opened up with them. I did come by London for a day there with the Foreign Office, and took a day off and went up to Oxford to receive a degree.

Let me say first about Paris General de Gaulle——

[Discussion off the record.]

RESISTANCE TO BRITISH IN COMMON MARKET

Secretary RUSK. Throughout I found in Paris they expected these negotiations to succeed. I found that there did not seem to be any political resistance to the idea of British entry into the Common Market. I think there is perhaps in Paris somewhat more resignation or acceptance than real enthusiasm, at least as far as the top leadership of the present government is concerned although there is very great interest among many French leaders for the idea.

There still was a little nostalgia about it in Paris and in Bonn for a little Europe, the Europe of the six, a little feeling that with the introduction of the British, the Norwegians, the Danes, and the Irish, that this would dilute the essentially continental character of a unified Europe and would delay the genuine construction of a closely integrated European political organization.

But, nevertheless in Paris they seemed to expect success in these negotiations without underplaying or minimizing the great difficulty, technical difficulty of some of the trading issues which are now being negotiated.

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection did they evidence any sympathy without position and difficulties on trade especially in agriculture?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I think they are fully aware of it. We are being kept informed on these matters through our representation in Brussels, and we have emphasized all along that they must not come to trading arrangements, comfortable with themselves at great cost to us. We are watching that very carefully and made in-

sistent representations on our own great trading interests in Europe. We think we will have a good deal more information on that by the end of this month as these present discussions go forward between the United States and the Common Market.

They are not being secretive about this with us, they are keeping us well-informed on what has happened.

Senator CARLSON. Can I get into this for just a moment?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, Senator Carlson.

PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR COMMONWEALTH

Senator CARLSON. Can Great Britain become a member of the Common Market without giving preferential consideration to trade with Canada and Australia?

Secretary RUSK. Apparently what they are working toward is a provisional arrangement, a disappearing arrangement which would carry them on a modified basis up to 1970.

Now, the big issue is going to be what happens in 1970, whether you take your chances on being able to work out worldwide arrangements before 1970, which would help deal with the Australian-Canadian problem as well as help us with some of ours, or whether any guarantee is now given to the Commonwealth members of what happens after 1970.

We ourselves are opposed to any guarantees for the indefinite future on a preferential basis. We made that very strong and very clear to all parties here. We don't believe we should be the residual holders of all the difficulties here and if Australia and Canada get long-term guarantees we should not be the risk bearers in this matter.

Senator CARLSON. It concerns me greatly; that is the reason I asked the question.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, this is a tight and tough point which has not been fully resolved yet. But the commonwealth problem is, of course, the critical one for Britain, both in terms of its international commitments and in terms of the domestic political possibility of swinging this in Britain itself.

If the Commonwealth interests there were deeply opposed then there would be a very close political matter as to whether Britain could in fact politically join the Common Market.

THE BERLIN MATTER

In all the capitals directly involved we talked about the Berlin matter, and I must say in Paris they were much more relaxed about it than they have been up to this point.

I did tell them that their prediction that we would not find a clearly satisfactory basis for negotiation on Berlin had thus far been correct and General de Gaulle reciprocated by saying his earlier fears that these discussions with the Soviet Union would upset the alliance and cause great misgivings particularly to countries like Germany had not proved out.

They thought that his earlier fears had been exaggerated. I think that the gap closed considerably on that, and if I have to go to Geneva some weekend to sign an agreement on Laos, the prospect is that the three Western foreign ministers will probably see Gro-

myko for an evening, and see whether anything more can be said on Berlin than has thus far been said. But there was general agreement in Paris, London, and Bonn about the Berlin question, and the handling of it and the nature of the issues, and that was one of the more gratifying parts of the visit to find that we were all working on the same line on that point.

LINKAGE WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The nuclear matter came in for some discussion in France. We did not get very far with it for two reasons: One is that the French have nothing of any consequence in prospect at the moment as an operational matter, therefore, they look upon this as something of a hypothetical political problem.

Second, they want to get the Common Market negotiations out of the way because if Britain comes into Europe then the general shape of some of these problems, such as the organization of NATO or the nuclear problem may take on a somewhat different form. I do not mean to suggest in that that there has been any linkage in these negotiations on the Common Market with nuclear assistance or nuclear weapons. That had been rumored. Both France and Great Britain had given us complete assurance that nuclear matters are not being drawn into these discussions, they are not being made a matter of bargaining with respect to the Common Market, and that these are for later discussion with us in the alliance, but I got the impression that the French nuclear program is going ahead in any event. It was started before de Gaulle. It seemed clear to me they are going ahead with it after de Gaulle. That he is not the decisive or determining factor here. That their nuclear force would be small indeed, almost trivial compared to our own, and small even compared to the British, but that nevertheless they are determined to have it, chiefly as a matter of prestige, for its political effect, and that the military aspects of it are secondary in their minds.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary, what was the word that was current, that there was a linkage developing between England and France and nuclear——

Secretary RUSK. There had been some press reports that in the MacMillan-de Gaulle discussions that this matter had come up, and that France was in effect saying, "If you will give us nuclear help we will admit you into the Common Market."

I am quite sure that was false and that was wrong.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in the paper?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I am quite sure that this is just not so.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think there is a very practical reason for that. They are not in position to give them any nuclear help——

[Discussion off the record.]

AMERICAN REACTION TO FRENCH NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Secretary RUSK. Now, there are two very simple facts in this French nuclear program that I am sure the committee would be interested in if you don't already know it.

The first is we have never ourselves said categorically in preemptory tones to the French, "You must not have a nuclear force."

That is we have not tried to order them or bring pressure to bear upon them or break up our friendship on this issue. We have simply said that we ourselves are in no position to assist other countries create a national nuclear compatability.

On the other hand, the French have never asked us for help, neither President de Gaulle nor the Foreign Minister has ever taken up with us on a governmental level the question of assistance to their nuclear program.

Now, some of their——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Nuclear submarine program?

Secretary RUSK. Well, some of their hardware shoppers have tried to buy certain kinds of equipment here but I mean——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. For 4 or 5 years dealers have been out on nuclear submarines assistance to France, otherwise, I think they have elected to go it on their own.

Secretary RUSK. What I mean by that is they have not asked us at the governmental level for assistance with (a) nuclear weapons, or (b) nuclear delivery missiles.

For example, we have sold them tankers which could be used to refuel certain nuclear aircraft, nuclear bearing aircraft, and certain common user items that we have been willing to sell to them, which may or may not be running into a program. I have no doubt we sell them stablizers for the submarines and some of these stabilizers will be used in submarines they may want to use in an eventual nuclear program.

But the key elements of a nuclear system have not been furnished to them and they have not directly asked us for them.

FRENCH PRESTIGE

As a matter of fact, General de Gaulle has indicated he understands our policy in this respect and he, if he were in our place, says he would follow the same policy. But nevertheless as a Frenchman he feels he must go ahead with his own program.

The CHAIRMAN. You say this is mostly prestige in your opinion?

Secretary RUSK. I think, Mr. Chairman, that this is almost wholly a matter of prestige, provided you interpret that broadly enough.

For example, I think he feels that he must assure his armed forces after the experiences that they have had over the post-war period that they are a modern armed force. I think he feels this is important to the morale of the French establishment itself.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that include ballistic intercontinental or small tactical?

Secretary RUSK. I think he would start with this strategic kind of thing.

The CHAIRMAN. The big one?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, those are the simplest and easiest to bring into the field.

And second, there is in his mind also the fact that this kind of a development, as is true with us and is true with our space program, has a kind of feedback into industry which is important in

terms of keeping research and development going for subsidiary industrial purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. What level is it? Did I see in the paper about $1 billion a year?

Secretary RUSK. Approximately. But they have underestimated the cost. They have had to go in for almost a doubling of the expenditures. But the pace of it is really quite slow. I was rather surprised to see what their modest forecast was about the rate and the date at which it would actually become operational.

From a military point of view it is really a very minor importance in the total situation.

ALMOST ENTIRELY A MATTER OF PRESTIGE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, don't you think that—I am not talking about the fact that France can't make nuclear weapons, even weapons of size in very limited numbers, I am speaking from a practical standpoint, not the token standpoint.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, I see.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is almost entirely a matter of prestige. I don't see how France can get into the nuclear business short of 10 years, short of $20 to $40 billion dollars of overall expenditures. They have to build up an industrial complex to supplement this thing which they don't have at the present time. They have skills, it is very true. It takes time to do these things. It takes years of coordination of an industrial complex and as well as money and plants, and I would doubt very much that they have any thought of getting into the nuclear business as a major nuclear power under their own steam.

I would guess, not knowing too much about it, that it is overwhelmingly a matter of prestige.

Secretary RUSK. I think that is so, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Admitting, of course, they can make atomic weapons, sure but a few of them.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, this may sound irrelevant but could you, as a counterpart of this, give a brief discussion on the same subject related to Russia and China? What is the status of it there? Will China get nuclear power from Russia?

[Discussion off the record.]

SUPPORT OF FRENCH AND GERMAN BUSINESS INTERESTS

Senator SYMINGTON. First, may I ask do you think the French businessmen are for the Common Market change?

Secretary RUSK. I don't believe that these particular French business interests will be able to block it. You get your German business interests taking the other view as you know.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand.

Secretary RUSK. And these French interests also oppose the formation of a six and then discovered that is was very much to their benefits to have a six so my guess is they will come along.

I think the great problems are going to lie in the agricultural field because this means a major readjustment of international agricultural policy, both in Britain and in countries like Germany, for example.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE

My second question and I will pool it with another question; you mentioned that you do not think there is any chance of the British utilizing their nuclear position to improve their Common Market position, as was rumored. I would be the first to say, Senator Hickenlooper has forgotten more about the atomic picture than I will ever know, but I don't quite agree with him as to what France or Germany would do because of the tremendous amount of cost that is expended and generally known in the art, plus the fact you have a lot more simple problems in the relatively short distances. I can conceive of how an unholy alliance with the British and the French might result in their getting from our standpoint 400 to 500 missiles without spending that amount of money. Again, that is my own personal view.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I tried to make clear that it is entirely within their capability to make a few. But I am talking about a massive system which would be essential.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, but an ICBM system is a massive system.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When they buildup that complex they are our problem.

AUTHORITY FOR POLARIS SUBMARINES IN NATO

Senator SYMINGTON. The third question is one that disturbed me a great deal the other day based on some testimony before Senator Stennis' committee. Are we clear about the degree of transfer of authority of a Polaris submarine assigned to NATO—exactly what will be the position of this country, still in control up to and including firing?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, it was made. I think I had better bring to the committee the paragraph or the statement which we indicated this assignment to our own NATO commander, SACLANT. This does not affect the targeting, it does not affect our ability to use them naturally if we wish to withdraw them for that, it does not affect our present missions.

In other words, the question that I would find it somewhat difficult to ask is would be from the European side, what difference does it make to assign them to NATO?

Senator SYMINGTON. My only point is I understand SACLANT runs it but then it goes into SACEUR in case of war. Is it sure——

Secretary RUSK. As you know, Senator, under the targeting it is highly centralized on a world-wide basis by our own people, and these, this targeting of the Polaris is tied right into that targeting system.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is there any possibility that a nuclear submarine would go into SACEUR in case of war and be directed by a foreign officer?

Secretary RUSK. I would not think so. Not under present arrangements.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you mind checking that because I was not quite clear on it?

Secretary RUSK. I will be glad to check that point precisely.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, sir, I would appreciate it.

Secretary RUSK. SACLANT is not under SACEUR.

Senator SYMINGTON. No, but SACLANT goes under SACEUR in case of war, I think, does it?

Secretary RUSK. Let me check that point.

FIRST PRIORITY TARGETS

Senator SYMINGTON. If you would I would appreciate it.

My final point is, this question of counterforce which was developed by Secretary McNamara and has created a great deal of disagreement, does the State Department, without reservation approve the Department of Defense's position on counterforce?

Secretary RUSK. You mean——

Senator SYMINGTON. Utilization of nuclear weapons without discrimination in case of all-out war?

Secretary RUSK. I think that is in a certain sense a truism rather than a major change in any doctrine for this reason. Your first priority targets almost certainly are going to be those things that can hit you. And those are the first priority targets. Any idea that this will produce a sort of truce with respect to cities or a pause is something on which we couldn't rely at all just as in the use of conventional weapons, we have always understood that we cannot write a scenario because the other players may not play. What General Norstad has referred to as a pause may last 5 minutes, it may last 5 days.

I think what Secretary McNamara was in fact saying was that we would in any event hit first those targets that would hit us. It would be then up to the other side to agree to decide how far to extend the war beyond that kind of an exchange, you see, holding cities somewhat in hostage for each other.

But we couldn't rely at all on its being played out that way. I personally don't believe the other side is likely to play it that way.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Secretary RUSK. All right, sir.

Mr. Chairman, I did also take up with the French——

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want this on the record?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL ACTIVITIES

We did take up with the French the stronger participation by them of some of these multilateral activities in which they have been relatively absent recently; more participation in the Berlin discussions, to take their chair at the disarmament conference at Geneva, to take a somewhat more active role in NATO than they have been taking lately and also to be of more help in the United Nations.

I don't really expect them to do much more about that sort of thing. They have been holding aside chiefly on procedural grounds, but we do hope very much they will help the West bear its load and make its weight felt in discussions of that sort.

EAST AND WEST BERLIN

I think the principal point of interest in my very brief visit to Berlin was a discussion with Mayor Brandt and members of the Senate about the situation in West Berlin and their attitude toward the Eastern part of the city. They seem to be quite encouraged about the present situation in West Berlin itself.

Their production is up 6 percent since the Wall was built, there is a net gain of population in the younger age groups because young married couples from Western Germany had been moving into West Berlin to take jobs. This has more than counter balanced the normal flow of the younger age groups toward going out to West Germany and looking for jobs in West Germany.

There has been some reduction in the forward orders that have been placed in West Berlin. But in Bonn, both business and goverment leadership there are moving to correct that.

But they are very much concerned there about trying to punch some holes through the wall. They do not expect to be able to knock the wall down itself completely but they do want to build on the arrangements with the International Red Cross and with other private contacts to provide opportunities for families to visit each other, for more traffic back and forth within East and West Berlin and to resume some of the working force movement back and forth across the wall.

The big problem thus far has been that although the Russians say they don't object, it is a matter for the Germans, on the East German side. The GDR insists this is something that the GDR has to handle with the West Berlin authorities, and the West Berliners and the West Germans think this invoves too much recognition.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is GDR?

Secretary RUSK. German Democratic Republic, the East German regime. They feel that would involve too much East German authority.

Mayor Brandt is following that up with private contacts across the wall to see what can be worked out because they are very much concerned with their fellow citizens in the Eastern part of the city.

I must say I was surprised having looked over the wall. I took a helicopter and flew along it, about 700 feet altitude. Block after block deep into the city seemed to be a deserted city, a ghost town. We know that the section right along the wall was empty, but I had not realized how empty the city was beyond that. You can see a mile or two over the city and in the middle of an afternoon and a mid-week day, just no stirring. It is a very strange impression to see such an empty city across the wall there.

I would like to talk a little about my visit to Bonn——

[Discussion off the record.]

NO NAZI INFLUENCE

Senator SYMINGTON. Thousands and thousands of Americans have read this book by Shirer,[1] and repeating it, it is incredible be-

[1] William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (New York, 1960).

tween 1933 and 1939 one person could create a situation that Hitler did.

From the people you mentioned is there any who, you might say, represents the past Nazi regime to a point where that is justification for apprehension?

Secretary RUSK. I don't think so, Senator Symington. You see there had been 12 years of preparation for Hitler in the situation inside Germany, constant economic distress, disillusionment with the German, or Weimar Republic, bitterness about the Versailles Treaty, all that prepared the way for the kind of thing that he was able to do.

I was there as a student during that period and saw the reaction of the students to the kind of psychological impact that Hitler made upon them and he was able to capitalize on a decade that most Germans were pretty bitter about.

Now, I think you have quite a different situation there now. You have a prosperous Germany. You have a Germany that has integrated itself into Western Europe to an extraordinary degree. The dominant theme in Germany is really the European movement if you had to select one and I would be very surprised if you could have anything like that blowing up except perhaps after a long period of political disorder and economic distress which is not, so far as I can tell, on the horizon.

Senator SYMINGTON. So none of these people in anyway represent that past group?

Secretary RUSK. I have seen no traces of that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Secretary RUSK. I have seen no traces of that. There are a few of these extreme rightists in Germany. I think perhaps the most unsettling group are those millions who came in from East of the Oder-Niesse line. They are the ones who are most determined to see the general status quo change at the first opportunity. But those are a few million, and I got no impression that the German Government was prepared to back their play in this kind of thing.

STRONG FEELINGS ABOUT GERMAN UNIFICATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. On the other hand, I think there are some elements that may be similar.

One of the important elements prior to World War II was the Polish corridor, East Prussia, and the very deep feeling in Germany that they must be united, they must wipe that thing out. Now, you have East Germany and the very deep feeling in Western Germany, and I expect it is prevalent with many people in East Germany, that catastrophy has to be eliminated. There is a lot of deep feeling in there.

It won't break out; I don't believe or I wouldn't see signs of it breaking out under Hitler as the result of a long period of economic distress. But I wouldn't be surprised if it is still in there. The program is on some future date, and I think that is what is bothering France.

Secretary RUSK. I didn't mean to indicate there is not a very strong feeling about the unification of what we call East and West Germany.

There is a very strong feeling about that, but I also have the impression if there could be a permanent peace settlement which included the unification of Germany west of the Oder-Niesse line, at that point the Germans would settle for that conclusion, rather than insist upon extending it further to the east.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was the area east of that line given to Poland?

Secretary RUSK. Poland; that was given to them for administration pending a permanent peace settlement.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They moved the Germans out and moved the Poles in.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

ITALY'S COMMITMENT TO NATO

I might just comment very briefly on the quick visit to Italy.

I had not met the new foreign minister, and I had not seen Segni since he had become President. I wanted to find out, if I could, what the opening to the left meant in terms of foreign policy. I got the impression that for the present we can anticipate Italy's continuing its basic commitments to NATO, to a unified Europe, and general participation in the European movement. I did not get the impression there had been any present impact of the opening to the left on foreign policy or defense questions.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Fanfani reminded me that after the defense minister came back from the Athens NATO meeting and reported on it he asked for a 7-percent increase in the Italian defense budget. For the first time in their history, the Socialist Party supported the defense budget.

Now, the more optimistic view is that this opening in the left was a move to split the Socialists away from the Communists and isolate the Communists. My own guess is that over time this is something we will have to watch very carefully, but we have some very strong friends in high positions there and we are very fortunate in having Mr. Segni as President for the next 7 years because in moments of crisis he can be in a crucial role.

I was very much impressed with Mr. Piccioni [2] who is a man of European attachments, West European and NATO commitments, a very solid individual who I believe would be an anchor to windward but there are developments there in Italy which could in time cause us some real concern, and we will have to watch that pretty carefully.

I am thinking now of some of the trading interests, some of the oil interests and others that we will have to be cautious about.

NO SURPRISES IN LONDON

I think there is nothing I need to say about my talks in London. There were no surprises there. We went over a great many questions. But we have been in close contact with London. I think unless there are some questions about particular points I won't take your time at the moment.

I came by Lisbon to try to clear away some of the bad atmosphere.

---

[2] Italian Foreign Minister Attilo Piccioni.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is only one thing I would like to ask about England.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, please?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Macmillan has been in there a long time. Did you sense a restlessness toward the present regime as a result of length of power?

[Discussion off the record.]

PORTUGAL'S MINORITY POSITION IN NATO

Secretary RUSK. I came by Lisbon to try to clarify some points that have given us a great deal of trouble. And to try to move our two governments somewhat closer together on the central issue of our respective attitude on these colonial questions.

I think I could first say that the Portuguese Government finds it very difficult to accept the notions which are pretty basic to us in our own commitments as far as they are concerned. Dr. Salazar told me that he understood why we could not ourselves abandon our own basic commitments if they are presented to us.

I pointed out to him we had not been leading crusades on this matter. However, these matters are forced upon our attention in places like the United Nations and there we had to represent our own general attitude as best we could. I also without too much success pointed out to them that they had not given us sufficient credit for trying to be helpful on their behalf in the sense of moderation, because it is true we had spent a good deal of political capital over the last several years in the United Nations trying to moderate otherwise extreme positions that the others would take if we just left them alone.

The kind of resolutions which have been produced might well have included trade sanctions, and things of that sort, and I think we have been able to cut those back to a very considerable degree. But nevertheless the Portuguese are very sensitive about these matters. They feel that we, as an ally, ought to give them strong support, although they are in a minority of practically 14 to 1 in NATO on such issues. We have a very difficult problem with them.

Now, they have moved to a considerable extent and I think this may give us something to build upon, to move forward on.

PORTUGAL AND THE U.N.

They are still denying the technical jurisdiction of the United Nations in such areas as Angola and Mozambique, but nevertheless they are themselves inviting full cooperation from several of the specialized agencies. The ILO,[3] for example, has gone in there and made a report. Part of the report was critical, and made recommendations for improvements.

The Portuguese Government accepted the report and is now working on the recommendations.

WHO[4] is doing the same thing and FAO[5] is soon to do the same thing. One of our problems in the United Nations has been that,

---

[3] International Labor Organization.
[4] World Health Organization.
[5] Food and Agriculture Organization.

because they have not accepted U.N. jurisdiction, the Portuguese have never told their own story effectively in the United Nations. They have never given their friends very much to support there in terms of their own reforms, their own development program and their own intentions in the matter.

I think it may be possible to work out a device used in the League of Nations by which the United Nations would appoint a rapporteur, a distinguished world citizen, who would study this Angolan question, go to Angola, make his own investigations, come back with a factual account of what is there, and get the true situation more adequately put before the United Nations. Thus far their story has been largely partial from the point of view of the strongest attacks upon the Portuguese position, and the Portuguese have not been able or willing to get their own case forward.

Now, they are very close to the notion of self-determination. The Portuguese Ambassador here in Washington made two speeches in the past few months saying that Portugal does not oppose the idea of self-determination but wants it to come from the peoples within the territories and not from terrorists from the outside.

Dr. Salazar subsequently seemed to limit that statement somewhat by interpretation but nevertheless that itself shows some movement. The Portuguese in private are making the argument that the Portuguese presence in Angola is wanted by the Angolese, their presence in Mozambique is wanted by the natives there.

Well, they are not very far away from resting upon an argument which gives the rest of us something to hang on to, that the attitudes of the people concerned are a very important factor in political solutions or political arrangements.

Further, I think it is fair to say some of the African states are becoming more moderate toward such issues. The French-speaking African states, the UAM[6] states, Nigeria, are concerned about the possibility of a succession of Congos on the African continent and they would like to see some moderate and responsible solution to this perennial problem of Angolan debate.

U.S. BASE IN THE AZORES

My own impression, Mr. Chairman, is that we will be able to work out the Azores base, it will take some time, it will take some tact. We will have to work pretty hard with the Portuguese in trying to get rid of the many misunderstandings that have accumulated. We will need some help from some of the Afro-Asians themselves. I think we need not despair in getting that help, but we still have a very long way to go in trying to find the right answer to our relations with Portugal.

I don't believe they are going to refuse the Azores base, I don't believe they are going to drop out of NATO. Incidentally, the interview in U.S. News and World Report which was reported yesterday and mentioned to the press occurred 9 days before my visit. It is a very tough and very disagreeable interview from our point of view but I think perhaps I did have some chance to modify that.

---

[6] Union Africaine et Malagache (Africa and Malagasy Union).

Perhaps the most important thing that I did in Lisbon was to talk fully and frankly with Mr. Salazar about general alliance problems, the general East-West problem. I discussed matters with him as an ally just as I had in the other capitals, and he seemed to appreciate that considerably, because he felt very isolated and left out of such matters. I tried my best to let him recognize that we felt that he was a member of the alliance, and ought to be brought into alliance matters as anyone else would be.

But nevertheless, tomatoes were thrown at the Embassy while I was there by a group of about 20 people. The tone of the press before I arrived was pretty disagreeable. It improved significantly while I was there, but I expect it will relapse back now that I am away. We have still some major problems with Portugal.

I have taken much too much time, Mr. Chairman.

THE ANGOLAN SITUATION

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the present status of the Angolan problem?

Secretary RUSK. The re-inforced Portuguese—you mean on the spot?

Senator LAUSCHE. No, that is with regard to the United Nations and independence.

Secretary RUSK. The United Nations has appointed a committee, the Salamanca Committee, to investigate Angola and report back. It has not been permitted to go to Angola by the Portuguese authorities. There have been resolutions passed in the last 3 or 4 years at the United Nations on Angola. Nothing has been done as a consequence of those resolutions. It almost certainly will be on the agenda at the next assembly. It is one of those matters debated annually without too much happening. The biggest threat occurred at the last Assembly when resolutions were developed between the Communists and Afro-Asian blocs that would impose rather sweeping sanctions on Portugal and we were able to block that, but in the course of blocking it we had to support a resolution which the Portuguese didn't like. This is the kind of thing that it is hard to get across to the Portuguese, that even though the result is something they don't like, if we go in and try to help moderate those things the result is much better than it might be otherwise.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the opinion about the ability of the Angolese to operate their own government?

Secretary RUSK. If you take into account the whites, the mixtures, and the blacks, there is a good deal of talent in Angola. They recently initiated a series of electoral processes for local governments, in the countryside for up to 500, municipal councils for larger numbers, and a national Angolese assembly with 18 representatives elected on a territorial wide basis with universal suffrage.

Now, this is beginning to produce large numbers of elected representatives and it makes it possible, therefore, for anyone from the outside, United Nations or otherwise, to consult these people who exist now by the hundreds, indeed by the thousands, and to find out from them what they think about the situation, and whether these elections are in fact genuine elections.

I personally think they are for the most part. And we may begin to get the kind of representative system there which will give us something to build up on or develop from. I don't believe the answer to Angola lies in these terrorist groups who are operating out of the Congo and other areas.

But it is hard to be categorical about that at this particular point.

BUILDUP OF TROOPS IN KATANGA

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, can I have 1 minute?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator DODD. Mr. Secretary, Reverend Howard Brinton, whom you may know——

Secretary RUSK. Yes, he and I were colleagues in California at the same college once.

Senator DODD. He has been in this country and I understand through him there has been quite a buildup of troops in Katanga, some 9,000 very recently, and I think Brinton is deeply distressed about it and feels there is a very real possibility of outbreak of hostilities again.

Secretary RUSK. 9,000 on the Katanga side?

Senator DODD. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I knew there had been some buildup. I thought the figures were closer to two, but I will have to check on that a bit.

Senator DODD. I wish you would.

Secretary RUSK. I will look at that.

Senator DODD. I have a very high opinion of him and as you know he has been there since he was 6 months old.

TROOPS IN THAILAND

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, there is one matter unrelated to my trip that I might just mention briefly to avoid misunderstanding.

We returned these thousand Marines to their fleet because this was the kind of movement that was anticipated when the first troops went into Thailand. We still have 9,000 in Thailand. These were the first ones who went in, then they were re-inforced by army units. We felt it was important to have these flight-based Marines on the fleet, because we might need them in short notice on another situation and didn't want them tied down in tents in Thailand during the Monsoon season but to get them back where they are most valuable to us, and where they could be used immediately. I don't want to leave the impression we are pulling out of Thailand at this point or we are bargaining on this at the Geneva conference. We will not go into this question in connection with the Laotian question in Geneva.

COMMITMENTS OF EUROPEAN ALLIANCE ARE SOLID

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to say, generally speaking, that you are fairly optimistic about our relations in Western Europe and their own developments?

Secretary RUSK. I think, Mr. Chairman, that one can say first that the basic commitments of the alliance are solid and there is no indication whatever there is any weakening on them from before.

Second, I think there is a good deal of ferment now apparent in connection with writing the next chapters in this Western experience. We are in the kind of ferment that occurred with the actual organization of NATO in the first instance or that accompanied the discussion of the European defense community which although it failed as such did in fact lead to the present type of organization of NATO itself.

I think that there is a good deal of movement apparent here but it is movement looking toward next steps and not concerned about the underlying commitments.

I do think, Mr. Chairman, that it affects my department even in matters of style. We have to recognize that one of the great objectives of American policy has been largely accomplished, namely that Europe is now strong, confident, they will be self-assertive.

They are going to speak their own piece and they are not going to be taking orders from us. They are going to be partners in the alliance but they are going to be partners and not satellites in any sense.

I think we can welcome the fact we are coming into a period where we have that kind of a strong Europe alongside of us working together with us on a great many world problems but it is going to affect, I think, our style, and our general attitude of mind in dealing with them.

EUROPE'S WILLINGNESS TO PAY MORE OF THE BILL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How about their willingness to pay more of the bill?

Secretary RUSK. This is quite right, Senator. They have to pitch in more. As you know, we are insisting that they, whether in military purchases or otherwise in this country, pick up the gold flow problem of our stationing troops there. We have been pushing them to increase their military budgets, with varying success, good success in Germany, less success in Britain.

And we are making it very clear to them on matters like multilateral or nuclear force this is not going to be a present from the United States. This is going to be an expensive business. If they want one the bill is going to be high and they will have to decide whether they are willing to pay for it.

I think it is quite right, Senator, that they have not picked up their share yet. They are moving well in the aid field but they still have a way to go. But they are coming in quite strongly and we are encouraged on that.

The CHAIRMAN. There are two other things that are not related to this while I have you here I would like to ask you about.

SITUATION IN CHINA AND INDIA

Is there anything new on this Chinese Communist and Republic of China situation, any evidence as to the character and motive of the buildup on the mainland of China?

What is Chiang's situation?

Secretary RUSK. Could we go off the record?

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. In the case of India, Menon was extraordinarily offensive in his appearance about 10 days ago. Do you know of any reason to explain this? Is it new or what is there in that situation?

It seems to be both Nehru and Menon have been unusually offensive in their comments about us.

[Discussion off the record.]

JUSTICE DOUGLAS' TALK

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman. May I ask one question that is not related?

Did Justice Douglas consult with the State Department, I know he has no relationship with it, in connection with this talk that he made, and announced it was going to be a controversial one?

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions now?

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Since there are no other questions the committee will go into executive session.

Thank you.

By voice vote, and without objection, the committee favorably reported the bill (H.R. 4441), To authorize the appropriation of $3,063,500 as an ex gratia payment to the city of New York to assist in defraying the extraordinary and unprecedented expenses incurred during the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations, amended, however, as to the amount.

The committee agreed to vote on the nomination of Matthew McCloskey, to be Ambassador to Ireland, on Friday next.

On motion by Senator Symington, and without objection, the committee voted to give favorable report to the Foreign Service list of promotion and appointments (Sverre M. Backe, et al.) held over from the June 29 meeting.

The chairman sampled the committee's reaction, but without conclusion, to a proposed broadcast with Jean Monnet for television transmission to Europe via the communications satellite.

The chairman submitted a preliminary report by the staff on the nondiplomatic activities of representatives of foreign governments, which was ordered to be placed in galley proof form.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcripts.

[Whereupon the committee then adjourned at 12:50 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, JULY 6, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 9 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Lausche (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Sparkman and Hickenlooper. Senator Morse also attended.

The subcommittee was briefed on the situation in Cambodia by Ambassador William C. Trimble.

No record was kept or transcript taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

FRIDAY, JULY 6, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Senator Morse moved that the nomination of Matthew H. McCloskey, to be Ambassador to Ireland, be reported favorably. After discussion, Senator Morse amended his motion to postpone the vote on the nomination until Monday or Tuesday next. This was established as agreed to, without vote.

Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and W. Michael Blumenthal, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, appeared and briefed the Committee on recent developments in the international commodities areas, with particular reference to coffee.

The Chairman submitted a draft of a preposed resolution authorizing the committee to study the non-diplomatic activities of representatives of foreign governments. On amendment by Senator Sparkman, the authorized amount for such study was fixed at $50,000. On motion by Senator Morse, seconded by Senator Sparkman, the resolution was ordered to be favorably reported, without objection.

The committee informally discussed the invitation received from the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. to hold interparliamentary exchanges between representatives of the Soviet and the Congress.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, JULY 9, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 11:05 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, Carlson, and Williams.

The chairman announced the first item on the agenda to be consideration of the nomination of Matthew H. McCloskey, to be Ambassador to Ireland. The chairman directed the clerk to call the roll, and the Members answered to their names, as follows:

YEAS	NAYS
Senator Sparkman	Senator Aiken
Senator Humphrey (proxy)	Senator Carlson
Senator Mansfield (proxy)	Senator Williams
Senator Long (proxy)	
Senator Gore	
Senator Church (proxy)	
Senator Symington (proxy)	
Senator Dodd (proxy)	
The Chairman	

Senator Hickenlooper abstained.

So the nomination was ordered to be reported favorably, 9 to 3.

The committee next considered the resolution (H.J. Res. 714), Authorizing the acquisition of certain property in the District of Columbia and its conveyance to the International Monetary Fund, for use in expansion of its headquarters. Following discussion and on motion by Senator Gore, seconded by Senator Carlson, the joint resolution was ordered to be reported favorably by voice vote, with Senator Capehart recorded in the negative.

On suggestion of Senator Gore it was agreed that the staff furnish the Members with a memorandum on the salient factors contained in the so-called satellite bill (H.R. 11040).

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 11:50 p.m.]

THE SITUATION IN LAOS

[Editor's Note.—The former French colony of Laos became a fully independent nation following the Geneva accords of 1954. In December 1960, right-wing forces under General Phoumi Nosavan gained control and installed Boun Oum as premier. Neutralist premier Souvanna Phouma fled to Cambodia, where he set up a rebel government in exile, backed by the Communist Pathet Lao. The Soviet Union airlifted supplies from Hanoi to the Pathet Lao; while the United States provided similar support to General Phoumi.

In 1961, the Kennedy administration decided to press for negotiations to restore a neutralist government in Laos. A 14-nation conference on Laos was convened in Geneva, attended by the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Britain, France, Canada, Poland, North and South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, India, and Laos. In December the conference completed a draft declaration on Laotian neutrality.

Civil war continued in Laos through the early months of 1962. In May, the Kennedy administration rebuked General Phoumi and Boun Oum for violating their pledges to form a coalition government with the Pathet Lao. Talks resumed, and on June 7 the warring sides reached agreement at a meeting in the Plaine des Jarres. Boun Oum retired from the government. Souvanna Phouma became premier in the new government, while General Phoumi and Prince Souphanouvong, representing the Pathet Lao, became deputy premiers. The coalition government went into effect on June 22.

Early in July, President Kennedy withdrew 1,000 of the 1,800 Marines he had had sent to Thailand during the Laotian civil war. At the same time, the 14-nation Geneva conference met to adopt a final agreement on Laotian neutrality, which was signed on July 23.]

FRIDAY, JULY 13, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 p.m., in room F-53, the U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. John Sparkman presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Wiley, and Hickenlooper.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Denney, and Mr. Henderson of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.

Several have indicated their intention to be here this morning. In fact, most of the committee, but I think we had better get started because others will be coming in from time to time. We don't know how long it may be before we can get them all here.

Mr. Secretary, we are delighted to have you with us this morning and we appreciate your taking the time to come up and brief us on this problem of Laos.

I understand that is the subject matter that you intended to discuss with us.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ABRAM CHAYES, LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The committee has had over the past several months a number of discussions about Laos, both with me and with Assistant Secretary [W. Averell] Harriman, and the President has discussed the matter on occasions with the leadership of both parties in meetings at the White House. I will not, therefore, review in detail the full history of this problem.

I wish, Mr. Chairman, that I could come here today to talk about the windup, the termination of the Laotian question but that is not possible. We are talking about simply another step in a series of steps which may lead to a peaceful and satisfactory settlement of that problem.

The present chapter of the Laotian question in a certain sense opened in early December 1960, when General Phoumi Nosavan and his troops took over the government from then Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. There followed immediately what amounted to a civil war in Laos; Souvanna Phouma and his own followers went up to the North, the Pathet Lao became very active indeed. The Soviet Union in early December 1960, started an airlift to Xiengkhouang in support of what we have called the rebel forces, what the Soviets call the Government of Laos because they continue to recognize Souvanna Phouma.

The next step of any importance was an agreement on January 18, 1961, by the United States with Britain and France to undertake a course of negotiations on the basis of the 1954 accords to call together the participants in that Geneva conference of that date, to try to find a peaceful settlement of the Laotian question.

When the new administration came in, we reviewed the situation in great detail, and made two decisions.

One, was to try to step up the aid and the assistance to General Phoumi, both in military supplies and in personnel to insure that he and his followers would not be overrun by the other side, if possible, and second, to try to find an agreed settlement on the basis of a neutral and independent country.

A cease fire was achieved in May 1961. The Geneva Conference met shortly thereafter, and during the course of the next several months reaching into November, the conference attempted to reach agreement on a broad declaration of principles covering a Laotian settlement.

The next step then was the formation of a coalition government in Laos, and the committee has had information on that.

GENEVA DECLARATIONS

Now, the present meeting at Geneva was convened for the purpose of concluding the declarations and arrangements which had been tentatively concluded last fall but which had to await the formation of a Laotian Government which could speak for a unified Laos. We have in front of us as a result of those discussions—two declarations and one protocol.

The two declarations are a declaration of neutrality by this Government of Laos itself, a declaration about the neutrality of Laos by the participants in the conference, and a protocol setting up arrangements for an international control commission and providing for its administration and its functioning.

Secretary RUSK. These declarations and this protocol would be documents which the President would expect to instruct me to sign as an executive agreement.

The papers, the documents themselves, do not affect in any way the private rights of any American citizens or corporations or entities. They do not affect any domestic law, and they make only one commitment as far as the United States is concerned with respect to any action which the Congress itself might be asked or required to take.

Under the protocol which provides for the ICC the participants in the conference would divide up the expenses of the ICC. The ratio of contributions which we would be expected to make would be 17½ percent under present estimates that might be something up to, say, $500,000 a year. This is to provide for transportation, for the engagement of personnel and the running expenses of the International Control Commission.

We do not make any commitments under these agreements, for example, to provide aid with political strings to it.

On the aid side we have in mind that there would be an immediate suspension of military assistance.

We believe that there is enough military hardware in Laos at the present time, more than to take care of their needs for the indefinite future, and we would consider with the new government some program of economic assistance, but even there we would expect to be smaller than the assistance we have been providing up to this point.

So that these are in the nature of declarations, plus a protocol which has some specific arrangements about the International Control Commission.

MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS

Now, as is the case in multilateral bodies or groupings, where there are authorities or governments present which do not recognize each other, the participation of governments in such meetings does not itself imply a recognition in any case where it has not been previously accorded.

That is not only a general principle of international law where the multilateral aspect is distinguishable from a bilateral agreement, but it is also specifically confirmed in this particular case. It has been made clear already, and would be made clear again at the final meeting by Lord Home, the co-chairman on our side. We would ourselves incorporate in any statement we make that neither the invitations to the Laos conference, participation of any delegate, nor signature of agreements can be regarded as implying recognition in any case where it has not previously been accorded.

That was the understanding in 1954, where the United States participated although did not sign the so-called Geneva accords,

and it is clearly the understanding in these which have been going on at the present time.

We also would make it clear under the protocol with respect to the financing of the ICC that we would inform the conference that article 18 of that protocol relating to finance provides a formula for distributing the costs of the operations of the International Control Commission among the parties thereto. We would invite the attention of the conference to the fact that the contributions by the United States will require annual appropriation and action by the Congress of the United States, and that that is a reminder to them of the constitutional processes under which we are able to subscribe to any arrangements for any contributions to a matter of that sort.

I am not sure whether each member has received it, but we have furnished the committee copies of the draft declaration, and I believe you have received those copies.

I will be glad to go over those with you and comment on some of the more important articles but I think perhaps I might, before doing that, try to indicate what we see coming out of this for the future.

Again, this particular declaration is only one of a series of steps, the cease fire, the coalition government, declarations on neutrality, and then comes the all-important question of the carrying out of these declarations as a fact in Laos.

REMOVAL OF FOREIGN FORCES

From that point of view the most important aspect will be the actual removal of foreign forces from Laos, with the exception of the French training mission which would assume responsibility for the continued training of Laotian forces.

Senator WILEY. How big is that?

Secretary RUSK. That would be not more than a few hundred in total. But the participants in the conference have agreed, as has the Laotian Government that it would be the French responsibility to provide training assistance for the Laotian forces.

Senator MANSFIELD. Isn't it true under the Geneva Accords of 1954 that was the stipulation at that time?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct and at that time also, Senator Mansfield, the arrangements were made for the retention of certain base rights by the French.

The French themselves do not themselves wish to maintain their base rights like Dienbienphu, for example, or in the general area of Vientiane, but they do wish to go ahead with the training mission. I might also say in that regard, we have explored with the French very thoroughly the very important point that the French would be carrying a very heavy responsibility from the point of view of the West in occupying that special position in Laos and we would expect them to do as good a job as possible and not to scrimp either on the quality of personnel, the numbers of personnel or the finance that would be needed to do that job adequately.

Now, the problem of insuring the removal of foreign troops is, of course, a significant one. We estimate through intelligence sources, some of them extremely sensitive that there are about 10,000 Viet

Minh in Northern Laos at the present time, around the eastern and northern fringes of Laos and the central and northern area. Under this agreement they are supposed to withdraw from Laos within 75 days of the signing, through designated exit points so they can be counted.

Also, we would expect that through our own intelligence sources, both overt and covert, that it would be possible for us to get a considerable reading on the actual withdrawal of these forces. But I would not wish to mislead the committee in supposing that we can be certain that there will be complete compliance.

EVALUATION OF SOUVANNA PHOUMA

We do believe that General Phoumi, whose forces would remain in position and remain in-being during this period, General Phoumi and Souvanna Phouma himself have a considerable interest in getting these Viet Minh forces out of the country.

Members of the committee, I think, may have had an opportunity to know Souvanna Phouma or meet him or talk with him in the past.

Quite frankly, I have not, but Assistant Secretary Harriman has had a number of occasions to do so, and the British and the French have been very close to him over these past several months, and there is some reason to believe that Souvanna Phouma is himself interested in and determined to get these troops out of Laos.

He, at critical occasions—for example before we reached this present state of general agreement on plans—has sent messages to us asking us to continue assistance, military assistance, to General Phoumi. He did not want the government forces to be in a situation of collapse. We know that this own forces which are about 10,000 in number, have had continued frictions with the Pathet Lao forces and there have been a number of shooting incidents between these two forces during the period of the rather fragile cease fire.

These agreements will not actually succeed in producing the result that is hoped for unless the Laotians themselves, chiefly Souvanna Phouma and his followers, and General Phoumi and his followers, continue to work and get these people out of the country and embark Laos on a neutral and independent course.

We feel very strongly if you can get these foreigners out of the country that the Laotians, left alone, would work things out among themselves.

INTEGRATION OF LAOTIAN FORCES

In the longer run, too, it is anticipated that there would be a gradual reduction and integration of the Laotian forces themselves. There are about 20,000 Pathet Lao. There are about 75,000 government forces, and there are about 10,000 of Souvanna Phouma's own forces.

General Phoumi has indicated that he does not want an internationally supervised demobilization or integration program, because his forces in the Mekong Valley are much easier to identify, count, discover; the other forces up in the hills are much more difficult to discover. He wants to be in a position of working on a proportion-

ate basis under circumstances which would leave the present government forces, that is, the former government forces, General Phoumi's forces, in a relative position of superiority insofar as the Laotians are concerned.

So if you get the foreign troops out you get a proportionate demobilization of the Laotian forces down to some general range of 10,000 to 20,000, work out on a proportionate basis General Phoumi feels that would be the appropriate way to proceed.

LAOS AS AN AVENUE OF INFILTRATION

One very important provision in the draft declaration is that both the Laotian Government and the participants in the conference commit themselves not to use Laos as an avenue for the infiltration of agents or subversion or to use Laos as a territory through which to interfere in the affairs of neighboring countries.

Now, again, how would we know? I think that although there would not be forces inside Laos that would enforce that provision, that the knowledge as to whether that part of the agreement is being carried forward would not be too difficult to ascertain, because we would have some intelligence in Laos itself. We would have effective intelligence both in Vietnam and in Thailand, and we believe that it would be possible for us to know whether that was being carried out.

The co-chairmen, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom, have themselves agreed to enforce that provision, but that means what it turns out to mean.

All I am saying to the committee is that if these agreements are not carried out we feel that we would know it promptly and then we would be presented with the same kind of problems, the same kind of issues with which we would be confronted had there been no such agreement of this sort.

In other words, we would have to decide what action we would take in those circumstances.

DECLARATION OF LAOTIAN NEUTRALITY

Now, you have in front of you the draft declaration on neutrality of Laos, which would be made to the conference by the Laotian Government, and would be incorporated in the final declaration by the conference itself.

The articles of that Laotian declaration are rather general in character. I might refer briefly to article (1) which talks about five principles of peaceful coexistence. These are the five principles which were agreed upon by a number of the Asian nations at the 1955 Bandung Conference.

Those principles are mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity, sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.

Those are the very general phrases which we used at that time.

I don't know, Mr. Chairman, whether you wish to go over these article by article. I am perfectly prepared to do so.

Article (2) simply declares the intention to preserve and secure respect for the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of Laos.

(3) Will not resort to the use or threat of force in any way which might impair the peace of other countries or interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

LAOS AND SEATO

Article (4) is worth giving attention.

The other side has tried to insist that an agreement on Laos would require an amendment of the SEATO Treaty. But as you will recall the protocol to the SEATO Treaty includes reference to Laos as one of the protocol states.

The present idea would be that the Laotian Government itself would simply make a declaration that it would not, among other things, recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition (including SEATO). It specified that in parenthesis because SEATO is a treaty which itself specifically mentions Laos.

Senator SPARKMAN. Would you explain that footnote one, referring to SEATO?

Secretary RUSK. There were two alternatives. Had SEATO itself taken action to withdraw the protection extended under the SEATO pact to Laos, then there would have been no reference in this declaration to SEATO.

Senator SPARKMAN. Oh, yes.

Secretary RUSK. But we felt among other things this would require the amendment of a treaty, that is in order to delete any reference to it in the SEATO Treaty.

Further, that under the treaty itself it would not ally to Laos except on request of the Laotian Government.

So if the Laotian Government in effect says, "We are not going to invoke the SEATO Treaty" that seemed to us to take care of the problem.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. This is an announcement on their part that they will not?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

But on the other hand, it does not prevent us in SEATO from meeting to consult with each other about the situation in Laos or if there is any failure of these agreements, in effect, to return to the situation before the agreements themselves were reached.

GUARANTEEING LAOTIAN NEUTRALITY

Senator SPARKMAN. This may not be in order at the present time, but the thought occurs to me, is there an undertaking on the part of the nations participating in this to guarantee the maintenance of these principles? In other words, to guarantee the neutrality of Laos?

Secretary RUSK. That would come on the draft declaration on the neutrality of Laos, that would be adopted by the conference itself, by all the participants.

And you will find that in that particular declaration, there are a number of references to it, specifically in article 4, the undertaking

In the event of a violation or threat of violation of the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos, to consult jointly with the Royal Government of Laos and among themselves in order to consider measures which might prove to be necessary to ensure the observance of these principles and the other provisions of the present Declaration.

Senator LAUSCHE. What did you read from?

Secretary RUSK. That was article 4 of the draft declaration of the conference itself, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. The first part of that.

Just below page 2.

Secretary RUSK. It is our view that article 4 of the declaration of the Government of Laos, that the insertion of the parenthetical phrase "including SEATO" which is an announcement by this Government of Laos that it does not intend to ask for the protection of SEATO, is itself within the terms or within the structure of the SEATO Treaty and would not require amendment of that treaty, because it would be up to any government of any one of the three protocol states, to decide whether they would ask SEATO for protection.

On the other side this does not bar SEATO itself from consulting about the situation in Laos.

NATIONS SUPPORTING THE AGREEMENT

Senator WILEY. How many nations have agreed to this now?

Secretary RUSK. It would be 14. It would be 13 plus Laos.

Senator WILEY. What are they?

Secretary RUSK. Burma, Cambodia, Canada, People's Republic of China, North Vietnam, the Republic of France, India, Poland, South Vietnam, Thailand, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Senator WILEY. If there is any violation of it, what is the responsibility?

Secretary RUSK. If there is a violation of this agreement there would undoubtedly be immediate consultation among those who are parties to the agreement through the cochairman, but also if there is a violation of the agreement that goes to the security of Laos or Southeast Asia, we would have to go into it to see whether such violations abrogated the agreement and we were back where we were before the agreement itself was reached.

Just as, for example, we have forces in South Vietnam that go far beyond the levels indicated under the Geneva 1954 Accords. But we have them there because the North Vietnamese have been breaking those accords, so we have not been willing to limit ourselves by those accords because the other side has broked them.

So, we do not consider ourselves in violation of the accords. We consider the accords themselves, to that extent removed by violation on the other side, have been abrogated by acts of the other side.

SOVIETS SOUGHT AN AGREEMENT

Senator WILEY. Do you feel that the people, the neighbors, so to speak, of Laos, really mean business in case there is a violation, or

do they expect Uncle Sam to come in again and carry the ball for everything?

Secretary RUSK. I think there is no question about the fact that we and the Thais, and the South Vietnamese and the Cambodians will be watching performance under these agreements very carefully indeed.

On the other side, I say with some caution, that I believe that the Soviet Union has been trying to get a settlement of the Laotian question on the basis of a neutral and independent country. Why that should be, I am not entirely clear. But there have been a number of occasions where had they had any other view, that is had they wanted to pursue another policy, they would have had good pretext and occasions for doing so.

But yet they have gone to considerable effort and we know to considerable effort in Peiping, to keep this situation within its present framework and not let it break out into more overt action.

I say this with some caution because we do not believe this means that the Soviet Union has abandoned its general policy with respect to Southeast Asia or other parts of the world; that is, penetration, subversion, and stimulation of the world revolution. But I do think they recognize that this is potentially a dangerous situation, and they might have had in mind that this was a direction in which the Chinese Communists might move, and Moscow was not too interested in that.

They are aware of the struggle for power in North Vietnam between those Communists affiliated with Moscow and those affiliated with Peiping, and for whatever reasons we have felt they have been using a degree of caution in this Laotian question. It may also be that Mr. Khrushchev wanted one instance in which there could be some sort of agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, because this was discussed very frankly by Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Kennedy at the meeting in Vienna a little more than a year ago.

WORTH OF THE AGREEMENT

But I want to say, Mr. Chairman, something that I perhaps won't be able to emphasize publicly in the sharpest terms and that is that this agreement is worth what it turns out to the worth in performance.

If it does not work we are where we were a few months ago; if it does work then we think that we are moving specifically toward a Laos from which the foreigners have been expelled, and the Laotians will be left alone to try to work out their own affairs.

I have indicated to the committee before that I feel very strongly that given the nature of the people, given all we have been able to learn about the Laotians in these past several years, given the return on our own investment in Laos which has been very heavy, over $350 million for military assistance alone, for example, we feel that the Laotians are not likely themselves to be a threat to their neighbors, and if we can get these people—I mean they haven't been able to be a threat to each other as far as the fighting between the Laotians are concerned.

If we can get these North Viet Minh out of there, then we feel this would be a very constructive step forward. If we can't get them out then this agreement, in effect will collapse, and we are back where we were.

GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954

Senator LAUSCHE. Are the member nations the same that were members in the Geneva accords of 1954?

Secretary RUSK. I think so, yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Except we were not.

Secretary RUSK. Let's see, we were members of the conference although——

Senator SPARKMAN. We sat in as observers.

Secretary RUSK. We participated although we did not actually sign the accords themselves. India, Canada, and Poland were added as members of the International Control Commission.

Senator LAUSCHE. No. 1, there were 14 nations in the accords of 1954, weren't there?

Secretary RUSK. I will have those for you in just a minute, sir. Those present in 1954 were Cambodia, North Vietnam——

Senator LAUSCHE. Just one moment.

Secretary RUSK. Right, sir. Cambodia.

Senator LAUSCHE. North Vietnam was in.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it in the present one?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. France, Laos, Peiping, South Vietnam, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States.

CHANGES IN MEMBERSHIP

Senator LAUSCHE. Why were the changes made in membership?

Secretary RUSK. They added India, Poland, and Canada because they were members of the International Control Commission, and Thailand and Burma because they were neighboring Southeast Asian States.

Senator LAUSCHE. If the addition of the new members changes the psychological complexion of the Commission of the body, does it change it in favor of the Soviet or in favor of us or would it be in balance?

Secretary RUSK. I would think it would be reasonably balanced to add, say Thailand and Canada clearly committed in our direction; India and Burma, neutralist; Poland, with the bloc. The actual membership——

Senator LAUSCHE. What's the difference between this protection of our interests and the protection we had under the Geneva accords and SEATO? That is, this means there is a change and if there is a change, what is the change and how are we benefited?

Secretary RUSK. I think there are some specific commitments here with direct references to Laos which are important to us in this present situation. For example, that Laos itself will not permit its territory to be used for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. This effort to stop the corridor of penetration from North Vietnam to South Vietnam by way of Laos is from our side one of the very important commitments.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, doesn't this new agreement bring in every country with the inclusion of Burma and Cambodia with which Laos has a common border, into effect a guarantee of its neutrality and in effect the creation of a buffer state? As far as the French military mission is concerned that was the only mission, as I recall, in the Geneva accords of 1954 which has a legal right to be in Laos.

So I would say that you have a continuation of France's interest in a military sense, you have the addition of Burma and Cambodia which both border on Laos, and thereby you make the ring complete as far as the neighboring nations are concerned in each of them assuring or collectively assuring that this neutrality will be guaranteed and that, in effect, Laos will be left alone if the agreement is lived up to.

Secretary RUSK. I think that is correct, Senator, and I think there is another element that has been encouraging in recent weeks.

POSITION OF PRINCE SIHANOUK

Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, who has been a neutralist in his foreign policy, has been rigorously anti-Communist in his own domestic arrangements. He expelled the Viet Minh elements from Cambodia and pursues an internal security policy against Communists in his own country that are very strong.

We have been interested that he seemed to be very pleased indeed with the movement of American forces into Thailand, and he does seem to be coming to the view now that Red China is not the way of the future in that part of the world. His own morale, his own attitude had changed recently in a very hopeful direction and if that lasts that will be a definite plus.

I would not attempt to guarantee that it will last, but this is, I think, an expression of the growing concern in Southeast Asia itself about the possibilities of pressures from the north.

COMPARISON TO 1954 ACCORDS

Senator LAUSCHE. The principal objective of this agreement is to create a neutral Laos, is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. Wasn't it the principal objective of the Geneva accords, and SEATO to have a neutral Laos?

Secretary RUSK. The actual concept of neutrality was not used at that time. It did refer to the independence and security and unity of the country.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, SEATO agreed to protect Laos' sovereignty, Laos was not a member of SEATO, and SEATO, if it were called upon by Laos, could go in and protect its neutrality.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. The French troops were to continue in Laos?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, what is the difference between this and what there was in the Geneva accords except that under this agreement we take out our troops and the French will take out a part of theirs. I can't see how this is anything new except that we

say to the Soviet side, we are pulling out, we will have nothing to do in there, and we will get out the North Vietnamese who never had a right to be in there.

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that as far as Laos is concerned, this is not a major change from the 1954 accords, I don't believe that the Laotian aspect of the 1954 accords was one of the reasons why the United States did not sign those accords.

I think it was Vietnam, the North Vietnam, South Vietnam aspect of it that was primarily responsible for the United States not signing the 1954 accords.

What this does is to try to be quite specific about the conditions under which Laos has a chance to be neutral and independent, and this is carrying into further detail arrangements which were implicit in the 1954 accords, but which broke down because of the event that you know about.

U.S. PERSONNEL IN LAOS

Senator LAUSCHE. We have troops in Laos, haven't we? We did until lately.

Secretary RUSK. We have no organized combat elements. We have personnel.

Senator LAUSCHE. Training them?

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. Are they in civilian clothes or military uniform?

Secretary RUSK. Many of them are in uniform now.

Senator LAUSCHE. We agree to pull them out?

Secretary RUSK. We agree that in 75 days all uniformed troops should come out. You see we have a fairly accurate estimate of the troops that are in there from the other side, from North Vietnam about 10,000.

Senator LAUSCHE. About 10,000.

If ours have a right to be there under the Geneva accords and SEATO and North Vietnam did not have a right to be there——

Senator MANSFIELD. Would the Senator yield there?

As I recall in the Geneva agreement we did not have the right to have any American troops stationed in Laos. That is why when we put them in, we put them in in civilian clothes. The only country which had a right to maintain troops there was France because of its prior and friendly connection with Laos, the most friendly of the three former Indochinese states and as I understand it under this new proposal that right would be continued. Now, the French, if my memory serves me correctly, never have maintained their full complement of personnel there to train the Laotian troops.

But if this is correct, the only outside forces which would be allowed to continue under this agreement, if it is adhered to would be the French training mission.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Now, we would not wish to be in the position of saying that the presence of American military personnel was directly contrary to the 1954 accords but their presence was certainly not contemplated by the accords. They came in first as assistance, in fact, first to the

French military mission, they came in to help them with American-supplied arms and equipment.

Then as the civil war developed we increased their number beyond the number contemplated in 1954 and we put them into American uniform last summer in order to get the additional impact of their presence there. But that was not contemplated that we would have American military personnel in Laos at the time of the 1954 accords.

OTHER TROOPS IN LAOS

Senator LAUSCHE. Are there any other troops in there except the North Vietnamese and ourselves that must leave?

Secretary RUSK. [Deleted.]

There are on the other side, we think, some Chinese up in the very far north, in connection with that road they have been building in the extreme north of Laos. There have been reports of Chinese units but we have not ourselves been able to locate them with our most sensitive type of intelligence. We are a little inclined to doubt there are organized Chinese combat units there. But those are the prinicipal foreigners that we know of.

Senator LAUSCHE. As I understand it we will have this Troika Government, a neutrality insured by the withdrawal within 90 days of all foreign troops?

Secretary RUSK. Within 75 days.

Senator LAUSCHE. 75 days.

Does that mean that we now admit that our troops were unlawfully in Laos?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. It simply means they are foreign, and that all foreign troops would go out.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

U.S. AND NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN LAOS

Now, under what guise or authority did we send in our troops? Wasn't it because Laos asked that we send them in?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And Laos having asked, we were in there rightfully?

Secretary RUSK. We would take the view that we were in there rightfully.

Senator LAUSCHE. And the North Vietnamese came in there by infiltration and crossing the lines and were in there unlawfully?

Secretary RUSK. The other side, Senator, took the view also, since they recognize Souvanna Phouma, that their troops were in there at the request of the government they recognized.

This is part of the problem.

We consider, in our view, they were in there unlawfully.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, what do we concede to the Soviets? What have we conceded in the matter of their demands upon us if this goes into effect? We gave up something and what is it?

Secretary RUSK. What we gave up was what they are giving up, if these agreements are carried out; that is, presence of forces in the country that would move Laos away from a neutral position. In other words, this is a common agreement.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is the North Vietnamese?
Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.
Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is all.

A VERY MESSY SITUATION

Senator SPARKMAN. Did you want to continue your statement or have you covered it?

Secretary RUSK. I will just look to see whether there are specific articles on which it might be well to make a comment.

Senator SPARKMAN. Before you start on another aspect, I don't know, this may be overdrawing it, but it seems to me to be a fair statement—talking about what we gave up. It seems to me we gave up from a realistic standpoint, from the practical standpoint, virtually full responsibility for a very messy situation. You get out of it a promise on the part of these nations to help enforce neutrality.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We put ourselves back in the position where we were some time ago.

Senator MORSE. I beg your pardon?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We put ourselves back in the position where we were some time ago.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it is a stronger situation than we have ever had before us.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Nothing could be stronger than the agreements made in North Korea, the agreements made in North Vietnam and all those things. Those agreements were made and they promptly were violated by Communists.

Senator SPARKMAN. These are not just between these three governments but among 13 different governments including the group in Laos, and I think this is the strongest agreement that has been worked out of this nature.

RECOGNITION OF SOUVANNA PHOUMA

Senator LAUSCHE. But on the other hand, we never for a moment, recognized Russia's claim that Souvanna Phouma was the duly constituted government. We have refuted and argued it. But now we admit there is validity in their argument and say that the North Vietnamese troops had a right to be there because Souvanna Phouma was a proper government.

Senator SPARKMAN. We don't say that. He said they claim that was right, just like they would say we were in illegally. But we claim that we were there legally.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I think it ought to be brought out, I am going back on memory on an awful lot of this so I may be subject to correction, but if I remember rightly, we recognized Souvanna Phouma, we supported him for a long time, and then I think probably the CIA and some other groups over there, in some way undermined this guy and caused the present trouble we are in at the present time. But we have always recognized Souvanna Phouma as the head of that government.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, I think what we are doing, we are recovering a lot of the lost ground that was occasioned by the very action that you refer to.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then do we take the position that we were in the wrong, and if that is the position we take, let's be facing it.

I am not going to take that position. That is what you are saying, we have been in the wrong for the last 3 years and we are now rectifying it.

Senator SPARKMAN. We bet on the wrong man, I don't think there is any question about it.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think it is fair to say we have to face up to the facts that Souvanna Phouma was the duly-constituted head of the government; at one time we did recognize him, isn't that correct, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. Up until early December 1960.

Senator HUMPHREY. We did support Phoumi who came in to overthrow Souvanna Phouma, isn't that correct.

Secretary RUSK. In December 1960, yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. In 1960.

But it isn't as if Souvanna Phouma represented only a faction and, therefore, had no de facto recognition from us. He had both de facto and de jure recognition. So he was a legally constituted officer until he was ousted and then we supported the Royalists, the so-called Western or pro-Western Royalist.

DIFFERENCES AMONG WESTERN GOVERNMENTS

Secretary RUSK. I think the background here, Senator Humphrey, is that for a period in 1960, the United States, Great Britain and France, all of whom were involved in Southeast Asia, found themselves in disagreement with each other.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. And the French and the British, for example, felt that we ought to try to make more out of Souvanna Phouma. The Americans felt he was unrealiable, and that someone much more strongly pro-Western should be allowed or even encouraged to take his place.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I think this illustrates a point in parts of the world like this that you can make a strong argument for each line of action, but what makes things very difficult is for the three Western powers to act separately, to have a different policy.

Now, the French and the British, who today are, and I must say my colleague Averell Harriman who has seen a great deal of Souvanna Phouma, thinks there is a reasonable bet that Souvanna Phouma will work toward an independent Laos. He is a Laotian nationalist. We know a good deal about the frictions which he has had with the Pathet Lao, both at the political level and as between his armed forces and the Pathet Laos armed forces.

We know that he and General Phoumi have had some very interesting conversations with each other about how they propose to move under the coalition government. We know that General Phoumi is much more optimistic now about what can happen than he was, say, 2 months ago.

And we also know that we have the other side on the line on such questions as no penetraton, no infiltration, no injection of foreign use, the use of Laos for penetrating into Thailand and Viet-

nam. We are under no illusion that a piece of paper, and I don't say that contemptuously, at all, that a piece of paper provides the answer on the ground, and it will be critical as to the fate of this piece of paper as to whether in fact it is translated into action on the ground by all concerned.

If it isn't we will know it, and we will be back preagreement. If it is we will be content with the result.

When you look at the large resources which we have put in there, the stepped-up resources we put in after General Phoumi took office, and the returns in terms of the independence of Laos, we think that this is at least as good an alternative to the track, that we were on before, and which the present Administration was on for the first few months trying to find a way to help General Phoumi bring this situation to a successful conclusion.

But that didn't work out for reasons that the committee knows about.

AGAINST GREAT ODDS

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, the only thing I would like to add is that I am quite sure that the circumstances that exist now or have existed in recent weeks in Laos, are less favorable toward genuine neutrality than could have been, let's say 2 years ago. What I am saying is that the Pathet Lao forces and the Viet Minh forces have made substantial penetration, and, therefore, if this agreement of neutrality works out—and I hope and pray that it will and I am for the agreement, and support the effort that has been made, but I think that we ought to face up to the fact—if it works out, it will be doing so against great odds, odds that have been intensified over the past 2 to 3 years or the last couple of years. I guess it is just a way of saying I think the thing got worse before it got better, and we ought to face up to that possibility.

I just want the record clear that if the thing backfires we had a situation about 1959, early 1960, that could have been sustained as a real neutral Laos. But we decided, through policy to change that, and then after having decided to change that—as I recall in December 1960, and January 1961, just so we have continuity here—there was at that time a desire to try to bring about some resolution of the problem in Laos in the form of neutralization, isn't that correct?

Secretary RUSK. The agreement with the British and French on January 18, 1961, to try to find a negotiated settlement to this problem, inevitably moved in this direction, because the only basis for negotiating a settlement would be an arrangement on the basis of a neutral and independent Laos, otherwise we would have had to try to fight it out in that country.

Senator HUMPHREY. I hope you understand what I am driving at.

No. 1, I am trying to say I think Souvanna Phouma was stronger in 1959, let's say, than he is in 1962. Now, maybe with this agreement, if this agreement, of course, is protected, which I hope it will be, we will do our best to see that it is——

Senator LAUSCHE. How protected?

Senator HUMPHREY. I mean by that, if the parties who signed the agreement fulfill their obligations, then, of course, Souvanna

Phouma will be as strong or stronger than he was but we ought not kid ourselves about the fact that Pathet Lao forces did gain the ascendency in the last few months in Laos, and, therefore, just to get the agreement, number one, was to me really a surprising development. The fact that you were able to get an agreement at Geneva, second, if the agreement is adhered to, it will be also another one of the great achievements, but I don't think we ought to minimize the fact that the agreement was arrived at under circumstances that were less than favorable toward our position.

AMERICAN TROOPS ARE A STABILIZING FACTOR

Secretary RUSK. Senator, if I might just put a footnote on that. I think that from the beginning, after the 1954 accords, the other side did start chisling away on these agreements in the infiltration of personnel beyond the lines drawn in 1954.

I also think there was another contributing factor to a stabilization of this situation, if in fact it is to be stabilized and that is the presence of some 16,000 American troops in Southeast Asia.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I think this gives in the background Phoumi and Souvanna Phouma an element of strength which was not there in the earlier period.

Senator HUMPHREY. I see.

Secretary RUSK. I think also that it is interesting to note that although the other side, the Communist side, had made some propaganda declarations on the subject they have not tried to bargain with us at Geneva in this present session about withdrawing any forces from Southeast Asia in connection with this particular declaration. The Red Chinese are the only ones who tried to raise this in connection with this agreement, and the Russians, the North Vietnamese did not.

I think this is a rather interesting indication of some differences in points of view there in the conference.

RUSSIAN COOPERATION

Senator HUMPHREY. Is it a fact that the Russians have cooperated in the conference at Geneva on arriving at this agreement?

Secretary RUSK. They have been cooperative and I am quite sure that the Russians want these declarations to come to be satisfactorily concluded. But one always has to have in the back of his mind what comes next.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. And we are in position, of course, to know whether these agreements are being carried out. If they are not carried out we will be the first to know and we will be confronted with the same issues which we were confronted with over the last several months as to what action then to take in the circumstances.

Senator LAUSCHE. On that score, let us remember that beginning last February the papers and commentators were daily declaring there will be a cease-fire. We sent our Ambassador into the middle of Siberia to find Khrushchev to get him to agree to a cease-fire. Each week the statements were made, but never executed. Six

months passed, the Pathet Lao achieved its objectives. We were done.

Now, that is the fact about Russia's cooperation. It only began to cooperate when it got control of Laos, and it got control because it kept fooling us that there will be a cease-fire and they never intended a cease-fire until they had complete occupation. Then they said, "We now have a Troika Government." I am pleased to note that there is question generally in the minds of all of us about whether this Troika Government will work out.

I think you did only what could be done after the facts became fixed last July and August. But the thing that we have to watch is, are we later going to follow in South Vietnam what we did in Laos, because if we are we might as well pull out altogether at this time.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LAOS AND VIETNAM

Secretary RUSK. Senator, there are some fundamental differences between Laos and South Vietnam, and I can, I think, ease your mind on that straightaway.

In the first place, in retrospect we had a crucial decision to make when the first Soviet plane entered Laos and started the airlift. The orders in South Vietnam are if any strange plane comes over South Vietnam, it is shot down. I mean it was important to decide what to do with the first plane.

The establishment of a regular Soviet airlift into Northern Laos in support of the government that they recognized was a very important step in this development of the whole Laotian question. Also, the South Vietnamese themselves are fighting. They are taking the initiative. They are taking the casualties, they are making it clear they are prepared to do what frankly the Laotians were never willing to do and I think frankly, these make an enormous difference, these two things in those situations.

REPORTS OF U.S. MILITARY IN VIETNAM

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, I have read some press reports about the military activity of our force in South Vietnam that was anything but reassuring.

You saw where General Decker, Chief of Staff of the Army, made somewhat of a lukewarm denial, but the press a week ago was filled here with stories of returning officers from South Vietnam as to some of the weaknesses of our present operation there, and some of the inadequacies. I don't recall all the details, I read it hurriedly, but I thought that the military coverup afterwards revealed there must be something wrong. In other words, if you don't mind my saying so it was a rather clumsy job.

Senator LAUSCHE. It says they were all advisers and no effective workers. That is, the whole contingent we sent there were made up of advisers.

Secretary RUSK. I would be glad, Mr. Chairman, to comment on this point because you are quite right, Senator Humphrey, there was more behind the scenes than appeared in what was said publicly.

In the first place, let me remind you that any of us who have served in uniform lower down the ranks know that you can get any kind of story you go after if you go to the right level.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. A company commander never likes regiment and the regiment never likes division and so forth, but it is more than that. We had until a very few months ago an ordinary mission, military assistance mission out there. They were there to supply hardware, and so they were ordinance men, quartermasters, signal corpsmen, and they were people who were not highly trained in actual tactical combat operations.

SPECIAL FORCES

Then we put in the special forces group, several thousand of them. These fellows actually went with the combat units on their missions, engaged with them in training activities, and changed significantly the kind of help that we were giving.

Now one of the things that caused the dissatisfaction is that because we did not have a lot of routine personnel there, platoon leaders and that sort of thing for normal basic training, these highly trained special forces—elite, selected men—found themselves necessarily having to give pretty basic routine training to Vietnamese units in the care and cleaning of rifles and things like that sort. They felt quite rightly this was sort of a waste of their time for that purpose. The alternative would have been to put in even larger forces so that you would have that kind of job divided up.

Further, these special forces men are pre-eminently combat troops. I mean they are selected as killers, they are trained as killers, their morale is to get in and do the fighting.

Now, for reasons we have discussed with the committee, what we have been trying to do is to get people in with the Vietnamese to show them how to do the fighting themselves and these fellows that we have had out there are not grouped as platoon groups or smaller groups that could get these jobs done if we just turned them loose. They are there to help the Vietnamese to show them how to get the job done, this creates a certain frustration.

FRUSTRATIONS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

On the intelligence side, this is the most frustrating, baffling kind of warfare that you can imagine.

Guerrilla warfare is mean, it is unpredictable, they strike at night. It means an intelligence network throughout the villages—it is improving, but is still not good enough. To try to anticipate where a guerrilla is going to strike is perhaps the most difficult of all straight intelligence problems. So that our fellows will drop in with a company of Vietnamese troops by helicopter into a place where last night they knew there were some Viet—and they find maybe four or five and some rifles and grenades there. They capture those but the enemy has gone, disappeared. So this kind of fighting does put a great strain on patience and does lead to some frustration.

I think we can fully understand the reactions of the captains and the sergeants who talked to these newspapermen but on the other side there is the steady increase in the effectiveness of our forces and more importantly the effectiveness of the Vietnamese forces.

Senator HUMPHREY. This is a good explanation and the only thing as I say, most respectfully because I have no reason to be critical of General Decker—I don't know him too well except as an official—his explanation aroused the inquisitiveness in me of saying there is something more behind this than meets the eye.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

CIA AT FAULT IN LAOS

Senator MORSE. I want to raise a thing or two with the Secretary. I think one of the most significant things Secretary Rusk has said this morning was his point when we find ourselves at odds with our allies that is when trouble starts. When this difference over Laos developed between the United States on the one hand, and France and Great Britain on the other, it was a very unfortunate thing. I am very glad to have the statement the Secretary made about it. Because it is very well known my great concern about a problem that I think is too prevalent in too many groups outside the State Department who have too much to do with American foreign policy, the Pentagon for one, and the CIA for another.

I am not satisfied that we have the line of command we ought to have in American foreign policy in respect to those two agencies, and that is why I still stand in the Senate battling for Mansfield's original proposal, namely, a watchdog committee over the CIA. For I happen to think the sooner you get the CIA out of foreign policy matters and make it an administrative arm of the Government and not a policy forming arm of the Government, the sooner the State Department will exercise completely the jurisdiction that in my judgment under the Constitution it should exercise. I don't expect the Secretary to agree with me about this, but I am just expressing my point of view about it for background of the questions I want to raise.

I am of the opinion that much of our early problem in Laos is to be laid at the door of the CIA, as I think some of our problems in Latin America have to be laid at the door of the CIA, that we have to check on the CIA, that the best interests of this country call for it. I don't think you are going to have that check until the man across the table from me is put in the position where there is no question about the fact that he is running American foreign policy.

He is a wonderful man to adjust, I think, to very difficult circumstances but he can argue until doomsday and he could not convince me to the contrary, because I know too much about what the CIA has done in Latin America. I happen to be one who believes the CIA is not always as helpful to the Secretary of State as they should be and I think Laos is one of the examples of what I am talking about.

There isn't any question that the Senator from Minnesota is right, Mr. Chairman. There was a time when we were with the British and French with regard to Souvanna Phouma and he was

the head of the government that we were supporting, and when we went one way, and France and Great Britain didn't go with us, trouble started. I think it is too bad that at that point we didn't somehow find a basis for reconciliation of differences.

I think Senator Sparkman described it as well as it can be described when he said we bet on the wrong man. I think we changed horses, to put it under another figure of speech, at a time when we shouldn't have changed horses, when we tried to bring Souvanna Phouma into line.

Be that as it may, we have this agreement. I want it understood, Mr. Secretary, I am asking these questions so we will all be in position to know what we are going to say when these points are raised and I am sure they are going to be raised in regard to these agreements.

CONSIDER AGREEMENTS AS TREATIES

It is an old issue before this committee, ever since I have been in the Senate, for that matter. So my first question is, why aren't these agreements considered as a treaty requiring a two-thirds vote? I raise the question because the charge is going to be made here is another attempt to let the President get around the treaty-making requirements of the Constitution. What are we going to say if the question is asked the members of the Foreign Relations Committee on the floor of the Senate and, I think it will be, why aren't these agreements submitted as a treaty?

Secretary RUSK. The President's intention is to instruct me to sign them as executive agreements and the reasons for doing so are that in essence they are declarations of policy. They do not operate to affect the rights, privileges of American citizens or corporations or any agency of the Federal, State or local governments in this situation.

As I told the committee before some of you came in the only thing in these agreements that would call for any action by the Congress at all would be the authorization to pay 17½ percent, as our share of the costs of the International Control Commission.

These declarations do not commit us to aid although they commit us not to give aid with political strings on them. We could withdraw our aid programs entirely and we do expect to withdraw our military aid program. They do not affect any existing domestic law of the United States. They do not call for the cancellation of any treaties of the United States. They are declarations of intent to behave in a particular way.

Now, there is one other reason, Senator, that I would prefer not to mention publicly or on the record at this point.

[Discussion off the record.]

AMERICAN SEPARATION OF POWERS

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, is there any danger that we may find that some other nation party to these agreements will consider them treaties and handle them in their countries as a treaty?

Secretary RUSK. It is possible that under the constitutional procedures of some of the members there would be no difference between a treaty and an executive agreement. For example, in the

case of the British system, their cabinet reports such agreements to the parliament, and the Crown can make treaties under the same procedure by which we could make what we would call executive agreements. My guess is that this distinction is of no real relevance in the Soviet Union, for example.

We don't have in all the governments that would be parties here the same clear distinction between a treaty confirmed by the Senate, approved by the Senate, and any other kind of agreement.

Senator MORSE. I think it is very important that we be ready with a good logical answer to the point I am now raising because I don't need to tell you that if we find that England treats it as a treaty, if we find that France treats it as a treaty or any other country as a treaty——

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I can't quite frankly keep up with you on the legal aspects in these matters because you have great distinction in that field. I wonder if my colleague, the legal adviser, could comment on how it would appear in terms of other governments.

Mr. CHAYES. I think actually, Mr. Secretary, you are too modest.

Your statement, I think, is exactly right. The distinction between a treaty and an executive agreement in terms of the requirements for ratification and validation is one that is almost exclusively confined to our own Government, because it derives from the question of separation of powers and from the provisions of the written constitution. In most other states there isn't really any distinction except, of course, that there are agreements of more or less formality and solemnity and I don't think anybody regards this agreement before us as requiring more formality and solemnity than that will be given to it which it will get by its signature in Geneva next week.

NEW OBLIGATIONS

Senator MORSE. Would I be correct in saying that the only new obligation that these agreements impose upon the United States—this matter of the obligations imposed is rather important in determining whether you are dealing with a treaty or not—would be the financial authorization obligation that the Secretary has talked about in connection with financing the additional personnel necessary to carry out our share of the agreement.

Secretary RUSK. May I comment briefly on that, Senator?

This is the specific point in which the United States is required to do something that is measurable and tangible. Now, there are some obligations of a broad policy sort that we would act in a particular way rather than another. For example, we respect the neutrality of Laos; the President, under agreed arrangements, will withdraw U.S. military personnel that the President put there. But the only obligation that requires us to do something requiring the manpower, resources of the United States would be the 17½ percent.

Mr. CHAYES. And just to add to that, the conference is clear that our agreement to do that is dependent upon annual congressional appropriations.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I read earlier into the record the statement we proposed to make on that point.

Senator MORSE. One more question.

ANTICIPATING TROUBLE

I think this is very helpful in strengthening our argumentative position as members of this committee if we are to back you up.

Of course, when you have SEATO, you bring that in for treaty ratification, and the argument will be made that here you have this group of countries that have formed a new alliance in effect, in maintaining a peace in Laos, and these agreements impose obligations for action on each one of them; liabilities, too, and this is what I want to be clear on. That in case one country violates these agreements, and then the agreements provide for the procedure that the other countries are authorized to follow in case of that violation, my question is, suppose that there is a violation of these agreements by some group in North Laos or they proceed, we will say, with a military invasion. What obligations are we under in that event?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, at one stage the other side, the Communist side, raised the question of a formal amendment of the SEATO Treaty as it applies to Laos. This is not anticipated under these present agreements.

Under the SEATO Treaty, under the protocol to the SEATO Treaty, the SEATO powers can consult with each other about anything that happens in Laos affecting the security, and so forth of that country, and if asked by the Government of Laos, SEATO could take action to assist Laos.

Now, in its own declaration here the Laotian Government is to say that it will not accept help from any military bloc including SEATO, that is, an announcement by this Government that it will not invoke that aspect of the protocol of the SEATO Treaty. This does not bar the SEATO powers from consulting under the SEATO Treaty, and it may be that circumstances would arise when a government of Laos would say, "This agreement has been broken, therefore, we are asking SEATO for the assistance."

But this is something that anticipates trouble, therefore, we do not make a point of this at this time.

Senator MORSE. That is all.

Mr. CHAYES. As to any new obligation to use force or anything, this is not a formal guarantee agreement by which we would be obligated to come to the assistance of the country in case of a violation of its neutrality or something of that kind. The only obligation is to consult with others as to the measures to be taken.

NO LAOTIAN MILITARY ALLIANCES

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the international legal situation in the event that Laos would ask some country to come to its aid, that is, let's assume it asks Russia for troops.

Secretary RUSK. That would be contrary to these agreements. That would destroy these agreements.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it specifically prohibited?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Where?

Secretary RUSK. First in the declaration of the Laotian Government which will be incorporated in the declaration of the others.

Article (4) says:

> It will not enter into any military alliance or into any agreement, whether military or otherwise which is inconsistent with the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos; it will not allow the establishment of any foreign military base on Laotian territory, nor allow any country to use Laotian territory for military purposes or for purposes of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, nor recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition (including SEATO).

Mr. CHAVES. Article 6 goes directly to the question of foreign troops.

Secretary RUSK. "Subject to the provisions of Article 5 of the Protocol, it will require the withdrawal from Laos of all foreign troops and military personnel, and will not allow any foreign troops or military personnel to be introduced into Laos."

FILING AGREEMENTS WITH THE U.N.

Senator MORSE. Is it necessary under the United Nations Charter to file these agreements with the United Nations, or to submit them in any way to the United Nations?

Secretary RUSK. We would suppose these would be sent to the United Nations because there have been times when the Laotian question was before the United Nations and it is anticipated these would be filed there.

Senator SPARKMAN. Any further questions?

COST OF THE COMMISSION

Senator WILEY. You mentioned a certain percentage a little while ago, how much?

Secretary RUSK. 17½ percent.

Senator WILEY. How much does that amount to?

Senator SPARKMAN. $500,000.

Secretary RUSK. On the basis of an estimate, we don't know yet because the actual extent of operations of the commission has not been fully determined we think somewhere in the range of $500,000 or somewhat less a year.

Senator WILEY. What would that be used for?

Secretary RUSK. For the hiring of certain personnel by the commission, for its expenses in Laos, its transportation, and expenses of that sort.

Senator WILEY. In other words, setting up another commission under this?

Secretary RUSK. It is there now.

Senator SPARKMAN. The commission has been there since 1955.

Secretary RUSK. We have been paying this ratio of cost for the commission.

Senator WILEY. There would be a change in personnel; you say there were some in here who were in SEATO before or is it a different commission?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, the commission is made up of India, Canada, and Poland.

Senator WILEY. Oh, yes.

OMISSION OF THE U.N. IN THE TEXT

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, Dr. Marcy suggested that I ask you this question based upon this item 5 on page 2 of the annex draft declaration of the neutrality of Laos.

If the present declaration should be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which will furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory states and all other states of the world, it doesn't mention the United Nations there, and I am wondering if the reason it doesn't mention the United Nations is because of this question as to the recognition of the Royal Government of Laos which obviously some of the nations of the world who are members of the United Nations wouldn't recognize, but that in itself might raise an issue in the United Nations.

Secretary RUSK. Let me, if I may, ask my colleague, Mr. Chayes, to comment on that. It has been our general practice ourselves to file agreements of which we are party with the United Nations, what is your view?

Mr. CHAYES. I can't account for the omission of the United Nations in the text, except perhaps on the basis of the fact, that Communist China and North Vietnam who are parties to this declaration are not members of the United Nations.

But it has been contemplated from the very beginning that these agreements will be filed with the United Nations as a routine matter. It doesn't require the United Nations to take any action or anything. They simply will be filed with the Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. You see we filed a number of agreements with the United Nations where the United Nations itself is not referred to on the face of the agreement. Because that is a general obligation under the Charter.

Senator MORSE. All right.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

BALANCE OF THE COMMISSION

We hestitated in calling upon the commission to act in the disputes we had last year. We did so because we didn't feel it safe to turn over the decision on an issue to a commission made up of Poland, India, and Canada. In the discussion on this agreement was that subject at all pursued, that is, that the balance is against us in the membership of this commission?

India has been voting against us, and Poland would be expected to vote against us; Canada would be our friend and would be one of three votes.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, on that we showed some reluctance last year, as you rightly recall, to simply reconvene this commission which had been out of Laos for about 3 years, since 1957. Because under the Geneva Accords the commission was so wrapped up in the unanimity principle we didn't see how they could make any useful contribution at that point, and further we had hoped at that time that it would be possible to constitute a commission made up of Laos' own neighbors including countries like Cambodia and Burma who would be expected to show a lively reaction to any ag-

gressive moves from the north. Now, under the present arrangements, the commission does have investigative authority on the basis of a majority vote and even Canada standing alone can turn in its own report as a minority report so we do have opportunities for making public what the commission can discover, so that Canada alone can give us the official information that we need.

Further, I do want to call attention——

Senator LAUSCHE. May I interrupt?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

LAOS PROMISES COOPERATION WITH COMMISSION

Senator LAUSCHE. That Sui Sponte, it can enter into investigations and make announcements?

Secretary RUSK. By majority vote it can determine——

Senator LAUSCHE. By majority vote. We don't have to ask them.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. And further the negotiating record, the parliamentary record is quite clear that in signing these declarations, the Laotian Government promises its cooperation with the commission, so that the commission is able to make its own determinations about where it can go and establish posts and where it can go to look.

But I do want to remind the committee that the Indian chairman of a similar commission in South Vietnam joined with his Canadian colleague recently to call very special attention to the fact that it was the North Vietnamese penetration of South Vietnam that started this whole problem that we are in now and we think that India is concerned about Chinese pressures into Southeast Asia.

So, we are not too pessimistic about this particular point.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thank you. That is all.

Senator SPARKMAN. Any further questions? Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I say this. The press will be asking questions, has this been made public yet?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. I think, Mr. Chairman, it would be entirely appropriate for you to say they have already had before them the text of the agreements that have been concluded.

Senator SPARKMAN. And you were just explaining them?

Secretary RUSK. And I went over those in considerable detail with the committee.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did you go to Geneva?

Secretary RUSK. I expect to go next week and it should be not more than what the people in Europe call a weekend.

Senator SPARKMAN. I hope it won't be a lost weekend. [Laughter.]

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, JULY 16, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLIC AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:45 p.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Hickenlooper and Capehart.

Testifying on the situation in Haiti and in the other Latin American Republics generally was Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 4 p.m.]

48-68½ O—86——22

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee on African Affairs met in executive session at 9:10 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman), and Senator Dodd.

The subcommittee took testimony on the Congo situation from the Rev. Howard T. Brinton.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 10:15 a.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, JULY 20, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 9 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Lausche (presiding), and Senator Dodd.

Clare H. Timberlake, former Ambassador to the Congo, appeared and testified on the situation in that country.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 10:35 a.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JULY 24, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 9:30 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Gore (subcommittee chairman).

G. Mennen Williams appeared and testified on his recent trip, as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, to Europe to coordinate the Department's African policy.

No record was kept nor transcript taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m., in room F–53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Humphrey (subcommittee chairman), and Senator Symington. Senators Morse, Lausche, Wiley also attended. Senator Clinton P. Anderson also was present.

William C. Foster, Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, appeared to brief the subcommittee on the progress of renewed disarmament negotiations at Geneva.

For a record of the proceedings, see the published transcript.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 1 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 1, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLIC AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:45 p.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (subcommittee chairman), and Senator Sparkmans, Hickenlooper, and Aiken. Senators Humphrey, Lausche, Dodd and Wiley attended. Senator Claiborne Pell also attended.

The subcommittee was briefed on recent events in Peru by Ambassador James Isaac Loeb.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 6:40 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 1, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 3:50 p.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Lausche and Wiley. Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Morse and Aiken attended. Senator Claiborne Pell also attended.

The subcommittee was briefed on the Congo situation by Ambassador Edmund A. Gullion.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee adjourned at the conclusion of his testimony at 4:40 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 2:40 p.m., in room F-53, the capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman), and Senators Humphrey, Morse, Long, Lausche, Symington, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

The acting chairman opened the meeting by stating its purpose would be to select witnesses and determine the scope of the committee's consideration of the so-called satellite bill (H.R. 11040), To provide for the establishment, ownership, operation, and regulation of a commercial communications satellite system, referred to the Committee yesterday with instructions to report back by noon, Friday, August 10.

It was agreed the hearings would begin the next day, and be public.

On motion by Senator Capehart to limit the hearings to international implications of the bill, and the exploration of international legal questions, the acting chairman directed the roll to be called, and the Members responded as follows:

YEAS	NAYS
Senator Sparkman	Senator Long
Senator Humphrey (proxy)	Senator Morse
Senator Lausche (proxy)	
Senator Symington	
Senator Wiley	
Senator Hickenlooper	
Senator Aiken	
Senator Capehart	
Senator Carlson	
Senator Williams (proxy)	

So the motion carried, 10 to 2.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee thereupon adjourned at 4:10 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:30 p.m., in room F–53, the capitol.

Present: Senator Humphrey (subcommittee chairman), and Senator Symington. Also present were Senators Sparkman, Long, Wiley, and Carlson.

Appearing to brief the committee on the renewed Geneva disarmament negotiations were Ambassador Arthur M. Dean, United States Representative to the Disarmament Conference; William C. Foster, Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director.

For record of the proceedings, see the published transcript.

[At the conclusion of their presentations, the committee adjourned at 5:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, AUGUST 6, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered into executive session at 12:35 a.m., in room 4221, the NSOB.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman), and Senators Morse, Gore, Lausche, Symington, and Hickenlooper.

The committee discussed certain procedural questions, after which it adjourned at 12:55 p.m. until 2:30 p.m. the same day.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee thereupon adjourned at 12:55 p.m., to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. the same day.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:40 a.m., in room 4221, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Wiley, Aiken, Capehart, Carlson, and Williams.

Following discussion of procedural questions, the committee recessed its executive session until 2:40 p.m. at 11:40 a.m.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee thereupon adjourned at 11:40 a.m., to reconvene at 2:40 p.m. the same day.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee reconvened in executive session at 2:40 p.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore, Church, Wiley, Capehart, Carlson, and Williams. Senators Symington and Aiken later joined.

The chairman announced the pending motion to be one made in the morning session by Senator Capehart to report the bill (H.R. 11040) the Communication Satellite Bill, without amendment. Following discussion, the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Capehart) withdrew his motion, leaving the bill open to amendment.

Various amendments offered by Senators Gore and Morse to substitute a new section 402 in the bill; to insert certain words in section 201(a)(4) of the bill; to insert certain words in section 201(a)(5) of the bill; to insert a new subsection on page 37 of the bill; to add certain words on page 37 of the bill; to insert a new section on page 40; to strike subsection 6 on page 25; to strike out certain words on page 28 and page 30; to add a new subsection on page 34, after section 304(b)(2); to add a new subsection on page 36; and two amendments in the nature of substitutes were all submitted to rollcalls and voted down.

Members of the committee were given until Monday noon next to submit their individual views or minority report to the Senate.

On motion by Senator Williams, seconded by Senator Symington, the bill (H.R. 11040) was ordered reported, without amendment, on rollcall to which the Members responded as follows:

YEAS	NAYS
Senator Sparkman (proxy)	Senator Morse
Senator Lausche (proxy)	Senator Humphrey (proxy)
Senator Symington	Senator Long (proxy)
Senator Dodd (proxy)	Senator Mansfield (proxy)
Senator Wiley (proxy)	Senator Gore
Senator Hickenlooper (proxy)	
Senator Aiken	
Senator Capehart (proxy)	
Senator Carlson	
Senator Williams	
The Chairman	

The chairman directed the staff to contact Senator Church, who was absent on the call, and to register his vote if he so desired. Senator Church later advised he wished to be recorded in the negative.

So the bill (H.R. 11040) was ordered to be reported favorably, 13 to 4.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 6 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered executive session at 11:05 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman and Aiken.

The chairman pointed out that, the Senate then being in session, the committee was meeting without its permission. He mentioned that Senator Morse had previously entered objections to any committee meeting during the sessions of the Senate. Their meeting now, therefore, was informal—a consultative gathering at which the committee had, by calling the nominees before it this morning, saved time, at least in their consideration. No action on them, however, could follow now.

The Members then present discussed, on an informal basis, an invitation to send Senate delegates to the next meeting of the British Commonwealth Interparliamentary Conference, in Lagos, Nigeria, the bill (H.R. 11721), To authorize payment of the balance of awards for war damage compensation made by the Philippine War Damage Commission under the terms of the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of April 30, 1946, and to authorize the appropriation of $73,000,000 for that purpose, and the bill (S. 3329), To authorize payment to the Government of the Philippines. The chairman also mentioned the preliminary staff study on the non-diplomatic activities of foreign representatives in the United States, the U.N. loan bill, Foreign Buildings bill, and the bill (S. 1010), providing adjustments in Foreign Service retirements.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The meeting adjourned at 11:20 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, AUGUST 16, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 9:30 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol, in executive session.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.

On motion by Senator Mansfield, seconded by Senator Sparkman, the committee approved for report en bloc the nominations of Foy Kohler, to be Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.; William R. Tyler, to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; John H. Ferguson, to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Morocco; William Leonhart, to be Ambassador to Tanganyika; and Bernard T. Brennan, to be Deputy Administrator for Administration to the Agency for International Development.

On motion by Senator Mansfield, seconded by Senator Sparkman, the committee approved for report, without amendment, the bill (H.R. 11721) To authorize the payment of the balance of awards for war damage compensation made by the Philippine War Damage Commission under the terms of the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of April 30, 1946, and to authorize the appropriation of $73 million for that purpose.

Consideration of Senate Concurrent Resolution 84, Expressing the sense of the Congress that arrangements be made for viewing within the United States of certain films prepared by the U.S. Information Agency, was passed over temporarily.

The 6-day rule applicable to nominations was waived in the case of Charles Bohlen, nominated to be Ambassador to France, and his nomination was voted for favorable report unanimously.

The chairman called to the Members' attention the forthcoming parliamentary group meetings at Brasilia, Brazil; Lagos, Nigeria, and Paris, France.

The committee returned to its consideration of Senate Concurrent Resolution 84, and it was approved for favorable report unanimously, with the provision that its actual reporting be held up until the chairman could consult one of the committee members.

The committee informally discussed the Foreign Service Buildings Act.

Senator Lausche asked the staff to prepare a resolution urging the United States to keep the Hungarian issue on the agenda at the United Nations.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 9:59 a.m., or 1 minute before the regular convening of the Senate.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, AUGUST 27, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 9:45 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Hickenlooper, Williams, and Aiken.

The committee, on motion by Senator Sparkman, and without objection approved for report an original resolution authorizing the Vice President to name four Senators as a delegation to attend the next meeting of the British Commonwealth Association in Lagos, Nigeria.

The next order of business was stated to be consideration (on reconsideration) of the bill (H.R. 11880), To amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act, 1926, and to authorize additional appropriations, as proposed to be amended by the amended text of S. 1507, of like title, by committee vote and poll agreed upon at a past meeting of the committee (August 21, 1962).

Senator Church entered the room at 9:59 a.m. to complete a quorum. Senator Sparkman moved the report of (H.R. 11880), as amended. The motion was seconded by Senator Gore, and carried, on voice vote, unanimously.

For a record of the proceeding, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 9:59 a.m.]

THE WORLD SITUATION

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committees met, in joint session, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J.W. Fulbright, (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Morse, Lausche, Church, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson and Williams, members of the Committee on Foreign Relations; Senators Russell, Byrd (Virginia), Stennis, Jackson, Thurmond, Bartlett, Cannon, Saltonstall, Smith, Bush and Case (New Jersey), members of the Committee on Armed Services.

Also present: Senators Carroll and Miller (Iowa).

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt and Mr. Henderson for Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. Durden for Committee on Armed Services.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, and will the press please leave the room.

This joint meeting was arranged in cooperation with Senator Russell to try to save the time of our officials, as well as the Senators, some of whom are on both committees, and I think it is a very excellent idea. We are very pleased to have with us this morning the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara and the Acting Director of the CIA, General Marshall C. Carter.

Secretary Rusk would like to open the meeting with a statement followed by Secretary McNamara.

General Carter will not have a formal statement.

For the benefit of the Senators who are here this is an executive meeting and we are very proud of our keeping it executive and not discussing with the press what is said here. I hope everyone understands that. I know the members of the committee do.

Senator Russell, will you have anything to say?

Senator RUSSELL. No, I have nothing to add to that, Senator. I agree this is a good idea to endeavor to let the people do some administrative work instead of spending all their time up here on the Hill. It is very difficult to have to go before two committees of each House and then the Appropriations Committees likewise, and it simplifies matters when it can be done. Of course, it isn't possible of achievement in all circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. We may be making history here, setting precedents we can follow more often, I hope.

Mr. Secretary, will you proceed?

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Senator Fulbright, Senator Russell, we very much appreciate the willingness of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee to give us a chance to spend some time with you this morning. We thought it would be helpful to us as well as to you if we could, toward the close of the session, have a hard-hitting general review of where we seem to stand in some of our relations with the Soviet bloc, and to try to anticipate some of the key issues that will be ahead of us between the weeks and months before the end of the year.

In the interest of time and in order to get to the questions which are most on Senators' minds I thought I might open with a relatively short informal comment on a number of these questions.

Secretary McNamara will do the same and then we would go immediately into discussion of the points that are most interesting to members of the committees. I think we are all here in Washington impressed by the turbulence and complexity of the scene in which we find ourselves in the world these days.

TURBULENT TRANSFERS OF POWER

Just to illustrate in a very minor way, the United States has relations with about 107 countries. That means that on a statistical basis we can anticipate a change in government in 20 to 25 of these countries each year for as long as we can see into the future and since a considerable number of those governments do not have stabilized built-in peaceful methods of transferring power from one regime to another or one leadership to another, that means we can expect from 12 to 20 minor or major crises each year affecting our interests in some part of the world simply in the processes of changing governments out of so many independent nations.

I think it is also true so far as the free world is concerned, it is in the nature of free societies to reflect a certain turbulence of activity, political debate, criticism, adjustments as they try to get on with their business, and even in the free world where you have societies that have a political monopoly at the top but without the solid far-reaching totalitarian police state of, say, a Stalinist period, you do have turmoil connected with attempts on the part of those not in power to reach power despite the control system at the very top.

I am thinking of countries like Korea, for example, or Pakistan or Ghana or a number of those where there is no democratic process in the way in which we normally interpret it.

It is also true in the great alliances that the far-reaching agreements which exist within these alliances come to very little public attention because they are not normally considered as news, whereas relatively minor disagreements within an alliance turn out to be fairly substantial news. Sitting at almost the center of turbulence and complexity of that sort we sometimes get the impression that things are much more simplified in Moscow, that

things are easier and, I think, one point I would like to make today is that Moscow also is facing a good deal of complexity as it looks at its situation and the world scene.

SOVIET LEADERSHIP

I think there is no question but that Mr. Khrushchev is in a position of very strong personal leadership. We do not believe that his own personal position is basically threatened by force inside the Soviet Union. I think there is little question that he does exercise the dominant power in the Soviet Union at the present time. But that does not mean that he is free to act individually and personnally as perhaps Stalin was able to do, because the phenomenon of collegiate rule does seem to be an increasingly important factor in the Soviet Government in recent years.

We do know there is lively discussion and debate at the top. We know there are differences among the leadership on important questions and that within that top leadership they face problems of allocating resources to different needs, to demands from different parts of their society and different aspects of their policy, and that collegiate rule is in fact the current characteristic of that top leadership. There have been some interesting rather small examples of the way this has operated from time to time.

You may recall that some months ago there was a joint declaration prepared in the Geneva disarmament conference on war propaganda. On a Friday of one week the Soviet delegate on instructions fully supported the declaration which he has helped to prepare. The Tuesday of the following week he completely reversed his position and indicated the Soviet Union had turned it down.

Our best guess is that although this was known to the top officials conducting foreign affairs in Moscow, that the Central Committee, over the weekend did in fact overrule the foreign office and perhaps Mr. Khrushchev himself and bring about that particular reversal. The handling of men like Molotov, the Stalinist who was strongly attacked by the Soviet Government, suggests there are contentions and stresses and some sort of maneuvering between the Stalinist group or the most conservative group on the one side and the revisionist group on the other.

I think it is also fair to say the Soviet leadership has to take into account more so than formerly the factor of Soviet opinion. The so-called de-Stalinization of the internal regime in the Soviet Union has permitted more discussion, more debate, has given somewhat more authority to scientists, to managers, to lower functionaries, and this in turn has led to more discussion, and more of what we would call public opinion poll. It still does not play a dominant role because the instruments are there for the government to play its power to a considerable extent but perhaps you can see the inroads of public opinion in a moderating direction but that is one of the factors Mr. Khrushchev has on some occasion adverted to and we see evidences of it in the Soviet Union.

SINO-SOVIET DIFFERENCES

He has to consider the Soviet-Sino differences which exist in the tactical world which have to do with getting on with the Commu-

nist revolution which has to do within the Communist bloc with the issue of leadership between Moscow and Peking. Peking has rejected the primary of the Moscow leadership, and there are a number of things on which Moscow and Peking have not been able to see eye to eye, on such questions as trade and aid. There is good reason to believe in Peking they are resentful and critical of aid which the Soviet Union has been giving to countries outside of the Communist bloc at a time when China itself needs massive aid to try to recover from some of its almost impossible problems.

NATIONALISM WITHIN THE COMMUNIST BLOC

There are signs of increasing nationalism within the Communist bloc. I refer to the strong sense of nationalism which one finds in Poland, a growing sense of national assertion in Hungary, somewhat modified evidences of it in countries like Rumania, but I think in the long run we can see a growth in the idea of the idea of national Communist parties expressing their own views to Moscow and in Communist circles and not acknowledging the complete authority of the party in Moscow.

We all know that the Communist bloc has some very severe economic problems reaching from East Germany all the way around to North Vietnam, problems that are most dramatically illustrated in the agricultural field, basic problems of feeding their people, problems which do put pressures on the Communist leadership and force a very difficult problem in allocating resources among the many different needs of the Soviet bloc.

COMMUNIST ATTENTION TO THE COMMON MARKET

One of the more interesting aspects of their concern about the economic situation in recent months has been the growing attention they have been paying to the development of the Common Market. For a very long time the Communists have asserted as a matter of doctrine that development like the Common Market among capitalist nations is basically impossible and it would break up. In recent weeks and months they have seemed to have revised their views on that, seemed to have accepted the fact there is going to be a Common Market and to look to the prospect that the Common Market may in fact be enlarged and indeed strengthened and that they have a new problem as to how they work out their relationships in their own economic sector, and with how they deal with the phenomenon of the Common Market in the West.

Their council for mutual economic assistance which is the Communist bloc, so-called equivalent of the Common Market, has been meeting intensively both at the top and through all sorts of commissions and sub-commissions trying to develop their policy with respect thereto. It appears they are not thinking about the possiblities of bloc trade with the Common Market bloc while at the same time trying to carry on active propaganda and opposition to the idea of the Common Market among the underdeveloped countries and to try to stimulate fears in the non-Western part of the world that the Common Market is a device for trying to restore a kind of economic imperialism of the West throughout the world.

The Soviets are also finding themselves caught up in occasional disappointments among the underdeveloped countries where some of their aid programs have not paid the political dividends that they hoped and have found themselves caught in between as we have ourselves frequently been caught in between countries with whom they would like to maintain close relations but are bitterly hostile toward each other. For example, the Soviets would like to have close relations with both Iraq and Egypt but these two countries are at each other's throat and this has caused them the same kind of problems that we are familiar with over the year in similar type situations.

COMMUNIST GOAL OF WORLD REVOLUTION

There seem to be on occasion some elements of conflict between the state interests of the Soviet Union on the one side and the commitment of the Communists to a world revolution on the other. In a simplified illustration which I think is not specifically in their mind at the present time, would be the problem that if the Soviet Union were thinking chiefly of Russia and the Russian people, they could accept, objectively consider, that it might be in their interest to accept a considerable period of detente during which they would build up the Soviet Union, its internal resources, its economy including the army but leave the foreign policy field relatively quiet for, say, a decade while they geared themselves to their own national need. During which time they might disarm and mislead the intentions of the rest of us as to what their intentions are.

But their doctrinal intentions seem to stand as far as we can see, although their techniques for getting on with it may have changed and their constant pressure of the world revolution, among other things, is a constant alert to the rest of us that their purposes remain the same and that we have a very formidable job ahead of us. This is part of, at the center of our own problems in dealing with the Soviet Union. There is no question their appetites will grow and feed on any successes they have.

It is also true that frustration of the world revolution will force the Soviet Union to make some far-reaching and basic decisions on policy and that period will be one of some danger. Indeed, I think we are in such a period now because there were reasons to believe that Soviet leadership has been going through a far-reaching appraisal or reappraisal of policy, and that they are in the process of making some fairly important decisions.

I would like to comment very briefly, if I may, Mr. Chairman, on certain specific situations to which the committees might wish to return later simply to illustrate the variety and what seem to be their policy at the moment, and some of the issues we will have to be facing in the weeks ahead.

SOVIET PROPOSALS ON BERLIN

In Berlin, the insistent proposals of the Soviet Union for solution to the problem of Berlin run directly counter to the most basic and vital commitments of the Western world and to our own national interest so far as West Berlin is concerned. The Soviets have made a variety of proposals as to how to deal with West Berlin but all of

them seem to be variations of a single theme that somehow our position in West Berlin must be drastically reduced or eliminated before that matter can settle down. This is something for reasons these two committees will fully understand that the West cannot accept. It is something that, therefore, provides us with a very important direct and dangerous confrontation of the two power groups right there in the heart of Europe.

In the most recent period the Soviets seem to be in the process of trying to eliminate East Berlin, East Germany, from any discussion whatever and to concentrate their attention on West Berlin, and to consider West Berlin somehow as a four-power responsibility in a way that is not true of East Berlin.

This opens up the prospect that they will attempt a series of nibblings, so-called salami tactics, trying steadily to undermine the position in West Berlin until a defacto position has been brought about where our own position has been greatly reduced and the morale of the West Berliners could not stand up under the strain. The three Western powers have completed a very extensive contingency planning against these salami tactics. We think that it is important to limit the Soviet presence in West Berlin in ways that would be consistent with our interests.

When the Soviets attempted, for example, to build up their entry to the War Memorial through Friedrichstrasse, they attempted to do so without escorts. We insisted that we would send escorts, and the Soviets did not want the presence of Western escorts. When they used the armored personnel carriers that created a traffic hazard and seemed to step up their presence in West Berlin we insisted in the last few days they use a gate which is immediately adjacent to the War Memorial, instead of Friedrichstrasse. We were faced with a real issue there, but the Soviets did accept the gate at Sandkrug Bridge, as an alternative which is in the immediate vicinity of the War Memorial and creates much less of a problem.

But we can expect, I think, some salami tactics in the weeks ahead. We shall try to anticipate them and use what leverage we have on counter-tactics to meet the efforts of that sort.

BERLIN AIR SAFETY CENTER

I might say there is one aspect of Soviet presence in West Berlin in which we ourselves have an interest. Basically the Soviet presence there rests upon the War Memorial of the Spandau prison where the war criminals are being kept and the Berlin Air Safety Center. We would like to see the Soviets stay in the Air Safety Center because that is the means whereby allied flights in Berlin are signalled by the Soviets to air traffic controls in East Germany so ordinary air safety can be carried out. Now, they may leave that center almost at any time, and we have contingency plans to take account of that in order to go right ahead even if they do break up the Air Safety Center by withdrawing. But we would prefer that they themselves stay in it, and it may be that they will use their known interest in participating in the guard of the war criminals as some sort of quid pro quo on that situation.

But I want to say to the committees that the allies are still very much together on the basic issues here in Berlin. We are working, I think effectively as a team; the only fundamental difference, has been that General de Gaulle has a different view as to strategy of the procedures and tactics in connection with contacts with the Soviet Union but on the basic underlying issues the alliance is solid.

LAOTIAN DECLARATIONS

In Laos the declarations, which were completed in Geneva some weeks ago, were in no sense the end of the Laotian question, they were the beginning. Everything turns on whether those declarations are carried out, because if they are not carried out, on the key issues which are of interest to us, then the declarations will dissolve and will be of no account.

I think the most critical things from our point of view would be, first, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos by early October which is the designated time, and second, the guarantee that Laos will not be used as an avenue of infiltration into neighboring states particularly into South Vietnam.

I think I can say that so far the attitude of the Soviet Union has been reasonably cooperative and reasonably cautious in Laos. We have had reasons to think that they themselves were acting with some restraint and were imposing some restraint on some of the other Communist members. But we still cannot be sure that we can get their full cooperation in carrying out the declarations and will be watching that very closely.

We think that Vietminh in Laos are in some cases going back to North Vietnam without being properly counted. We have some pretty good ideas as to how many are there and we think our intelligence will give us a pretty good indication in general as to whether there has been compliance with that part of the declaration. I think also if there were any significant movement of Vietminh withdrawal from Laos into South Vietnam that we would become aware of it.

Now, on the political side in Laos, there is minor encouragement in the fact that Souvanna Phouma and General Phoumi seem to be cooperating on a number of important questions. There are tensions between Souvanna Phouma and Souvannavang, who is the Pathet Lao leader on the other, and there is some dissension within the Pathet Lao group itself.

But, nevertheless, we are not taking anything for granted there, and we will be watching that situation very carefully indeed. We cannot provide any assurance as yet that the declarations will, in fact, be carried out as intended, but we are working at it.

GUERRILLA WARFARE IN VIETNAM

In South Vietnam the situation has not significantly changed in recent weeks. The South Vietnamese are making a considerable effort in the field. The village program is making some headway, but nevertheless, the guerrilla-type warfare there is one of the meanest and most difficult sort to deal with and we have no reason to think there will be early ending of that operation. We are mildly

encouraged at times and then we get setbacks which we regret. It looks as though it is going to be a difficult operation there, along the lines of the Malayan campaign and it will take some time to make any serious headway.

It is still true that President Diem has not succeeded in broadening the political scale base on which he is operating. If anything, I suppose, there has been some impression of restriction of that base in some action he has taken against so-called dissidents in his own country. But nevertheless, we think that some progress is being made.

SITUATION IN THE CONGO

In the Congo, the Soviet Union appears to be standing aside for the time being on a wait-and-see basis. Having been thrown out of the Congo by the Central Government shortly after the Congo became independent they shifted their efforts to the Oriental Province, and tried to build a pro-Communist group over the east of the Congo. But when the Central Government, through the United Nations, were able to establish reasonable control over that part of the Congo following the death of Lumumba and imprisonment of Gizenga, the Soviets shifted their emphasis and attention to Leopoldville and are now pursuing what seems to be a wait-and-see course.

We have been, I think, encouraged, by the response of Prime Minister Adoula on the one side and Mr. Tshombe on the other to the proposals recently made by the United Nations for a federal constitution and federal arrangement by which the Congo can become unified. From the Prime Minister's point of view he made a considerable concession in accepting the far-reaching federal arrangement as he did in fact accept. I think from Mr. Tshombe's point of view, his acceptance of the idea of federalism opens the way for a unification of the Congo with large automony to the provinces on matters of provincial concern. We are again not over the hump. There is a great deal of palaver still ahead, a great deal of negotiation on constitutional issues but we are interpreting what has happened in the past 2 weeks as a forward step and will build what we can on it.

Meanwhile, the Soviets have expressed distrust of such a Congo settlement and are trying to encourage those elements who would simply like to remove Tshombe from the scene and restore the disunity of the Congo by force.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CUBA

In Cuba the principal thing has been the stepped up military assistance in the past few weeks. I think I might pause at this point to let General Carter give a brief summary as to what in fact has happened in Cuba in the last few weeks in increased military supplies.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, General Carter.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. MARSHALL C. CARTER, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN WHITMAN

General CARTER. New information received from highly reliable sources over this past weekend has confirmed a considerable step-up and build-up in Soviet aid to Cuba, specifically in the areas of surface-to-air missile defenses, guided missile motor torpedo boats, and some land armament and artillery. Eight surface-to-air missile sites are now in process of being set up with an assembly area for the missiles just south of Havana. Two more sites appear to be in the offing, and there is equipment for a ninth site available. As we look ahead there is a possibility that we would have as many as 24 sites ringing Cuba.

Now, the small amount of permanent construction that has been put in there indicates quite clearly that the Soviets have gone ahead on this in a crash program. These sites, at least some of them, could be fully operational within another week or so. It takes approximately 125 technically trained personnel to operate a single site, and we have no information indicating that the Cuban are thus trained; consequently we look to Soviet technicians to man these sites for probably the next 9 to 12 months.

The capabilities of this missile system are substantially the same as our earlier versions of the NIKE, the NIKE Ajax. This means they have a range of about 25 to 30 miles, an altitude capability of up to about 80,000 feet. They do not have a low altitude capability and cannot fire below about 2,500 feet. Their maximum operating capabilities are within the area of about 10,000 to 60,000 feet.

All sites that we have now fully confirmed are on the western third of the island. However, further defector and clandestine sources have indicated a process of building up in the eastern section of the island.

SOVIET MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS

In addition to the surface-to-air missiles we have information that there are eight Komar class motor torpedo boats of Soviet design and manufacture. These carry two short-range ship-to-ship missiles on each ship. The boats themselves are capable of 45 knots and have a cruising radius of 300 miles. Some Cuban naval personnel have been trained in the Soviet Union. We do not know whether they are trained in this type of boat. These are in addition to the 13 motor torpedo boats and the six submarine chasers that we had previously reported earlier this year.

Now, our same highly reliable sources indicate that there has been some increase in tanks and in armored personnel carriers, and perhaps some in combat aircraft. We credit the Cubans with having now 60 Migs of the 15 and 17 class and about a dozen 19's. We have no indication they have any Mig 21's or any bombers.

SOVIET SHIPS EN ROUTE TO CUBA

Soviet shipments, as you know, have been drastically increased since mid-July and we total about 65 Soviet ships and bloc ships into Cuba since that time. Right now, there are 16 dry cargo ships

en route to Cuba, and we estimate that 10 of these probably contain military equipment and technicians.

We have on our books up until mid-July of this year they have been carrying about 500 military type technicians and several thousand agriculture and economic technicians. We have now increased this estimate in view of the influx to 1,700 military technicians in Cuba at the present time, and we believe that at least 1,300 more have just landed or are en route.

We would anticipate still more additional bloc technicians as the number of surface-to-air missile sites increase. These are all defensive type weapons of relatively limited capabilities. That is the status as of right now.

Are there any questions?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, perhaps I might make some further comments before we get to questions.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

CUBA AS A SOVIET BASE

Secretary RUSK. This military assistance to Cuba is in general the same type the Soviet Union has furnished to certain other countries outside of the bloc such as Indonesia, on order, or for Iraq or for Egypt. Nevertheless, the fact it is Cuba in this hemisphere poses some very special problems for us, because it is a very expensive operation for the Soviet Union to bolster Cuba economically and militarily in the way they are now doing. We don't believe the Soviet Union will be putting in this vast expenditure, very substantial expenditure, just for Cuba although there are obviously some advantages on the political side in Cuba alone.

They, we suspect, look upon Cuba as a base to cause difficulty in the hemisphere. Therefore, we feel it is of the first importance for us to deal with that problem, to make sure that what is going on in Cuba is not exported into the hemisphere either through subversion or through illicit arms traffic or whatever it might be.

On that we have been working closely with the other countries in the hemisphere. I won't review for you the action taken at the Punta del Este conference in January, but I can say since that time we have been working closely with the military intelligence organizations of these countries as well as their political leadership to try to insure that they would have immediate information about illicit traffic in arms, and we would understand the techniques used by the Cubans in the hemisphere.

Thus far, the techniques appear to be chiefly the supply of money, intensive propaganda by powerful broadcasting stations from Cuba and training of personnel who come into Cuba from other Latin American countries.

SOVIET CAUTION

We have not been able to find any significant shipment of arms or any activity of that sort directly out of Cuba, and we suspect there is a certain caution in this matter on the side of the Soviets and Cubans because I am sure they know we would be looking for that and would be perhaps glad to catch them in the act in illegal arms shipments.

Now the situation, it seems to us, in Cuba would change in important respects if the Soviets were to establish their own military base there, submarine base, or if there were to be established in Cuba ground-to-ground missiles that would directly threaten the continental United States or Cuba's neighbors in the Caribbean, if there were a step-up of the role of Cuba in the general political and military situation rather than in the confrontation between the Soviets and the free world.

Thus far, we do not see that type of activity going on, and it is of some interest that the Soviets have held back from making a flat military commitment to Cuba of a military pact type. They have withheld making the types of commitments that they made to, say, the Warsaw Pact or to other members of the bloc in other parts of the world.

We think they are somewhat cautious about making an all-out commitment, and given the location of Cuba and the difficulties which they would have in making good on such commitment if there were serious trouble.

I would also say if there is any sharply increased crisis over Berlin due to their pressures on West Berlin, that that would also inevitably cause us to take another look at the Cuban situation to see what might be done under the conditions of greatly heightened crisis.

THE ISSUE OF CASTROISM

We still have in the hemisphere some problem with certain of the larger countries at a distance from the Caribbean, who are less interested in Cuba than they are in the great complex of their own internal problems. I think particularly of countries like Brazil and Chile; Mexico is rather a special case.

Castroism is a key issue in many of these countries. What led to the overthrow of the Frondizi government was the direct consequence of the attitude of Frondizi toward Castro. [1] It still is a key issue in the tense situation in Brazil, and we still do not have complete hemispheric solidarity. But, on the other hand, there has been strong emotion in the hemisphere away from Castro toward a recognition of the nature of this threat, and we have been encouraged by growing cooperation in this hemisphere.

COLLECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST CUBA

We are concerned about the attitude of the other members of the free world on Cuba. They have not taken it as seriously as we have pressed them to do. A good deal of the shipping which is going into Cuba does come from free world sources.

When we take this up at governmental level as we have more than once, the problem seems to be that these governments claim to lack the legal ability to move directly on it. They point to some very practical problems from their point of view, because their chartering of ships to the Soviet bloc normally is on a bare bones

---

[1] On March 28, 1962 Argentine President Arturo Frondizi was overthrown by a military coup. This action followed closely after congressional election victories by supporters of exiled dictator Juan Peron.

charter over time, so that there is no way of knowing at any particular time which ships chartered to the Soviet bloc will in fact be used in the Cuba trade.

Now, the Soviet bloc's use of free world shipping in the case of Norway, United Kingdom, Greece, countries that depend on their shipping services for a considerable part of their own foreign exchange necessities, creates a real problem for them economically unless we get into a situation with the bloc where general economic measures against the bloc can be taken.

We are discussing this further in the North Atlantic Council at NATO today, for example, to see what measures can be taken. We have had some cooperation from countries that has helped to a degree. Canada, for example, has taken action to prevent reshipment of anything coming out of the United States to Cuba. They have applied the Cocom list.

The Canadian exports to Cuba will drop from about $35 million last year to about $6 million or $7 million this year. Part of that is due to the shortage of foreign exchange to Cuba and not necessarily to actions taken by the Canadian Government. We can come back to this in a moment, Mr. Chairman, if you wish.

PROBLEM OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

I would like to make just one very quick comment on disarmament and then conclude. We do not see on the side of the Soviet Union any serious interest in disarmament as in practical steps in the field of disarmament. In the field of nuclear testing the critical issue has been this past year and still is today the refusal of the Soviet Union to accept on-site inspections.

We have been unwilling in recent weeks to talk about numbers of on-site inspections which might be possible as a result of the Vela tests. Our view has been so long as the Soviet number is zero there is nothing for us to talk about because we do not wish to negotiate the number of on-site inspections with the neutrals and with other countries. The reason for that being very simple, that whatever number we use will be subject to erosion and, therefore, to no avail, no point, no purpose.

We earlier had put in a proposal, we and the British, calling for 12 to 20 on-site inspections on a sliding scale related to the number of suspicious events.

Suppose we took 12. The neutrals would come along and say, "This is your proposal. Why don't we split the difference, why don't we make it six," and you recess your conference, come back a month later and at that point the neutrals will say, "Have you got something new, why don't you make six, four?"

There is just no point in going down that trail, so we have rigorously stayed away from talking about those numbers with those who don't count. If the Soviet Union wishes to talk seriously about on-site inspections and genuine arrangements for international control we will talk about it. So far they have said, "Nothing doing."

Similarly on general disarmament. Gromyko told me if we thought they were being sticky on suggestions made for nuclear testing this would be multiplied many times over when we get to

complete disarmament, because inspection would be so much more intrusive into the Soviet Union.

There is one possiblity in the disarmament field in which there might be some Soviet interest. We have had some indications that they might be willing to sit down and work out an arrangement that would try to interfere with the transfer of nuclear weapons to presently non-nuclear powers. We have an interest in that particularly as regards China. They have an interest in it particularly as regards Germany. We have been unwilling to make a deal on this with specific relation to Germany. The Soviets have recently indicated that they might be ready to talk about that on a world-wide basis, if we can find arrangements that would prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. That is the only glimmer of any relevance.

U–2 INCIDENT

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would say this U–2 incident was exactly what in fact it was said to be. One of our planes was on a course which would have kept it well outside of Soviet territorial waters or air but it was flying at night, very severe winds did come up, and it apparently blew it off course and it did go over the southern tip of the island and was picked up by Soviet radar.

We understand this morning that Moscow radio has played it straight as far as our announcement is concerned and we thought we would just tell the truth and prevent thereby the Soviets from making a great issue out of it on a policy basis. But we do believe that our pilot did fly over the end of the island and that the best way to handle it was simply to say so and let it go at that.

We do have a number of flights for all sorts of purposes going over international waters. Some of it connected with what the Russians call our national capability for detecting nuclear tests, air sampling and things of that sort and it is possible an occasional incident will occur. In this case it apparently did occur.

Mr. Chairman, what I have said indicates on easing up in Soviet policy. We do not see an indication of preparations to launch an overt military action against the West or against any of our military allies.

We do think there are many dangers in the situation but there are elements of caution on the Soviet side which I think we have to keep in our minds as well as the dangers. But certainly there is no indication from anything we can see that the United States or the free world can relax in our own efforts to get on with our job. I am quite sure if we do get on with our job in the free world, and encouragements about it, if we do get on our job that the worrying will have to be done by the Russians. If I had to draw a balance sheet, I think I would rather have the problems confronted by the free world rather than the problems confronted by Mr. Khrushchev.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Secretary of Defense, do you wish to proceed?

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and Chairman Russell, I will speak very briefly on our appraisal of the Soviet military power and policies and, I will answer any questions you may direct to us.

I think it is clear to all of us that the foundations of Soviet military power are their long-range strategic nuclear weapons. These have increased significantly in numbers over the past 24 months. They are continuing to increase, although neither the precise number of the force nor the rate of increase is as large as we had previously estimated.

These forces fall into four categories. The intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM], the medium range ballistic missiles [MRBM] the submarines launched missiles and their long-range aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

The Soviets, we estimate, have today about 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles in operational condition. These could all be directed against this country. They have about 500 MRBMs, most of which are targeted against Western Europe. They have about 40 submarines, mostly diesel powered, perhaps 30 diesel powered and 40 nuclear powered, each capable of directing against this country about three ballistic missile with ranges of perhaps 350 miles, all of which have to be surface launched; they differ, therefore, significantly from the capability of our Polaris type submarines. They have about 165 long-range bombers and tankers, and about 950 medium-range bombers and tankers, and out of that total bomber tanker force of something on the order of 1,100 or 1,200 aircraft they could put about 200 bombers, we believe, over North America today.

NOT AS LARGE AS PREVIOUSLY ESTIMATED

As I suggested these forces are not as large as had previously been estimated for this period, and while they are increasing they are not increasing as rapidly. Furthermore, our forces today are very much larger than the Soviet forces, and based on our forecasts, our strategic nuclear forces will continue to be considerably larger at all times within the next 5-year period, the period of our forecast.

Today we have about 1,500 long-range bombers, plus an additional 1,000 tankers associated with those long-range bombers and of that 1,500-bomber force about approximately half of the bombers are on 15-minute ground alert, ready to take off within that 15-minute period. Those bombers carry about 400 hounddog missiles, which are missiles that can be launched approximately 500 miles away from the target carrying nuclear warheads.

Furthermore, we have approximately 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles on launchers today, ready for launch, and beyond that we have about six to seven Polaris submarines operational today each of them carrying 16 missiles.

So our total aircraft and missile force and each of the sub-components of it, substantially exceeds the comparable Soviet force, roughly by a factor of two.

In total, we have on alert about 1,500 nuclear warheads. These are nuclear warheads that we believe can survive any strike by the Soviets, and it is this capability that leads us to make the statement that we have made in public, that we have a force sufficiently large to absorb a full Soviet first strike surprise attack against our nuclear forces, and survive with sufficient size to literally destroy the Soviet Union.

This has been our objective and will continue to be our objective.

RESULTS OF A NUCLEAR WAR

The Soviets have not built, and apparently they will not in the future, their strategic forces, particularly their missile forces, as rapidly as a maximum allocation of their resources would permit. But while our force is superior today, as I have outlined, superior in numbers, in power, and superior in survivability and while we believe it will continue to be superior in those terms in the years ahead, a nuclear exchange either today or in the period that I have outlined, the 5-year period ahead, would destroy both the Soviet Union and the Western world.

We estimate that the fatalities that result from such an exchange would approximate 50 to 100 million people in the Soviet Union, in the Western European nations and in the United States, 50 to 100 million in each of those three areas.

Now, whether it is 50 million or 100 million or whether, as a matter of fact, it is somewhat less or somewhat more of those figures, depends on the characteristics of the operation of the exchange but in any event it is perfectly clear to us and we believe it is clear to the Soviet Union that destruction of both the Soviet bloc and the Western world would result from a nuclear exchange. I say this despite the fact that we have a clear superiority in terms of numbers and we have a force so large as to survive with sufficient power following a first strike by the Soviets to literally destroy the Soviet bloc.

OTHER ASPECTS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Khrushchev appears to recognize the limitations of nuclear war as a tool of foreign policy and, therefore, he appears to be placing increasing emphasis on three other aspects of military operations: First, the maintenance of large conventional forces, non-nuclear forces. Second, the maintenance and probably the increase of military assistance programs to non-bloc countries.

The military assistance programs of the Soviet Union are very substantial. Since World War II they appear to have provided military assistance in one form or another to bloc countries totaling between $10 and $15 billion, and since 1955 they appear to have provided military assistance to non-bloc countries totaling in excess of $2 billion and currently it appears to be running at the rate of several hundred million dollars a year. I think you are familiar with many of those programs, as Secretary Rusk mentioned, they have applied them particularly to Iraq, to Egypt, to Cuba, and to Indonesia.

So they appear, therefore, to be placing increasing emphasis as I have suggested on three aspects of their military operations, first,

conventional forces; second, the military assistance programs to non-bloc countries, and third, the form of subversive operations and covert aggression that we see going on today in Southeast Asia, particularly in South Vietnam, the type of operation that Khrushchev labeled the war of liberation in that famous speech of January 6, 1961.

NON-NUCLEAR POWER

We believe this pattern of military operation and military power application by the Soviet Union will continue, and we believe it will support a program of diplomatic pressure and small unilateral steps by the Soviet Union designed to whittle away the Western position throughout the world.

Although the stated Soviet position is that the limited war or the non-nuclear war will grow inevitably into nuclear wars, these public statements appear primarily designed to deter the West from developing its non-nuclear power, and from the local use of such non-nuclear power.

We believe, however, if at all possible, the Soviets would employ political means to prevent the escalation of non-nuclear military operations into nuclear operations wherever possible, assuming, of course, that the non-nuclear power of the West is maintained at high levels, and that the Soviets could not snatch a quick and easy victory.

In summary then, we believe that the Soviets hope to confront the West with continuing political pressure, with subversion of various forms, with unconventional warfare, all under their umbrella of their growing strategic nuclear power. Therefore, we must continue to shape our military force so as to provide credible military options over a wide spectrum of contingencies, ranging all the way from all-out nuclear war to the very minor forms of aggression at the other end of the scale, and that our own strategic forces must remain so strong that they will deter the Soviet nuclear forces, deter Soviet nuclear action and thereby permit us to apply our expanded non-nuclear power to meet the Soviet confrontation wherever that may occur and at whatever level that may occur.

Mr. Chairman. I will be very happy to answer any questions.

CAPABILITY OF DESTROYING EACH OTHER

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, did I understand you correctly, your estimate about the effect of nuclear war was 50 to 100 million in each of three areas or altogether.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, in each of three areas.

The CHAIRMAN. In each of three areas.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I mention this with some hesitancy, because the character of a nuclear exchange has a great effect upon the estimate of the—if I said casualties, I should have said fatalities, I meant fatalities—and whether the fatalities total 50 to 100 million or whether it might range between 30 and 120 million is questionable, but I use 50 to 100 million because I do want to emphasize that when we have 1,500 warheads, roughly [deleted] megatons, in our alert force, all launchable within 15 minutes, and all capable, therefore, of surviving a Soviet first strike, and when they

have perhaps half that that can be launched against the West, we each have a capability of literally destroying the society of the other. We actually have made calculations, very detailed calculations, based upon specific target analysis, and specific damage assessment analysis which do support the figures I gave you of 50 to 100 million fatalities in each of the three areas, Soviet Union, Western Europe and the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. You emphasize fatalities as distinguished from casualties, including what are the side effects of those who would survive?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes.

The fatality figures of 50 to 100 million would include those who die within approximately a week of the initial attack.

IRRATIONALITY OF A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Rusk, on your long-range policy, if I understood you correctly in your summary, you said you felt that you do not believe they are anticipating any overt military action provided we pursue our present policy, is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is the judgment of the Department and the intelligence community. But I would point out in relation to what Secretary McNamara just said the irrationality of a nuclear exchange does not provide the guarantees that you might think it might provide. Because if two sides come to the table and each one is utterly convinced that under no circumstances will the other side fight a nuclear war, it is a pretty good way to have a nuclear war because one side or the other would overreach into vital interests that would just be unacceptable to the other side. Therefore, I don't think we can take too much comfort in the factor of irrationality as a deterrent to nuclear war when such issues such as Berlin are involved.

STRENGTH THROUGH TRADE

The CHAIRMAN. One last question: Assuming the Common Market, which you commented on with regard to Khrushchev, does develop and Europe does proceed to, in a sense, federation—and they are talking very much of political federation now—and we are able to adjust to it, what effect would this have upon our relations with the Soviet bloc?

Secretary RUSK. I think, Mr. Chairman, that that would be one of the most important forward movements of the strength and unity of the free world that we could find, and I think this would be reflected in growing caution on the part of the Soviet Union. This is not just in economic terms but also will be reflected in political and military terms.

Western Europe, if it were really unified, and the North Atlantic Community, if we really developed the relationships that all of us have been discussing in the last few years here in this country, would be a nexus of special relationships reaching right around the world, with our relations with Latin America, and with the countries in the Pacific, the British with the Commonwealth, and the French with the French-speaking countries, Germany is establishing some interesting relationships with selected countries. This

could be a focus of influence, assistance, help and strength that would go far beyond the North Atlantic Community itself. I think this would be a great impetus for the free world.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't wish to propagandize for any particular bill, but is this what is involved in this trade bill? Does it have overtones of strategic value other than just trade or is it just a trade bill?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I would think that the purely trading aspects of the trade bill are not as important really in the longer run as the great political objectives of the free world, that are now gathering around the issues of trade in the Common Market and across the Atlantic and between that association and countries in other parts of the world. I think the political aspects of the trade bill to me are even more important than the sheer trading aspect.

LESSEN FOREIGN AID BURDEN

The CHAIRMAN. Doesn't that also imply the possibility that the burden on us of this worldwide foreign aid program can be lessened? Isn't it the only way it can be and still provide security as the Secretary said?

Secretary RUSK. We have been working very hard, as you know, in the development assistance group of the OECD to get our other friends more and more into the aid business. I think we should try to work toward more division of labor in this field.

I would hope we could find a time when the Europeans would, for example, make a concentrated substantial effort on the continent of Africa so we don't have to build up there the same intensive effort that is necessary, for example, in our own hemisphere and I think that prospect of division of labor is already beginning to make itself known, and I think we can look forward to a greatly enhanced free world effort in this field.

The CHAIRMAN. Just having gone through a primary, I can assure you that foreign aid is the most unpopular of all the issues before the country. I think you ought to know that as a practical and political matter.

Senator Russell, will you proceed?

TEST BAN RATHER THAN DISARMAMENT

Senator RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright, this entire briefing has given such a wide spectrum it is almost impossible to know where to approach it without consuming more time than any one member could fairly be allotted.

Secretary Rusk, does the world generally look on these negotiations for a ban on nuclear testing as a preliminary for more general disarmament?

Secretary RUSK. I think that there are those who hope that it would. I think a careful examination of the Soviet attitude on general disarmament would show that a test ban would not necessarily lead to sweeping measures of disarmament. Senator, if I could comment on that for just a moment and I am not sure that General Carter and Secretary McNamara would necessarily agree with this 100 percent, I think they would. About a year ago, perhaps a

little earlier, the Soviet Union made a basic decision to rearm substantially in the missile and nuclear field, and that they simply are not at the present time interested in a genuine test ban.

Now, I say that because if they were seriously interested they could not possibly have turned down the treaties that had been offered to them last April, for example.

CONCERN ABOUT CONCESSIONS

Senator RUSSELL. That is just what I was coming to. I had apprehended that the world was looking on that as a preliminary to further disarmament, and I have been very deeply concerned about our continuing concessions in an effort to get something with which the Russians would agree. It would seem to me that, after we had made about two concessions and they have stood adamant right where they were at the beginning and offered nothing whatever, we would have slowed down because I think we are setting a stage where they will demand that we play on when we come to the other disarmament and we would be terribly handicapped if we continue this policy.

It would seem to me to be most foolish to be weakening our inspection from time to time because if we get into disarmament of conventional weapons without any inspection we are undone then completely. Are we planning any more concessions other than we have made now? We won't inspect in the air, under water, on the surface or underground. We have given up almost everything.

Secretary RUSK. The proposals in that field turn on our own capability of detecting atmospheric tests, and under ground.

The concessions on control posts, for example, are a direct result of improved technical capability to use instrumentation for purposes of detection.

I would not myself have supposed that those were in the normal sense concessions, because it simply meant we could do more efficiently and at less cost what had to be done to assure ourselves that no underground tests were in fact going on.

But, I must say, I think, Senator, we are at the point where the key issue of inspection is now laid bare, the Soviets are saying no inspection. We don't see how we can proceed without adequate inspection, and, therefore, I cannot be very optimistic at this point as to what is going to happen in the disarmament field although we think we have to stay in session and fully expose the necessity for adequate inspections and control if actual steps in disarmament are going to be accomplished.

CONCEDED TOO MUCH WITHOUT QUID PRO QUO

Senator RUSSELL. Don't you think there is a very great danger that the Soviets will think we have become awed by this horrible prospect of holocaust that would wipe out about half the people of the Earth and they could, therefore, almost dictate their own terms to us? It seems to get right back to what you stated a moment ago, that one side gets the impression that the other will yield because of the prospect that we will have an atomic war.

I frankly have been very unhappy about the last proposals that have been made. I think we have conceded too much without any quid pro quo at all on the part of the Russians.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, it is always hard to know what is exactly in the Soviet mind, but it is my impression that their decision to go into a significant rearmament program was based upon pretty good estimates as to what our capabilities were, and the knowledge that they had important deficiencies and those deficiencies had become known to us, and rather than feeling that we were awed they had to take steps to try to build up their own strength.

RESTRICTING TRADE WITH CUBA AND CHINA

Senator RUSSELL. What is the official policy of the United States with respect to dealings with countries like Canada and Mexico, with Cuba and with China? Do we have any policy?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, we have. We do take up with these governments the importance of restricting their contacts with and trade with Cuba. This is not something that they find easy to do within their own systems and their own political situation. We have made, I think, considerable headway with the Canadians who have been, I think, more helpful than any other members of NATO.

Senator RUSSELL. Did we make any headway with Canada at the time they sold surplus wheat to China and Cuba until they had run out of American dollars?

Secretary RUSK. For some time now they have taken rigorous measures to prevent, for example, re-export of American supplies through Canada which was plugging one hole that was important for us, and have permitted us to discourage Canadians with American affiliations to stay in the Cuba trade.

CUBAN FOOD IMPORTS

Senator RUSSELL. What is the food situation in Cuba?

General Carter, you, perhaps could answer that better than the Secretary.

General CARTER. Yes.

Senator RUSSELL. Do they have to rely on exports to a large extent?

General CARTER. Yes, sir, they are having a rough time and it is getting no better rapidly. They are under extensive rationing of staples and meats.

Senator RUSSELL. How about medicines and equipment for hospitals?

General CARTER. They are also short of those, sir. They are dependent almost entirely now on Soviet and bloc imports.

Senator RUSSELL. Industrial machinery, such as it was, was composed almost entirely of American manufacture. Are they having any trouble now with their replacement and spare parts?

General CARTER. They are having a great deal of trouble, sir. Whenever a major item of equipment goes out for assembly or spare parts failure it is almost invariably stood down until they can get a part pre-built and shipped over from the bloc.

Senator RUSSELL. I noticed in the press a number of Liberian ships were engaged in these deliveries to Cuba. Aren't they American owned? Don't we have any control at all over that?

Secretary RUSK. It is not my impression, Senator, that Liberian flagships are playing nearly as important a role in the Cuban trade as Norway, United Kingdom, Greece and so on.

Senator RUSSELL. I think that is true but some are.

Secretary RUSK. But if they were American-owned, I think that the action should be applied. I will look into it and see what action can be taken. I would be surprised if American owned Liberian ships were involved.

MILITARY CHECKPOINTS IN BERLIN

Senator RUSSELL. I was very pleasantly surprised on the Russian request that they use some entrance other than Checkpoint Charlie. Was any approach made to them other than through military channels in Berlin?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, this was handled by the Commandant.

Senator RUSSELL. The State Department did not handle it?

Secretary RUSK. We did not go behind the scenes.

Senator RUSSELL. Nor Adenauer or any of our associates?

Secretary RUSK. This was handled on the basis of the three-party, three-power agreement in Berlin and we left the Commandant to handle it with the Soviet military powers. I mean there was no trading done on that point, for example.

U.N. POLICY ON CONGO

Senator RUSSELL. Just how was the recent policy devised that Mr. U Thant announced with respect to the Congo? Did the United Nations have a committee that got up that policy or was it the brainchild of Mr. U Thant?

Secretary RUSK. It is a combination of influences there. I think that the principal move toward a federal structure came from the first indication on the part of the parties in the Congo that they might by interested in a federal structure. Then we, the British, the French and the Belgians who had some possibility of bringing some influence to bear in the Congo directly helped put together some suggestions about a federal constitution.

Mr. U Thant, encouraged by the information about the probable reaction of the Congolese, adopted that as his own approach to it, and put that to the parties. I would say that U Thant's role in this is influenced both by people like ourselves and also by the Afro-Asian group who are furnishing troops there and the so-called Congo Advisory Committee, and that these are based on a number of contacts with a number of governments.

We did not particularly, ourselves, like the reference to sanctions which he put into his public statement on the ground that the effort of conciliation ought to have full chance to run on its own without implied threats in the background.

He was under other pressures at the United Nations and made references to it and so far apparently that reference to sanctions has not been a major impediment in the Congo in getting an agreement.

SOVIET GUARANTEES TO CUBA

Senator RUSSELL. I don't want to monopolize the time. I have just one other question there.

You said that Russia has not entered into any formal agreement with Cuba. What importance do you attach to Mr. Khrushchev's declaration that they would feel bound to come to the assistance of Cuba in the event of any attack or intervention in Cuba?

Secretary RUSK. I think, Senator, that our analysis of that declaration would indicate that in the wording he was careful to leave himself without a flat commitment of a security guarantee type, and that they have been very reluctant to undertake that commitment even though the Cubans have pressed him on it.

There is some reason to believe that Castro's declaration of Marxist-Leninist commitment in December of last year was not very pleasing to Moscow, because it took away from Castro some of his influence in Latin America, on the one side, and second, it seemed to be part of a pressure on Moscow to get a security commitment of a sort which the Soviets have been reluctant to give.

But I would be glad to have a little study of that sent over to you so you can see our analysis of those declarations.[2]

Senator RUSSELL. I would be interested in that. I am gratified they haven't signed any agreement but I think there would be considerable loss of face if he didn't do it.

Mr. Chairman, I won't take any more time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman?

DE GAULLE'S VIEWS ON BERLIN

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I shall be very brief because other members want to ask questions. I want to ask you about the statement you made regarding de Gaulle having his own ideas with reference to the Berlin situation? Just what is his view?

Secretary RUSK. General de Gaulle is in a minority of one in NATO on this particular point of contact with the Soviet Union on the subject of Berlin. His view is that you should not discuss the matter in any way with the Soviet Union until you have a so-called acceptable basis of negotiation. Well, it is a little hard to get to that point without contacts.

In any event the rest of us have felt that because the Berlin question is so dangerous, because it is the one question that really can blow things up into a major war, it would be irresponsible not to maintain at least a contact with the Soviet Union, to have a channel by which you can exchange views even if they were diametrically opposed.

Now, such contacts do not mean you give away any vital interest or you agree to things that are not agreeable. But we think it is important for these heads of government and the governments concerned to be in touch with each other, to try to find a way to manage so dangerous a problem without a world war, and as a matter of fact, if we could leave this particular comment off the record——

---

[2] See Appendix C.

[Discussion off the record.]

CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BERLIN

Senator SPARKMAN. In speaking of these contacts, not necessarily that we have, but contacts as between the people of West Berlin and East Berlin, to what extent do they have joint sessions or joint commissions or trade with one another?

Secretary RUSK. There is very little contact, unfortunately, between the West Berliners and the East Berliners either at the private or official level. Mayor Brandt is very much interested in trying to find some way to punch holes through the wall by restoring contacts between families or between the administrators of city utilities.

But so far that has not been possible because the East Germans, Ulbricht, will not allow the East Berliners to deal with the West Berliners on such questions. Now, there is, however, a great deal of contact between the West Germans and the East Germans.

Under their interzonal trade arrangement, they are exchanging several hundred million dollars worth of trade each year and they have had several discussions at a technical trade level and it is there that key questions of civilian supply to West Berlin, trade to West Berlin, as well as with East Germany are worked out.

You see, about 95 percent of the traffic into West Berlin is handled through civilian German channels, and much of that is West German, and the West Germans travel freely into Berlin along the autobahn. Occasionally there is some incident, some arrest of some sort, but they go by the hundreds of thousands and there is free traffic between East and West Germans.

Now, the contacts between East and West Germans are far more extensive than our own, and when questions come up such as nervousness about a particular question by international excess authority applied to East Germany we find ourselves a little surprised because we are not the ones doing business with them, it is our friends in Western Europe. They are the ones supplying the business in East Germany.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrd.

POLITICAL EFFECT OF EUROPEAN UNITY

Senator BYRD of Virginia. Mr. Secretary, you implied that the advantages of the Common Market were important politically. Will you elaborate a little more on that?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I just indicated from the point of view of our discussion today in these great political relationships between the free world and the Soviet Union, that the political effect of the unification of Europe and a close relationship between the United States and that kind of Europe, and a right trading relationship between that Atlantic Association and countries in other parts of the world, will have very important and far-reaching political implications. I would think those were a major element in any approach to such a problem.

Senator BYRD. You mean draw those nations closer together?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; for example, the United States got into two world wars because of wars that started in Western Europe. I

think we are almost in position to be able to say that surely if the Common Market proceeds as they expect, we can really say for the first time perhaps in 500 or 600 years, that wars are not going to start within Western Europe. This is a very great thing in the history.

Senator BYRD. Wait a minute, how many years?

Secretary RUSK. I would say 500 or 600 years.

Senator BYRD. Five or six hundred years?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. That is a long time.

Secretary RUSK. All of these rivalries that have gone on for centuries in Western Europe are now being brought to a conclusion. This is a very important thing for us.

WOULD U.S. ENTER COMMON MARKET?

Senator BYRD. What I am leading up to, what would be our position? Do you visualize the fact that we would enter the Common Market or ask to enter the Common Market at any time in the future?

Secretary RUSK. I would not see in the foreseeable future our entering the Common Market, because the European Common Market would also carry with it political implications with regard to the political unity in Europe and we probably would not for some time, in any event, be able or willing to take up because of our different responsibilities in this hemisphere and other parts of the world.

But I do think as the President indicated in his July 4th speech that that kind of Europe and the United States and Canada, can grow increasingly closer together and work as a team on more and more subjects so that the total military and economic impact would be one of joint action and unity. But I don't see a development in a constitutional form. At the moment if that were suggested it would scare the Europeans to death.

Senator BYRD. I am not talking about the constitutional point. But what do you consider our position should be with respect to the Common Market?

Secretary RUSK. I think it ought to be——

Senator BYRD. If not being a member, at any time in the foreseeable future what will be our position?

Secretary RUSK. I would think that we ought first to be in position of broadly encouraging the success of the negotiations that are now going on between the Common Market and Great Britain in the first instance, and with Norway, Denmark, and Ireland as a second consideration.

But I do not believe that we should ourselves try to spell out in detail or provide a blueprint for those negotiations. That is chiefly on the European side nor should we try to tell the Europeans exactly what form their own political association in Europe should take.

They are perfectly capable of working it out for themselves. But it seems to me, sir, if we can get the kind of authority that is asked for in the trade bill that we can then move to insure our own market opportunity in the Common Market and at the same time

prevent the North Atlantic Community from becoming a little ingrown trading community at the expense of our trading relations in other parts of the world.

In other words, bring that association across the Atlantic into a profitable trading relationship with the non-Western part of the world.

COMMON MARKET PARTNERSHIP

Senator BYRD. Secretary Hodges[3] indicated he had thought our position would be that we would be a partnership in the Common Market. Would you define that, exactly what that would mean if we are not in the Common Market, and what is a partnership?

Secretary RUSK. I am not familiar with the context in which he used that word, Senator, but I would suppose that he was referring to the fact that the Common Market and we would be great trading partners, because we have a vital interest in flourishing trade with Europe.

Senator BYRD. We have always had it.

Secretary RUSK. And those would be, I believe myself, increased and the opportunities for American exports to Europe would grow as the standards of living in Europe grow and the extent of trade between the two areas would expand.

Senator BYRD. When we would negotiate, would we negotiate with the Common Market as a whole or with each individual nation of the Common Market?

Secretary RUSK. This would depend somewhat on the arrangements worked out on the European side. At the moment we would take these matters up as a part of our multilateral negotiations in which each country participated.

Senator BYRD. Would you take it up through GATT? [4]

Secretary RUSK. That would be one of the principal forums in which we would take it up, yes, sir.

But we would have to reinforce those negotiations with constant bilateral diplomatic discussion in capitals.

Senator BYRD. What is the relation between GATT and the Common Market?

Secretary RUSK. GATT has a broader membership, and includes countries that would not be either members of or associated with the Common Market, but we would assume that in the Common Market they themselves would develop common trade policies, and we would negotiate with them some matters, I am sure directly, and on other matters in GATT in the broader forum that is present.

Senator BYRD. As I understand it our relations with the Common Market would be a matter of growth?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

RECIPROCAL TRADE AND THE POLITICAL SITUATION

Senator BYRD. You expect it to be a gradual growth, and is it based on the reciprocal trade idea?

---

[3] Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges.
[4] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. Or is it based on the political side?

Secretary RUSK. I think it would be based on both, Senator, that we do want to share fully in the trading opportunities that an expanding Common Market would offer as well as to protect our own present trading position. But at the same time, this is spurred by the great political impact of a vibrant and successful economy in the Western world.

I think really that one can see signs of the fading of the balloon or Communist propaganda in many parts of the world. One of the reasons is they have shown themselves not to be competitive with the rest of the Western world at the very point at which the Communists made their greatest claims, namely, to take care of the economic needs of their people. This contrast between Eastern and Western Europe has made the point and you see the effect of it all over the world.

Senator BYRD. One other question. The main factor for the future, would it be promoting reciprocal trade or promoting the political situation that you just mentioned?

Secretary RUSK. I would think, Senator, those two go hand in hand. I don't see how you can separate one from the other because they both feed back into each other in important ways.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper.

SOLUTION TO CONGO SITUATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, in the Congo, has there been any formalized acceptance or paper statement with regard to the proposed constitutional arrangements there or is it just a statement of U Thant that Tshombe said verbally to him?

Secretary RUSK. No, Senator, there has been a statement of the central principles of a federal solution put to Prime Minister Adoula and to Mr. Tshombe and they both have come back and accepted this in basic principle, and are ready to talk now about drafting a constitution and taking some of the other steps necessary to give it effect.

I would be glad to have that paper furnished to the committee so you can have it available.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There was a statement in the press, I think, last night or this morning, that there had been no formal agreement except the verbal statement by Tshombe to Mr. U Thant, that he would agree in principle to this discussion of it. I don't know just what it was.

Secretary RUSK. I would think, sir, it would be just a little more than that, because this was an outline of a federal constitution. It did not have every clause drafted because that is something that has to be done with the participation of the parties. But it was the outline of a division of power between the central government and the provinces which is the key element, of course, on whether you can get on with such a constitution. A team is there now to start the drafting with the participation of the parties.

CUBA AND THE WARSAW PACT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Going to Cuba for just a minute, is there any evidence or do you or anybody here have any information that Cuba and the Soviet bloc contemplate adherence to the declaration of the Warsaw Pact by Cuba in the future, assuming some of these preliminary military and technical installations are a little more stabilized?

Secretary RUSK. I haven't seen that, have you, General?

General CARTER. No.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Allegations have been made that it is only a few weeks before a declaration of adherence or association with the Warsaw Pact would be coming from Cuba.

Secretary RUSK. I have nothing on that, sir. I would be a little surprised if that would occur.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would be surprised if other sources had that information and we did not have it.

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET

So far as the action of the Common Market and our association with it is concerned, I certainly agree that the political possibilities or potentials or implications of the Common Market in the future are important in addition to the trade situation, but do you think it is important that we know or that there are finalized the arrangements or agreements of Great Britain and the Commonwealth countries so far as the Common Market countries are concerned?

Wouldn't that be an important phase in connection with our association with the Common Market?

Secretary RUSK. I am quite sure, Senator, that our relations with our friends on the other side of the Atlantic, that is, the form of our relations would be very much affected by the results of the present negotiations between the Common Market and Great Britain, and this would be true in the political as well as in the trade field.

I do think that these discussions will succeed because I get the impression that in Western Europe they recognize that the problems of failure are now at least as important as the difficulties of success, and, therefore, in the last several days we have had encouraging news about the probable course of these negotiations.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The point of my question was this, if Britain and the Commonwealth countries and their trade influence are not to become a part of the Common Market, it would not become a part of the market, that would pose one set of problems for us.

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If Britain and the Commonwealth countries do become a part of the Common Market, that might conceivably change our posture and attitude toward the whole Common Market complex, don't you think that would be the case?

Secretary RUSK. I think it would involve such questions, for example, as those items on which we and the Common Market together produce, say, 80 percent of the total world production——

COMMON MARKET AND NATO

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I am not talking, especially emphasizing economic good, I am talking about the whole ball of wax here, the whole political future of Western Association or Western Europe Association, its possibilities and the economic side as well.

I am just asking if the participation or non-participation of Britain and the Commonwealth countries in the Common Market would not pose a different set of circumstances to some extent vis-a-vis ourselves.

Secretary RUSK. I am quite sure it would, sir. I would think, for example, if Britain were a member of the Common Market, and they moved for a rather close political unity, this could affect the way in which we handle defense and political questions in NATO. It might affect the actural defense of NATO itself on the military side, the processes of consultation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am concerned about the wisdom of how far we get into involvement in the Common Market until we know whether this whole great British complex, that is Great Britain and the various Commonwealth countries and this great trading complex, how they become involved. I think it would be very important as to our attitude with respect to the Common Market as it becomes a matter of permanence.

Secretary RUSK. I think a great many of these questions are being postponed by governments until they see what the results would be of the Common Market negotiations, the questions of nuclear policy——

SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND NUCLEAR WAR

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One question, I am trying to hurry on, because there are others here who would like to ask questions: One question about the Communist attitude on the question of war and destruction or the deterrent to destruction, that is, the theory that they will be deterred from military action because of retaliation and mutual destruction of the two countries. It seems to me that inherent in the whole international Communist movement, beginning with the Bolshevik revolution at the end of World War I, they were not in any way involved in any humanitarian considerations. They were involved in considerations of control of power and they were willing to destroy themselves and their own institutions on the old Marxian theory that you have to have the blood purge, you have to completely eliminate these offending and interferring forces and start anew, start from the bottom to build.

If that philosophy still continues, and I have no doubt it does, in the thinking of the Communists and their world conquest philosophy, it would seem to me that the question of whether or not they could destroy us utterly and Western Europe completely would be only an incident in their consideration as to whether or not they could do it first.

If they could do it first and destroy us, humanitarianism would have no place in their thinking, and probably the only possible deterrent they would have would be if we could retaliate and in our dying gasp, put the sword to them.

Secretary RUSK. I think this is critical and I hope Secretary McNamara will make a comment on this. The knowledge that they will be destroyed even if they destroy first is very essential to us in dealing with the Soviets.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think it is absolutely critical. It is my own personal view, and I think it is the view of others in the government, that it is not the humanitarian considerations that are deterring the Soviets. It is only one thing, the fact that we have, as I suggested, [deleted] megatons in our alert force that can survive any first strike that we or they can conceive of against us today and with that [deleted] megatons can literally destroy the nation.

I spoke only of a portion, I spoke only of 50 to 100 million in the Soviet Union. It would have associated with it destruction of 80 to 90 percent of their industrial capability, of all of their military capabilities of any substance or size, and moreover, it is our plan to double that force within the next 5 years, and we have received from Congress this year in fiscal 1963 appropriations to undertake the major part of that doubling program.

KHRUSHCHEV'S OBSESSION OVER BERLIN

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One last question, Secretary Rusk and perhaps Secretary McNamara would care to answer this, too: How do you consider the Berlin situation as a focal point of crisis today? Its proportion is hard to define, but it is a focal point in crisis today, is it not?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Considerating the Russian buildup over the years and considering the long delays and the repeated statements of the Kremlin that the East German situation has to be resolved and is going to be resolved and repeated statements that they are going to sign peace treaties and so on and the position it has put them in, how do you rate the tensions and the dangers inherent in the Berlin crisis today as compared to the historic background of this whole Berlin situation, as compared to the airlift period, let's say?

Secretary RUSK. I would think, Senator, that they are more dangerous than they have ever been before and partly because in the last 3 years the Soviet Union has developed an enormous capability of wreaking destruction on the West and this itself makes a little bit more dangerous situation. I was interested in U Thant's remarks that Khrushchev seems to have an obsession over Berlin. I think there is a good deal in this, and so I think this is more dangerous than it has been since 1945.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, to illustrate roughly the purpose of my question, Hitler said if he did not succeed he would pull the world down for a thousand years or something of that kind.

The attitude of the dictator or of a centralized power of a group is: "If we can't have our way we will destroy everybody else along with us, if we are destroyed." Do you think there is a danger today that in desperation they might go on some adventures of destruction if they feel they are not prevailing?

Secretary RUSK. There is always that possibility where human frailties are involved but I am inclined to think that Khrushchev

still has those essential elements of rationality about him so that is not really the problem.

I think at the present time he is doing his best to see how far he can get within a certain range of risk, but on the other hand, I think that there is a danger that he would underestimate the unity and determination of the West and make the mistake——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As I read here about Mr. Khrushchev's statements, it seems to me they are about as erratic and emotional as Mr. Hitler's were under slightly different circumstances, so I am not so sure he is any more rational when it comes down to his emotional statements, anyway.

Now, what he will do in action I don't know, but it seems to me his statements are about as emotional and inflammatory as Hitler's.

Secretary RUSK. Of course, there are a good many ways, good many steps in which this matter can further be taken up, United Nations and other steps of that sort so we have a full chance to explore this question of rationality if matters get worse.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you this.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON CUBA

The President made a very strong statement this morning as I listened on the radio, that is all I know.[5] How much must we discuss with the OAS or the South American countries before we would reach a decision as to how to followup on that statement if we want to do it?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think in a closed executive session of this sort, I would say this: Basically we start from the elementary security interests of the United States in a matter of this sort.

From that point of view, the commitments that we have undertaken for more than 100 years under the Monroe Doctrine are part of that elementary national interest necessity of the United States. But since the late twenties and early thirties as we move into a good neighbor policy, we have tried to put the security interest of this hemisphere on a multilateral basis, Rio pact, developments of that sort.

I think it would be very important for us to do everything possible within the multilateral framework, but if that proves impossible at a time when our vital security interests are genuinely at stake as a national matter we might have to take some action regardless of the other members of the hemisphere.

Now, what we are trying to do at the present time, as Senator Morse and Senator Hickenlooper observed at Punta del Este, is trying to mobilize the hemisphere to a serious regard for this problem. We have had only partial success, because Brazil, Chile and some others are preoccupied with other matters. Our first object ought to be to deal with it as a hemisphere matter but if we have to we might have to deal with it as a national matter.

---

[5] On September 4, President Kennedy pledged to take whatever means necessary to prevent Cuba from exporting "its aggressive purposes by force" in Latin America.

WEAPONS OF A DEFENSIVE CHARACTER

Senator SALTONSTALL. If I might perhaps make an observation and a question. It seems to me we want to be awfully careful how far along we get in making a statement before we take an action.

Now, for 15 more Soviet ships coming across, with arms of various kinds and more technicians, when does the time come when we live up to that statement that the President made this morning of which I approve?

Secretary RUSK. At the heart of the statement this morning was a direct assurance to all the members of this hemisphere that the armed forces in Cuba are going to stay at home.

We won't let them interfere with or threaten other countries in this hemisphere. We would undoubtedly move with association with other friends, because they would want us to do so. In other words, the Caribbean countries who do feel themselves threatened would act with us in a circumstance of that sort.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So you are convinced from what General Carter's information and the CIA and so on gives us that the actions of the Russians in assistance to Cuba up to the present time are purely defensive?

Secretary RUSK. Well, they are weapons of a defensive character.

Now, any weapon can be used offensively under certain circumstances, but these weapons normally associated with the defensive military establishment. If they develop other type weapons there, then we have another situation to look at.

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I jump to the other hot question which we have been discussing?

NIBBLING ON BERLIN

One thing I have never clearly understood—perhaps it is because I don't understand fully the agreement on Berlin where Khrushchev is contantly nibbling at us on the West Berlin situation—why can't we nibble more with him on the East Berlin situation?

Secretary RUSK. The principal nibbling that continues to go on there is the escape of refugees from East Berlin. But in 1948 and 1949, when the four-power Kommandatura was abolished, when the Soviets walked out of it, and again in 1955 when the Soviets made their agreement with the East Germans, the effective control of East Berlin and East Germany did in fact pass to the Soviet Union.

The four-power commission, the control commission and the Kommandatura had not been operating for a very long time.

Senator SALTONSTALL. We never admitted that; we have never agreed to that, have we, though?

Secretary RUSK. No, that is right.

The legal situation continues the same but in fact the control has developed as I indicated.

Now, we are taking steps to prevent the Soviets nibbling at West Berlin in Berlin and in their negotiations attempting to get us out of Berlin we are taking a very definite and firm view on it. So this is the problem which is to prevent that kind of nibbling but I don't believe there is a great deal that can be done back into East Berlin except to take the refugees that come in and to work through the

West Germans working through trade arrangements to try to establish as many contacts as possible with East Germans and matters of that sort.

We have military personnel going in several times a day, but their effective presence doesn't mean a great deal in East Berlin.

AN AUTOMATIC SELF-BLOCKADE OF WEST BERLIN

Senator SALTONSTALL. It does seem to me—again, perhaps from not as much knowledge certainly as you have—if we took in working on a trade with them or trying to work the situations out, if we took some aggressive actions in relation to East Berlin, that we would have something to offset what they are trying to do with us in West Berlin.

Secretary RUSK. Well, the three Western powers and Germany have tried to find steps which could be taken of that sort which would not lead directly to, in effect, an automatic self-blockade of West Berlin. You see, it is a most uncomfortable physical situation there because the kind of step that you might take in retaliation might turn out to be simply a self-imposed limitation on yourself. That is one of the difficulties.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I see.

A TRADING PARTNERSHIP

May I ask just one more question. Fellowing up what Senator Byrd and Senator Hickenlooper said with relation to the Common Market, one thing that disturbs me at the present time is if we go into a partnership and reciprocal trade partnership, which you say it is, from a political point of view, reciprocal trade from an economic point of view, and we don't know before we have to act on it in Congress this autumn what Britain is trying to do it seems to us we are putting ourselves into a partnership without knowing what the other partner is going to do.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think the partnership aspect of it is more a trading partnership than an organic partnership, just as we could continue to be a major trading partner with Canada and Japan.

But I think the prospects of the success of the Common Market negotiations today are if anything better than they were when the bill was first proposed to the Congress because they now have exposed fully the difficult questions, and despite the fact that difficult questions have been fully explored, there is a feeling that these negotiations will succeed.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You mean the British and the French?

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Because if we go in and put ourselves in the position then my only worry was as to whether or not the attitude of the French and the Germans would change toward Great Britain if they had us pretty well tied up.

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, I think in fact the trade bill does provide inducements in effect, for Britain for example, to come in in relation to their Commonwealth problems—the 80 percent free world production aspect of it.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.
Senator MORSE. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stennis.

MISSILES IN CUBA

Senator STENNIS. Secretary Rusk, you reviewed here, your idea was that the Soviets were using Cuba as a base for hemispheric action, particularly in Central and South America, as I understood it; now we had the facts stated here about bringing in the arms and so forth, and now what do we propose to do, and we have the President's statement that Senator Saltonstall brought up about not permitting those arms to spread to other countries to their peril. What do we propose to do now?

I know you can't predict events ahead but what are we going to do about stopping them? Have you any position on that and I don't mean to be premature.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, when I first referred to the Soviet interest in Cuba as a base in this hemisphere, I was not at that particular moment referring to a base in military terms, but as a place from which they could direct subversion and propaganda and so forth into Latin America. If any move were made by military means out of Cuba against any other countries, I would think there would be no question but we would retaliate with military action straightaway.

Senator STENNIS. That was the President's statement as I understood it, that we would not permit any launchings toward them but I don't just know when this buildup is going to stop being defensive and become offensive. Perhaps no one can say exactly. I just want to know if there is anything firm or are we just going to keep on letting them come in there in greater and greater volume, which will probably be the trend unless we do something about it.

That is the question, what do we propose to do about stopping them from coming in?

Secretary RUSK. Well, as the President's statement referred to certain contingencies that had not yet occurred—the establishment of a Soviet military base in Cuba, ground-to-ground missiles—the indication of that was a signal to the Soviets that the situation would be changed if they moved in those directions.

VIOLATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Senator STENNIS. I realize my questions involves war plans to a degree, and perhaps you shouldn't disclose anything here if you had some plans now, but it seems to us like it violates the Monroe Doctrine just to permit them to bring in the amount they already have.

That is a school boy's idea of the Monroe Doctrine perhaps, but don't you think that this violates the basic concepts of the Monroe Doctrine—I mean what they have already done?

Secretary RUSK. As was agreed unanimously at Punta del Este, I think the existence in Cuba of the Marxist-Leninist system is contrary to the commitments of the inter-American system and cer-

tainly we go back to the type of threat for which the Monroe Doctrine was devised.

However, I don't think that means that the reaction to that kind of a threat has to be a flash reaction with all-out military force in a given set of circumstances. In most situations where the Monroe Doctrine has in fact been invoked it was applied diplomatically, politically, and all sorts of ways and the military action was in the background.

Now, the resort to force is always present, something that one could do at any moment. The more important, the more immediate problem is to deal with this situation.

DIRECT MILITARY ACTION AGAINST CUBA

Senator STENNIS. I certainly heartily agree with that and I haven't advocated any immediate blockade or invasion. But I certainly do think we need to be assured and the American people need to be assured that this thing is not going to be passed up, that something is going to be done about it, diplomatically if possible, and otherwise, if not possible, that steps are going to be taken of a positive nature, with no abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine.

I know the channels are through the Organization of American States, but we don't know how long that would take if any action would come. I think we have to be prepared to move unilaterally and I imagine you have some plan along that line. Is there anything assuring to us, more assuring to us or to the people any time soon with reference to positive action along this line?

Secretary RUSK. Well, as far as direct action against Cuba is concerned, I don't think I could go beyond what the President said in his statement. But I do think there is action underway to be sure that this Castro movement is limited to Cuba and does not affect the rest of the hemisphere and does not get involved in illicit operations in the hemisphere and activities of that sort. I think that is step one.

Depending on the development of events, it may be that additional steps will have to be taken. We are today talking in the North Atlantic Council about further steps that our allies in Europe might well take in regard to Cuba because we believe it is expensive there, that Cubans are finding that this operation is not to their liking.

All the rationing and everything else that is going on is making its impact, the attempts to mobilize Cuban labor on a gang basis, causing reactions, all sorts of things are going on there. But so far as direct military action is concerned, I think the President's statement is sufficient.

Senator STENNIS. I don't want to take any more time, but what is going on, plus the fact that our NATO allies are furnishing the ships, and the atmosphere that is prevailing, this is building up rapidly in the minds of the American people. Some positive plan must be devised and for us to go on and announce a major part of it would perhaps be a waste of time. But still Secretary McNamara emphasized the deterrent effect of our striking power.

SENATOR KEATING'S CHARGES

If you don't have anything else to say on that, may I ask General Carter this question?

General Carter, are you familiar with facts that Senator Keating feels to be true, in effect in his speeches last week, you know about the number of cargoes and the number of men and ships and all?

General CARTER. They are reasonably accurate. There is nothing new that Senator Keating has brought out we have not already publicized.

Senator STENNIS. That is what I wanted to ask: Do you think they are reasonably accurate?

General CARTER. They conform to what we had already released, yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. I didn't know you had released that before he spoke on it.

General CARTER. In general terms, sir. We have not run an analysis directly.

Senator STENNIS. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. There——

GROUND-TO-GROUND MISSILES

Secretary RUSK. On that last statement, I think Senator Keating did refer to ground-to-air missiles. I think that had not been confirmed.

General CARTER. That had not been confirmed until this weekend.

Senator LAUSCHE. I want to pursue the questions put by Senator Stennis.

Are we to understand that the continued shipment of technicians or troops and military equipment will be tolerated by our country and that we will only take action if and when it appears that those troops and the military equipment are being used against other nations in the hemisphere?

Secretary RUSK. I think, Senator, that is not exactly what the President's statement indicated. He indicated that at the present time the types of weapons which are going into Cuba are weapons normally associated with defense.

Senator LAUSCHE. Right.

Secretary RUSK. Now, that itself might change, in which case we would have a changed situation.

Senator LAUSCHE. If I may put this question: If they are shipping in missiles that can be used in ground-to-air, and if they are equipping torpedo boats with missiles, why do you assume that they are not now sending in equipment of ground-to-ground attack?

Secretary RUSK. Would you wish to comment on that, General?

General CARTER. We don't assume they are not, sir. We have no confirmation, however, that they are.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

So you take the position, because you have no confirmation that they are, that therefore they are not sending in ground-to-ground missiles?

General CARTER. No, I don't think it is quite that way, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, put it in your own words.

General CARTER. We have no confirmation that they are sending any surface-to-surface missile type equipment into Cuba. We do not assume that they are not; we have no confirmation that they are.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is your judgment then as to the situation? Do they or don't they have ground-to-ground?

General CARTER. Our judgment is that they do not have ground-to-ground.

Senator LAUSCHE. You are assuming then that because you have no information that they are sending in ground-to-ground, that therefore they do not have them?

General CARTER. Our judgment is that they do not have it. We are not assuming, however, that it could not be there nor that it may not come. We have no confirmations.

TORPEDO BOAT MISSILES

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the range of these missiles they have in the torpedo boats?

General CARTER. 15 miles.

Senator LAUSCHE. You do then have detailed information on that item?

General CARTER. Yes, sir. Those are 15-mile missiles, each motor torpedo boat carrying two of them. They have a 2,000 pound high explosive warhead, and are guided, radar-guided.

Senator LAUSCHE. If you have that detailed information on the missiles that are in the motor boats, how is it that you have no information on whether there are ground-to-ground or not?

General CARTER. Because our information indicates that there are no ground-to-ground missiles there.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is a different story.

Secretary RUSK. I think, if I may add, it needs a little clarification. I believe there is a variety of sources of information, some of great accuracy. If they are anything like installations that are used in ground-to-ground, I think those you would know something about.

General CARTER. We were bound to know something about it.

Senator LAUSCHE. How long have they been delivering this equipment?

General CARTER. Military equipment in some degree started being delivered to Cuba in July 1960, 2 years ago. But the bulk of what we are reporting now has come in since July of this year.

Senator LAUSCHE. Have Chinese troops come into Cuba?

General CARTER. We have had reports of Chinese technicians in Cuba.

SHORT RECESS

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt, you gentlemen are leaving. Do you wish to come back and ask some questions?

Senator JACKSON. I don't think I need to.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a vote, gentlemen, we have to go vote, but there may be others and I don't want to interrupt.

Senator JACKSON. If you are still meeting I will come back and ask some questions.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess for 5 minutes and come back.
[Short recess.]

A DIRECT SECURITY THREAT TO U.S.

Senator LAUSCHE [presiding]. I would like to know just what the policy is with regard to Cuba.

It has been stated if there are evidences that ground-to-ground missiles were brought in, or if there is evidence of external action against neighboring countries, that would be a ground for taking firmer action than we have taken.

Is there any other condition that would induce us to act?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, there are a number of things that are being done in the field of action with respect to this situation created by the Cuban problem. Most of those actions are being taken outside of Cuba.

If you are referring to actions in Cuba by the United States through its Armed Forces in overt formal action against that island, then that is a matter that has to be looked at in the full circumstances of the time, and in full relationship to our total confrontation with the Soviet bloc wherever it happens to be. I do not think it would be possible to anticipate precisely what the President would urgently do or decidely do in a number of contingencies, but he has made in certain ones of them——

Senator LAUSCHE. I wish you would interpret the meaning of what the President said, if such-and-such events occur, we will take action; what are those events?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think that the most direct and simple one is that if any armed action is launched from Cuba against any of its neighbors, we would meet that immediately and directly with armed forces. That is one of the central purposes of his statement yesterday.

The second contingency would be where Cuba itself came to be a direct security challenge or threat to the United States. There the President indicated that we would be forced to take action. He did not specify the kind of action.

Senator LAUSCHE. When would that challenge to our security occur?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I would not wish to commit the President——

Senator LAUSCHE. Because that is a very broad——

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. On this.

But I want to point out in his statement yesterday there was a very broad signal to the Soviet Union about two things that would involve that kind of problem: One of them, the establishment of a Soviet military base in Cuba and, second, this ground-to-ground missile situation.

SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN CUBA

Senator LAUSCHE. What would they have to do to establish a base? How far would they have to go?

Secretary RUSK. I think the actual basing of Soviet combat forces in Cuba.

Senator LAUSCHE. I understand that Castro is giving immediate citizenship to these people, thus claiming that they are citizens of Cuba and not outside military forces. Is there any truth to that?

Secretary RUSK. I have not heard that report, and I would think that is not a veil that would be difficult to pierce. I do not think that would make any difference.

Senator LAUSCHE. My information is, from people who are in close contact, that that is what is going to happen.

Secretary RUSK. Do you have any information on that?

General CARTER. No, we do not have a thing on it. It seems unlikely.

A VERY FLEXIBLE POSITION

Senator LAUSCHE. The President then has left himself a very flexible position in determining whether the security of our country will be endangered through the presence of military equipment and foreign personnel in Cuba; is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. I think, Senator, when we are talking about the great issues of war and peace in this modern world, that it is understandable and necessary for the President to reserve a degree of flexibility.

Now, there are certain points at which he has announced that our action would be—action A would follow situation B.

Senator LAUSCHE. I will tell you, frankly, why I am alarmed. I listened to the Secretary's description of the fatalities that will occur in an all-out war, and in a measure I inferred, Mr. Secretary, that because of this horrible destruction that would come we must be cautious in everything that we do, and I agree with that.

But while we are fearing the consequences, aren't we yielding all along the line. We yielded in Laos; we drove The Netherlands out of West New Guinea; we went as far as we could in trying to get a banning of the nuclear tests; we are sort of cringing in Cuba. That is the situation. How long can we go on? To me, we are appeasing.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, let me comment on two of the elements you questioned. I do not believe we are cringing in Cuba. What we are not doing is launching an all-out invasion on Cuba under present circumstances.

But in Laos, I think, let us see how this story comes out. I personally believe that the objective of getting all the foreigners out of Laos and leaving the Laotians there will be in the security interests of the free world. I do not believe the Laotians themselves will go Communist; I do not believe they will link themselves with the block to the north.

COMPARISON TO NEW GUINEA

I do want to correct very specifically, if I can, sir, the impression that you have that we drove the Dutch out of West New Guinea. The Dutch were incapable of making or unwilling to make a decision to pursue any other course than they, in fact, pursued.

They did not mobilize, Senator. They did not decide to fight for West New Guinea; they decided to get out of West New Guinea about a year ago. They decided to get out and preferred to turn it over to the United Nations, and for the United Nations to provide

for its future transfer. That did not work because they did not get the two-thirds majority.

But they did not mobilize; they did not give anybody anything to support. They would have been glad to have the Seventh Fleet and boys drafted out of Kansas and Pittsburgh to do something that the burghers of The Netherlands were not willing to do for themselves. It is true that the Foreign Minister wanted to pursue another policy for The Netherlands, but he could not get the Cabinet, nor could he get the Parliament to go along, and the Dutch society from top to bottom decided not to fight for West New Guinea.

Therefore, we decided it was not for us to be the gendarmes in that situation, particularly when they said in 1948 they would not negotiate on West New Guinea, which created the possibility that they would turn it over to Indonesia.

Senator LAUSCHE. Where does the word emanate, or where did it emanate that they yielded to our persuasion?

Secretary RUSK. I think this is primarily an internal Dutch political problem in The Netherlands. The Dutch press and the Dutch leadership have indicated recently a much more different, rather different, view.

Mr. Chairman, may I go off the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator LAUSCHE. Just one more question and then I will close:

WESTERN COMMITMENT TO BERLIN

What is our policy with respect to West Berlin, Berlin, and East Berlin? What are the lines beyond which we will not allow the Soviets to go?

Secretary RUSK. The heart of it is the presence of the three Western Forces in West Berlin, the security and safety of West Berlin, and both military and civilian access to West Berlin, the visibility of West Berlin; those are not fundamental commitments.

We are unwilling to talk with the Soviets about dividing up West Berlin with them. We are perfectly willing to talk with the Soviets about an all-Berlin. We have said to them, "You can have your troops in East Berlin, as you did before. We will stay in West Berlin, but we are not going to share West Berlin with your troops or with neutrals or anybody else. This is a Western commitment."

So this is the point at which there is direct and, so far, unyielding confrontation—unyielding on their side because they have a major commitment of prestige to getting us out of West Berlin, and we are just not going to get out. So that is the interim nature of the crisis there.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do the captive nations enter at all into the discussion of the settlement of West Berlin?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the Poles, the Yugoslavs, the Czechs do have a fear, and an understandable hatred, for both the Germans and the Russians in view of their experience. I think, looking at their national policies, they would, for example, frankly prefer a divided Germany.

But on the issue of confrontation in Berlin, I think the Eastern European satellites are having a moderating effect in Moscow. I am

quite sure, for example, that the Polish Foreign Minister is urging moderation in Moscow because he understands what a Berlin crisis would do for Poland if it came to a real showdown.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

HUNGARIAN ISSUE AT U.N.

A final question: There has been a current rumor that there is a proposed arrangement with the Soviets that if the Soviets will go along with U Thant they will drop the Hungarian issue on the United Nations agenda. Is there any truth to that charge?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. There have been no discussions of any such——

Senator LAUSCHE. No discussion anywhere?

Secretary RUSK. No.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. Just a couple of questions.

Secretary RUSK. As a matter of fact, we put the Hungarian issue on the agenda for the next Assembly.

Senator LAUSCHE. Fine.

ILLICIT SHIPMENTS OF CUBAN ARMS AND AGENTS

Senator JACKSON. You mentioned with respect to Cuba that we would, of course, take appropriate action if Cuba is used as a base to launch military aggression into the Latin American community.

I do not think that is going to happen; I mean that is stating something we do not need to be concerned about for a long time. But what is our position with reference to the launching that is now under way, which is from within, sending agents into these various countries, which seems to me to be the next step?

Secretary RUSK. We have organized very close cooperation with the military intelligence and police organizations of the countries around the Caribbean to try to discover and block such things as illicit shipment of arms and movement of agents, and things of that sort.

Our principal unresolved problem in that direction has been the flow of students from Latin America to Cuba and back again, and this is partly because of the large amount of traffic that goes on that does not involve that movement, and the difficulty the Mexicans have of getting effective control of those who study in Mexico. The Special Security Committee of OAS set up at Punta del Este is setting up this week what further steps can be taken with respect to this flow of individuals simply by traveling to Cuba, get trained, and then come back home.

We have been able to do a little bit, not as much as we would like, about the movement of money which was going on with the Communist Parties in Latin America before Cuba. That movement of money does continue, and in the radio propaganda coming out of Cuba with their new powerful transmitter, that is a troublesome effort. But those are the three things we are most concerned about and working on.

Senator JACKSON. It seems to me this is the heart of the immediate problem. The other is long-range. If they are successful in this

area, obviously they are not going to worry about having to launch a military attack on any of their neighbors in order to achieve their objective. I just hope this will be pursued.

Let me ask you——

Secretary RUSK. There had been over the last 3 years, Senator Jackson, two or three instances of Cuban parties landing in other Latin American countries by ship.

Senator JACKSON. That is relatively minor, I assume.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. They are working through Mexico, and we are not getting a great deal of cooperation out of Mexico.

Secretary RUSK. I would like to say that we are getting more cooperation from Mexico [deleted].

Senator JACKSON. That is helpful.

The whole Latin American community is in such a mess internally that the easiest way to take them over is to do what they are doing, stir up trouble in each of the countries, based in Cuba.

Secretary RUSK. Funds going to Guatemala and to Venezuela are troublesome—the money there.

AGGRESSIVE BASES IN CUBA

Senator JACKSON. At what point are we going to make a finding that certain bases in Cuba are actually aggressive? Suppose they start building submarine facilities in Cuba; suppose that in that connection the Soviets turn over submarines, but we have reason to believe they will serve the real purpose of a Soviet submarine base facility in Cuba?

You see what is going to go on. They are going to do this piece by piece by piece. They are not going to do the overt thing that is going to give us a chance to really move. They are going to avoid that to the hilt.

Isn't this what they are going to do?

Secretary RUSK. I think this requires, this would be entirely probable, that would be the way they would move if they so intended. This requires a constant assessment of what is happening, what are the risks, and what is called for by way of counteraction, and I do not think——

Senator JACKSON. But it does seem to me that we are prone to talk about the obvious, and they are not going to do the obvious. I mean, we get the American people all stirred up about Russian troops—that there are Russian troops down there and they are about to make an attack on the United States. This is not the way they are going to operate.

Secretary RUSK. I think it is important to realize, Senator, that we do not see any signs, indeed any reason to believe, they are going to launch any overt military operation by organized forces against the countries in the Caribbean. But it is very important that the other countries in the Caribbean area understand this will not be allowed to happen and cannot happen.

AGGRESSION FROM WITHIN

Senator JACKSON. I agree on that, but I think there also should be a more vigorous effort undertaken in the area of subversion be-

cause this is where it is going to come. There is no area in the world that is any more ripe, at least, than Latin America for this type of aggression from within.

What is going on in Brazil and these other places is so sour that I do not envy your job at all. To me it is almost a matter of despair if you look at Latin America.

Well, my only other observation is that, of course, we can invoke the Monroe Doctrine any time we want if we want to make the finding that Mr. Castro is no longer a sovereign unto himself but he is directed by the Soviets; is that right?

Secretary RUSK. I do not think there will be any problem about finding the policy basis if under all these circumstances a particular action is wise to undertake, given our——

Senator JACKSON. I agree that once we decide we have to do a certain thing so far as making the Monroe Doctrine applicable, it would not be difficult on sound precedents.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, I just have three or four questions. I was going to ask some questions along the line that had been asked by Senator Jackson and others about our policy in Cuba.

CUBA'S ALIGNMENT WITH COMMUNISM

How long are we going to stand by and permit Cuba to remain aligned with the international Communist conspiracy? Is there any definite action which is going to be taken at a definite time, or are they going to be allowed just to continue as they are now, and the threat to us, which is increasing all the while; or are we going to at some definite time say, "You are now part of the international Communist conspiracy, therefore we are going to take action to remove you from that alliance."

Secretary RUSK. Well, there is no set time in our minds that will be given as an answer to that question without regard to the development of circumstances. There could be circumstances under which it would be necessary to take that kind of direct action. I think there are a number of other actions, some of them known publicly, some not, that do have a bearing on the situation and may be of some help. But this is a matter that I just cannot give you a categorical answer on, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, don't you think Cuba's becoming stronger militarily and becoming further involved with the Communist conspiracy, that the longer we put that off the greater our task is going to be?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, given the nature of the total situation, if we get to a point where there is not any future in trying other means, that decision might have to be faced. But I would think at that point that the issues involved would be so grave that something—we should be sure that the country and possibly the hemisphere and as much of the free world be united on the necessity for it.

[Deleted.]

SOVIET TREATY WITH EAST GERMANY

Senator THURMOND. Secretary Rusk, suppose Russia signs a treaty with East Germany. What would be the policy of the United States? What will we do? Will we continue diplomatic relations or just what steps will we take?

Secretary RUSK. It depends a good deal on what, in fact, happens. They can go out into Siberia somewhere and sign a treaty at any time. The question is what the effect of that would be on our rights and on our position in West Berlin.

For example, we ourselves have signed a treaty with the West Germans in which we reserve to the Western Allies full disposition of all German questions such as a German peace treaty for all Germany, and reserve to ourselves the responsibility for Berlin. If the Soviets signed a peace treaty with the East Germans, so-called peace treaty with that kind of a reservation, that would be one thing; or they might do what they did in 1955, sign such a treaty and themselves put in a reservation reserving Soviet control of the Berlin questions. That would be another.

But if they signed a peace treaty and tried to apply it to our situation in West Berlin, then we would have a crisis—we would be right there; we would have a crisis, which we have all known could come about. But it is not the actual signing of the paper that is the critical thing. The critical thing is what they do about our presence and our access to Berlin.

Senator THURMOND. That would be the result of signing a treaty.

FOOD TO COMMUNIST NATIONS

Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you this question which has caused to lot of comment in my section, and I think throughout other sections of the country, too. I presume you consider food as a weapon of war just as important as steel. If that is true, why do we continue to provide food to any Communist country which tends to build up the economy, which is, in turn, something which prepares it for war?

Secretary RUSK. It depends a good deal, Senator, on which country. In the case of Yugoslavia, for example, I think we have a basic interest in the continued independence of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc, and if assistance in food helps them maintain that independence, I think it is a good investment on our part.

In the case of Poland, I think that there is one of the places where a counter-offensive by the West is possible because of the strong sense of nationalism that one finds in Poland.

I remember 10 years ago the question was how can we take on a counter-offensive then behind the bloc. One of the ways we can take a counter-offensive is to get into a situation like Poland, get them some food, get some contacts between their leaders in science and industry and so forth and leaders in the West, to stimulate that nostalgic feeling of the Poles for the restoration of their relations with Western civilization, Western Europe.

I would think that these are matters of tactics, and have nothing to do with the question of supporting communism by feeding some Poles or some Yugoslavs.

Senator THURMOND. If we should have a showdown with Russia, whose side do you think Yugoslavia would be on?

Secretary RUSK. I would think Yugoslavia would probably, in the first instance—even over Berlin where they have some strong Yugoslav feelings of their own—I think they would probably stay out of it.

SOUTH VIETNAM OFFENSIVE AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

Senator THURMOND. Now, the last question I want to ask you is, it seems we in South Vietnam are trying to help hold South Vietnam since the Communist take-over. What is the objection to the South Vietnamese going north and clearing the Communists out of North Vietnam and cleaning the country of Communists? Won't there always be and continue to be in the future trouble and agitation there unless the Communists are cleaned out of Vietnam? What is the objection to insisting on their doing it?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think this is one of those questions where one has to select the policy and pay the price. The South Vietnamese could not themselves take on this job in North Vietnam with the support of the bloc behind North Vietnam without a major military effort by the United States, which might very well lead to world war.

We ourselves believe that there is a better alternative to try to put the South Vietnamese in a position to fight their war in South Vietnam and win it there. It was won in Malaya, in the Philippines, in Burma, where this type of subversion was attempted. The South Vietnamese are fighting. The principal differences between them and the Laotians is that they are fighting and making some headway, and I would think this course is much preferable at this point to the all-out engagement that would be implicit in this question.

Senator THURMOND. Of course, that tactic was used in Korea when we did not win in Korea. Now we have two Koreas; we have two Chinas; we have two Vietnams. As long as we do, we are going to have agitation, and we are going to have trouble. We have to start with winning; we have to start with taking the offensive. As long as we just stay on the defensive in dealing with the Communists, we won't win, in my judgment.

Secretary RUSK. I think there are many ways in which we can take the offensive, and one of the most important is in the field of foreign aid. I think these men we have outside the United States in uniform are part of the necessary security and defense of the free world, and those are there for that purpose. It may be necessary to engage them.

Senator THURMOND. I thank you very much.

Secretary RUSK. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cannon.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CUBA AS A VIOLATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Mr. Secretary, I take it from what you have said already that insofar as Cuba is concerned you do not consider the actions now

being taken as being in violation of the Monroe Doctrine, based on the information I have?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. I would not be that categorical about it, because I think the recognition by all the hemisphere states, for example, at Punta del Este was that the existence of the Marxist-Leninist regime is incompatible with the American system and, at the same time, saying that this is a system which is contrary to the basic doctrine involved in the Monroe Doctrine.

However, that does not, it seems to me, mean that we move automatically toward an attempted military solution by an American assault on Cuba.

Senator CANNON. Then your belief is there is actually a violation, but the question is what method to pursue to counteract that violation?

Secretary RUSK. I think, by and large, the development in Cuba is contrary to the purposes and intent of the Monroe Doctrine and, indeed, the Inter-American System.

UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING

Senator CANNON. Senator Russell raised a question that I am much concerned about, and that is the changing of our position with respect to nuclear testing and disarmament, and the apparent change of position even though you say we know that the Russians are not going to agree. I wonder if you can say categorically that we will not agree to a nuclear test ban without having adequate rights of on-site inspection?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, I think I can say that entirely, because this is crucial to any test ban that would involve underground tests.

Senator CANNON. Could you also say categorically that we will not proceed to enter into any disarmament agreement without adequate on-site inspection provisions?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator CANNON. And then don't you think it is important that we try to——

Secretary RUSK. May I just qualify that in this sense, there may be certain aspects of the disarmament agreement that would not for itself call for or require inspection. For example, if the Soviets bought our proposal to turn over certain weapons of fissionable grade material that would not itself require a count except for what was turned over.

Senator CANNON. Don't you think it is important, so far as particularly our own people are concerned, that we not take actions that might mislead them?

Many people in our own country here have the idea that when we come out and say that we are going to lessen the number of inspection requirements, even though we know the reason for it, we know that it is because you have advanced your technology insofar as detection is concerned. But this to the American public and to many people means a different thing; it means that we are giving up, we are entering into more concessions to try to get an agreement.

Don't you think it is important that our position be made a little more clear in that regard?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, this is one of the reasons why I mentioned earlier why it was we were refusing to talk about numbers of inspections at Geneva, and the real reason for it is this point that we do not want to negotiate about the numbers with people to whom it does not make any difference. I recognize the inability to be precise on what does leave the way open for misgivings here at home by what might be involved.

The essential thing is that there must be adequate on-site inspections to give us assurance that the other side is not cheating if we go into a test ban that eliminates underground testing, and the President's approach to this has been based on the security interests of the United States and will continue to be.

So it would be difficult for us for the reason I indicated earlier to talk about precise numbers. I think that would tend to help reassure people here.

EAST GERMAN COMMANDANT IN BERLIN

Senator CANNON. With respect to Berlin and the Soviets turning over or putting the East German Commandant in charge, what significance does that have insofar as we are concerned?

Secretary RUSK. That particular move in itself did not actually amount to anything because the Soviet Commandant in Berlin, so-called, had pretty much dropped out of the function years ago. He was reduced to a Colonel in rank; he was there. There was very little business transacted with him. He was a relatively junior officer in the Soviet military hierarchy.

That position was eliminated as a Soviet position. We got to such questions as insisting that they move from Friedrichstrasse to Sandkrug Bridge to get to the Soviet War Memorial and we had the Soviet Commander, in fact, operating on that question as, in fact, he was the Soviet Commandant in Berlin, so I would not think myself there was any importance with respect to him.

Senator CANNON. You say you dealt with the Soviet Commander?

Secretary RUSK. No, the Soviet Commander of their forces in East Germany.

Senator CANNON. I see. You did not have to deal with the East German people.

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. We said to the Soviets that before and after they took this step that there is no way in which the Soviets can transfer to the East Germans their responsibility to us, and there is no way in which they can put our rights at the disposal of the East Germans.

Senator CANNON. So it is our intention then, for all intents and purposes, to just completely disregard the fact that they have supposedly turned the control over to the East Berliners.

Secretary RUSK. That is right; and continue to deal with the Soviets.

SOVIET REARMAMENT PROGRAM

Senator CANNON. You made a statement earlier that kind of raised a question in my mind. You made the statement that the

Soviets had made a very significant armament build-up program or rearmament program.

Now, that raised a question in my mind because at the same time we are saying that they have less ICBM's now than we thought they were going to have a short time ago; we know they have a much smaller long-range bomber force now than we thought they were going to have a short time ago, and they have demobilized a substantial number of their personnel in a very recent period of time.

So I am wondering, would you explain to us what have they done to build up their rearmament or their armament program?

Secretary RUSK. The Secretary of Defense may wish to comment on this. It was partly the result of more accurate information about what they have.

These tests of theirs are part of the development of additional nuclear missile weaponry, but I think the Secretary of Defense ought to comment.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think we can say they stopped a reduction of their conventional forces, particularly their ground forces. Their previous plans called for their forces to be at a lower strength today than they are. This, I think, is a clear indication of shift in military planning.

They appear to have recently placed greater emphasis upon the development of missile-carrying submarines, including the possible development of Polaris-type submarines, that is to say, nuclear-powered missile-carrier submarines with capabilities to launch missiles below the surface. So far as we know they have none of those operational at the present, but there is information to indicate they plan to develop such launchers.

They appear to have held back from deploying any substantial numbers of what might be called their first generation intercontinental ballistic missiles, recognizing its serious deficiencies and anticipating they could design around these and introduce a second generation missile which, we believe, they are doing at the present time and which they appear to be accelerating the production of, although, as I stated, their force today and their rate of increase for the future appears substantially less than ours.

REDUCING THE RATE OF DISARMAMENT

Senator CANNON. Well, then, actually as far as their present strength is concerned, they have not undergone any substantial rearmament program to beef them up as of this moment, but you would say it was in the planning stage from the standpoint of nuclear submarines or Polaris-type submarine capability, and also second generation ICBMs?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would say they have changed their previous plans for reducing the size of their ground forces. I think that is very clear.

Senator CANNON. Well, they have reduced the rate of their disarmament then. The thing that raised the question was because the Secretary said they had undergone a very significant rearmament program.

Now, that does not seem to me to be rearmament. It seems to me to be just a slow-up of what appeared before to be a disarmament program insofar as the present posture is concerned, and I just wanted to get it clear in my own mind as to what the facts were.

Secretary RUSK. Perhaps I should explain the basis for my statement, and if the Secretary of Defense has another way to explain it, he will express it.

I think that the Soviets have, say, 2 years, in fact, had less than we thought they had; that they also knew that we had increasing power for a nuclear force that made it necessary for them to take additional steps to develop their nuclear force and, therefore, there was a very important military decision to break the so-called moratorium and renew their testing, and this was part of the build-up in the missile nuclear testing, not beyond our earlier estimates but beyond what they had.

I cannot be sure of this, but I suspect, and perhaps General Carter will comment on it, that they are building up more than they had planned building at this point, so Mr. Khrushchev has talked about the effect of our own build-up. He is blaming the rationing in the Soviet Union and the higher prices on defense necessity, and it sounds as thought they have stepped up for them their military program.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think I would agree on that. We get into a problem of estimates here. They have less than we previously estimated they would have, and I think it is very important to recognize that.

They have substantially less than we have today, but they probably—and I can only say probably because I have no certainty with respect to this next statement—are spending more on arms today in total than they planned to spend today. The evidence that we have points to that.

SOVIET MISSILE PRODUCTION

Senator CANNON. In other words, our evidence now would indicate not only did they not go ahead as fast as we thought they were going to in the bomber area, they did not go ahead as fast as we thought they were in the missile area.

Secretary MCNAMARA. That is correct.

Senator CANNON. But they are apparently taking steps now, and particularly in the submarine area and in the second generation——

Secretary MCNAMARA. Missile area, exactly.

Senator CANNON. Missile area.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Exactly.

Senator CANNON. General, do we have any specific information as to what they are coming up with now in the way of a second generation missile in light of the association of tests that they undertook?

General CARTER. I would like to revert to Mr. Whitman, sir, who is our expert on that.

However, it appears that they have stopped entirely the first generation missiles and the missiles that Secretary McNamara in-

formed you of earlier are the second generation sophisticated missiles.

Senator CANNON. Fifty ICBM's?

General CARTER. Yes, sir.

Senator CANNON. They are second generation?

General CARTER. Yes, sir.

Senator CANNON. Are they solid or liquid fuel?

STATEMENT OF JOHN WHITMAN, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. WHITMAN. They are liquid fuel and they are considerably smaller and easier to handle than the rather giant first generation which they started out with.

Senator CANNON. Is there any indication as to whether they are storable liquids?

Mr. WHITMAN. Storable liquids, yes.

Senator CANNON. Fast reaction time?

Mr. WHITMAN. Not very fast reaction. They have not sought anything like the 15-minute reaction time we built into the Minuteman.

Senator CANNON. Do we have anything, any information, about their rate of build-up now in the missile area, in the ICBM area?

Mr. WHITMAN. The rate of build-up so far, sir, the 50 that we estimate, has come about in the last 9 and 10 months, primarily.

Senator CANNON. Do you think the entire 50 have come in during that time?

Mr. WHITMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator CANNON. Did they wash out the others that they supposedly had a year ago, for example?

Mr. WHITMAN. The first generation?

Senator CANNON. Yes.

Mr. WHITMAN. Insofar as it was deployed, they held it.

Senator CANNON. They held it?

Mr. WHITMAN. Yes.

Senator CANNON. Are they doing any build-up in the MRBMs, or is this 500 figure about—does that appear to be what their level would be?

Mr. WHITMAN. We think they are going somewhat higher on this, up into the 550, 650 range. They are very near the end, but not completely.

Senator CANNON. Not an appreciable degree higher?

Mr. WHITMAN. No, sir.

Senator CANNON. Do you have any current information as to whether they are doing anything in the long-range bomber area now?

Mr. WHITMAN. They seem to have stabilized that. They are not—we do not know of any new bombers that they are planning to put into production, and they are holding what they have and we expect as they undergo attrition, there will be a gradual decline in that force.

Senator CANNON. What about their other aircraft that they showed at the last Tushino show?

Mr. WHITMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator CANNON. Have they appeared to go into production with any of those?

Mr. WHITMAN. One not at all, and the other apparently is a civil aircraft in its civil version.

Senator CANNON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think that covers my questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, gentlemen, we appreciate very much your coming down.

Senator RUSSELL. Can I ask just one or two questions?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

AMERICAN AID TO INDONESIA

Senator RUSSELL. There are just one or two questions raised in my mind with respect to Secretary Rusk's referring to foreign aid.

I was interested in your categorical statement to Senator Lausche that we had nothing whatever to do with forcing the Dutch out of West New Guinea because I certainly had a contrary view, and I think the press generally has carried it as if we were certainly discouraging that.

I understand that the Dutch have been spending from $25 to $45 million a year—that they have had that much loss there. Have we agreed to furnish any funds to Sukarno and picking up their tab there?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. The arrangements on financing would be that the Dutch and the Indonesians share the costs during the United Nations period of trusteeship, and then the Indonesians take over the costs after transfer to Indonesia.

Senator RUSSELL. If they are not able to do it, would they expect us to do it or the Russians or who?

Secretary RUSK. There is no discussion of U.S. aid for that purpose. I think the types of aid we had in mind will not be available for general budgetary support of that sort in West New Guinea. There may be some technical assistance or things of that sort in the general aid program that would include that.

INDEPENDENCE OF SURINAM

Senator RUSSELL. I read from a newspaper article where the people in Surinam, I believe that is one of the names, were debating whether or not to get independent status from Holland so that they could get more money out of us than from the Dutch.

Did you see that article?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; I did not see that.[6]

Senator RUSSELL. I have it in my office. I was very much interested in whether it was more probable on their part profitably to be independent and stay on the dole here than to stay with the Dutch.

Secretary RUSK. We would not want to encourage that idea because one of our main efforts in the OECD is to try to get these countries who had a former colonial relationship with these independent countries, former colonial countries, to keep their backs in there and continue to give the kind of support they gave during the colonial period.

---

[6] See Appendix D.

AID TO TRINIDAD AND WEST INDIES

Senator RUSSELL. We are encouraging that idea with Trinidad and others celebrating their independence. We had Mr. Hamilton [7] there on hand as a symbol of American foreign aid programs, did we not?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. We had——

Senator RUSSELL. He was representing us down there. We had already advanced them a great deal of money for housing and other purposes down there before they became independent.

Secretary RUSK. There had been an aid program for the British West Indies, but we were very much expecting the British to continue to put in the kind of assistance they had put in when they were responsible for these countries.

It is true a developing country finds itself facing larger needs, and an independent country would tend to want to go faster. Therefore, they will be looking for larger assistance than they had when they were a colony. But actually Mr. Hamilton's presence there was due to last minute arrangements. We had to find a high official who could go to the place of someone else.

Senator RUSSELL. I thought it was rather symbolic that Mr. Hamilton was there, in view of Dr. Williams' statement particularly.

How about all through the Antilles, having become independent, the Barbados and otherwise, have we any information from our consular agent in that area as to whether they expect us to take up where the British have not been giving them?

Secretary RUSK. There has been very little along that line. The prospect seems to be——

Senator RUSSELL. Jamaica, too, while you are discussing that.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. There will be three independent states coming out of what was expected to be the British West India Federation.

Senator RUSSELL. That fell apart. Jamaica would not go along.

Secretary RUSK. Jamaica and Trinidad separately, and a combination of the smaller groups as a third. But that is still quite a way down the track, and we had not gotten into direct aid discussions with them.

Senator RUSSELL. Of course, the Bahamas never were in the Federation, I believe.

Secretary RUSK. I believe that is correct, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. They did not need anything other than American tourists, I suppose, to keep them going.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, gentlemen. We appreciate your taking the time to come down here.

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS

Do you have any suggestions at all as to what we might say to the press? They will be in here. We cannot avoid them. Do you wish for us to be very general?

---

[7] Fowler Hamilton, Administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID).

Secretary RUSK. It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, if you and Senator Russell and Secretary McNamara agree, since we had certain points stated frankly this morning, figures and things that had been given, we think it should be quite general about the briefing with respect to the world situation.

The CHAIRMAN. I intended to be very general. They usually ask, though, was he opitimstic. Are you optimistic?

Secretary RUSK. Diplomacy has to work on an optimistic basis.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be at all out of the way, Mr. Secretary, that we say that you are quite confident of the present military strength of this country? Would you care for us to make any reference to, say, that kind of thing?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think it would be very helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be appropriate?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I am going to propose to say to the press that any comment will come from the chairmen of the committees.

Senator RUSSELL. I do not think it would hurt for us to say anything to the effect that a great many questions were asked particularly about Cuba but that most of the answers were covered in the President's statement this morning, or something like that.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

The CHAIRMEN. I propose to be very general, but I just thought——

Secretary RUSK. I though perhaps Secretary McNamara and I might just not make a statement as we go out and leave it to the chairmen.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Senator Russell is going to carry on.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. Because we value very much the executive nature of this discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is very helpful for both committees to clarify a great many things. I think you have done a wonderful job in both of your initial statements which I thought were helpful, and I personally think they are reassuring.

I have no illusions that this is going to get over next week or next year. I think your summary as to the prospects of its continuing a series of crises and troubles is exactly what I see. But I agree with you—I would rather have our problems than theirs. I mean, we both have problems, but I think they have worse ones. In that sense it is optimistic.

Thank you very much.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the committees adjourned.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC

The committee entered an executive session at 11:10 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, and Carlson.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, seconded by Senator Carlson, the committee voted to report favorably the nomination of Abba P. Schwartz to be Administrator, Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State.

Without objection, the committee also voted favorably to report the nomination of Tom Killefer to be Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank.

On motion by Senator Morse, and without objection, the committee voted to report the nomination of John J. Seigenthaler to be a Member of the United States Advisory Commission on Information.

The nomination of Francis H. Russell to be Ambassador to the Republic of Tunisia was approved for report.

On motion by Senator Morse, and without objection, the committee approved for report as Representatives and Alternate Representatives to the United Nations the nominations of Adlai E. Stevenson, Francis T. P. Plimpton, Senators Albert Gore and Gordon Allott, Arthur H. Dean, Charles W. Yost, Philip M. Klutznick, Jonathan B. Bingham, Marietta P. Tree, and Carl T. Rowan.

A Foreign Service list of promotions and appointments was also approved for report.

On motion by Senator Morse and without objection the committee voted to report the Treaty of Friendship, Establishment, and Navigation between the United States of America and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (Executive B, 87th Congress, 2nd Session).

The committee approved an original resolution for report to print the committee's study on the Common Market.

The committee discussed a paper prepared by the committee staff suggesting proposed phases for study in the committee's current inquiry into the non-diplomatic activities of representatives of foreign governments in the United States, and asking for guidance on them. On motion by Senator Carlson, seconded by Senator Morse, the outlines proposed by the staff were approved unanimously.

Senator Morse gave notice that his Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs would hold executive sessions next year on the program of Alliance for Progress.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 11:40 a.m.]

FORTHCOMING MEETING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. John Sparkman presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, and Hickenlooper.

Also present: Senator Allott of Colorado.

Mr. Holt and Mr. Henderson of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.

The meeting this morning is for the purpose of discussing the U.N. General Assembly items.

Here is one of our delegates to the U.N. Assembly, Senator Allott. We are glad to have him with us this morning.

Senator Hickenlooper is supposed to be on the way here, and others. Mr. Secretary and Mr. Assistant Secretary, we are glad to have both of you with us.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much.

Senator SPARKMAN. I may say that the record should show that the Secretary is accompanied by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Mr. Harlan Cleveland.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one suggestion, since we are going to talk about the United Nations, I think in fairness to the Secretary and to the committee that before he leaves this room he ought to make whatever comment he wants to make on this latest propaganda sheet of Khrushchev's so that when the press asks us individually whether or not we even raised it at the committee we at least can say we raised it but we are not in position to make comment but it was discussed. I think it is a pretty omninous thing myself, and it is a typical bluffing statement on the part of Khrushchev, but I think it is shocking that he would use the language which Tass reports him as having used.

If there was ever a case of semantic intervention this is it. But on the other hand, the American people ought to have an answer to it, I think, at an early hour in some form. These are only my offhand remarks. What I said to the press this morning was that I would discuss it with my subcommittee and the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. [Edwin] Martin. I thought the comments of Khrushchev could very well develop into a serious crisis if he sought to implement them by setting up a beachhead for offense in Cuba and

that he would discover that his bluff would be called if he followed that course of action in Cuba.

That is all I said.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, I would be glad if we could save some time at the last, all of us would like to have your comments on it.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY HARLAN CLEVELAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Since there are more than 80 items already on the agenda of the U.N. Assembly and there undoubtedly would be 100 or more before the Assembly adjourns, I thought I would not get into too much detail of those 80 items, but to speak a little about the background and the environment and some of the special activity which would be going on at the Assembly and during the course of the Assembly.

We are delighted to have Senator Allott and Senator Gore, a member of this committee, on our delegation this year. I am looking forward to their participation.

The full text of the Tass statement today had not reached the Department by the time I left, so I have only a portion of it in front of me. We will want to give it immediate study and comment as soon as we can get the full text to see exactly where we are on it. It is to a considerable extent a repetition of a line which they have taken on many other occasions on a number of questions, but what we will be most interested in is to see whether what they have said about Cuba will be in any significant way different from what they have said about it before.

Up to this point it has been our judgment that they have held back from making an international all-out commitment to Cuba, and if this statement goes beyond that, if it threatens the buildup of a base here in this hemisphere or anything of that sort, then this could, of course, increase the crisis very significantly.

EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS

I have not seen the exact text of this yet, but I gather there is a portion of the statement which represents still another one of those transparent and crude efforts to try to influence and comment on American elections or free world elections. They have done it with Britain, they have done it with Italy, they have done it with France, some indication there is not to be a crisis on Berlin until the elections are over.

Senator SPARKMAN. That part rather puzzles me, I mean the way it was given over the radio.

Secretary RUSK. Any such comment is just about as gross as one could imagine.

Senator MORSE. That is right.

Secretary RUSK. Because if there is one thing that is clear it is that the U.S. Government is in business to do business if they have anything constructive to say about Berlin at any time, and second, the crisis on Berlin at any time before or after an election can be a

very dangerous thing because the West is united and determined on Berlin.

So that if there is anything that has been clearer about this country since World War II it has been that the Democrats and Republicans have been united on these great issues of defending the freedom and the security of our country with that of the free world.

So, I don't understand—well, I do understand—why the Soviets would have made such a gross comment on an election in this country. But in any event we will, Senator Morse, study that statement very fast and we will undoubtedly have some official comment on it. But we thought we ought to see the full statement before we make any official comment.

Senator MORSE. I agree.

KHRUSHCHEV'S EXPECTED VISIT TO U.N.

Secretary RUSK. Let me again, before getting into the actual key items on the agenda of the Assembly, make one or two comments about other matters. There has been a good deal of speculation about what Mr. Khrushchev is coming to the Assembly for. I think we can say with reasonable assurance that he does not plan to come at the beginning of the Assembly. He apparently indicated to U Thant if he came at all it would be toward the end of the Assembly, but he has not said that he is coming even then. He just left the door open for later on. We don't expect him to come at the beginning of the Assembly. Of course, the situation could change and he may in fact turn up. But we ourselves have had no negotiations or discussions with him on that subject.

THE BERLIN QUESTION

The rumors that have come out of different quarters that U Thant's discussions with him was the closest to an official discussion of that with him and the impression that U Thant had was that he would not be present at the beginning nor do we have any information indicating that the Soviets themselves will put the Berlin question on the agenda of the United Nations. Let me just comment a little about that because that is potentially an extremely important matter.

It has been our view in the West that in a matter as dangerous and complicated as this on which 104 nations would have a great many different views or no views at all, that it would not be wise, and I think U Thant agrees with us on this, for us to put the Berlin question into the assembly at this stage in any expectation that the United Nations could or would even attempt to seriously find a solution for it. But on the other hand, the U.N. stage of the Berlin question could be a critically important stage if it moves on, as we expect it well might, into the more serious crisis.

In other words, you will remember at the time of the first Berlin blockade the United Nations made a useful although not a decisive role. We have actions going on the ground which are very dangerous to both sides. It may be that at that point a U.N. phase would be one of the ways to keep this matter from blowing wide open at a time when we are having to insist upon our rights in Berlin.

So to a certain extent the U.N. stage is held in reserve for the time when it can maybe contribute something to the situation, but if it were to go into the United Nations today, the only attitude that the United Nations probably would or could take would be "Don't shoot but talk." Well, the talking opportunity is present, although there has been very little headway made in recent discussions because of Khrushchev's insistence on the removal of western forces from West Berlin. But at some stage, one side or the other may put the Berlin question on the agenda in either the Security Council or the General Assembly.

Now, an effort will be made to take advantage of the presence of a great many foreign ministers at the General Assembly to transact or have discussions both on a bilateral basis and on a multilateral basis in a variety of combinations.

We expect, for example, to have 1½ to 2-day meetings of the Latin American Ministers during the course of the General Assembly, a little later this month, before the end of this month and that will probably be held here in Washington.

THE SUBJECT OF CUBA

Now, the subject that will be for primary consideration there will be Cuba, and we do have indication that there are some, again some serious movements in the attitude of certain of the Latin American countries on the Cuban question because of their own growing concern about the Cuban issue. I refer now to countries like Mexico, Brazil and Chile, who still have relations with Cuba. The reporting of their own missions out of Cuba and the known facts about the Soviet arms program in Cuba have caused these countries to begin to take another look and with a change in Argentina on this issue that occurred after Punta del Este and the overthrow of the Frondizi Government, it appears we are finally getting within reach of hemisphere solidarity on this issue, even beyond, very considerably beyond what was expected at Punta del Este.

The issues that will be, the primary problems, that we have with the other countries, operational questions, have to do with such things as how we further protect, insulate, the other members of the hemisphere against any interference from Cuba. At the present time that takes the form of training individuals from other Latin American countries in Cuba and this traffic in persons is something that is of growing concern to the countries that have thus far been used as transit areas for them.

The widespread radio propaganda coming out of the new stations in Cuba is another part of the problem. The transfer of funds into such countries as Guatemala and Venezuela is something we think we ought to be able to operate more effectively against. And to be sure that we get the full coordination and cooperation from all of the inter-American countries and particularly in the Caribbean area to be sure that there is no illicit traffic in arms or no threat of any sort has any validity to it or any strength behind it coming out of Cuba because we certainly would move with our own armed forces immediately and promptly if there were any such motions against other countries in the hemisphere.

Then we need to be sure that the foreign ministers of the other countries are accurately informed about what is going on in Cuba and to consider then what else might be done to help reduce that situation.

But we will have an informal meeting of the inter-American foreign ministers during the assembly. Similarly the SEATO and CENTO foreign ministers will have some discussions and I think it is entirely probable there will be some group discussions among the NATO foreign ministers while they are here during the Assembly.

NEW PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY

In the Assembly itself, it appears that Zafrulla Khan of Pakistan has a long lead to become the President of the Assembly. He is a man of great experience and he has been in the past very helpful to the United States, and we think it will be of considerable advantage to us in some of the problems and debates and decisions that will have to come up during the course of the proceedings.

Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, he was one of the leading candidates in the Fifth General Assembly when the man from Iran beat him out.

Secretary RUSK. Zafrulla Khan had a tour on the World Court and now he is back as the Pakistan representative, a man who has great personal respect around the Assembly and we think he will make a good president.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did he retire from the court?

Secretary RUSK. Well, his term expired. The term is——

Mr. CLEVELAND. Nine years.

Senator SPARKMAN. Not eligible for reappointment?

Secretary RUSK. He was eligible but they did not re-elect him. I suppose it was more the political distribution of seats.

Mr. CLEVELAND. I think he was anxious to get back into politics.

ELECTION OF A SECRETARY GENERAL

Secretary RUSK. The next principal personnel question will be the question of the election of a Secretary General. At last year's Assembly the Troika proposal was decisively defeated or set aside, and the Soviets finally did go along with the election of U Thant as Secretary General, and without any impairment of the office of the Secretary General which is one of the real achievements of a great majority of the United Nations at the last Assembly. Now, the question of electing a Secretary General for a full 5-year term comes up.

We believe that U Thant has done a good job. He has not always followed our wishes in every particular point but he has acted with considerable courage and independence, and we think that it would be entirely appropriate for him to be re-elected. We don't know what the attitude of the Soviets will be to him.

He was reasonably cordially received in Moscow but they censored his speech when he gave a farewell speech to the Russian people upon his departure. He was critical in some respects of the Soviet policy in informing the people about what was going on, critical of their policy toward the Congo and that statement was censored on the Russian side.

Then, U Thant has referred publicly since his visit to Moscow to Khrushchev's obsession with Berlin, and, I would say, to me this is a rather accurate description of Khrushchev's personal attitude toward the Berlin question at the particular moment. Comments of that sort, whether they will make any difference in the attitude of the Soviets, we don't quite know. But we are quite sure Troika is dead and the Assembly, if necessary, will go ahead and exercise its Assembly right to elect an acting Secretary General without a veto in the Security Council if there is difficulty with the Russians on that matter.

PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES IN CONGO AND MIDDLE EAST

Then, another new question which comes up this year is the consideration by the Assembly of the advisory opinion of the World Court with respect to the assessments on U.N. peacekeeping activities in the Congo and in the Middle East. It would be normal for the General Assembly to accept an advisory opinion of the World Court. They have done so on each previous occasion and it is our expection that the Assembly will do so again.

If this should occur, then it is again our expection that it would take a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly to prevent the automatic application of article 19 of the Charter with respect to voting rights in cases where the members are in arrears for more than the 2 years indicated in the Charter.

There will be some real discussion of this, some negotiations. Some of the smaller countries whose contributions to the U.N. systems are larger than their total bill for the conduct of their foreign relations otherwise seem to be a little nervous about what this might mean if the United Nations takes on vast financial responsibilities in the future and they may be hesitant about it. This is a matter about which we theoretically could be concerned about the future of the U.N. financing, but we are quite confident that politically, the majority, two-thirds, of the Assembly will not go down this trail in irresponsible fashion.

Indeed, if we look ahead to the future I think the problem may well be that there will be times when action by the United Nations would be very important in keeping the peace, but where members might be reluctant to have the United Nations take a particular step because of its direct cost to them as a part of the regular budget of the United Nations.

That has pluses and minuses to it and there may be situations where the United Nations might not be able to act, but on the other hand, we think there is much advantage in the membership, large and small, accepting the fact that casting votes in the United Nations is a responsible act and that there are no free rides there and when nations make a decision of this sort they expect to take their share of the necessary costs involved.

But nevertheless, we expect the Assembly to approve the advisory opinion, and that will be of very considerable help in getting on with the business of collecting the arrearages that are owed to the United Nations by members under earlier assessments.

PROCEDURES OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Now, we will be giving considerable attention at this session of the United Nations to the procedures of the Assembly itself.

It now has 104 members. There may be as many as six members admitted during the course of this coming session: Algeria, Ruanda, Urundi, Uganda, Jamaica, Trinidad almost certainly would come up for consideration during this Assembly.

It is rather unlikely on political grounds that Kuwait would overcome a veto in the Security Council for membership. But in any event with 104 or 110 members we feel it is very important for the Assembly to give a lot more thought to the conduct of its own business. We have in mind, for example, that the technique of the rapporteur, used with considerable effect by the League of Nations and in a few instances within the U.N. system itself, might be further developed so that a key statesman might be asked to look into a particular question before the Assembly—particularly one involving a dispute between two parties—to talk these matters over with the parties, to investigate fully the background of the situation, to consider whether any action by the Assembly could in fact move toward a solution, but to take some of these specific questions of disagreement up in a way that would in a sense protect them from the violent impulse of debate year after year, where the debate itself contributes very little to the solution, and where some quiet diplomacy behind the scenes might be able to move toward a solution.

Because the procedures of the General Assembly could get out of hand and the sense of the responsibility of the Assembly could be diluted by regular repetitive debates filled with controversy with no constructive outcome and no settlement in sight.

ARAB REFUGEE QUESTION

For example, in a certain sense the efforts Dr. Joseph Johnson has been making on the Arab refugee question is a sample of what an individual might take on in an attempt to find a settlement. Here is a question which has been stubbornly with us for the last 15 years. Dr. Johnson is now sounding out very quietly the governments directly concerned, Israel and the neighboring Arab States, to see whether there is a possibility for us to get on even with a small first step of the business of exploring with the refugees resettlement and repatriation.

This is a question filled with political dynamite. It is a question on which the refugees themselves have never really had a chance to express a responsible opinion as far as their own particular individual cases are concerned because the question has never been asked as a real question, "Do you, Mr. so-and-so, wish to repatriate; if so, where? Do you wish to resettle; if so, where? What arrangements can be undertaken to make this possible?"

Now, to give that any chance at all, it means the subject ought not be inflamed by a lot of passionate debate in the General Assembly, so that if a little quiet diplomacy can move the question on we hope that very much the debate on that particular issue can be reduced to a minimum while those explorations are going on, be-

cause there is no solution there if the governments themselves have to agree publicly.

There may be a solution if the U.N. administration of that problem can proceed quietly with simply the acquiescence of the governments concerned. That is an illustration, I think, of one of the techniques we hope very much that can be taken up.

DEBATE ON DISARMAMENT

Now, there will be a very major debate once again on the subject of disarmament. Although we cannot report any serious progress in Geneva, I think the attitude of the Soviet Union on disarmament has been fully disclosed, and the issue will concentrate very heavily on the subject of control and inspection of disarmament arrangements.

Nuclear testing will come in for very active discussion. We will be under some pressure by a great many in the Assembly to take on an uninspected moratorium on nuclear testing. We have said we cannot accept nuclear arrangements that do not involve necessary or national inspection in the atmospheric field. There are ways and means of detecting which give us ways of assurance, but in the underground field we don't see how any progress can be made without the necessary inspection arrangements.

But that will be certainly one of the major issues before the Assembly, and my guess is that the United States will be in pretty strong position, although, I think we can expect a majority of the Assembly to call on all powers to cease nuclear testing with or without inspection on any bases whatever because so many of them are simply opposed to nuclear testing for whatever the circumstances.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, may I ask a question or two?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, please.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, certainly.

EMBARRASSMENT OVER EMOTIONAL ISSUES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This question has been bothering me for a long time. If a proposition is offered in the General Assembly that all nations agree to forego testing of all kinds without inspection, just based on their own word, it could get a very substantial majority of votes in the United Nations and there we would be. The Russians would agree to it right off the bat.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, this came up last year, Senator Hickenlooper, and the Assembly passed two resolutions, one to eliminate nuclear testing period. And the other to eliminate nuclear testing with adequate safeguard. We supported the second one and we did not support the first one. But both of them passed by very large majorities, and we simply are in position of not being able to accept that first resolution which called for cessation of nuclear testing without regard to inspection.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I know, but the embarrassing situation we are in is we say we will not accept, and I say we can't accept it. We will not accept the decision of the United Nations on one thing

but we ask other countries to accept the decision of the United Nations on other matters.

That is the embarrassment that is created by all these new immature countries that come in and their emotion and all that.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think it is true this particular resolution last year was one of the very few resolutions passed by a large majority of the United Nations that the United States did not feel it could comply with and in a sense it is true that this put us in an embarrassing position.

Alongside of it was the other resolution adopted by the same majority calling for inspection and control, and so we have insisted on putting these two resolutions together.

The same issue came up in connection with nuclear weapons. A resolution was introduced which was passed by a large majority calling for the non-transfer of nuclear weapons to nations not now having them. We supported that, and it had large support throughout the Assembly.

The Swedes put in a resolution similar to the Irish resolution but adding we should not provide nuclear weapons or station nuclear weapons in other countries' territories. This would wreck NATO so we opposed that. This resolution passed, but again we had the Irish and the Swedish resolutions that had to be taken together.

Quite frankly, one of the reasons why we are anxious that the Assembly look to its procedures and try to find ways to act in a more responsible fashion is that they can get caught up in ideas that are more sentimental than realistic on certain issues, and it does create that sort of embarrassment for us, but I don't think that politically speaking, you can get a majority of the Assembly not to express themselves as against nuclear testing, I mean in terms of their own political orientation, their own politics at home and so forth. I think we just have to accept the fact that for the time we are going to have that embarrassment and do our best to work toward a real nuclear test ban treaty rather than a moratorium. But that is a real problem. We had it last year and we expect we will have it again this year.

QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION

The Chinese representation question is not yet on the agenda although it is certain to come up from some source. We have indications that the Soviets will raise it again, if no one else does.

Last year we passed an important turning point on that when the Assembly agreed that a decision on that matter was an important question requiring a two-thirds vote and it is our feeling that the Assembly will sustain that view this year, continue with that view, and we don't really expect that seating question to be one of the central questions in this particular Assembly.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, procedurally in any meeting of the General Assembly, however, they could reverse themselves by a majority vote, couldn't they?

Secretary RUSK. That is quite right, sir. Each Assembly would be master of its own rules and decisions on that and a majority could reverse that particular decision. But in checking around among

governments and looking at the attitudes expressed we feel that we are in reasonable shape on that.

A number of the African states have been very helpful on it and we expect them to continue to be so. You don't anticipate any major problem on that, do you?

Mr. CLEVELAND. No; in fact, we would hope that the new president of the Assembly would not require each year what's really been established by last year's vote as a new category of adding to the list of things in the Charter that take a two-third vote because this is an important question and does not add to.

Secretary RUSK. His ruling again could be upset by a majority vote.

Mr. CLEVELAND. He would still have to get a solid majority on this issue.

THE CONGO SITUATION

Secretary RUSK. On the Congo situation which will, of course, be thoroughly debated in the Assembly, we are very anxious to move fast now to drive home the tentative agreements of both Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Tshombe to settle on a federal constitution and get that basic issue into what might be called a normal framework of a developing country rather than one of civil war secession and high controversy.

We have been encouraged by the response of both of them to the proposals of the United Nations on the constitutional settlement. I think it ought to be pointed out Prime Minister Adoula made some important concessions in his own thinking because the federal structure involved a diminuation of the powers of the Central Government under the Loi Fundamentale, and Tshombe on the other hand has indicated that a federal arrangement would be acceptable to him, although there are some details that do have to be worked out, and being pursued vigorously by the United Nations and the governments most interested there.

There is, I think, a gratifying amount of unity among them, with the U.N. representative on the spot, the British, the French, the Belgians, ourselves, are trying to drive this first agreement home. We hope very much that much of the controversy can be relieved by actual agreement on the ground. That would, of course, make a very big difference in terms of the U.N. troops in the Congo and the whole structure of that problem.

We are not home safe on that question yet. There is still a lot to be done but our great objective will be to move to get that objective off the agenda.

It will be there for some time as an aid problem, and in terms of U.N. technical and other forms of assistance to the Congo, administrative and otherwise, training, law enforcement. But we do see the possibilities of settlement in sight and on that we are moderately optimistic at the present time realizing we can't be completely assured until the matter is really driven home. We are working on that very hard.

Mr. Chairman, I just mentioned a few of the many items on the agenda. I wonder if you or members of the committee have any special questions about anything that I have said or about other

items I have not alluded to. I think the general shape of the agenda is known to the committee.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Morse, do you have any questions?

REDUCING THE FINANCIAL BURDEN

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, what do you or Mr. Cleveland think will be the discussion in this General Assembly in regard to the financial problems of the United Nations?

Secretary RUSK. Well, our first objective will be sharply to reduce the financial burden in the Congo by a settlement. If for any reason we can't move to get that question settled within the, in effect, time limits of the U.N. bond operation, then we have a very serious question ahead of us. We don't look forward to that with any relish whatever.

Senator MORSE. What has been the reaction to the World Court decision on the assessments?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Cleveland, would you like to speak to that because you have been doing some nose counts.

Mr. CLEVELAND. On the whole, it is very favorable on the court decision itself. Most of the countries we have canvassed, with a few notable exceptions, have said, "Well, sure, naturally the Assembly will have to accept this advisory opinion."

I think there will be two problems. One, the Soviet problem, which will continue probably to be chronic. Their whole view being that the United Nations ought to be a meeting place and not an operating organization, and they will continue properly to try to starve it financially.

ASSURANCES ON FUTURE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The other problem is a problem of the small countries for whom, as the Secretary said, contributions to an international organization bulk very large in their national budgets who will want some kind of assurance that any future peacekeeping operations of any major scale would not be stuffed into the regular budget, at the regular scale.

And in the negotiating situation we may find that there are a number of them who want some kind of assurance along that line before they are prepared to convert the advisory opinion from a statement of law into a statement of policy.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What kind of assurance can they get? You mean we guarantee their payments?

Mr. CLEVELAND. No—excuse me.

The view of a lot of the small countries is that peace and security operations are somewhat different. That the scale set up for administrative expenses doesn't necessarily apply to a Congo situation, and that, therefore, it ought to be done in some different way. There are a few countries that think all these expenses ought to be carried by the five permanent members as payment for their veto.

Secretary RUSK. May I also comment on this, that this is a question which also may cause us to take a hard look at the arrangements that are actually set up in one of these controversial situations. For example, in the West New Guinea situation there were

early suggestions that during the period of U.N. responsibility that the United Nations itself take on the bills.

In fact, it was worked out on the basis that the Netherlands and Indonesia themselves as the parties in interest split the costs of that situation, so that I think that the injection of the factor of cost into the question of how the United Nations proceeds in a given situation to me is a wholesome one and leads toward a growing sense of responsibility.

I think it is a matter that certainly will have to be dealt with in individual cases. I doubt that we shall find a generalized solution to the particular problem because in some instances particular countries will have greater interest than in others, I mean, in each instance, so that we will have to consider each one on its merits.

But I do think that financial responsibility is now a question which has to be faced by the total U.N. membership.

Senator MORSE. Yes.

COUNTRIES DELINQUENT IN PAYMENTS

I think this is one of the toughest problems that faces the United Nations. Are there any countries that are delinquent in their special assessments who since the World Court decision have either paid up or indicated that they intend to pay up?

Secretary RUSK. There were four delinquent at the time of the decision, I believe. I know two of them have paid.

Have the other two paid yet?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Beyond the 2-year ruling?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Mr. CLEVELAND. No; there are only two now that are beyond the 2-year rule, Bolivia and Paraguay, but I think you are talking really about the whole problem.

There has been some payment since, but none of the big countries, that is, France, Belgium, and the Soviet bloc which account for the biggest part.

Senator MORSE. Bolivia and Paraguay are beyond the 2-year rule in Latin America?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Actually, there were about six. Two of them Communist, Cuba and Hungary. Cuba and Hungary paid up in anticipation of the court decision, just 3 or 4 weeks before.

U.S. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well now, how did they pay? What is this controversy about the money we put in being used to pay up their delinquencies?

Mr. CLEVELAND. We didn't put in any money to pay up their delinquencies.

What we did was to make a voluntary contribution to the U.N. emergency force and to the Congo operation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did any of that emergency force contribution credit Cuba with its contribution?

Mr. CLEVELAND. What happened was the General Assembly made two decisions which tend to get linked in discussion about it. It made a decision to make an absolute reduction of the assess-

ments for 80-some countries, all the countries that were getting aid, the poorer countries, and then it asked the stronger members to put up voluntary contributions in addition to their regular assessments, which we did.

Now, we put up our voluntary contributions not to pay the smaller countries back in any sense, but to support the operations concerned, support——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But thereby relieving those smaller countries from paying their assessed share?

Mr. CLEVELAND. They were relieved under the General Assembly resolution on the subject there I understand, but they got relieved from their payment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It doesn't make any difference which pocket you take it out of. They got relieved.

Mr. CLEVELAND. They got relieved under the General Assembly resolution regardless of whether we put up a voluntary contribution or not.

Secretary RUSK. Wait a minute. What happened was a special assessment in effect was laid on——

Mr. CLEVELAND. Well, no——

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. On a special formula, is that not right?

Mr. CLEVELAND. No. The problem was for these two operations there wasn't any other scale to use than the U.N. scale for regular administration expenses. They used the U.N. scale and they said this really means that the poorer countries are paying too much, so they reduced all of the poorer countries and they said, "Well now, that doesn't really leave enough money for the total cost of these two operations for the period involved and we would be grateful for any voluntary contributions over and above these regular assessments any countries wanted to make. In the case of the U.N. emergency force a number of countries put in and in the case of the Congo we did.

Senator MORSE. One more question and I am through.

BOND PURCHASES

What is the situation with regard to the bond purchases by other countries?

Mr. CLEVELAND. $73 million pledged, $27 million of that actually purchased, and that is, of course, in the absence of any USA ability to press them very hard because we haven't gone at it.

Senator MORSE. In your judgment if you finally decided to buy the bonds would that speed up these other purchases?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Yes. Our hope would be to have a second round, let's say, of pledges, based on the matching proposal that is now intimated in the bill as it now stands.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, that is all for now.

Senator SPARKMAN. To follow that up, under the House bill as they plan to take it up Thursday, we would purchase only to match what was actually purchased?

Mr. CLEVELAND. The actual cash matching?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I might say, Mr. Chairman, I don't think that is much of a problem because these purchases and pledges on the U.N. bonds are pretty serious and responsible. I think they will go ahead and buy what they pledged to buy, but what the United Nations may have to do is to get a second round and get governments to make up, to put the total of $73 million higher than it is at the present time, and there are about 12, 15 governments that have it under consideration who have not pledged or bought and we think there will be some more money coming in.

PEACE FORCE IN THE GAZA STRIP

Senator SPARKMAN. What is the size of the peace force that is maintained in the Gaza Strip or in that area?

Mr. CLEVELAND. 5,100 men.

Senator SPARKMAN. 5,100?

Secretary RUSK. 5,100.

Senator SPARKMAN. It has been cut considerably since earlier in the year, hasn't it? Wasn't it about 10,000?

Mr. CLEVELAND. No, it was about 5,300 earlier. At the beginning of the operation it was a good deal bigger, 6,000 or more, but it has been held to around 5,000 now.

Secretary RUSK. We are looking into the possibilities of further reductions but they do have an enormous problem.

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me things have stabilized there so well that it would not require too big a force.

Senator Lausche, would you like to leave?

Senator LAUSCHE. No.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

PLEDGE OF FOODSTUFFS TO U.N.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I have been concerned and put a statement in the record the other day, as to what authority did Secretary Freeman [1] have to pledge $50 million to the United Nations as he did the other day—$40 million in foodstuffs and $10 million in cash and transportation. Do you know what authority he worked under? There is some emergency authority under Public Law 480,[2] but both Houses of Congress repudiated requests in the last bill that went through. I mean turned it down or failed to take it, and I wondered where he got that authority for $50 million more.

Mr. CLEVELAND. There are two different parts of the pledge.

One, $40 million of that was really a repeat of the pledge that was already made by McGeorge Bundy last year on the President's behalf, and that was under authority of the Public Law 480 legislation under which it is possible to make contributions to international organizations as well as to make specific bilateral commitments of Public Law 480 food.

The other is an indication on the part of the United States that we would be prepared subject to our constitutional procedures, and we always put the congressional rider on every such pledge, to put

---

[1] Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman.
[2] Food for Peace Program.

up not to exceed $10 million for ocean freight expense for that food and for a small cash payment, probably $4 million over a 3-year period for the ocean freight and perhaps $6 million for the cash. The $6 million would be on a matching basis comparable to the special fund of the United Nations and under these arrangements, these funds would be funded for the first year.

Two or four million dollars depending on what the people put up, would be funded for the first year out of AID appropriations and there is a loan or grant idea in the AID appropriations. In future years it will be presented specifically as an item in the course of the discussion of voluntary contributions which we discuss every year in connection with the AID bill, voluntary contributions for all international organizations.

AUTHORITY FOR THE PLEDGE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have the impression that it is, since the committees of both Houses of Congress turned down this particular activity, it is not in the bills, that it is strange, this point, for this sudden pledge of $40 million plus $10 million for transportation and cash.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I ask in that connection, what is cash for over and above the transportation?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary?

Mr. CLEVELAND. This is a world wide program in which in order to——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am talking about the authority about it. You will find all kinds of excuses for cash. But it is the authority that begins to concern some of us, these pledges and promises that don't seem to be based on existing authority or the approval of the Congress.

Mr. CLEVELAND. A pledge, Senator Hickenlooper, is quite often made, I think it is probably fair to say, diplomatically made, subject to a congressaional review and subject to, I mean, coming and getting the funds.

Secretary RUSK. I will look into this, Senator, and give you a detailed report on it, but it was my understanding that the food that was pledged was pledged under the authority of the existing legislation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is Public Law 480 on food, that is very true, but there is an emergency provision in Public Law 480 which under certain circumstances can be exercised.

But certainly, as I read the thing and as we try to research it a little bit it would have to strain the interpretation terribly to bring this particular thing under that emergency provision of Public Law 480, and especially in view of the fact that the matter has been passed on by both committees, that is the Senate and the House, and actually turned down.

Secretary RUSK. In connection with Public Law 480?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, in connection with the use of this Public Law 480 food and things of that kind—they decided definite-

ly not to enlarge that emergency provision which is quite restrictive.

We will look into that a little further.

INDONESIAN TROOPS ON TIMOR

I wanted to ask about the buildup of or alleged build up of Indonesian troops on the island of Timor, which was alleged by the Portuguese at least, to be a threat toward the absorption of Timor by Indonesia.

Is that going to come up?

Secretary RUSK. We have had reports of some strengthening of the Indonesian forces there as well as the Portuguese forces, but we have had also, for what it is worth, Senator, definite declarations by the Indonesians that they do not have any further territorial interests or ambitions in this area.

Now, as I say, that is for what it is worth. There have been some incidents along the border there, between the two halves of the islands, but both sides apparently have strengthened their security forces.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, this was on the Portuguese section of Timor.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But, of course, the Indians walked into Goa and took that over and then we said, "Well, it is all done and over with and there is nothing we can do about it, so we might as well give them our blessing and some more money. It is very difficult to unscramble the element once it has been stirred up."

Apparently Sukarno was completely successful in taking over New Guinea, that has been a fait accompli, has it not?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the arrangements are that there would be a period of U.N. administration and then turned over to Indonesian administration and there would be a plebiscite among the Papuans.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But the plebiscite will come after Indonesia has had charge of it.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There isn't much question then about how the vote will come out.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you yield for this question?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

SUKARNO'S EXPANSIONIST VIEWS

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes say for whatever it is worth that Sukarno has said he has no further territorial expansionist views.

By using that language, "for whatever it is worth" do you imply that you have a doubt as to what——

Secretary RUSK. Senator, it is just this, that the statement Sukarno or his foreign minister made, seems to be pretty categorical. I am not going to sit here before four or five Senators and say to you I can assure you that is the way it is going to happen in the future, because I have some doubts. I have some doubts, but I put that in here because we are in executive session.

Senator LAUSCHE. A lot of us are laboring under the belief when West New Guinea was taken from the Netherlands, East New Guinea will be taken from the Australians.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, on that point let me say we would apply the ANZUS Treaty to the responsibilities of Australia and New Zealand, no question about it.

If anybody should make a pass at East New Guinea you would have a wholly different situation than they had when they were agitating for West New Guinea which was a part of the Dutch East Indies at the time when the Indonesians were claiming the entire matter as a free Indonesia.

It has nothing to do with East New Guinea and I can assure you those two questions are just as different as night from day.

SOLVING THE U.N.'S FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, if this bond issue goes through and these bonds are sold, $150 million or whatever it is, if it is on a matching basis, whatever the amount is, is that going to pull the United Nations out of its financial difficulties?

Secretary RUSK. I think it will if we can go ahead and get this Congo thing settled. As far as the Congo is concerned that is a major problem for the United Nations at the present time.

I don't believe that the United Nations will ever be out of financial difficulties in one way or another.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, the point is, I don't want to take too much time because there are others who have questions here. Are we going to be faced in about 2 years from now with another U.N. bond issue that we will have to subscribe to?

Of course, I subscribe very strongly to the idea of loaning them $2 or $3 million for a period of time and get out of this bond fiasco and try to put them on a responsible business basis, but that didn't seem to meet with the approval of my colleagues.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think we will have as far as one can see into the future some difficulty and complex financial problems involving the United Nations. I personally would very much hope, and it is our intention, not to go down this trail of sucessive bond issues to finance the going operations of the United Nations.

The U.N. Assembly itself registered its view that this should not be a precedent. This had happened once before in the United Nations—the U.N. loan for the U.N. headquarters. There are two instances where loans were used, each one specifically designated as not being a precedent, but now the weight is against this procedure.

U.N. HEADQUARTERS LOAN

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As a matter of fact, I had something to do with that original U.N. loan for the building of the headquarters.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. About as fully as you can put in on a business basis it was put on a business basis.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The United States advanced most of the money, the land was provided in one way or another, we have got a mortgage on the thing, and because they are being snubbed up to the Manger they are paying off. I mean it is a business proposition and they are meeting their obligations there with some reasonable currency, I guess.

They are about current, I guess, I don't know the amount, but so far as precedents are concerned, these things are bound to be precedent. We can declare that it is no precedent, and we do it very often, but they all become precedents just cumulatively, it is the natural operation.

So far as the U.N. history is concerned we have been called upon repeatedly to bail them out. They get into trouble and come to Uncle Sam and we do this, that and other things and the delinquent members enjoy the luxury of sitting back and just being delinquent so often.

I wish some device or some compulsion or some coercion method could be developed so that these people who want to dance have to understand they have to pay the fiddler. They have to pay their share of the obligation if they want to be considered in the class of countries mature enough to hold a membership in this organization.

But we let these fragmented countries, I don't mean we, I mean the United Nations lets these fragmented countries like Urundi and Uganda and now we are going to take in some of these little islands in the Caribbean and all that sort of stuff. Our financial troubles, I think, are just going to increase in complexity.

MOVE TOWARD FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I would certainly agree that we have to move toward increasing financial responsibility among the total membership of the United Nations.

However, I remember once when I was occupying the chair that Harlan Cleveland is now sitting in, a delinquent member came to Mr. Trygve Lie, then the Secretary General, and offered him $5 because the $5 would tip him from the 2-year delinquency just inside of it.

Trygve Lie simply refused. He said, "Yes go back and get me some real money, we have to have a real contribution."

We just have to work toward financial responsibility.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Meanwhile I get back to the very idea: I understand so-called national pride and all those things that these people want. I also know people who live in big houses way beyond their means, and are on the verge of bankruptcy all the time to keep up a front. But I suppose it will happen this year that a lot of those countries will spend more on two or three cocktail parties and receptions than the entire assessments for their delinquencies. It is rather revolting. They like to put on a big show like the big countries, too, but those costs are tremendous.

I mean there are ways and means if they want to live within their means, if they want to meet their obligations there are ways and means they can do it. I don't know whether we have the coercive mechanism to make them do it. I understand those difficulties.

Secretary RUSK. Our proposal was to the Secretary General that they have a reception at the beginning of each Assembly in which every delegation is host to every other delegation and get that business out of the way.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It would be a godsend and you would be contributing a great deal to the human progress if you could get that done, because I still recall with great revulsion one party that one of these small African countries threw on the Starlight Roof of the Waldorf Astoria. They had 1,500 people there, they served them food and drink galore. If you can get the Starlight Roof and feed people and give them booze and everything else for less than $20 a head, I will put in with you—that was $30,000 right there and I think their whole assessment was $28,000 and they were delinquent.

But I mean, those things get a country boy, who used to think 10 cents worth of beefsteak years ago was about enough to feed a family for lunch, a little bit disturbed on some occasions.

I think if we used the big stick a little bit more often—it is a difficult situation.

[Discussion off the record.]

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I have a little bit of a problem. I knew the Senate was very busy today and I anticipated this would be a rather short discussion but I have an appointment at noon. Senator Allott is going to be with the delegation and we will be meeting with him regularly and I don't know whether he has any questions and then Senator Lausche.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am sorry.

Secretary RUSK. I apologize to the chairman of the committee.

Senator SPARKMAN. We will be through in a few minutes.

BERLIN AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Senator LAUSCHE. I am getting increasingly alarmed about what our position will be with the General Assembly if and when we might be compelled to bring the Berlin or the Cuban or some other situation to the U.N. General Assembly, and that is the large number of countries that are in it. While they have shown some favor to us, it seems that they lean to the other side.

What will our position be if the Berlin situation is brought before the General Assembly for a vote, and they take the position adverse to our firm position on Berlin?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, on that, let me say two or three things. The first is that the North Atlantic Community, which is deeply involved in Berlin, does have a network of special relationships reaching into all parts of the world.

We ourselves have our allies, the British have their Commonwealth, the French have their French-speaking colonies with whom they are in close touch. I don't believe we can get a Berlin decision out of the United Nations adverse to us.

But there is something more running across that. There is an issue of war and peace, and on this issue each country that decides what its attitude is going to be has got to put into balance its full relationships with the United States. This is the issue on which we

can have no quibbling. We don't put aid strings or anything out of this sort.

Any nation who comes to this issue has got to realize that its total relationships with the United States are engaged. So I am not really concerned about what we are going to do about the Berlin question. They can't do anything else but apply the principles of the charter, and the principles of the charter make it very clear, what the Germans and West Berliners think about it, that the commitments of the charter as applied to the principles of West Berlin are utterly involved with the question of war and peace, so I approach this question with total confidence.

There will be a great deal of maneuvering around by certain ones who will try to find some war around it that looks easy and simple but when you get down to the hard core of the matter I am basically not too deeply concerned.

Senator MORSE. I share that point of view for whatever it is worth based on my experience there. When you come to the question of war and peace you are going to have a 90-percent United Nations vote with the United States.

THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE

Senator LAUSCHE. Just one further question: The Hungarian issue is on the agenda.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, it is.

Senator LAUSCHE. And there has been no understanding reached, as you have already answered me, that in the event Russia votes for Secretary General U Thant that we will not press for a discussion of the——

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, in fact there has been no discussion with the Russians by U Thant at all. There is a possibility, Senator, that with this business called de-Stalinization going on in some way in Hungary, that the Hungarians may try to find a way to cooperate with the United Nations on this issue in some way, but we don't know.

At the moment, it is on the agenda and we don't really know what the significance is of these changes in Hungary.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all I have.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Allott, did you have any questions?

Senator ALLOTT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunitity of being here, as the Secretary has indicated we are going over this all extensively during the week.

Secretary RUSK. I didn't mean to cut you off.

Senator SPARKMAN. I wish you a very happy experience in the United Nations.

Senator MORSE. Senator Allott is not a member of this committee, but I think you should know those of us who have been up there on both sides of the table are at your service.

Senator ALLOTT. I am sure of that.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Both of you, glad to have you.

Secretary RUSK. I will get a note to you.

Senator SPARKMAN. I would like to know what the cash is to be used for. I can understand what the other is.

Secretary RUSK. Perhaps I can get a little statement on those points and have it added to the record.

Senator SPARKMAN. The committee will now recess.

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee stood in recess.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLIC AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:30 p.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (subcommittee chairman), and Senator Sparkman.

Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin (for Inter-American Affairs) briefed the subcommittee on the situation in Cuba.

No record was kept nor transcript taken of the meeting.

SITUATION IN CUBA

[Editor's Note.—In late August 1962, the United States became concerned over large quantities of Soviet personnel and equipment entering Cuba. President Kennedy pledged that the United States would take any action necessary to prevent Cuba from threatening its neighbors. On September 20, by a vote of 86-1, the Senate passed Senate Joint Resolution 230, authorizing the President to prevent Cuba from "extending by force, or threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere." The House passed the resolution on September 26, by a vote of 384-7.

Critics in Congress called for tough measures against Cuba, ranging from a blockade to an invasion, but the administration followed a more cautious policy, observing that the Soviet military buildup appeared limited to defensive weapons. Then on October 22, President Kennedy made a national broadcast to announce that the Government had "unmistakable evidence" of "a series of offensive missile sites" in Cuba. The President ordered a naval quarantine of Cuba, which went into effect on October 24. At first, the Soviet Union responded that any attempt to stop and search its vessels could trigger a nuclear war, but instead it diverted its ships to avoid the U.S. blockade. On October 28, President Kennedy announced that he had accepted Premier Khrushchev's proposal to dismantle Soviet bases and remove offensive missiles from Cuba under U.N. supervision, in return for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba.]

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committees met in joint session, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room 318, Old Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard B. Russell, (chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Morse, Gore, Church, Symington, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson, of the Committee on Foreign Relations; Senators Russell, Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Ervin, Thurmond, Engle, Bartlett, Byrd (West Virginia) Bush, and Beall of the Committtee on Armed Services.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, and Mr. St. Claire of the Staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations; Mr. Wingate, Mr. Darden, Mr. Braswell, and Mr. Nease of the Staff of the Committee on Armed Services.

[This transcript was published in 1962 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks

in context. Page numbers, in brackets, are to the previously published text.]

* * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM P. BUNDY, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND ABRAM CHAYES, LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

* * * * * * *

REAFFIRMING THE COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF HEMISPHERE [P. 32]

It is, I think, also possible in such a resolution to reaffirm soberly our sense of the inter-American commitment to the security of the hemisphere. I would hope, sir, we could do that without, at the moment under the present stage of negotiations, appearing to draw the other members of the hemisphere into precisely detailed actions at this juncture.

We expect about October 2, about 2 weeks' time to have an informal meeting of the foreign ministers of the hemisphere. We do expect to discuss there what further steps can be taken in the hemisphere with respect to the Cuban question.

Now, we do believe that certain of the countries that showed some reluctance at Punta del Este to take the strongest possible line toward Cuba have been showing some movement; the very shipment of Soviet arms to Cuba beginning in July has caused them some deep concern. I say this on the assumption that, Mr. Chairman, this is an executive session and I could be consulted if there were any intent to make the record public.

Chairman RUSSELL. We intend to have this record sanitized and printed. We would hope the State Department would be very frank with us but we intend to authorize you and the Department of Defense to go through it to eliminate any matter that might be detrimental.

Secretary RUSK. I would appreciate that, Mr. Chairman, because we do feel that in Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, there has been some significant movement in recent weeks on this question. We would like to have the opportunity to work with them further between now and October 2, and indeed for a period after October 2, without in a sense scaring them away at this moment or making the possibility of their governments moving with the rest of the hemisphere more difficult because of the resistances that might be built up domestically in their country before we can get their governments to move on the matter.

* * * * * * *

DIPLOMATIC PRESENTATIONS TO NATO AND OAS MEMBERS [P. 38]

Secretary RUSK. We have taken up the question with other governments in NATO. We have made a very strong case on the security aspects of the Cuban problem as it affects us and the preoccupation of the American people with this issue and we have asked

them to consider urgently what steps they can take with respect to their ships, flagships, in the Cuban trade.

Also I think it is correct to say we have been very strongly supported in those efforts by the known concern of the public opinion here and the Congress with respect to NATO flagships. I suspect the very fact they have accepted the preoccupation of the American people with this issue has greatly reinforced and helped our diplomatic effort.

The principal difficulty about this is that, so far as we can learn, practically no ships are chartered for the Cuba trade. They are chartered on a bare bottom, long-term basis, maybe some of them running as far as 5 years, to, say, the Soviet Union. If these ships, for some reason, were to be drawn out of the Cuba trade but remained chartered to the Soviet Union, then the Soviet bloc would divert its shipping into the Cuba trade and use these chartered ships for intra-bloc shipping so this is immediately involved with the problem of almost a total economic break with the Soviet bloc and Western Europe.

Now, there we get into another type of problem, and that is that in connection with the Berlin issue we have laid elaborate plans in NATO for the imposition of economic measures at a very early stage of the harassment of our position in Berlin, which would, at a certain stage, amount to a total break of this sort with the Soviet bloc. Since July, since these shipments to Cuba have greatly stepped up the problem and the concern about it, this question has not been directly related yet to the contingency planning with respect to Berlin.

But even so, and I will have to delete this from the record at some stage later, the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, has just informed us that they are moving immediately to stop whatever ships they can stop under existing law, and are considering asking the Bundestag for additional legislation to stop further flagships, German flag ships, in the Cuban trade.

We know that the British and the Norwegians are reviewing this urgently at the present time. You perhaps saw the press report that an Italian ship did not sail today because its crew would not take it into the Cuban trade.

SHIPS INVOLVED IN CUBAN TRADE

In other words, this idea is making some headway. I would add, however, two things which are not fully helpful, but help to this extent: We have not yet been able to determine that any NATO flagship is involved in arms and munitions of war so far as Cuba is concerned; and second, we have not found any American-owned ships under Liberian or Panamanian charter engaged in the Cuban trade. In other words, we are trying to close in on this from every direction.

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean in the Cuban trade or carrying arms and ammunition?

Secretary RUSK. No, in the Cuban trade, American-owned ships under the Liberian flag.

Chairman RUSSELL. I had read in the press where ships both under Panamanian and Liberian registry had gone into the Cuban trade.

Secretary RUSK. We inquired into that some time ago and our best information now is there is no American-owned ship under Liberian or Panamanian flag engaged in that trade.

I might also inform the committees we are now making a detailed examination of the actual ships and the actual lines that have ships in the Cuban trade so we would know exactly who they are and how they relate to general free world trade and what measure might be available short of formal government action in those cases where the governments are unable or unwilling to take action against them.

* * * * * * *

STIFFENING LATIN AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD CUBA [P. 40]

Secretary RUSK. There has been some change in opinion which was the trend followed at Punta del Este. Of course, the attitude of the Argentine Government is significant with the overthrow of Frondizi. We just heard this morning that General [Amaury] Kruel has just been named minister of war in Brazil in the caretaker government there to last until the plebiscite next spring, and he is well known as a staunch anti-Communist, pro-American, pro-Western Hemisphere individual. We feel that is an encouraging sign. We also know that Mexico is much more concerned about this than she was in January of this year, for example. So we are hopeful there that some movement, some further movement, can in fact be reported and some further action be taken.

QUALITY OF INFORMATION ABOUT CUBA

Chairman RUSSELL. What do you think about the quality of the information we have about what is really taking place inside Cuba? We have been deceived in that area before; we were before the invasion. I just wondered if we have improved our means of getting information in Cuba on which we could risk the security of this country.

Secretary RUSK. I think that this varies somewhat with the type of information. In connection with such things as missile sites, for example, the ground-to-air, anti-aircraft missiles, in that we do have very firm information indeed, and of a most reliable sort.

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean as to the nature and the capacity of the sites?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, I think we have very good information on that. I am not at liberty to indicate exactly how, but I am myself fully confident we have very good information on that, sir.

In terms of political information, we do need to get more than we do. We get a good deal from the refugees who continue to come out. We get a good deal from the diplomatic missions of those countries that still have embassies in Havana, who have been very cooperative in passing on information that they get, that is for the most part. There are certain ones that don't, such as the Swiss, who are handling our affairs there and have to be very careful about that.

We do not have as much information as we should like about the political attitudes and the effect upon the Cuban people of the stringencies which they have been facing to an increasing degree in the last several months.

Actually, agent-type of intelligence is difficult. The apparatus of control is pretty persuasive there, so there are types of information which we need to find ways to improve, if possible. But on a strictly military side, I think we have quite firm information on the specific elements of armaments that are going in there.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't like to get in too deeply in this because I realize it is a sensitive area.

SOVIET SPECIALISTS IN CUBA

On what do you base your conclusions that there are more agricultural specialists than missile specialists from Russia to Cuba? That struck me, I read somewhere or we heard, that there were more agricultural specialists than military specialists. I just wondered on what base you reached that conclusion?

Secretary RUSK. I believe, sir, there recently has been—was a statement in the Tass statement. I think the figures on specialists, Mr. Bundy, did you have the latest figures on that?

Mr. BUNDY. The figures, Senator, are that approximately 1,700 Soviet military people came in late July and early August and another 1,000 since then. That is about 2,700, pretty clearly identified and counted at least as to order of magnitude. Prior to that influx there were about 500 military technicians. Economic specialists were considered by the intelligence people to be several thousand in number. My own guess at this point—I haven't checked the point in the last 2 or 3 days—would be probably 50–50 at this point between economic and military people.

Chairman RUSSELL. How can we determine what he is doing, Mr. Bundy? We get such scanty information over there. How can we tell whether he is teaching them to build a power line or whether he is teaching them to engage a radar set so as to fire missiles against the United States?

Mr. BUNDY. I don't think we can be sure of that, Senator. I am afraid I will have to put on my old hat—I used to be in CIA—but you can tell a good deal about the nature of the people they associate them with, whether you see them in association with the military, but I am sure it is not an exact demarcation.

* * * * * * *

CAN THE UNITED STATES ASSIST OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE? [P. 51]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I merely use the example of Guatemala. Suppose the Guatemalan Government said officially, "Look, we think we are about to be put upon here. Would you send some ships down here to help us out?"

Secretary RUSK. I think we have gone somewhat beyond that, Senator, because we have undertaken active cooperation with all of these governments, with the possible exception of Mexico, on just

the kind of surveillance and preparations that you are now talking about.

For example, there was a report, and this will have to be taken off the record, that there was a ship leaving Cuba for one of these Caribbean countries. We had the most intimate cooperation with the country involved and prepared to take whatever action was necessary to catch it, seize it. Whether the report was inaccurate or whether they heard about the preparations and, therefore, called it off, I don't know. The ship didn't in fact turn up as we had expected, but we had the total cooperation of the government concerned in that and we had no question about the rights.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

SITUATION IN THE CARIBBEAN [P. 63]

Secretary RUSK. Senator, on the first part of your question, your comment about the effect of the worldwide confrontation with the Soviet bloc, I can comment briefly on that. I did comment on that before you came in.

Senator HUMPHREY. I will read the record.

Secretary RUSK. But I will comment on that further later on this afternoon. There are a number of things that are being done to try to encourage people inside Cuba. How much I cannot say. I would like to get some advice on it.

UTILIZATION OF CUBAN EXILES

The various refugee groups at the moment are not able, because of a disagreement with each other rather than agreeing on a single unified consistent effort, to get all of their activities coordinated. There are some that I think we have very close relations with; others we do not have as close relations with

Some of these refugees, of course, are being offered places in our own Armed Forces where they can play a very useful role in some stage. Others have been picked up by some of the other Caribbean countries.

* * * * * * *

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: From the Committee on Armed Services: Senators Russell (presiding), Thurmond, Engle, Bush, and Beall.

From the Committee on Foreign Relations: Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Church, and Aiken

Senator RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

Senator Bush?

Senator BUSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, has our government made any request of the Soviet Government for a demand or warning of the Soviet Government that they should discontinue this military buildup in Cuba?

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM P. BUNDY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND ABRAM CHAYES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we know that the Soviet Government fully understands the attitude of the U.S. Government on this matter. This has been conveyed to them in a variety of ways. But we have not formally presented them with a note or formally proposed any discussion or negotiation on that subject. The reason for that is that we believe very strongly the Soviet Government would attempt, if we opened up the question on that basis, to link this with other situations in other parts of the world as a matter of organic discussion; they would attempt to link it with our own allies, with the situation in Turkey, for example. In their Tass statement they attempted to draw some connection between Cuba and a considerable number of arrangements which we have with other countries.

We feel it is very important for us to maintain the view that this is a special problem in this hemisphere and is not to be tied for purposes of discussion, negotiation, possible deals, with situations in other parts of the world.

* * * * * * *

PUBLIC INFORMATION ON EXTENT OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO CUBA [P. 65]

Secretary RUSK. The President has included information on this in his statements and has included that if the situation changes we will make further information available. We are working on a more detailed statement of the sort that might, under the right circumstances, be used as sort of a white paper or more extensive information over a period of time.

* * * * * * *

DOES UNITED STATES HAVE RIGHT TO RESTORE CUBA TO A GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE [P. 68]

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. The question was asked you this morning about our sources of information. My recollection is that you said we did have sources of information that you think are absolutely reliable; isn't that right?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. And the information the President has given to the country has been based upon information obtained from those sources?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. And now I have heard and seen in the press different statements about the number of missile bases and things of that kind. I do not believe that has been made public, has it, by the President?

Secretary RUSK. Has the actual number been made public?

Mr. BUNDY. I think not.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I do not think it has.

Mr. BUNDY. It has been revealed to both of these committees and to the House committees.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Yes I know that. But the point I am trying to make is, I am not trying to get numbers on the record. There may be reasons why it might be not good to have it, and there may be reasons why it may be good to have it there.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. But the estimate that has been made, and the information that has been given various committees of Congress by the President and by the military and by the CIA and by you, the Department of State, all of that has been based upon this information from these reliable sources?

Secretary RUSK. Which is on those subjects and can be exceedingly accurate.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. There are other questions of judgment.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I am not asking you about those, but I am just asking about the accuracy, for instance, of the number of missile bases.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. The number of torpedo boats.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. And things of that kind in which you have a definite count; isn't that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Now, I said this morning I hoped there would be some testimony by the military. The two of you are at the table together, and you can certainly give this, and that is with reference to those missile sites. I have heard the statement made, over the radio last night, for instance that these sites could be readily converted into IRBM sites or sites for long distance—I count the IRBM as long-distance, I am not talking about the ICBM—long distance missiles.

I want to ask you is that true or not?

* * * * * * *

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I know that in the briefing at the While House at which the President and the Secretary of State and the Deputy Director of the CIA all joined in the briefing, I remember distinctly or I have the distinct impression in my mind that these sites could not be usable in their present shape nor readily convertible for land-to-land use missiles.

Mr. BUNDY. That is my understanding, Senator, and I would like to check that.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. And it would take considerable effort either to convert them or to build new ones, and it would be such effort as could be easily discovered and learned of through the same sources of information.

Secretary RUSK. The configuration of the sites, or a very typical configuration for a particular type missile or missiles themselves, certain ones of them were easily identified.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Is the range of these missiles a matter of secrecy or has that been made public?

Mr. BUNDY. No, that has been made public in the President's statement, Senator.

* * * * * * *

SUPPORT OF STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION BY DEFENSE DEPARTMENT [P. 73]

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Bundy, do you have any statement you desire to make on this matter?

Mr. BUNDY. No, sir. I came purely to respond to any questions the committees might have on matters of a military nature, the military situation. The Department of Defense fully supports the statement Secretary Rusk has made, and the position he has presented.

Senator BUSH. I have one question, Mr. Bundy.

Chairman RUSSELL. YES.

Senator BUSH. Mr. Bundy, you were in the CIA for many years, I know. Do you feel that these estimates we have about the number of men and the amount of military equipment and all that is going in there, has gone in there, is based on hard intelligence that is absolutely reliable?

Mr. BUNDY. I have not been behind all of this, Senator, but I am certainly prepared to take the rating of the professionals whom I got to know as individuals, and this is a high level intelligence. I have not the precise report on which these figures were constructed. A good deal of it, of course, comes in through the refugees, Senator, and has to be sifted by those who know who is a good informant and those who are not, and I assume that to be done by a very competent professional man.

Senator BUSH. I do not want to ask an inappropriate question, but I want to know about how we get this information. Do we have hard intelligence that was generated over there by our own people?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, on that question this varies with the category of information.

On the question of the nose count of Soviet bloc personnel, we get that from a variety of sources, but we do find a consistency that points, I think, quite reliably to the figures we are talking about.

On certain other kinds of information, the missile sites or the motor torpedo boats, we have information of the highest possible reliability.

Senator BUSH. Thank you.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Let me ask this question, Mr. Bundy.

Mr. Bundy, with reference to those sites, you have had an estimate of the situation from our own defense forces, and they know pretty well the degree of the task that it would be if they were called upon to knock them out, have you not?

Mr. BUNDY. Yes, sir. We would not in the normal course of events fail to keep completely up-to-date contingency plans based on and revised more or less constantly as information of this sort becomes available.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I remember General [Curtis] LeMay, Chief of the Air Force, stating that there would be no difficulty in knocking out those missile sites.

Mr. BUNDY. That is correct, Senator. This particular missile has a mean range; that is, a range below which it is ineffective, a range of 2,500 feet altitude, and below that you can go in the back and they cannot do anything to you.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I remember hearing General LeMay say it would be a rather easy thing to knock them out, knock them all out. Of course, those are things I do not know that the public should know, but I do feel that it is always reassuring to know that our people are on the alert regarding those things and do keep their plans ready and are sizing up the situation.

Senator BUSH. May I ask one more question? If you want this answer off the record, you think it should be answered off the record, you may answer it off the record. Do we know of any movement by the Cuban refugees to organize an attempted invasion of Cuba that is going on at the present time?

Secretary RUSK. There are various groups, Senator, undertaking various tasks pointing in that direction. But I would not be able to say today that there is a large group of refugees preparing to take on this job on a scale which would insure its success by Cuban efforts alone. In other words, if this reaches an effort where military action is required, I think it would involve necessarily U.S. Armed Forces.

Senator BUSH. I think the President said in his statement last week we would encourage such activity, is that not so?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we want to encourage Cubans, both inside and outside of Cuba—and outside Cuba in this country and outside Cuba in other countries—as well as everybody else in this hemisphere, to keep concentrating on the problem of the liberation of Cuba.

* * * * * * *

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

SITUATION IN CUBA (MARK-UP) [1]

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committees met in joint session, pursuant to recess, at 10:35 a.m., in room 318, Old Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard B. Russell (chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Gore, Long of Louisiana, Church, Symington, Dodd, Hickenlooper, and Aiken of the Committee on Foreign Relations; Senators Russell, Byrd of Virginia, Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Ervin, Thurmond, Engle, Bartlett, Byrd of West Virginia, Saltonstall, Smith of Maine, Bush, Goldwater, and Case of New Jersey of the Committee on Armed Services.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt and Mr. St. Claire of the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations; Mr. Wingate and Mr. Darden of the staff of the Committee on Armed Services.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will now go into executive session. Members of the committee, since we had the hearing here on the day before yesterday, there have been a number of conferences held as to the proper procedure in dealing with the several resolutions that are before us. Some of them were Senate resolutions expressing the sense of the Senate. Others were concurrent resolutions expressing the sense of the Congress. This matter has been discussed with two or three of the ranking members on each side.

Unfortunately, due to the limitation of time and the large number of members involved it was impossible to discuss it with all of the members of both committees. But you have before you as a starting point for our deliberations a draft of a proposed joint resolution that has been prepared for our consideration.

This draft contemplates the reporting of an original joint resolution from the two committees meeting jointly rather than amending one of the several resolutions referred to in the committee. We hope by presenting a clean text of whatever the committees agreed upon, to limit the discussion and controversy to a minimum.

With very few changes, the first whereas—as a matter of fact, all of the whereas clauses, are the same as in the so-called Mansfield resolution.

[1] See Appendice E.

Now, the resolving clause is different. We struck out references to the President and to the sense of the Congress and the determination of the Congress.

If you will note we confined it to the simple language that the United States is determined. Then we proceed with the objectives that are in part taken from the original Mansfield resolution but were greatly modified, and shortened.

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

We added, "aggressive" to the words "or subversive activities" on lines 6 and 7 of page 2. The subversive idea was not suggested in the original resolution.

We were concerned about the stating of Guantanamo and passage of the Panama Canal and space explorations and other specific areas that we would prevent any action by Cuba or any force stationed on Cuba for fear there might be some hair-splitting on the part of our enemies that would get us in a bad light before the world, and decided to leave that out and just rely on the simple words that we would prevent in Cuba the creation or use of a military capability endangering the security of the United States without going into all the details.

Senator AIKEN. You would confine that to the United States, Dick, what about Panama?

Chairman RUSSELL. We took care of that first in (a), did you read (a), George, "to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere by force or the threat of force," that is where we undertook to deal with this. Panama and everywhere else.

Senator AIKEN. You covered everybody.

Chairman RUSSELL. Panama and Nicaragua and all of the Spanish-American and Portuguese-American countries.

I had some doubts, very frankly about sub-title (c), but those with whom I discussed the matter thought that we should have it in there, and it certainly can't hurt anything, so sub-title (c) commits us to our determination to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for turning to self-determination.

AS SIMPLE AND DIRECT AS POSSIBLE

Now, very frankly we tried to get this as simple and as direct as possible, where it could not be capable of any misunderstanding. We endeavored to eliminate any line or language that could generate any hair-splitting arguments as to whether it was constitutional or not, or whether we were undertaking to delegate a power we couldn't delegate or recognizing a power in the executive branch that didn't exist or one in the legislative that should be in the executive.

So we eliminate all that language that could possibly be the cause of debate as to the constitutional objections.

Now, when the matter was brought up that we had eliminated the reference in the Mansfield resolution to the President—now supporting the President in its determination—it seemed we were

eliminating him from the picture. When we determined to make it a joint resolution that would go to the President for signature and would, therefore, unify the legislative and executive branches of the government, of course, the President could make such statement as he saw fit at the time that he signed the joint resolution.

We have done the best we could with this in the time at our disposal. We have gone over it very carefully. It is not—we lay no claim to perfection and we will be glad to hear any suggestions from any member of the committees about the resolution.

MARXIST-LENINIST REGIME

Senator BUSH. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Indeed.

Senator BUSH. On page 2, in line 5 of the resolution you use the terms, "Marxist-Leninist regime."

Is there some special reasons for changing that from the "Castro regime" to the "Marxist-Leninist regime?"

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator BUSH. Why don't you use the words "Communist regime"? I am curious as to it.

Chairman RUSSELL. It is quoted from the Punta del Este Treaty, as you will observe in the third whereas. I would be less than frank, too, if I didn't say an effort to coordinate this matter with the House and they are marking up a resolution this morning, we also had some communications with their committee on this.

OFFENSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY

Senator BUSH. My second question was, on line 10 of the resolution, where you speak of, "(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported offensive military capability."

Why do we necessarily use the word "offensive"? What we want to prevent is the creation or use of an externally supported military capability.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, very frankly, it would have to be "offensive" to endanger our security and except for amending the resolution I would have no objection to it. I think the language is rather strange.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Although I didn't have anything to do with the formulation of this language, may I just comment for discussion on that.

We quite consistenly and broadly over the world aid other countries in maintaining a military capability.

Senator BUSH. Not one endangering the security of the United States.

Chairman RUSSELL. I see what he is driving at and I think the reason is completely sound and I am glad; that is the virtue of having a member of the Foreign Relations Committee here.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We have not taken a position against a number of countries that have secured some arms from the Iron Curtain bloc for their own internal security and that is a military capability.

On the other hand, the danger comes when an internal military capability gets to the point where it can be instantly converted

only by the simple method of saying, "It is offensive," from a defensive to an offensive capability. It is a hard line to draw.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, of course, I had assured the reason we had confirmed ourselves to the offensive business was that since the repeal of the Platt amendment referred to the other day, we have no real right to dictate to the Cubans what they have on their own in Cuba.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. And the maintenance of a defensive force is a right of sovereignty.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think it would say the same thing if that word "offensive" were taken out of there, because it would say, "the use of an externally supported offensive military capability endangering the security of the United States."

Senator BUSH. That is the point.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I don't see that the offensive is necessary in there.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't think it is necessary. I think we have overdone this business of seeking to placate and curry the favor of our brethren to the south of us, but don't you think that in our position with the other Latin American countries we ought to leave that word "offensive" in there?

I don't see it would do any harm.

Senator SYMINGTON.

AMERICAN MISSILES IN TURKEY

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, following Senator Hickenlooper's thought, we do already have units drawn very close to Russia that are in no sense defensive, completely offensive. Take the fighter wings we have at Adana, Turkey. It seems to me that the emphasis that is being placed on the word "offensive" is overemphasized. It could get into a question of semantics. We were thinking yesterday about the Bomarc which has a range of 400 miles, and its development was stopped. I think Senator Bush's point is well taken. I think that if you say endangering the security of the United States, you might get out of a semantic disagreement where they were claiming defensive and we were claiming it was offensive.

I think if you run that phrase through endangering the security of the United States, I would be for taking the word "offensive" out unless there is something I don't know about.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. I want to be sure this is included in the executive record.

Chairman RUSSELL. This is an executive record—what we say here this morning.

Senator JACKSON. All right.

SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE

It would seem to me what we are trying to do here, if I understand our mission, is to speak as well as we can with one voice and in unequivocal terms to the Sino-Soviet bloc that we mean business.

I think what is needed is, namely, to have a basis for future action. We do not want to tell them how we are going to do it or what we are going to do. But I think our document ought to be couched in certain idealistic language that makes it possible for the government at a given time to make the finding under the terms of this resolution and to take the action.

I think we are in a stronger position if the "offensive" language is in there because the government can make the finding.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, if you will excuse me for a minute, the thing that has disturbed me about the words "offsensive" is: what is defensive and what if offensive?

Senator JACKSON. I know, but that is the kind of phrase we want.

Senator SYMINGTON. The phrase "endangering the security of the United States."

Senator JACKSON. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, Senator, if this is a joint resolution it is a law, and it is a more vigorous and solemn declaration than a concurrent resolution. It has more weight and force and effect. It has not particularly enforceable provisions except that it does give authority under law, which is what a joint resolution is, a law for a specific purpose.

Senator JACKSON. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In my view, this is a question of individual views. In my view there is offensive military capability already in Cuba. I don't go along with the idea that this is all defensive there.

Senator JACKSON. This is my point, that we can make the finding.

EXPORTING SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The point is, there is room for disagreement as to whether it is offensive or defensive. I think it is offensive because I think they have the capability of exporting subversive surreptitious operations in the Caribbean area with guns and equipment and all kinds of things like that, even though they don't have any rockets that will reach the United States supposedly at the moment. But that is a matter of disagreement, of individual opinion. I think it is offensive. I think its capabilities are offensive within a limited degree down there.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, would the Senator yield for a question there?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Isn't it clear that endangering the security of the United States, if it does that as a matter of fact, it has already reached offensive capability, hasn't it?

Chairman RUSSELL. It is embraced with that.

Senator STENNIS. It is superfluous.

Chairman RUSSELL. Personally, I have no objection to taking the word "offensive" out. It is in the original Mansfield resolution.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Let me ask Scoop a question.

Scoop, I wasn't sure you wanted to have the word "offensive" stay in or be taken out.

REAFFIRM HISTORIC POLICY

Senator JACKSON. What we are trying to do is to send a signal, if I may put it that way, to the Soviets that we are not going to tolerate certain situations, and we reaffirm historic policy.

And this is the primary mission, because, let's face it, you can't deal with this problem by merely talking about the geographical situation in Cuba. This is not what is involved. The real issue at stake is a manifestation of our intentions, and our intentions have to be made clear that we are not going to permit the Soviets or the Sino-Soviet bloc, because the Chinese are in there, too, to use Cuba as a part of an over-all scheme and device to gradually take over the world.

I mean, this is what is at stake, and more than anything else is a clear unequivocal statement of our intentions that we are not going to let them take over piece by piece or that we are going to be bullied or we are going to be blackmailed. Now, it is that simple, and I think that our language that we use here has to be pretty clear in that regard.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you think, Scoop, that "offensive" is implicit——

Senator BUSH. Mr. Chairman, would you mind using these things? I can't hear very well. I would like very much to hear every word of this.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was asking, and I don't think this thing is turned on, if the offensive danger is not implicit, in "endangering the security of the United States" because if it were not implicit, endangering the security of the United States it would not be——

CUBA AS A THREAT TO U.S. SECURITY

Senator JACKSON. I thought the key language here is in "endangering the security of the United States."

As a matter of fact, the more I think about it, it would be pretty hard actually to establish on an offensive basis that Cuba is a real threat to the security of the United States, because in the missile age distance is not the test. I mean Moscow is just as close to New York as Cuba if you reason this thing through logically with strategic weapons.

So that is not really what we are trying to get at, it seems to me, if we premise it solely on that, I think sub-section (a) above is a critical part of this language and I am a little disturbed there, Mr. Chairman, if I may tie these two together, that we do limit the exportation of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine in Cuba to actual use of force to disseminate it or the threat of force, and I am wondering if we wouldn't want to maybe broaden that a little bit not to tie it just to the threat of force.

As I read it, "to present by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere by force or threat of force."

If they do this without the force or threat of force, then it doesn't come within the purview of the resolution, and I think this is a mistake.

Senator AIKEN. Cut the last six or seven words off, leave off the words, "by force or threat of force."

Senator JACKSON. That is right. Because what you are getting at is this over-all threat, and frankly, arms are not the main threat as I see it, if you look at this coldly at the moment, to the security of the United States.

It is what is contained in subsection (a), Mr. Chairman, I think, that is pretty crucial.

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course, my own personal view is it would be much more likely to invoke section (a) a long time before we get to section (b), the two are interlinked because our security is threatened every time they take over another country.

Senator JACKSON. I don't think they are going to do us the favor of making possible the invocation of subsection (b), they don't have to.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I see very little difference in the use of the word "offensive," I mean very little difference in whether it is there or whether it is out. I do make this suggestion, though, before we definitely agree to take it out, we ought to have a chance, and Pat is calling right now, to check with the House Foreign Affairs Committee because, remember, all of this has been worked out in correlation with that committee and I think we ought to go along and keep the two together.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Mansfield.

SINCE 1958

Senator MANSFIELD. I would like for the committee to consider in the last whereas striking "since 1958" because I think it could have an unfortunate connotation, and either deleting "since 1958" entirely or substituting for 1958 "in recent years."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that would be more accurate.

Senator GOLDWATER. I was going to suggest that but I think if we struck "since 1958," and "increasingly", and state "Whereas the international Communist movement has extended into Cuba."

Senator MANSFIELD. That would be all right. I wouldn't want to have an unfair connotation applied to this date.

Senator GOLDWATER. I think so for the same reason. If they both came out it would, I think, express the sentiment because this isn't something new, it has been going on for years.

Chairman RUSSELL. They want to take "increasingly" out. Of course, it is a little surplus, but that is what it is.

Senator STENNIS. It is increasing.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. It has been a steady growth.

Chairman RUSSELL. That shows the reason why we are passing the resolution, I can't see "since 1958" and I have no objection to taking that out, but it has been increasing.

If it hadn't been, there is no reason for us sitting around this table here resoluting on it.

Senator CASE (New Jersey). Mr. Chairman.

Senator AIKEN. "Increasingly" covers it all.

Senator GOLDWATER. It doesn't read as well when you take the date certain out and have "increasingly" in, but I am not going to argue the point.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, if they call the House, I believe we have almost unanimously agreed on striking out "offensive" and might reflect that sentiment of the entire two committees if they are going to take it out.

THREAT TO ALL LATIN AMERICA

Senator CASE (New Jersey). Mr. Chairman, may a very new man say one word on this?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. I only raise this now because if the House is being called I myself think Scoop has a very good point, and couldn't we include the query as to their willingness to take out "by force or threat of force" as well as the word "offensive."

Senator JACKSON. Yes. The threat of Cuba is a threat to all of Latin America. It is not the military threat to the United States and it is a threat to our situation in Vietnam and Berlin and so on. But I think that in subsection (a) we ought to just knock out "by force or threat of force." This gives us greater latitude and it puts them in a state of great uncertainty. This is what you want to do. We want to keep them guessing.

Senator BUSH. That language that you seek to strike is implicit in line 4 of the same paragraph.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Thurmond?

Senator JACKSON. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say I agree with Senator Jackson in taking out "by force or threat of force."

RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE

It is more flexible and more comprehensive and I am certainly in favor of taking out the word "offensive" and while I am speaking, I might say that Senator Miller feels very deeply about one whereas in his resolution which I would like to call to the attention of the committees on his behalf.

On page 2 of his resolution, if we can have copies of it before you.

Senator GOLDWATER. Read it, Strom.

Senator THURMOND. It reads this way, and this would follow the first whereas in the proposed resolution which is, "Whereas, President James Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, declared that the United States would consider any attempt on the part of European powers 'to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety'; and" and he would come in with this last whereas and say, "Whereas the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, enunciated by President James Monroe in his annual message of December 2, 1823, are an expression of the inherent right of the self-defense of the United States."

Senator Miller feels that it is important for us to include here that the Monroe Doctrine is an inherent right of self-defense. He thinks that would get around some points that would be raised in the United Nations on this particular question.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Senator Miller talked to me about that. The right of inherent self-defense is mentioned in this document already. It is in the second whereas already before you.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think it is redundant when we are trying to boil it down to as few words as possible.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It says "each one of the said contracting countries undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercising of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense," that is in the second whereas already.

Chairman RUSSELL. We worked hours here to get words out of this.

Senator THURMOND. I think it probably covers it, but on the other hand, I promised it to him.

SOMETHING WE CAN'T CONTROL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I just suggest, Mr. Chairman, for your thinking here, if you strike out "by force or threat of force" of that paragraph (a) from a standpoint of practicality, aren't we setting up something we either can't control or would have great difficulty in controlling? If you strike that out, then we would be committed under this resolution to support the vigorous action.

For instance, the exchange student groups who go into Latin America with the consent of the Latin American countries and there are all kinds of businessmen going in and out and all this sort of stuff. I think that you broaden to the extent that we might have a rather futile area there that we would be committed to either do something about or not do something about.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Bourke, that is exactly the line of thinking that is going through my mind. I was just wondering, it says to prevent by whatever means may be necessary and I was just wondering what would be the means——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We are all right.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN [continuing]. Of meeting subversion.

Senator JACKSON. That is not the point, though, John. The point is, sure, we will use whatever means necessary, including the use of force of arms, provided that the Marxist-Leninist Doctrine in Cuba is exported by force or the threat of force. Now, if they don't do it by force or threat of force, then we do nothing about it under this.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If you take out by force or threat of force we are committed to do something about it.

Senator JACKSON. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But we are already doing it now.

Senator AIKEN. Sure.

WATERING DOWN THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Senator JACKSON. We don't see by whatever means are necessary we would go to the use of arms. Supposing they knock over two or three countries, would we allow this to go on? I just raise the question. This is what you are getting at because otherwise you are watering down the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine doesn't say you have to use—a European power, we are opposed to the extending of the European system to the Western Hemisphere and the

Monroe Doctrine did not condition that policy on the force or the use of force.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I think that the taking out of the "by force or use of force" broadens the scope of this thing and probably strengthens it, but all I am raising is the question for your thinking, what are we getting into?

Now, we already have combative psychological and publicity forces and all that sort of stuff working in these Latin American countries combating the subversive activity in the universities, in the businesses and labor unions and all that sort of stuff——

Senator JACKSON. I will tell you, Bourke, it seems to me what we are trying to do or trying to say, if I understand it, is that we will not permit the extension of the Marxist-Leninist system to the Western Hemisphere.

This is why we are meeting here today because it was extended in Cuba, and I think that is the sole issue. I realize that it creates some problems but on the other hand, I think we have to decide that question first and it is not going to be—if it is extended into the Western Hemisphere, gentlemen, it is going to be extended not necessarily by force or the threat of force.

Senator HUMPHREY. Isn't the point that Scoop or Bourke is making is that efforts already are being made, isn't that your point?

INTERNAL SUBVERSION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The point is how wide are you going to extend the scope of the mandatory scope of this operation here.

Suppose through internal agitation, maybe stimulated by Cuban agitators, maybe stimulated by others, an internal coup occurs in which a Communist operation occurs or Communist control takes over. What do we do about that? This resolution says that if it is done by force or threat of force then we move. If we take out "force or threat of force" aren't we committed to move as a Nation if there is an internal coup?

Senator HUMPHREY. But by whatever means may be necessary.

Chairman RUSSELL. They might hold an election. They might run in Costa Rica on, "I am a disciple of Castro, Marx, and Lenin," and he got himself elected there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You see that happened in Guatemala. Exactly what happened in Guatemala. They had an internal coup there.

Senator HUMPHREY. We took whatever means were necessary.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We did.

Senator JACKSON. Covertly.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. It is going to be a lot tougher next time. I don't think this would have arisen if we hadn't inserted those words "or subversive activities." The original resolution read "from extending its aggressive activities to any part of this hemisphere."

We added "or by subversive activities."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not opposed to opposing subversive activities. That is not the point. We have got to meet that situa-

tion, but here we are writing a joint resolution and it is a declaration that has considerable force.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, may I throw out a suggestion for what it may be worth?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall.

PRINCIPAL MENACE IN THE FUTURE

Senator SALTONSTALL. We used the words in the last whereas "from extending the international Communist movement as extended into Cuba its political economic and military sphere of influence." Why not repeat those words down in this (a), we would leave out the words "its aggressive or subversive activities" and leave out the words "by force or threat of force," and put in this "from including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending its political, economic and military sphere of influence to any part of this hemisphere" and then in (b) we put in the military side, but in there we leave out the words "aggressive or subversive," and put in the words, the same words we use up in our last whereas clause, which would, it seems to me, eliminate some of the difficulties that we have been discussing as to the meaning of "aggressive or subversive" and when we might have to take some action if we leave out the words "by force or threat of force." I think that might cover it.

Senator GOLDWATER. Will the Senator yield?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Yes.

Senator GOLDWATER. If you do that you have the word "economic" and suppose Cuba is trying to expand its trade. We would then have to stop the shipping.

Chairman RUSSELL. This is a very practical reason why I would have to oppose that, is that the House is very insistent on this "subversive activities" going in here.

Otherwise, they would take our resolution and——

Senator SALTONSTALL. I just throw it out.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't think we should eliminate "subversive activities" anyhow. I think it is going to be the principal menace for the next immediate future.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, there is one thing we have left out, and I think it may be quite fundamental. This resolution would have no application if the Soviets directly intervened without the aid of Castro in the Western Hemisphere.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, you have your Monroe Doctrine.

CONFINED TO CUBA

Senator JACKSON. That is in the whereas, but we have limited it here, we have confined it. It says to prevent, by whatever means may be necessary including arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending its aggressive or subversive activity to any part of the Western Hemisphere.

Chairman RUSSELL. Isn't it taken care of by your Rio Treaty and the Punta del Este agreement? I thought it was specifically spelled out in those if the Soviets themselves moved militarily against any country we would all collectively in the Americas would oppose it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You have the Rio Treaty and the Compact of Mutual Defense to take care of that.

Senator JACKSON. My point which I want to make is that I believe the treaties refer only to military actions. You are saying to foreign powers that the treaties refer only to military action, yet you are saying to Castro if it is subversive we will apply it. This would imply, therefore, that the Russians or the Chinese, if they engage in these activities short of military action, would not come within the provisions of the resolution.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I believe if you leave the word "subversive" in, that it is essential to leave "by force or threat of force" in. If you take "subversive" out, then I think you could take out "by force or threat of force." I think it turns on whether or not you are determined to leave the word "subversive" in. Because if you get into this prevention of subversive activities short of the use of force or threat of force then you get into a mare's nest of difficulty. If you leave the word "subversive" in then they must do the subversive act by force or threat of force before this particular document, or the mandate in this document is called up.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Senator JACKSON. Why shouldn't we say after "Cuba" though, it is not just Cuba doing this but what if it is done by the Chinese or by the Soviets? It is international communism that we are concerned with.

Senator HUMPHREY. If you said the Marxist-Leninist system which was the Punta del Este type of commitment you would be somewhat in line with that.

Senator JACKSON. I think you can't just limit it to Cuba. You have all your whereases and you are predicating it on the various treaties and the Monroe Doctrine and then you come down to the resolving part and say if Cuba does it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But, Scoop, this is a resolution directed at the menace that now exists with Cuba as its focal point. This is directed at Cuban activities. I think it is a specialized resolution, not generalized and I think if the Chinese or the Communists attempt to do this we have inter-defense treaties and we have a lot of other things that can take care of it.

Senator HUMPHREY. Bourke, the language "to prevent" is a very direct and inclusive term, and that language was related to prevent extending its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of the hemisphere by force or threat of force.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is exactly why I say if you leave the word "subversive" in there you have to leave in the words "force or threat of force" I believe.

If you take the word "subversive" out, then you rely on the word "aggressive" which would cover almost everything.

Senator AIKEN. That would cover almost everything.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If the House is adamant——

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't think they are. But they said now they were able to get only a small group of the House members, but personally, I think something ought to be said about subversion

in this thing. I think there is more danger from subversion than there is from direct attack.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is. But I believe if you leave "subversion" in there——

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I thoroughly agree with you.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I agree with Bourke Hickenlooper, I think he is right. I think the wording that we have there in (a), that is with reference to subversion, coupled with the force or threat of force, I think that is the best wording we can get and we ought to leave it that way.

A PLAN OF SUBJUGATION

Senator STENNIS. May I ask a question there? That word "subversion" is what we seem to think is the most probable thing that will happen in these other countries.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. That is right.

Senator STENNIS. We have to leave it in there. Couldn't we add something to those words "by force or threat of force," add to them some additional wording here that would apply to subversive activities?

Senator AIKEN. Or other means?

Senator STENNIS. That would apply just to subversive activities alone. When we say if they were acting by force or threat of force or a plan of subjugation, internal subversion, that "subversion" couldn't be used a second time. Couldn't we just add something and cover subversion activity of a pronounced type?

It wouldn't say a political party or say a university, didn't we do that in the Dominican Republic last year?

Chairman RUSSELL. Do what?

Senator STENNIS. We virtually intervened almost with our own Navy.

Chairman RUSSELL. We did it by threat of force but it wasn't against the Communists in that instance.

Senator STENNIS. But, I mean, there was a serious threat that there might be a regime of that kind come into being, wasn't there?

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Yes, and it was force and the threat of force that was pushing it.

Senator STENNIS. We did.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. And so did they.

Senator STENNIS. I don't know to what extent they used force.

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course, I am not too sure but what subversion and reflecting on it, would not be implied in the word "aggressive" that precedes it there.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, may I comment to this point?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Dodd wanted to ask a question.

THE RAMIFICATIONS OF SUBVERSION

Senator DODD. I didn't follow Senator Hickenlooper's reason as to why you had to take out "subversion."

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. He didn't say take it out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I said if you leave "subversion" in, then I think it would be necessary to leave the words "by force or threat

of force," otherwise we would be committed in this particular document if some Communist haranguers and agitators went into any country down there. We then would be caught in a mare's nest of complicated political activity.

Chairman RUSSELL. We should send the FBI down.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We are doing a lot of things down there now.

Senator DODD. Aren't you putting a strict construction on the word "subversion" when you put it that way?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, I am only thinking of the ramifications of subversion, that is all.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman. I just want to say this for what it is worth. As I understand what you are trying to do is to prevent the extension of the Marxist-Leninist regime into these other countries, whether it is by force or threat of force makes no difference.

As I see what you are trying to do is exactly what Senator Jackson has suggested here. To eliminate "by force or threat of force," it seems to me you accomplish exactly what you want.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I have some——

Chairman RUSSELL. I am sorry, gentlemen, I promised Senator Church to be recognized.

LEGITIMATE SELF-DETERMINATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Senator CHURCH. I just want to speak up in behalf of the position taken by Senator Hickenlooper. I think "subversive activities" needs to stay in because that is the most likely character of the threat but I think if it does stay in then "by force or threat of force" needs to stay in too, and I say this for two reasons.

First, I think there is an implication in the term "subversion" of the use of force or the threat of force in one form or another. Second, I think if you strike "by force or threat of force" from this statement, then you run a serious danger of putting the Congress on record in favor of a statement that might be widely construed as placing the United States against legitimate self-determination.

I don't think that communism ordinarily gains power by legitimate self-determination; in fact, I can't think of a single instance where this has been the process.

Nevertheless, if you strike "by force or threat of force" from this statement you place the Government of the United States in the position where many other countries will say we have taken a position against the right of legitimate self-determination in South America and I wouldn't want to put the Government in that position.

I think that is a weakening position for us to be put in and unnecessary for the purposes and objectives of this resolution.

GOING BEYOND THE RIO TREATY

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I have some language on (a) I would like to mention.

Chairman RUSSELL. Beg pardon?

Senator JACKSON. I have some language on subsection (a).

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well, let's clear up on what we have practically agreed on here.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I say just one other word about (a). This is, as it is written, clearly in line with international law, and within the scope of the Rio Treaty.

I feel that if we leave the words "subversive activities" in there and take out "force or threat of force" we are going beyond the Rio Treaty and we are setting it up as unilateral action which might obligate us to intervene for some purpose that is not agreed to in the treaties that we have with the Latin American countries.

Chairman RUSSELL. In other words, some South American neighbors will say we have gone back to gunboat diplomacy.

First, is there any objection to eliminating the word "offensive" on line 10 of page 2? If there is none that word will be eliminated.

AGAINST DETERMINING A STARTING POINT

Is there any objection to striking in the last whereas after the word "whereas" "since 1958" and inserting "in recent years."

Senator GOLDWATER. Why do you want to put in "in recent years"?

Why don't you start off with "the international Communist conspiracy."

Chairman RUSSELL. Only because Senator Mansfield said that.

Senator BARTLETT. Why insert anything in lieu of "1958"?

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, we will just eliminate "since 1958".

Senator BUSH. I think that is the main point.

Senator AIKEN. We don't have to determine the starting point there.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Right.

STRIKE "UNANIMOUSLY"

Chairman RUSSELL. The first whereas on page 2, the word "unanimously" in the second line of that whereas is erroneous and was inadvertently inserted and that will have to come out.

Senator BUSH. That is line 4 on that page?

Chairman RUSSELL. That is right. Line 4 on page 2.

Senator HUMPHREY. Reading "January, 1962 declared."

Chairman RUSSELL. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. There were some abstentions.

Senator GOLDWATER. What was the vote on that, 12 to 6?

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Everybody except Cuba.

Chairman RUSSELL. No.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think there were a couple of abstentions, two or three.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Two or three abstentions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mexico. I think Brazil but I am not sure. He will find out. We are prepared to proceed to anything that requires a motion on something which is evidently something on which we are not in agreement.

Senator Jackson.

WHATEVER MEANS NECESSARY

Senator JACKSON. Subsection (a), strike out "whatever means" on line 4, including "may be necessary", and insert the following so it will read as follows: "to prevent by all appropriate means including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere" and then strike the balance of this sentence.

Senator SALTONSTALL. How would it read then?

Senator JACKSON. So it would read as follows, "so as to prevent by all appropriate means, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere."

Isn't this what you are really doing? That is what you are doing. What we are saying is if they are going to send out agents of Cuba and so on, this is what the President said in his message, if you will check it, that we won't allow it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I still submit if you leave the word "subversive" in there you are getting into a mare's nest of trouble because of the subversive activities that may go into a country on a political basis and then are we up against at least a partial mandate to go in there and intervene in the international political affairs of that country which would strike at our own treaties?

Senator JACKSON. Not necessarily, let's be specific. Supposing we get information that the Cubans are sending a boatload of agents into Guatemala, this would cover it.

AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course, they are sending them in one at a time now and two at a time and three at a time. In all these countries there is a constant traffic between Cuba and these countries they are trying to subvert. They are trying to organize groups, they are especially active in Recife, Brazil, and other places, they are attempting to be active in Venezuela and they are attempting to be active in Ecuador and Bolivia and to a lesser degree in some of the other countries. That activity is going on all the time. Now, we know it, what are we going to do about it? Are we going to prevent that and they go in twos and threes at a time as merchants or travelers or this, that and the other?

I don't care which way you go on that thing so far as I am concerned, except if you leave "subversive" in then I think you have to put in "by force or threat of force."

If you take "subversive" out then I would just as soon take out "force or threat of force," take that out because then you extend it to the aggressive activities and "aggressive" will cover an awful lot of sin.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am much impressed.

Senator LONG. Doesn't Senator Jackson's proposal meet what you are talking about?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, because he takes out—by including "subversive," and taking out "by force or threat of force" you get into this political mare's nest under subversive activities.

If "subversive" stays in there then it has to be subversive activities by force or threat of force.

Senator LONG. I thought he was striking the subversive part?

Senator JACKSON. No, I am not striking "subversive."

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. He was striking "by force or threat of force."

Senator JACKSON. The language, by the way, I read it to you—let me read it to you again.

Senator LONG. Read it the way you would have it read.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Let me read it again, "to prevent by all appropriate means including" it doesn't mean we have to use arms "including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending its aggressive or subversive activities into any part of this hemisphere."

Senator STENNIS. Yes, it will.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. You don't mean to say that every incident has to be covered or resorted to or justified out, but this is a determination to do it by appropriate means in cases we think that are serious enough.

Senator JACKSON. This is precisely right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think you are saying the opposite, every case of subversive activity will have to be handled.

GIVING THE PRESIDENT BROAD DISCRETION

Senator JACKSON. Let me make my statement and I won't say any more.

This gives the President broad discretion. It is directed at Cuba. This doesn't mean you have to intervene in every country. If you look at the language, this particular subsection (a) only applies to agents that emanate from Cuba. Let's get that clear. That is all we are talking about. We are not talking about a regime that is overthrown in a given country. This is limited to activities on the part of Cuba. I am trying to find the language.

Senator THURMOND. International Communist conspiracy will cover it.

Senator HUMPHREY. What do you do in a situation like in Ecuador where the Cuban Embassy is itself the center of a subversive activity and yet the Ecuadorean Government is recognizing the Cuban Government and the agents operating in Ecuador are officially recognized and accepted members of the Cuban Embassy. The Ecuadorean Government told us, "We are watching it," and they told us they were watching it and trying to control it.

It is one point to do what Senator Jackson says about intercepting, for example, agents coming out of Cuba, going to Guatemala or going to Nicaragua or to Honduras or any country, really intercepting a boatload of them, saying "Absolutely not, you are not going and get back."

On the other hand, when we have an embassy which we know is the case where the host government recognizes the Cuban regime officially gives it recognition, and yet that embassy is the center of propaganda and subversive activities, and this regrettably is the case in country after country. I wish we could stop it, and I think we ought to say something in here that indicates our activities as a determination to stop it but how you do it by making it so com-

plete. When you say here we are going to prevent it, you don't say you are going to resist it, you are saying that you are going to prevent it and there is a great deal of difference between resisting it or attempting to stop it than there is to say to prevent it.

Senator JACKSON. Well, I get back to my basic point here, it is a limitation of conduct that we will tolerate on the part of the regime in Cuba, and I am trying to find the President's statement. I think he indicated that he would not allow Cuba to be a base to export subversion throughout Latin America. There is a misunderstanding, I am not suggesting that this language require us to intervene in every country in South America. It is directed at the conduct and the activities going on in Cuba against the rest of the Western Hemisphere.

Senator ERVIN. Mr. Chairman, if I may say a word.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Ervin.

AN UNFORTUNATE WORD

Senator ERVIN. I hate to disagree with my good friend Henry Jackson. But I think if you cut out the words "by force or the threat of force" you would have a resolution that would be susceptible of interpretation that we are against persuasion. This word "aggressive" is one of these unfortunate words in the English language that has a good connotation as well as a bad one.

If a person is very energetic he is aggressive, and certainly we have no right to prevent any person, by use of aggressive persuasion, to convert people to communism.

He has that right and if we cut out these words "the use of force or threat of force" I think we would be having a resolution that would be susceptible of interpretation that we intend to prevent any great activity or any great devotion to persuasion, and I think we would be playing into the hands of our enemies rather than doing good.

Chairman RUSSELL. You couldn't do it in the first place.

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I make a remark?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I always regret to oppose anything that Mr. Jackson, whom I respect, advocates. It seems to me we want to remember this. We have headed this resolution, "the United States is determined."

Now, that means every citizen in the United States and what we want to do is to get in here language, something that every citizen can very simply understand, and the language that is written under (a), the way we have it now, with force and threat of force and aggressive or subversive activities, the average American citizen can understand much better than he can by the words "all appropriate means" and I personally hope that we will leave the language as we have it at the present time rather than to put in the suggestion of Mr. Jackson. I would, if it is in order, Mr. Chairman, move that we for further discussion—not to stop discussion, but to bring something before us—I move we report the resolution as we have it now drafted.

Senator BUSH. Mr. Chairman.

Senator JACKSON. I would like to add one word about this "by all appropriate means." That word "appropriate" is bandied about so much that the people of this country are very suspicious about it and my folks down there understand "Whatever means may be necessary" better than "by all appropriate means."

Senator Bush.

DIRECTED AT THE SOVIET UNION

Senator BUSH. Mr. Chairman, I will support what has been said by Senator Saltonstall and Senator Hickenlooper and others, Senator Sparkman, regarding the Jackson suggestion. We started out here to get a resolution. Really this is directed at the Soviet Union, that is what it is directed at basically, at least that is what I think most of these resolutions filed were directed at including the Mansfield resolution.

My fear is if we enlarge the scope of this resolution at this time we are taking on an unnecessary responsiblity at this time and possibly liquidating to some extent the force and effect of the main purpose of the resolution which is directed against the military build up in Cuba by the Soviet Union, and I think that is a sufficient reason for our sticking to the language that is before us in this draft.

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long.

TO PREVENT CUBA FROM EXTENDING ITS CONTROL

Senator LONG. I would hope that we could consider drafting subsection (a) like this. "To prevent by any means necessary the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending its control to any part of this hemisphere."

That is what I thought we were thinking about. If we are thinking about getting some government out, we would just put the Marines in there, and whatever might be necessary. They are just not going to take it.

It seems to me that is what we are talking about, and if some fellow finds his government is about to be overthrown he ought to call for American assistance and we ought to be there. And we ought to know what they are doing, we ought to have agents in there just like they have agents. We ought to have agents in Cuba trying to overthrow them just like they are trying to overthrow, but when it gets to where we are about to lose one we ought to be there with our own forces.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If I may suggest when you say be extending its control you shorten the scope of this thing.

Senator LONG. That is what you are talking about, I don't think you want to commit yourself to go to war because they have some saboteurs in there, they have saboteurs and agents.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You don't if you leave it this way. If you leave "subversive" in this way and leave in "by force or threat of force" you have it, you get out of that mare's nest.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't think we can wait until they extend their control, it would be too late.

Senator LONG. You have to move before they extend their control.

Chairman RUSSELL. Last year we did. Wasn't it Honduras that told us they heard there was a boat on the way and we sent the aircraft carriers and enough destroyers down there to whip the whole Russian Navy, to intercept them?

Senator GORE. And we didn't have to have a resolution for the President to do it.

Senator LONG. If you are going to use "by force or threat of force" I hope you put that right behind the word "Cuba" then because frankly when I read this thing I gained the impression of us using force or threat of force rather than them using it. If you put that phrase right behind the word "Cuba" by force or threat of force then you understand who you are talking about using the force.

I read the resolution and at first blush I thought you meant by us using force or threat of force or after the word "extending" but I would like to have it come somewhere toward "Cuba."

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Put it after "extending."

Senator LONG. Put it after "extending."

PERFECTING THE AMENDMENT

Chairman RUSSELL. Well now, gentlemen, as I understand it in committee we apply the rules of the Senate insofar as possible, and under the rules of the Senate, to perfect the original text before voting on a motion that applies to the whole such as made by Senator Saltonstall. Under the rule, there is an amendment that Senator Jackson has proposed which would be the first in order, and are you ready to vote.

Senator DODD. I wanted to ask Senator Jackson if he accepted your suggestion to retain the language "by whatever means necessary."

Senator JACKSON. I have no objection to that.

Senator DODD. Senator Russell had suggested that be kept in.

Chairman RUSSELL. I get tired about this word "appropriate" here. We use it, "by whatever means may be necessary."

Senator JACKSON. I will accept it.

Senator GORE. Before we vote, Mr. Chairman, would you mind the clerk reading subsection (a) as it would read if amended by Senator Jackson?

Senator JACKSON. I will read it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Jackson is perhaps in a little better position to read his amendment.

Senator JACKSON. "To prevent by whatever means necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;".

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, on that amendment may I just say one word?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

LIMITING THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Senator CASE. I do understand the point raised by Senator Hickenlooper and John and Lev, but I think we are in danger, if we don't do something to go beyond force, of a permanent declaration by this Congress which limits the traditional Monroe Doctrine and cuts it down. Now, I am very concerned about it. I would rather say nothing than to do something which suggests any foreign power can come in and subvert any American power and get its influence up to the very peak in this country if it doesn't use force or the threat of force.

I am afraid that says it. I had a different set of language or piece of language for this purpose. I apologize to my senior colleagues for shooting my mouth off here but I think this is so terribly important that we don't, by deliberate action, cut down for all time the scope of the anti-intervention sense of the Monroe Doctrine, and——

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Cliff, will you yield to me before you submit your language? This does not apply to any country outside the Western Hemisphere. In fact, this applies, as Scoop pointed out a while ago, that applies only to Cuba. The Monroe Doctrine stands, and it is the only thing that stands, I presume, so far as other countries are concerned, except, of course, the statements in the Rio Treaty.

LEAVING OUT THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

Senator JACKSON. This is what concerns me and that was the second point, and that is that we have all the whereases going back and referring to our historical policy but then when we get down to resolving we only direct the problem at Cuba, and by implication, we have clearly left out the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Chairman RUSSELL. No, I couldn't agree with that.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I don't agree with that.

Chairman RUSSELL. The first whereas has the Monroe Doctrine if it did not I wouldn't vote for it myself. I thought this was a new doctrine and new policy that we were enunciating to apply to this hemisphere and more specifically to Cuba. There is no limitation on the Monroe Doctrine.

Senator JACKSON. I refer to the whereas; is China a European power?

Senator GOLDWATER. Not yet. [Laughter.]

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. But we would certainly invoke the same——

Senator JACKSON. Russia is.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN [continuing]. Policy as the Monroe Doctrine.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The Inter-American Defense Agreement would come into play by any overt act by China or any other foreign power.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Any foreign power.

Senator JACKSON. No, but the activities going on in the hemisphere involve China and Russia and the Chinese to a very substantial extent.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. But we are dealing today only with Cuba, that is what the resolutions are that are before us.

Senator JACKSON. The problem in Cuba stems from the aid and assistance flowing into Cuba from the Soviet Union and China, and when you get right down to the directive part of this resolution, you only mention Cuba and you, by implication, leave out the Sino-Soviet bloc. In any event, you leave China out.

Senator THURMOND. From the international conspiracy. There is Czechoslovakia.

Senator JACKSON. China is left out clearly.

Senator GOLDWATER. Scoop, I don't think that is correct. We are talking about ideology or philosophy, that is mentioned in the Marxist-Leninist, Communist movement.

Senator JACKSON. Where?

Senator GOLDWATER. All through this. In the second——

Senator JACKSON. Where are you reading from?

Senator GOLDWATER. The first whereas on page 2, it talks about the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Communist powers, extra-continental Communist powers, and then it has in it in the last whereas "Communist movement," the international Communist movement. We are not arguing about China. We are arguing about the Communists in China, Cuba, and Russia.

Chairman RUSSELL. They are based in Cuba.

Senator Case, do you desire to formally state your amendment so it can be before the committee when we vote on the Jackson amendment?

SENATOR CASE'S AMENDMENT

Senator CASE. The amendment I have proposed would be to make section (a) read as follows:

"To prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending its aggression to any part of this hemisphere by force, threat of force or subversive activities."

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't know exactly how we could enforce that.

Senator THURMOND. Its aggression, did you say?

Senator CASE. Aggression.

Senator THURMOND. Does it have to be aggression?

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. No.

Chairman RUSSELL. Aggression or subversive activities.

Senator CASE. I said extending its aggression to any part by force, threat of force or subversive activities.

Senator BUSH. I don't see too much difference.

Senator CASE. I think this is a great difference because you don't limit cases in which you move to those where they use force or the threat of force. You also extend it to subversive activities.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the first amendment that was proposed was that of Senator Jackson. Of course, if that is agreed to, Senator Case, yours would not be in order.

Senator CASE. I accept that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Under the parliamentary rules.

OPPOSITION TO COMMUNISM

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I want to say this on that point. I don't think we ought to limit this to aggression. That is the word the State Department uses, that they oppose Communist aggression. What we oppose is communism, not just Communist aggression. I just want to call your attention to that because it is clear in the statements of the State Department and their actions that they are opposed to Communist aggression.

As I understand what we want to do is to oppose the Marxist-Leninist regime, their ideology, their subversive activities, and emanating from Cuba to these other countries, so I think it would be unfortunate if we adopted the resolution with the word "aggression" in there as he has it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, I am not sure I exactly understand that. I assume we all are opposed to communism, but as a practical matter, if the Communists would elect a President of Mexico tomorrow I don't know whether we ought to immediately convene and declare war on Mexico. But anyhow——

Senator THURMOND. I want to draw that distinction because that is familiar verbiage, I want to call your attention to it, as being used by the State Department. They are opposed to Communist aggression. It is not just Communist aggression that this country opposes.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am opposed to communism in Russia but I am not in favor of us doing anything about it, to go over there and stop it.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, if we stand for anything it is the right of self-determination and if the people in Mexico could freely choose communism, no country ever has, but if it should we wouldn't go to war to overthrow it.

Senator THURMOND. So long as they don't become a part of this international conspiracy of communism the policy of which is to enslave the world and being part of the Western Hemisphere and the Monroe Doctrine would apply.

DEFEAT OF SENATOR JACKSON'S AMENDMENT

Chairman RUSSELL. If there are no further comments, those of you who vote for the amendment of the Senator from Washington will please raise your right hand.

[Showing of hands, five.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Those who oppose it will raise your hands.

[Showing of hands.]

Chairman RUSSELL. The amendment is not agreed to.

Let's see, Senator Long had a suggestion.

TRANSPOSITION OF LANGUAGE

Senator LONG. I would like to suggest along the line of what Senator Bush suggested to modify my proposal that these words "by force or threat of force" be moved up behind the word "extending."

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there any objection to that transposition of language? It makes it a little clearer.

If there is no objection that amendment will be agreed to.

DEFEAT OF SENATOR CASE'S AMENDMENT

Now, Senator Case, do you desire to offer your amendment now?

Senator CASE. If I may.

Chairman RUSSELL. Perhaps you had better read it again so that the clerk may get the language.

Senator CASE. The first part would be unchanged and reads "To prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending" and here the change occurs "its aggression to any part of this hemisphere by force, the threat of force, or subversive activity."

Senator LONG. Extending what?

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Its aggression.

Senator CASE. Extending its aggression.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, you have heard the amendment. Those of you who favor this amendment will raise your right hand.

[Showing of hands, three.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Those who oppose will raise their right hand.

[Showing of hands.]

Chairman RUSSELL. The amendment is clearly not agreed to.

RESTORE SELF-GOVERNMENT TO CUBA

Now, we recur to the motion to report the——

Senator BUSH. Mr. Chairman, just one word. I want to make it awfully clear. Have we already eliminated the word "offensive" in line 10?

Chairman RUSSELL. We have.

Senator BUSH. That is agreed to.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, would you explain this item (c) on page 3 some further?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well now, Senator, I had my doubts about that being necessary, but there was a considerable school of thought which thought it should go in there.

Senator HUMPHREY. Was that on, page 3 you say?

Chairman RUSSELL. Page 3, yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. (c).

Chairman RUSSELL. Particularly some of the members of the House.

I don't see it hurts anything. We are going to do it. It is indefinite as to how we are going to work with them but if the American people were expressing their views on this situation in any respect, I think that they would include the idea that we should undertake to restore self-government to Cuba, that is all it would mean.

Senator STENNIS. I asked for an explanation. It is no implication in any way that this language has no special meaning. It is just——

Chairman RUSSELL. It doesn't mean we are going to launch any invasion of Cuba——

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL [continuing]. Tomorrow, but I hope there is nothing in here anyway that would prevent us from doing something if we knew we could succeed next time.

A SERIOUS THREAT

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, might I offer an amendment here on subsection (b)?

Behind "capability," I would like to offer the word "seriously" because in my judgment this section without that word in here requires the President right now to put our forces in Cuba. Reading the President's statement he says this cannot now be regarded as a serious threat to the security of the United States.

It seems to me that the question is when does this become a serious threat and at that point it seems to me it is his duty to put our forces on Cuba. If you can say threatening, I think it threatens us now.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. It says endangering.

Senator LONG. I say seriously endangering. You think endangering implies seriously?

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Let's don't put it. Let's leave it like it is.

Chairman RUSSELL. Let's don't put it there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is a descriptive word that I don't think adds anything to the word "endangering."

Senator LONG. Let me see if we understand one another then. Are we to understand when you use the word "endangering" you mean seriously threaten, seriously threaten when you say endangering?

Chairman RUSSELL. I think we are going to have to leave this up to the President to interpret it more or less, unless we are going to exercise our war-making power under the constitution.

Senator LONG. It seems to me, if you are saying that any threat to the security of the United States requires us to go in there I think we are voting something that requires him to go in there now.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. It doesn't say threat, it says endangering.

Chairman RUSSELL. It doesn't say threat, it says endangering, where it gets to a certain proportion where it endangers our security.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I make my motion.

Senator LONG. If I interpret what you are saying you are in effect saying not just threatened but seriously threatened.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I think endangering probably implies more than that.

Chairman RUSSELL. It implies it has to be more than just an ordinary military build up but I don't want to stick any word in there that can be used as any excuse for not taking action if action ought to be taken, to be very frank about it.

I think if we added the word "seriously" might do that. Senator Goldwater has a question.

JOINT RESOLUTION HAS THE EFFECT OF LAW

Senator GOLDWATER. Before we vote on the adoption of this I would like to ask one parliamentary question. If we agree on this as a joint resolution, and the House accepts it and the President signs it, is it not in effect law?

Chairman RUSSELL. A joint resolution is supposed to have the effect of law. This is not a commonly used device but I checked with the clerks of the Foreign Relations Committee and there have been other occasions where similar resolutions have been as joint resolutions.

The last one was the one sent up here that never did come before the Congress with respect to disavowing the Yalta Agreement that Mr. [John Foster] Dulles sent up. He sent that up in the form of a joint resolution so we are not without precedent.

Senator GOLDWATER. You think this would be then a better, stronger presentation?

Chairman RUSSELL. Formosa was a joint resolution, of course.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Formosa and Lebanon.

Chairman RUSSELL. It is better, Senator Goldwater, because it shows a unity between the executive branch of the Government and the legislative, and it shows that the President approves of the statement of determination of policy that is expressed in this resolution.

I think it is preferable to have it. The Formosan resolution was a joint resolution, and it——

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I may say, as I understand the position of the executive, it is that while they might prefer a concurrent resolution, they are perfectly willing to have a joint resolution.

Chairman RUSSELL. They prefer a concurrent resolution but I think the President ought to be a party to this.

Senator GOLDWATER. I agree with you.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think he should sign it.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, now there is a question that comes from the House Committee.

The last line on page 2 the word "security" where we say "endangering the security" an amendment has been proposed over there, it has not been adopted, but they are checking with us, to change the word "security" to "vital interests."

Senator AIKEN. Let's leave the sugar out today.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I think we would prefer "security."

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman,——

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gore.

TO ENLIST A WIDER FRONT

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I hesitate to speak since I am late in coming into the deliberations. I seriously doubt the advisability of reporting and passing a resolution, but in the hope of improving this one, I call to your attention page 3 the word "support" seems to me that if you read the sentence without respect to the Organization of American States it would read this way "to work with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people."

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gore, to be perfectly frank with you the State Department wanted this in here because they are conferring with the foreign ministers in an effort to enlist a wider front in this hemisphere against the Communist state in Cuba.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, the question I am raising is not the inclusion of the Organization of American States. I was merely trying to emphasize the importance and I think inadvisability of the word "support." I think "encourage the aspirations of the Cuban people" would be better than to pledge this country to support it.

Senator AIKEN. I don't know what you mean.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Albert, I believe that these words are taken from the President's statement, I don't know. I think they are in his statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. Anyway, the word "support" is stronger than the word "encourage" and I don't want to water this thing down any.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Aiken.

REACTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator AIKEN. I am not objecting to paragraph (c) at all, but I think you have to realize if we adopt this there will be all kinds of speeches made at the United Nations by the Asian and African Arab, Soviet bloc and they will interpret this as a promise on our part as to our manner of equipping the Cuban refugees to overthrow a government which is recognized by the United Nations and has its representation there.

You have to expect it but I think we have to make our decision on what is right rather than what other people are going to say about us.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think in saying that, I have thought for some time our foreign policy was being directed from too many places other than here in Washington.

Senator AIKEN. This will be interpreted as an attempt on the part of the United Nations to overthrow by violence a recognized government.

Chairman RUSSELL. I remember that old minstrel song when I was a boy where the fellow came out and said, "Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me," and having seen Khrushchev going to Hungary and getting away with grinding the poor freedom fighters under the iron flanges of the tanks and apparently he has not lost any great face in the world anywhere.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. He had us all pinned down. I am not too particular myself about what all these people think.

UNITY IN THE LATIN AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, so far as this subsection (c) is concerned, I don't care whether it is in there or out of there, but its verbiage as it now reads, I think, is designed to emphasize the importance of getting unity in the Latin American Republics——

Chairman RUSSELL. Exactly.

Senator HICKENLOOPER [continuing]. Behind us in any movement which we took toward Cuba.

I don't think it hurts anything. Maybe it helps a little bit, I don't think it is vital.

Chairman RUSSELL. If it is necessary to take military action don't you think it would be helpful if we had a company from four or five southern hemisphere states?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If we want to recognize a Cuban Government in exile we have to have 15, 16 Latin American countries behind us, and we get that if we take in the Organization of American States. If we act unilaterally, I am afraid there will be a pulling away that might otherwise not occur, I don't know.

INADVISABLE TO SUPPORT A REVOLUTION IN CUBA

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, if the purpose of subsection (c) is as Senator Hickenlooper has described it, I would agree with it. But I submit it goes much further then that. If indeed the resolution has the force and effect of law, then under this, by law we would be pledged to support such freedom-loving Cubans as may aspire to return to self-determination, maybe we need to support them through the CIA, but I think it would be quite inadvisable before the world for the Congress to pass a resolution having the forces and effect of law pledging the people of this country and our Government to support such Cubans as may want to organize a revolution or a return to Cuba.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't think that denies us the right of electing or force us to follow a very foolish course.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me read a statement made by the President. It is not in the exact words here but here is what he said.

> Our friends in NATO must realize the implications of their ships engaging in the Cuban trade. We shall continue to work with Cuban refugee leaders who are dedicated as we are to that nation's future return to freedom.

It seems to me to have the same sense.

Senator Gore. Well, "working with" is quite different from support.

Senator SALTONSTALL. But this, Albert, is to work with the Organization of American States.

Senator GORE. Oh, yes, I am not complaining about that.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. It is not to support the Cubans but to work with the Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people to a return to their freedom.

Chairman RUSSELL. I point out when you get into this area, it is impossible to definitely define. If you remember the Formosa resolution we debated for 3 or 4 days about what was meant by to include "the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands." We debated for 2 or 3 days and nobody ever told us exactly what it was and we don't know yet. Whether it includes Quemoy and Matsu, just like we had difficulty—nobody will know it unless there is an attack.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. In the Middle East resolution we had trouble for a couple of days finding out what the Middle East was.

Chairman RUSSELL. It took 2 days to find out.

PROTECTING THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Senator JACKSON. I hesitate to go back to (a) but what would be wrong at line 6 right after "Cuba" "or any other Marxist-Leninist country."

Senator ERVIN. The thing wrong about it is this is dealing with this hemisphere instead of the whole world.

Senator JACKSON. No. Well, it is protecting the Western Hemisphere from intrusion on the part of other countries.

Senator GOLDWATER. If you go back to the first page, Scoop, the very first sentence expressing the determination of the United States with respect to the situation in Cuba.

Senator JACKSON. I just want to make it clear we do a lot of whereasing but we never get it down to resolving on the question of the Sino-Soviet bloc. I think it leaves a dangerous implication that implication we don't resolve; we resolve against a little country of Cuba but we fail to resolve against either China or the Soviet Union, and I say that for the record, and I think that is a clear implication from this resolution.

Chairman RUSSELL. They are certainly included in the international Communist movement and it is aimed at that.

A GOVERNMENT OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING

Senator BUSH. Mr. Chairman, I would like to, if I may, direct the committee's attention to the last language on page 3 where it speaks of the aspirations of the Cuban people for a return to self-determination. Now, I think that is very fuzzy language and I think what it means to say is we want to support the aspirations of the Cuban people toward the adoption of a form of government of their own choosing.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, the right or self-determination has been the fundamental and underlying basis of American foreign policy ever since the revolution when we fought to get it for ourselves and that is embraced within it. Self-determination, if that doesn't mean a government of their own choosing, I don't know what it could mean. Self-determination means that they——

Senator BUSH. It doesn't say government. I just think it improves the language to talk about government if you are talking about government. This just says return to self-determination.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, we could get away from Batista by simply saying we support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination and then they don't have to bring Batista into it at all.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Say that again?

Chairman RUSSELL. I think that is all right.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Say that again, George?

Senator AIKEN. "With freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination."

Senator BUSH. Toward a government.

Senator AIKEN. I can tell you now Guinea and New Guinea and the Ukraine won't like it.

Senator BUSH. I think everybody who knows anything will see what we are shooting at.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there any objection to eliminating "a return to"?

Senator HUMPHREY. I think it is a very good amendment.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I think it is a very good amendment and let me offer again——

Chairman RUSSELL. Let's get rid of this one first.

Is there any objection to this amendment proposed by Senator Aiken?

The Chair hears none.

The Senator from Tennessee.

REJECTION OF SENATOR BUSH'S AMENDMENT

Senator BUSH. Has my amendment been discarded?

Chairman RUSSELL. I didn't know you offered one.

Senator AIKEN. I offered an amendment to get away from the word "self-determination" and speak of a return to a government of their own choosing or speak of the adoption of a government of their own choosing, that is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, if that is not implicit in self-determination I don't know what on earth it is. But we will submit the amendment. Those of you who favor the amendment proposed by the distinguished Senator from Connecticut will say "Aye."

[Chorus of "Aye."]

Chairman RUSSELL. Opposed?

[Chorus of "no."]

Chairman RUSSELL. The noes appear to have it. The noes have it, and the amendment is rejected.

SUPPORT OR SUSTAIN

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I suggest for consideration of the committee another word to use instead of "support." It seems to me "support" has the connotation of activity about it. How would "sustain" be, "to sustain the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination."

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, you may offer that. Personnally, I don't want to weaken this. I like "support" better.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I am not so sure but what "sustain" is a heavier word than "support." When it comes to activity, support you just lend a little aid, sustain you hold up.

Senator GORE. I want to sustain it. I want to sustain it.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is what we are all doing. I think——

Senator AIKEN. Easier said than done.

Senator GORE. I want to keep it alive and encourage it.

Chairman RUSSELL. We recur to the motion of the Senator from Massachusetts that the two committees might jointly report this resolution favorably to the Senate so it may be considered under the instructions of the Senate tomorrow.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Do you think we should have a roll call or not?

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman—go ahead, tomorrow.

Senator DODD. I was going to ask a parliamentary question, if one votes for the resolution will one be barred from or will Senator Jackson be barred from, amending it?

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course it is customary for a man to reserve the right to offer an amendment. At least in Armed Services we prefer to do it, so we know what to expect, but it doesn't bar you.

Senator DODD. I don't know what Senator Jackson's plans are.

FINAL VERSION OF THE RESOLUTION

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, could the (a), (b) and (c) points be read as finally determined?

Mr. HOLT. (a) To prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending by force or the threat of force its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere.

(b) To prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and

(c) To work with the Organization of American States and the freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspiration of Cuban people for self-determination.

Chairman RUSSELL. If there are no further questions, we will call the roll starting with the Committee on Armed Services, first alphabetically on it because it happens to be first alphabetically.

Mr. WINGATE. Byrd of Virginia.

Chairman RUSSELL. He asked me to vote for it.

Senator DODD. When does one vote on this?

Chairman RUSSELL. All right. It is just a little informal, convenient to the rest of the members of the committee, Senator. It is not necessary.

Senator Byrd asked me to vote him for the resolution.

Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I vote aye. If Senator Jackson or Senator Case should rephrase or offer their resolution, as an amendment, I would want to reserve the right to consider that.

Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Aye.

Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Jackson?

Senator JACKSON. Aye, with the reservation I may offer an amendment along the lines discussed.

Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Ervin?

Senator ERVIN. Aye.

Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. I vote aye with the same reservation expressed by Senator Jackson and Senator Stennis.

Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Engle?

Senator ENGLE. Aye.

Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Bartlett?

Senator BARTLETT. Aye.

Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Cannon?

Mr. Byrd of West Virginia?

Senator BYRD (West Virginia). Aye.

Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Aye..

Mr. WINGATE. Mrs. Smith?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Aye. I have her proxy.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Case?
Senator CASE of New Jersey. Aye, with that same reservation of Senator Stennis.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Bush?
Senator BUSH. Aye.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Beall?
Mr. Goldwater?
Senator GOLDWATER. Aye.
Senator SALTONSTALL. I think Mr. Beall would like to have me vote for it although I don't specifically have his proxy. He votes aye.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Goldwater?
Senator GOLDWATER. Aye.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Chairman Russell?
Chairman RUSSELL. Aye.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Sparkman?
Senator SPARKMAN. Aye.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Humphrey?
Senator HUMPHREY. Aye. With the reservation relating to the Jackson type of proposal.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Mansfield.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Aye, voting his proxy.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Morse?
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Aye, voting his proxy.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Gore?
Senator GORE. Aye.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Lausche?
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Aye, voting his proxy.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Church?
Senator CHURCH. Aye.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Symington?
Mr. Dodd?
Senator DODD. Aye, with the same reservation expressed by Senators Stennis, Jackson and Humphrey.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Wiley?
Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that there are two or three that have never given proxies or have not been recorded.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have proxies for everybody except Wiley.
Chairman RUSSELL. I think I shall take the liberty of voting Senator Cannon in favor of this resolution, he may have a reservation but I know he would support it. So I will so vote him.
Senator GORE. What about his suggestion that all absent members be contacted?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would like the privilege of contacting Senator Wiley to see how he wants to vote on it.
Chairman RUSSELL. Certainly, there is no objection for any Senator to be recorded until the time the resolution is taken up by the Senate tomorrow.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Hickenlooper?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Aiken?
Senator AIKEN. Aye.

Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Capehart?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye, by proxy.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Carlson?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye, by proxy.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Williams of Delaware?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye, by proxy.
Mr. WINGATE. Mr. Fulbright?
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Aye, by proxy.
Mr. WINGATE. The vote is 31 to nothing with the right to reserve and three absentees.
Chairman RUSSELL. If there is no objection it will be reported by Senator Sparkman.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I suggest we ask permission of the Senate until midnight to report it to have ample time.
Chairman RUSSELL. We are having a copy of the hearings printed as cleaned and sanitized, including a number of documents, President Monroe's message to Congress and others.
Senator STENNIS. May we thank and commend the men who worked on this resolution which had something very desirable here before its passage.
[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered an executive session at 11:45 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman), and Senators Humphrey, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

On motion by Senator Humphrey, and by unanimous consent, the committee approved for report the nominations of Llewellyn E. Thompson, to be Ambassador at Large; Dr. Leona Baumgartner, to be Assistant Administrator for Human Rights and Social Development and Hollis B. Chenery, to be Assistant Administrator for Program Review and Coordination, both of the Agency for International Development; and W. Walton Butterworth, to be Ambassador to Canada.

The bill (S. 3679) To authorize an appropriation to enable the United States to extend an invitation to the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations to hold the world food congress in the United States in 1963 was amended in minor degree and ordered reported, without objection.

The bill (S. 3459) To authorize the appointment of one additional Assistant Secretary of State was ordered reported without objection.

The nomination of John M. Leddy, to the United States Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, was approved for report unanimously, after the waiving of the 6-day rule on nominations.

The nomination of William C. Doherty, to be Ambassador to Jamaica, was passed over.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The meeting then adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in informal executive session at 9 a.m., in room F–53, the Capitol.

Present: Senator Lausche (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Dodd and Hickenlooper.

The meeting was with the Vice President of the Legislative Council of West New Guinea, and some members of the council.

No record was kept or transcript taken at the session.

BERLIN RESOLUTION (MARK-UP) [1]

[Editor's Note.--Following the Berlin crisis of 1961, negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western allies over the status of that divided city proceeded slowly. In August 1962, the Soviet Union again stirred the issue by abolishing the office of commandant of Soviet troops in East Berlin, in preparation for turning command over to East Germany. The situation in Berlin became further inflamed when East German border guards shot civilians fleeing across the Berlin Wall to West Berlin, and harassed Western air and ground traffic to West Berlin.

The Kennedy administration reiterated its intentions of defending allied rights in West Berlin at all costs. Congress responded with House Concurrent Resolution 570, authorizing the President to use "whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms." The House passed the resolution on October 5, by a vote of 311-0, and the Senate adopted it by voice vote on October 10.]

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. John Sparkman presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Lausche, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. The committee will take up for consideration House Concurrent Resolution 570 and Senate Concurrent Resolution 97. Let the record show that the committee met and Senator Morse entered a motion to report out——

Senator MORSE. Report out the Javits-Morse resolution, as amended by the House.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senate Concurrent Resolution 97, as amended to conform with the language of the amendment.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Chairman, in each of your folders you have Senate Concurrent Resolution 97, which is the Javits-Morse resolution, and on the second page are shown the only changes made by the House in it. So, in effect, you would be reporting out the House resolution with those changes.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is right.

BERLIN IS NOT NEGOTIABLE

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the urgency of this? First of all, has the administration expressed to you that they want——

[1] See Appendix F.

Senator MORSE. No more than they did in regard to the Cuban resolution. It is parallel to the Cuban resolution.

As I said on the floor the other day, what you have to watch out for is the charge that Berlin is negotiable in regard to the Cuban situation, and I think we ought to take a stand for the protection of freedom in Berlin as much as in Cuba, and all this does is just advisory to the President. All this does is say that we are back of the protection of freedom in Berlin just as in Cuba.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am going to read this:

"Whereas the primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations is and has been to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all,"

"Whereas, it is the purpose of the United States to encourage and support the establishment of a free, unified, and democratic Germany,"

"Whereas, in connection with the termination of hostilities in World War II the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union freely entered into binding agreements under which the four powers have the right to remain in Berlin, with the right of ingress and egress, until the conclusion of a final settlement with the Government of Germany," that is factual; there has been no settlement.

Senator MORSE. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. And, "whereas no such final settlement has been concluded by the four powers and the aforementioned agreement continue in force," now then, on that score, how do the Germans answer that, do they claim we made a settlement with West Germany and are, therefore, vulnerable, Carl? At the top of the page——

Mr. Marcy. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. "Now, therefore, be it resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring) that it is the sense of the Congress.

(a) that the continued exercise of United States, British, and French rights in Berlin constitute a fundamental, political and moral obligation," do they have the word "purpose" in the House?

Senator SPARKMAN. No, "obligation." They have the word "obligation."

Senator LAUSCHE. Because it is more than a purpose.

Senator MORSE. We have "obligation."

Senator SPARKMAN. "Obligation" is to conform to the House version. There is a copy of the House resolution in your folder. They have "determination," Carl.

Mr. MARCY. That is right. I beg your pardon, that is an error; that should be "determination."

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. "That the continued exercise of United States, British and French rights in Berlin constitutes a fundamental political and moral determination."

Mr. MARCY. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. "(b) That the United States would regard as intolerable any violation by the Soviet Union directly or through others of those rights in Berlin, including the right of ingress and egree," I agree with that.

"(c) That the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, any violation of those rights by the Soviet Union directly or through others, and to defend the rights and freedom of the people of Berlin."

Do you think we ought to go so far as to——

LANGUAGE OF THE HOUSE BILL

Senator SPARKMAN. Wait. The House bill differs from that a little, "and to fulfill our commitment to the people of Berlin with respect to their resolve for freedom."

Senator MORSE. I want the House language.

Senator LAUSCHE. I have the House language.

Mr. MARCY. I must apologize because it passed the House without amendment, and now checking I discovered that the language which the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported out is not the same as that which is in the resolution before you, House Concurrent Resolution 570 which has been referred to this committee.

Senator MORSE. I want the House language.

Senator SPARKMAN. This is the way the House passed it.

Mr. MARCY. I think you had all better be referring to House Concurrent Resolution 570 as it was referred on October 8, and showing "attest: Ralph R. Roberts, Clerk."

Senator MORSE. "To fulfill our commitment to the people of Berlin with respect to their resolve for freedom," that is what I want.

All my motion is that we modify the Javits-Morse resolution to conform to the House resolution, and pass it.

Senator SPARKMAN. We have to report the House resolution back in order to——

Senator MORSE. We can do that in the Senate.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is in this committee, and we have to put it on the calendar.

Senator MORSE. We can put the Javits-Morse resolution, as amended, on the calendar, and then in the Senate move to substitute the House resolution.

Senator WILLIAMS. Wouldn't it be simpler to just report the House resolution if that is what you want and just be done with it?

Senator SPARKMAN. Can we do that with this in the committee and with it not on the desk? If this were lying on the desk, we could.

Senator MORSE. We do it with bills all the time.

Senator MANSFIELD. You can do it either way.

Senator MORSE. I think you ought to vote out of your committee your own Senate resolution and then substitute it.

Senator SPARKMAN. I would agree.

COMMITMENTS TO BERLIN

Senator LAUSCHE. How did we commit ourselves to the people of Berlin with respect to their resolve for freedom? Is that a commitment made separate and apart from the agreement under which the four powers were occupying——

Senator MORSE. No.

Senator MANSFIELD. Those were commitments made by two Presidents of the United States.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is as I understood it.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is, commitments made from time to time and not as a part of it.

Senator LAUSCHE. So we are dealing with two things: We are affirming we will insist on our rights——

Senator SPARKMAN. Under the Four Power Pack.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

CONGRESS SUPPORTS THE PRESIDENT

Senator MORSE. All we are saying, Frank, is "Mr. President, we want you to know the Congress is behind you." That is all this means.

Senator LAUSCHE. I suppose that unless we agree with the House we will have no resolution at all.

Senator MORSE. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. I do think this man Curtis over there had an improvement on the bill.

Senator MORSE. But you cannot get it now.

Senator LAUSCHE. You see, he says that the Congress regards violation of U.S. rights in Berlin as contrary to its vital interests and supports the President in his determination to prevent—well, I wouldn't put it that way; that is, I am not doing it because the President says it, but I think we ought to insist upon our rights by whatever means necessary, including the use of force. I mean the violation of these rights by the Soviet Union directly or through others.

Senator SPARKMAN. If I were writing it I would put it, one, to support the President in his determination to do these things. But it has already passed the House in this other form, and I would suggest that we keep it.

Senator MORSE. The only way is to get something, anything. I think it is a bad thing to adjourn with nothing on Berlin in connection with our resolution on Cuba.

SUBSTITUTE THE HOUSE RESOLUTION

Senator LONG. If you are going to modify anything at all in the Senate resolution to conform to the House resolution, you need no change in section (c). Section (c) of the Senate resolution was exactly, up until the time that our staff got confused about the matter, the same as the House section (c).

Section (b) was exactly the same, and the only change would be one word in section (a), is the best I can make of it, the word "purpose" to be changed to "determination."

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes; whatever change is made we will ask the staff to make the language of Senate Concurrent Resolution 97 to be identical with the language of House Concurrent Resolution 570.

Senator MORSE. Then when you get to the floor of the Senate you substitute the House resolution.

Senator SPARKMAN. And complete action on that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then, in substance, it would mean——

Senator LONG. You are only changing one word.
Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.
Mr. MARCY. That is right.

PLEDGES BY TRUMAN, EISENHOWER, AND KENNEDY

Senator LAUSCHE. We would insist upon the enjoyment of the rights granted to us under the Four Power Pact, and that we redeclare our purpose to keep our commitment made by the two Presidents to the people of West Berlin, is that about it?

Senator SPARKMAN. I guess it really has been made by three Presidents, because Truman, take the 1949 airlift——

Senator LAUSCHE. Has Kennedy made that statement?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes; you take the airlift itself, the statements made in connection with that were to the effect that we would not leave them alone, and we carried on the airlift, that was during Truman's administration.

Then, of course, during the Eisenhower administration and during the Kennedy administration.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. There really have been three Presidents' statements.

Well, without objection, the motion is agreed to.

USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

Senator LAUSCHE. Let me come back to this resolution, if I may. If somebody says to me, "Aren't you declaring by this resolution that you will use atomic weapons," now, I can answer in two ways, yes, that is our declaration absolutely. Two, we will use atomic weapons, by the language of this resolution, when it is necessary.

Senator MORSE. My answer to you is that we are saying we are backing the President in the use of whatever weapons as Commander in Chief he decides has to be used. That is all we are saying.

Senator LAUSCHE. In my judgment, we do not absolutely declare that when the right is violated that ipso facto we are going to use atomic weapons.

Senator MORSE. That is right. We do not declare it.

Senator LAUSCHE. We do not declare it.

Senator MORSE. We have no right to.

Senator LAUSCHE. This language "by whatever means may be necessary," connotes that we will only use atomic weapons when it becomes necessary.

Senator MORSE. When it becomes necessary.

Senator LAUSCHE. Because I am not going to be in the position to say at the moment these rights are violated, we are going to use atomic bombs.

Senator MORSE. We are not saying that.

Senator LONG. I want to raise something else. I want to raise, before we vote this resolution out——

Senator MORSE. We voted it out.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. You voted out under the Senate title?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.
Senator HUMPHREY. With the House language?

NOT A TRADE OF CUBA FOR BERLIN

Senator LONG. I still want to raise this question, because the whole idea of this resolution is that this is not a trade of Cuba for Berlin. That issue has come up.

My impression has been in the discussions I have heard from people who have been down at the White House and discussed this matter at all that our people feel that at such time as we move on Cuba, assuming that we make that move, and I am not trying to prejudice it one way or the other, but the Soviet Union is not going to sit still. They are going to move somewhere.

Senator LAUSCHE. You are assuming that?

Senator LONG. Yes, that they are likely going to tell you that, either directly or through an intermediary they are going to tell you, "Don't misunderstand. We know you can take Cuba, but there are a lot of things we can take. Berlin is one of them." But a lot of things the committee has been furnished information—but Berlin is the easiest plum for them to take sitting out there for them to grab it.

It seems to me that at such time as we move on Cuba they are likely to just tell us, "Now, whatever force you think is necessary to take Cuba we are going to use an equal amount necessary to take Berlin."

That is just a way of checking it. This resolution puts it on that basis, that we are ready to go to war over Berlin, and if we move on Cuba and they move on Berlin, let us face it, that is what we are voting that we will not accept any solution except victory in Berlin. Where does that put us on Cuba?

STRENGTHENING THE PRESIDENT'S HAND

Senator MORSE. Let us look at it this way. All we are doing here is strengthening the President's hand in this international negotiations, whatever they may be between now and the time Congress reconvenes. All we are saying is, "Mr. President, we are behind you on Berlin as we are behind you on Cuba." That is all this means.

Senator SPARKMAN. I would not equate one with the other.

Senator MORSE. No, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. This is solely Berlin regardless of whether we move on Cuba or not. If they move on Berlin we are going to meet them with whatever force is necessary to carry out our commitments.

Senator LAUSCHE. When you assume we are going to move on Cuba, all of the words of the President have been contrary to that.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am not assuming we are. As a matter of fact, I believe if we can get this OAS moving or keep it moving in the direction that it is moving now, we can put a squeeze on Cuba that they cannot possibly live through.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION

Senator LAUSCHE. As far as I have been able to ascertain, this is the position of the administration:

1. We are going to use the embargo method to the fullest extent possible.

2. We are not going to suffer any overt act against Panama, Guantanamo Bay, any interference with our Canaveral operations, and overt act against citizens of the United States.

Now, that is my understanding.

Senator HUMPHREY. And any overt aggression against any of the neighbors of ours, the Latin Americans.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, overt action.

Senator MORSE. Frank, if you want my opinion, and I have nothing to back it up, but I think I put in the record yesterday Walter Lippmann's column on Cuba, and my hunch is that Walter Lippmann's column on Cuba yesterday set out the administration's policy. I think it is a fine statement, and I just have a hunch that Walter Lippmann presented the policy of this Government as of now. It is a very sound policy and it bears out what you have just said we are going to use the embargo, we are going to stop their spreading their doctrine to other Latin American countries. If they come in and make an act of aggression we are going to answer it, and that is it. That is my guess.

TRANSPORTING MILITARY EQUIPMENT OUT OF CUBA

Senator LAUSCHE. There was one omission that I have been concerned about. What are we going to do in the event they begin transporting military equipment out of Cuba into let us say, Haiti or——

Senator MORSE. We stop it.

Senator LAUSCHE. That would not seem to be in the resolution, it would not seem so to me.

Senator MORSE. Oh, yes. That was the agreement of Punta del Este. That was within it.

Senator LAUSCHE. It is in it?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it is clearly within the limits of the resolution. We say to export none of their aggressiveness.

Senator LAUSCHE. Rusk tried to hold himself flexible on that when he was before our committee.

Now, frankly, I do not see how you can now on our part go into Cuba. If we had done it the moment those ships were going in carrying missiles, I could understand it. But now you have a different psychological situation, and we have to wait for an overt act before we do anything.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think, I know that the course that the administration has followed has been one that has not taken well with a great part of the public in this country, but I cannot help but believe that it is right, because of our past experience in Latin America. They still think of us as the Gringo Imperialist of the North, and they think of intervention and all of those things, and I think we have pursued the right course even though it has been a different one.

OK, the committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:15 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. SITUATION IN VIETNAM

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, March 14, 1962.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: In Governor Harriman's absence I am forwarding the Department's replies to the questions which you have recently asked concerning Vietnam. The Department's comments respond to the inquiries in your letter of February 21st, the questions on the cards which you provided to Governor Harriman at the recent executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee on Vietnam and the oral questions which you asked at that time.

The enclosed material is provided with the understanding that those portions which are classified are for the sole information of the Committee.

In the present circumstances the Department believes that it is most important to look as carefully as possible at the problem of Vietnam and if you or other members need further information, I shall do my best to supply it.

Sincerely yours,

Frederick G. Dutton.

3 Enclosures

1. Questions and Answers on Vietnam.
2. Letter from President Kennedy to President Diem, October 24, 1961.
3. The Economies of North and South Vietnam.

ANSWERS TO SENATOR WAYNE MORSE'S QUESTIONS OF FEBRUARY 21, 1962 ON VIETNAM

Question 1. (Unclassified) From what provisions of the Constitution or treaty or statute does President Kennedy derive the right to order United States military personnel to transport South Vietnamese troops into combat, to return the fire of North Vietnamese, to patrol the sea approaches to South Vietnam and to drop propaganda leaflets over areas held by the guerrillas opposing the Government of South Vietnam?

Answer. (Unclassified) Article II of the Constitution makes the President Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and vests in him the executive power. Article II has also been interpreted as making the President the "sole organ of the nation" in the field of foreign affairs *(United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright,* 299 U.S. 304, 318 ff. (1936)). These constitutional powers give the President authority to deploy United States military personnel abroad.

In addition to the President's constitutional powers, the Congress has enacted Section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which authorizes the President to furnish military assistance abroad, *inter alia,* by ". . . . assigning or detailing members of the armed forces of the United States . . . to perform duties of a noncombatant nature, including those related to training or advice."

Furthermore, the United States and Vietnam are parties to the agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina of December 23, 1950 (TIAS 2447; 3 U.S.T. 2756) which was concluded pursuant to Public Law 329, 81st Congress (63 Stat. 714, 22 U.S.C. 1571-1604). This agreement provides for the furnishing by the United States to Vietnam, among others, of military assistance in the form of equipment, material and services. Article IV, paragraph 2, of the agreement states that "To facilitate operations under this agreement, each Government agrees . . . To receive within its territory such personnel of the United States of America as may be required for the purposes of this agreement . . ."

Under these provisions the United States has since 1950 provided military assistance to Vietnam in the form of training, equipment and logistic support. The activities mentioned in the question are an expansion of this training and logistic support role. The transportation of troops is logistic support. The sea patrols referred to are carefully limited to training operations and the exchange of intelligence with Vietnamese navel units. Our assistance to the Vietnamese in dropping leaflets over isolated parts of Vietnam has similarly been confined to training and logistics aspects of the operation.

Given the activities in which they are engaged, and the character of guerrilla warfare, in which hostilities occur sporadically at scattered points throughout the country, we had to face the possibility that United States personnel would come under hostile fire. In these circumstances, it was obvious that they would have to be able to defend themselves, and the President has accordingly authorized them to fire, if fired upon if necessary for self-defense.

Question 2. (Unclassified) Would you discuss the differences and similarities between the present use of United States forces in Vietnam and their use in Korea in 1950 and in Lebanon in 1958?

Answer. (Unclassified) United States military personnel are presently in Vietnam pursuant to a request of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam of December 14, 1961 (attached) and to an Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina of December 23, 1950. These personnel are engaged in activities of a noncombatant nature, primarily in training, logistic and advisory capacities, designed to assist the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to counter the indirect aggression directed against it from the North.

United States forces were sent into direct combat operations in South Korea to repel the aggressive armed attack launched on June 25, 1950 by North Korea against the Republic of Korea. On the same day the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the situation. The Korean National Assembly, on June 26, appealed both to the United States and the United Nations for assistance. On June 27, 1950 the Security Council adopted a resolution recommending that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might be necessary to repel the attack. The Security Council, on July 7, established a United Nations Command under the United States. In these circumstances, the President on the basis of his constitutional authority sent United States forces to Korea.

United States forces were deployed in Lebanon in 1958 pursuant to an urgent request from the Government of Lebanon which felt itself threatened by externally inspired civil strife. These troops were sent to Lebanon under the President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief. President Eisenhower stated that United States forces had been sent to Lebanon "to protect American lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese Government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity."

It will be recalled that pursuant to President Eisenhower's request the Congress had on March 9, 1957, passed a joint resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East which provided in part, "if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism:" (Public Law 85–7, 85th Congress). In sending United States troops to Lebanon, the President did not make use of this joint resolution since the Lebanon situation did not involve Communist armed aggression as contemplated by the resolution.

In the Lebanon situation, United States forces neither engaged in combat operations as in the Korean conflict nor in training or advisory functions as is the case today in Vietnam. Their mere presence in Lebanon had the desired effect of helping to restore order and tranquility there.

Question 3. (Unclassified) Would it be appropriate under the Constitution for the President to submit to the Congress a resolution covering the situation in Vietnam which would be comparable to the Formosa Resolution of 1955 and the Middle East Resolution of 1957?

Answer. (Unclassified) As indicated in question 1 above the President has power under the Constitution to take the actions presently being carried on in Vietnam.

It is obviously desirable that the Congress understand the basis for Presidental actions of this character and fully support them. Traditionally, these objectives have been achieved by consultation between officers of the Executive Branch and members and Committees of Congress having responsibility in the premises, particularly the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In the present case the President has asked that the fullest and freest consultation with the Committee and the Congres-

sional leadership be maintained. He has himself met with appropriate members of the Congress on several occasions to discuss the problems in Vietnam. The Secretary has frequently testified before this Committee on the same subject, and has discussed it informally on many occasions with the members of the Committee. The Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs with appropriate members of his staff are and have been available for the purpose of consultation.

On two occasions in the past, where it seemed possible that the President would wish to commit United States forces to combat operations, President Eisenhower decided to invite Congress to associate itself with his exercise of his constitutional functions as Commander in Chief, primarily in order to provide a convincing demonstration of United States unity on the issues there involved. We have not thought that such action has been called for to this point. However, should circumstances develop in which a formal expression of Congressional support seems desirable, the President undoubtedly would not hesitate to seek an appropriate resolution.

Question 4. (Unclassified) To what extent are the actions by United States military personnel in South Vietnam considered to be combat actions?

Answer. (Unclassified) As the President said in his Press Conference on February 14, "We have not sent combat troops in the generally understood sense of the word." The United States is assisting Vietnamese combat units with training, logistic, transportation and advisory personnel.

The nature of the activities in which United States military personnel are engaged in Vietnam is dictated by the very character of guerrilla war. Hostilities are not concentrated in any well-defined area; rather, fighting is likely to break out sporadically and without warning in any part of the country. The "front" is not fixed as in the classical situation; the front literally is everywhere. In these circumstances, as indicated in question 1 above, the President has ordered our military personnel in Vietnam to fire back in self-defense if fired upon.

As noted above, United States military personnel in Vietnam are noncombatants. In the 7 years since 1955 violence in Vietnam has claimed about 26,000 casualties. Of these, 15 have been American personnel (4 killed, 10 wounded, 1 missing). Despite our increased activities in Vietnam, we would hope that those casualties can continue to be kept at a minimum.

Question 5. (Unclassified) Is the action of the United States in Vietnam inconsistant with the agreement of July 1954 on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, having particular reference to Chapter III entitled "Ban on Introduction of Fresh Troops, Military Personnel, Arms and Munitions, Military Bases"? (End unclassified)

Answer. (Confidential) The United States did not sign the 1954 Geneva Accords and is not a party thereto. At the time of conclusion of the Accords, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith stated that the United States "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the . . . agreements with grave concern and as seriously threating international peace and security." We have maintained the view expressed in General Smith's statement, and our present actions in Vietnam are fully in accord with the policy.

However, North Vietnam which is a party to the Accords has consistently violated the agreements by directing, assisting, supplying, and reinforcing guerrilla forces in South Vietnam and by illegal introduction into North Vietnam of military personnel and war materials.

International law recognizes the principle that a material breach of a treaty by one party entitles the other at least to withhold compliance with an equivalent, corresponding or related provision until the other party is prepared to observe its obligations. Both the United States and Vietnam have made it clear that if North Vietnam would comply with the provisions of the Geneva Accords, increased United States assistance would no longer be necessary. Legally, the actions of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam in requesting and receiving additional assistance from the United States are fully consistent with the above principle.

Justification for the application of the principle of law outlined above gains force in the present context from the fact that actions being taken by the Government of Vietnam can be related to the requirements of legitimate self-defense necessitated by the breaches of the other party. (End Confidential)

Question 6. (Unclassified) Section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes the President to assist a friendly country by providing defense articles and by assigning military personnel "to perform duties of a noncombatant nature." To what extent are the operations made pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961? (End unclassified)

Answer. (Begin confidential) As of March 1, 1962, fiscal year 1962 operations in Vietnam have been funded to the extent of $151.3 million from appropriations made

pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and $49.6 million from Department of Defense appropriations. These figures are subject to adjustment by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in accordance with the following guideline issued by the Secretary of Defense:

> "Under MAP financing procedures, reimbursement is made to the Military Service for material and/or services delivered or furnished to a recipient country against an approved and funded Military Assistance Programs. On the other hand, where a Military Service has been assigned a U.S. military mission in a foreign country by the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all costs involved will be charged to the Military Service Appropriation."

Salaries of all military personnel are, of course, funded from their Service appropriations and are not included in the above estimates. (End confidential)

Question 7. (Unclassified) What are the plans of this administration, if any, to bring the South Vietnam issues before the United Nations?

Answer. (Confidential) The Administration has no present plans to bring the Vietnam situation before the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly for debate or action. However, Vietnam's case has been officially brought to the attention of the United Nations and its members. The State Department paper on Vietnam entitled "A Threat to the Peace" was transmitted to the Secretary General and all members on December 8, 1961. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam's own presentation of the facts has been made known to the members. The Secretary General, at the request of the Australian Delegation, circulated to all United Nations members copies of Vietnamese Notes to the Internationl Control Commission on January 10, 1962. (End confidential)

Question 8. (Unclassified) What do we consider to be our obligation to SEATO in regard to supplying military aid and economic aid to South Vietnam?

Answer. (Confidential) Under Article IV (1) of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the Protocol to the Treaty, the United States is committed, in the event of Communist aggression by means of armed attack against the Republic of Vietnam, to act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. In the case of a threat to Vietnam other than armed attack, the parties to the Treaty have agreed under Article IV (2) to consult in order to agree on measures which should be taken for the common defense. Under Article IV (3) of the Treaty, no action can be taken on the territory of Vietnam except at the invitation or with the consent of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. There has been no request by Vietnam for SEATO action.

There is, of course, nothing in the Treaty which prevents the United States from taking action bilaterally with the Republic of Vietnam outside the framework of the Treaty.

Several years before the creation of SEATO, the United States began to supply military assistance (1950—TIAS 2447) and Economic Aid (1951—TIAS 2346). A good working relationship for dealing with the fast-moving complexities of a guerrilla war has been established.

We have consulted regularly in the SEATO Council Representatives with our Treaty partners on the situation in Vietnam. We have informed them of our efforts there and have urged them to join in helping Vietnam. A majority of the members are doing so. (End confidential)

Question 9. (Unclassified) What is the Administration's answer to the cumulating evidence that the Government of Vietnam is not an effective government, that it is a corrupt government, and that it is a government that will probably fall at some time in the absence of U.S. support? (End unclassified)

Answer. (Begin secret) The effectiveness of the Vietnamese Government can only be judged against its circumstances. It is a new country emerging from 15 years of war and 80 years of colonial control. During half its 6 years of existence it has fought off the threat of Communist conquest. Its political policy has been to lay the "infrastructure of democracy" through education, transportation and communication. Despite the war the number of children in Vietnamese elementary schools has grown in 5 years to 1,100,000, an increase of 272 percent, and a far better record than that of Communist North Vietnam. The Government of Vietnam has also made a proud record in expanding transportation, communication and health services. Its per capita food production and per capita gross national product are growing and are both higher than in North Vietnam. This is a good indication that the Government of free Vietnam with U.S. help has made more effective progress than has North Vietnam under Communist control. Statistical evidence carefully compiled from the best sources available is enclosed.

On the other hand Government effectiveness in South Vietnam has been hampered by overcentralization, overlapping agencies and insufficient understanding be-

tween the governing and the governed. While this is partly due to the lack of competent administrators, it is also true that a greater number of competent administrators could have been developed if they had been given more responsibility and authority.

Another fact which has hampered the effectiveness of the Government of Vietnam is that President Diem does not possess the magnetic qualities needed to rally his people enthusiastically to his Government's programs.

There is evidence of corruption in the Government of Vietnam. There is no evidence of corruption on the part of President Diem and he has carried on an extensive and well-publicized campaign to punish corrupt officials. Several have been publicly tried and punished.

Some official corruption is endemic in Southeast Asian countries. The amount of corruption in Vietnam does not appear to be greater than in neighboring countries. However, it has damaged the prestige of the Government of Vietnam because exaggerated stories of official corruption are widely believed. We have checked these stories carefully and find no evidence for many of them. However, the Government of Vietnam has not done an effective job setting the record straight with its own people.

Two attempts have been made against President Diem. Both were military in origin and seem to have been motivated by the feeling that the government was not giving them the authority to press on vigorously with the anti-Communist struggle. The attempts failed. President Diem is clearly in control as the legitimate and elected head of the government. No other group has any appreciable degree of popular support. In the circumstances of war and tension existing in Vietnam, some discontent must be expected. Also the trouble lies partly with Diem's inability to project adequately his own many good qualities of leadership to his people. (End secret)

Question 10. (Unclassified) What actions has President Diem taken in regard to the 9 points for reform which he and Ambassador Nolting agreed to in December?

Answer. (Unclassified) Varying progress has been made on all the points on which President Diem and Ambassador Nolting reached agreement in early December. Since their understanding intimately affects the interests of both governments and the prosecution of Vietnam's defense effort, it cannot be spelled out in detail.

However, the following has clearly emerged in the intervening three months:

1. There is a much closer and more effective working relationship between the United States Government and the Government of Vietnam.
2. American military advisers have been accepted and listened to in a variety of roles.
3. The Vietnamese National Internal Security Council (War Cabinet) has met more frequently and is playing a somewhat greater role.
4. There has been increased freedom of debate in the National Assembly.
5. The military command structure has been strengthened, but considerable improvement is still needed.
6. U.S. and Vietnamese officials have embarked on joint studies of local conditions.
7. Civic action and plans for village and hamlet defense are being made. Further coordination and better implementation are needed.
8. Provincial Councils are being created. It is too soon to judge their usefulness.
9. There have been increases in military salaries and benefits.
10. A wide range of sound measures have put the economy on a sounder basis.
11. A National Economic Council has been formed and has commended examination of government development plans. Its activities will be slow and cautious.
12. The effectiveness of military intelligence has been greatly increased.
13. Flood relief and rehabilitation have been carried out with good effect.
14. The President has increased his travels to the provinces.
15. Public information has definitely improved.

Question 11. (Unclassified) Do the Attorney General's remarks at the Saigon Airport represent the policy of the Administration? Were they cleared by the President or the Department of State in advance?

Answer. (Unclassified) The Attorney General received intensive briefings on the situation in Vietnam before his departure for the Far East. He made a stop in Vietnam at the Saigon Airport only for purposes of refueling his aircraft. His remarks there were informal and consisted largely of answers to questions from the press. In these circumstances there was no formal clearance of his statements. However, his remarks reflect the policy of the Administration toward Vietnam.

Question 12 (Unclassified) To what extent are our allies and other non-Communist states contributing to and supporting the combined U.S.-Vietnamese effort to preserve the independence of the Republic of Vietnam?

Answer. (Unclassified) Since it became independent Japan, France, Germany and Australia have made available to Vietnam various forms of aid whose total value is about $100 million. In addition there have been other programs involving students, teachers, technicians, commodities and equipment from these countries as well as from Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, China, Malaya, India, FAO, WHO, ILO, ICAO, UNESCO and UNTAO.

The United States is, moreover, presently trying to stimulate expanded Free World aid to Vietnam as evidence of financial and political solidarity with Vietnam in its struggle.

Question 13. (Unclassified) What precisely is the present attitude of the Indian Government toward the conflict in Vietnam? Heretofore, India has appeared to observe a strict and uncritically neutral role in its function as Chairman of the International Control Commission for Vietnam. I would like to know whether this continues to be the case.

Answer. (Unclassified) India, as Chairman of the International Control Commission for Vietnam, has, according to its rights, sought to play an impartial role dealing with the problems of Vietnam as they relate to the Geneva Accords of 1954. (End unclassified)

Question 14. (Unclassified) What is our intelligence estimate of the possibility that the Communist bloc will escalate the conflict in Vietnam above the level of subversion and guerrilla warfare? (End unclassified)

Answer. (Secret) The Communist objective remains that of eliminating United States influence and presence from Vietnam and of replacing it by Communism. They have so far maintained coordination within the Communist bloc in their attempts to attain this objective. While the tempo of Viet Cong activity is likely to increase in Vietnam, there seems little prospect at present that the pattern of this activity will change quickly and drastically.

In looking further it must be remembered that Hanoi and Peking are more militantly revolutionary than Russia and consider their interests to be more directly involved in Vietnam than Russia's.

If Vietnam's efforts to defend itself are more successful, Hanoi, with military forces of 300,000 available, will be strongly tempted to increase the strength of its attacks. To Hanoi the struggle is at least as much a struggle for national reunification as an ideological struggle. It has largely committed its prestige to this struggle.

However, the following factors are likely to deter an overt escalation by North Vietnam in a situation where South Vietnam is defending itself with increasing success:

1. Hanoi would not welcome the presence of a large number of Chinese Communist troops in North Vietnam. China is the traditional enemy. North Vietnam does not want to become another Chinese sphere of influence.
2. North Vietnam fears Free World retaliation.
3. Hanoi desires to retain some latitude of action by playing off Moscow and Peking.
4. Moscow might increase its military aid to Hanoi, but would probably prefer to see a conference on Vietnam rather than a full scale war in Vietnam, an area which Russia probably does not consider vital to its interests.
5. There appears to be some Communist belief, particularly in Moscow, that even if South Vietnam is able to resist temporarily, it will, in the long run, fall to Communism.

If Viet Cong success increases, the present guerrilla struggle will be likely to move up the scale, in the pattern of Communist wars of "national liberation," towards open war involving increasingly large troop formations. A "liberated" area and "liberation government" would probably be established. However, the formation of a "liberation government" would not be an automatic signal for Communist military escalation.

It appears more likely that the present pattern, a long, wearing struggle, will continue. The South Vietnamese effort, with U.S. support is designed to meet this challenge. Time is not necessarily on the side of the guerrilla, as shown in Greece, the Philippines and Malaya. The Viet Cong probably must escalate their guerrilla war to open war in order to conquer the country. If they should decide to escalate to larger, open formations, it will be a particularly dangerous time for them. On the other hand continuation of present guerrilla destruction risks angering the peasant without winning the war. Since Communist propaganda carries limited conviction in Vietnam, where so many have already lived under their domination, the Viet Cong guerrillas must operate through fear and coercion as well as through propaganda and persuasion to obtain men and food. The South Vietnamese counterguerrilla strategy seeks to save the peasant, conserve his property and deprive the Viet

Cong of their needs so that they will have to take increasingly cruel measures to obtain food, arms and men. (End secret)

Question 15. (Unclassified) I find myself unclear as to the Soviet Union's attitude toward and role in the Vietnam conflict. I would like an assessment of that question. More specifically, I would like to know whether Russian and Czech arms are being made available to the Viet Cong—if so, whether the levels of such assistance are appreciable or token.

Answer. (Begin secret) As indicated above the Soviet Union for the present probably desires to avoid an enlargement of the struggle in Vietnam to the point which would increase the likelihood of a major war. If, however, South Vietnam's defensive efforts become more successful, the U.S.S.R. might feel constrained to redress the balance by increased aid to North Vietnam in order to reduce the likelihood of a large scale Chinese Communist intervention. Moscow cannot appear to oppose Communist expansion in underdeveloped areas.

While the Soviet attitude towards Vietnam will be largely influenced by developments in Laos, as well as by its own relations with Communist China and by developments on disarmament and in Berlin, it seems probable that at present Moscow does not want any major escalation in Vietnam. This attitude will not prevent the continuation of Russian and Communist bloc military aid to North Vietnam.

Communist bloc military aid to North Vietnam has been large and effective. However, the Viet Cong have sought to avoid the use of Communist manufactured arms in South Vietnam. (End secret)

Question 16. (Unclassified) If President Diem should depart the political scene—either as a result of a military coup such as was attempted in November 1960, or otherwise—are there elements, military or civilian, which could cope effectively with the situation, in our judgment?

Answer. (Unclassified) We believe there are. We are following this most sensitive subject very closely. (End unclassified)

IMMEDIATE RELEASE,

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

October 24, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On the sixth anniversary of the Republic of Vietnam, the United States of America is proud to pay tribute to the courage of the Vietnamese people. We have seen and marked well the anguish—and the glory—of a nation that refuses to submit to Communist terror. From the people that twice defeated the hordes of Kublai Khan, we could expect no less. America, and indeed all free men, must be grateful for the example you have set.

Mr. President, in 1955 we observed the dangers and difficulties that surrounded the birth of your Republic. In the years that followed, we saw the dedication and vigor of your people rapidly overcoming those dangers and difficulties. We rejoiced with you in the new rice springing again from fields long abandoned, in the new hospitals and roads and schools that were built, and in the new hopes of a people who had found peace after a long and bitter war. The record you established in providing new hope, shelter and security to nearly a million fleeing from Communism in the North stands out as one of the most laudable and best administered efforts in modern times.

Your brave people scarcely tasted peace before they were forced again into war. The Communist response to the growing strength and prosperity of your people was to send terror into your villages, to burn your new schools and to make ambushes of your new roads. On this October 26, we in America can still rejoice in the courage of the Vietnamese people, but we must also sorrow for the suffering, destruction and death which Communism has brought to Vietnam, so tragically represented in the recent assassination of Colonel Hoang Thuy Nam, one of your outstanding patriots.

Mr. President, America is well aware of the increased intensity which in recent months has marked the war against your people, and of the expanding scale and frequency of the Communist attacks. I have read your speech to the Vietnamese National Assembly in which you outline so clearly the threat of Communism to Vietnam. And I have taken note of the stream of threats and vituperation, directed at

your government and mine, that flows day and night from Hanoi. Let me assure you again that the United States is determined to help Vietnam preserve its independence, protect its people against Communist assassins, and build a better life through economic growth.

I am awaiting with great interest the report of General Maxwell Taylor based on his recent talks and observations in Vietnam, supplementing reports I have received from our Embassy there over many months. I will then be in a better position to consider with you additional measures that we might take to assist the Republic of Vietnam in its struggle against the Communist aggressors.

Mr. President, we look forward in these perilous days to a future October 26, when Vietnam will again know freedom and peace. We know that day is coming, and we pray that it may be soon. I speak for the American people when I say that we are confident of the success of the Vietnamese nation, that we have faith in its strength and valor, and that we know that the future of the Vietnamese people is not Communist slavery but the freedom and prosperity which they have defended and pursued throughout their history.

Sincerely,

/s/ John F. Kennedy.

APPENDIX B. SITUATION IN THAILAND

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 8, 1962.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In accordance with Mr. Harriman's promise, I enclose herewith answers to questions asked by Senators Hickenlooper and Gore during the hearing held before your Committee on February 27, 1962, with regard to the situation in Thailand.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK G. DUTTON,
Assistant Secretary.

Enclosures:

As stated above.

Replies to questions directed to Mr. Harriman by Senators Hickenlooper and Gore asked at hearing held on February 27, 1962 before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate relating to the situation in Thailand:

Question 1. Senator Hickenlooper asked as to the number of military personnel in Thailand.

Answer. The total United States military personnel, including TDY's and military civilians, presently in Thailand and contemplated in fiscal year 1962 (exclusive of Embassy Attaché offices) is 1843. This number is broken down into the following groups: OICC, 81; JUSMAG, 317; other military (SEATO Military Adviser, STARCOM, MATS MAAG, USAFPO, Air America-Udorn, 809th Eng. Constr. Btn., other TDY personnel), 1445.

Question 2. Senator Hickenlooper also requested information on the number of helicopters based in Thailand flying into Laos.

Answer. There are no United States helicopters in Thailand at this time. A Marine unit, consisting of a squadron of about 16 helicopters, was withdrawn from Thailand about two months ago. As of possible interest, there are two air force units operating fixed wing aircraft in Thailand at the present time. Each unit consists of four planes; one is a reconnaissance unit which operates into South Vietnam, and the other is for training purposes within Thailand.

Question 3. With respect to Senator Gore's question whether Thailand is cooperating in efforts to curb the illicit trade in dope, the Department has the following information on the subject.

Answer. Thailand is a party to the following narcotic treaties to which the United States is also a party: Convention and final protocols relating to the suppression of the abuse of opium and other drugs, signed at The Hague, January 23, 1912 (TS 612); Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, and protocol of signature, signed at Geneva on July 13, 1931 (TS 863); Protocol signed at Lake Success December 11, 1946 (TIAS 1671, 1859) amending the agreements, conventions and protocols on narcotic drugs concluded at The Hague on January 23, 1912, at Geneva on February 11, 1925, and February 19, 1925, and July 13, 1931, at Bangkok on November 27, 1931, and at Geneva on June 26, 1936.

Following are the principal narcotic treaties to which Thailand, but not the United States, is a party: agreement concerning the suppression of the manufacture of, internal trade in and use of, prepared opium, signed at Geneva on February 11, 1925 (51 LNTS 337); international opium convention, signed at Geneva on February 19, 1925 (81 LNTS 317); agreement concerning the suppression of opium smoking, signed at Bangkok on November 27, 1931 (177 LNTS 373).

In addition, Thailand, signed the recently concluded 1961 single convention on narcotics and is one of four countries which has to date ratified it.

Thailand has been cooperating internationally for many years in curbing illicit trade in narcotics. Since 1959 trade in opium in Thailand has been prohibited by law. The law is strictly enforced. In 1959, Thailand participated in a narcotics seminar in Paris (INTERPOL). It has sent representatives to various international meetings during the past several years, including observers to the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Their delegations have been large in number, evidencing serious interest in the problem.

In April 1961 the Thai Government organized a Central Narcotics Bureau in the Department of Police. This Bureau works exclusively on narcotics and problems connected therewith. Since its establishment, this Bureau has been responsible for seizing three very important heroin laboratories in Bangkok. It is interesting to note that the Bureau is staffed by young, intelligent, and capable police officers, many of whom are graduates of American universities, and who have also had training in our narcotic training schools.

Marshal Sarit is personally interested in the problem. He has interrogated many offenders and has recently sentenced to death a ring leader in the manufacture of heroin in Thailand. In a statement to the press, he indicated that the example of the ring leader should be notice to manufacturers of heroin as to how they will be treated in Thailand when captured.

In addition, the Thai Government has established a narcotics committee which consists of members of the Executive Office, cabinet members and members of the various ministers of the government, including the Minister of Health. The Committee is concerned with the problem of illicit traffic as well as dope addiction.

On the panel side, the Thai Government has dealt with the question of manufacture or trade in narcotics by providing penalties, including the death penalty, depending on the gravity of the offense.

On the basis of the available information, the Department has reason to believe that the Thai Government has been cooperating fully in trying to curb illicit trade in narcotics.

APPENDIX C. SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO CUBAN SECURITY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, September 10, 1962.

Hon. J.W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At the joint briefing on Wednesday for the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of State indicated he would submit for the record a statement relating to the commitments suggested by the recent Soviet military shipments to Cuba.

I am enclosing an analysis of Soviet public statements with respect to this situation; a copy has also been sent to Chairman Russell. The covering sheet is confidential, but the quotations of Soviet statements are, of course, unclassified.

If I can be of any further assistance on this matter, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

Frederick G. Dutton.

Enclosure.

SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO CUBAN SECURITY

SUMMARY

The Soviets have been circumspect in public statements about a "commitment" to render assistance to Cuba in the event the latter were attacked. Probably the strongest statement was Khrushchev's July 1960 threat of missile support for Cuba, but this statement was soon qualified as a "symbolic" one. Khrushchev's April 18, 1961 letter to President Kennedy also contained a strong promise of Soviet assistance to Cuba in repelling armed attack; but it made no specific reference to the armed attack then in progress but quite clearly already a failure. Other authoritative Soviet statements have referred generally to "well-known" warnings of the Soviet Union, and Soviet propaganda has warned that a U.S.-Cuba conflict could broaden into a world war.

Khrushchev implied in September 1961 that the Soviet Union could hold as hostages for Cuba the countries on the Soviet periphery with which the United States has military alliances and in which the United States has bases.

There has never been any evidence that the Castro regime has been admitted to the Warsaw Pact, the only multilateral military alliance of the Communist bloc embracing the Soviet Union and seven East European Communist states. There was a report that Raul Castro requested Cuban admission to the Warsaw Pact during his visit to Moscow this July, but that the request was denied. A Soviet commentary on Cuban developments this week specifically denied that Cuba was a Warsaw Pact member. There is also no evidence that the Soviets and Cuba have concluded a bilateral military alliance, and Khrushchev specifically denied in September 1961 that any such agreement existed.

In April 1961 Khrushchev denied that the Soviets had any military "base" in Cuba or intended to establish one there; and the denial that one exists was repeated in Soviet propaganda this week.

The Soviet-Cuban September 2, 1962 communique providing for arms assistance to Cuba and asserting Moscow's "right" to help Cuba ensure its security constitutes the most binding assurance the U.S.S.R. has officially given in underwriting the Cuban regime's security. However, it still stops short of the full-fledged Soviet commitment to defend Cuba in specific situations which is a feature of Soviet military assistance treaties with the Communist bloc states.

QUOTATIONS, PRINCIPAL SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON DEFENSE OF CUBA

Warning that Soviet rockets can protect Cuba:

It should be borne in mind that the United States is now not at such an unattainable distance from the Soviet Union as formerly. Figuratively speaking, if need be, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire should the aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare to start intervention against Cuba. And the Pentagon could be well advised not to forget that, as shown at the latest tests we have rockets which can land precisely in a preset square target 13,000 kilometers away. This, if you want, is a warning to those who would like to solve international problems by force and not by reason.

(Khrushchev July 9, 1960 Kremlin speech, commenting on planned U.S. cancellation of sugar purchase from Cuba.)

Rocket Support Warning Attenuated:

(TASS Summary) "The head of the Soviet Government noted that he would like his statements regarding aid to Cuba in the case of armed aggression against that country 'really to be symbolic'."

(Full Text) Mr. KHRUSHCHEV. I should like such statements to be really symbolic, as the enemies of the Cuban revolution say. For this purpose, it is essential that the imperialists' threat of intervention against Cuba should not resolve into military operations, and then there should be no need to test the reality of our statement concerning armed assistance to the Cuban people against aggression. Is this clear?

Senor FRANQUI. We shall also use this figuratively in the case if they do not attack us meanwhile.

Mr. KHRUSHCHEV. That is right.

Senor FRANQUI. I should like you to get me right. It would be fine if the threats did not exist.

Mr. KHRUSHCHEV. That is right.

Senor FRANQUI. I should like you to get me right. It would be fine if the threats did not exist.

Mr. KHRUSHCHEV. Yes.

Senor FRANQUI. But if this threat does exist, if this threat is carried out, it seems to me that rockets are adequately prepared for this?

Mr. KHRUSHCHEV. Unquestionably. You got it right. It would be fine if there should be no aggression. And we are doing everything not to launch combat rockets because it is human life, the flourishing of life, and not the destruction of human beings that is our supreme concern.

(Khrushchev October 22 interview with director of Cuban newspaper *Revolucion;* Soviet versions released October 29.)

Soviets Ready To Provide "Any" Assistance:

We should not forget that Cuba is not alone today, that Cuba has many friends in the world, and that among the most sincere friends of the Cuban Republic, who are ready to provide any assistance, the Soviet Union is to be found. The Soviet delegation wishes to make this statement today most clearly, most definitely.

(Soviet Representative's Statement in UNGA Committee April 15, 1961 during discussion of Cuban exiles invasion at Bay of Pigs that morning.)

Soviets Will Render All Necessary Assistance To Repel Armed Attacked on Cuba:

As to the Soviet Union, there should be no misunderstanding our position: We shall render the Cuban people and their government all necessary assistance in beating back armed attack on Cuba.

(Khrushchev April 18, 1961 letter to President Kennedy concerning Bay of Pigs attack.)

Soviets Have and Seek No Military Base in Cuba:

As for the Soviet Union, we have stated on many occasions, and I am stating again, that our government does not seek any advantages or privileges in Cuba. We do not have any bases in Cuba, and we do not intend to establish any. This is well known to you, to your generals and admirals. If, despite this, they still try to frighten the people by fabrications about "Soviet bases" in Cuba, this is obviously designed for simpletons. But there are fewer and fewer such simpletons, including in the United States, I hope.

(Khrushchev's April 22, 1961 reply to President Kennedy's letter of April 18 concerning Cuban Developments and World Affairs.)

U.S. Cuban Policy Can Lead to World War:

As for your concern for the emigres expelled by the Cuban people, I should like to add the following: You are well aware, of course, that there are emigres in many countries who are dissatisfied with the situation and the system existing in the countries they fled from. If the abnormal practice were introduced into the relations between states of using these emigres, especially arms in hand, against the countries they fled from, it can be openly said that this would inevitably lead to conflicts and wars. Therefore, it would be well to forebear from such unreasonable actions. This is a slippery and dangerous road which can lead the world to a new global war.

(*Ibid.*)

U.S. Action Against Cuba Fraught with Serious Consequences:

The Government of the Soviet Union sent the Government of the United States messages in which it condemned the armed incursion and warned that it could bring terrible consequences. The aggression against Cuba has brought about an exacerbation of the international situation but we would like to look optimistically upon the further development of events in this part of the world. The peoples expect the statement of the United States to draw the correct conclusions and the necessary lessons from what has happened.

Cuba became a victim of aggression. However, its leaders showed not only a reasonable approach but nobility and proposed holding talks with the United States to eliminate the tension in the relations between the countries and normalize the situation in the Caribbean area—Cuba and the United States are neighbors and must live like good neighbors. Certain sober people in the United States are calling for action on the principle of "live and let live." It would be a good thing if the United States used this principle in its relations with Cuba and other countries. Such an approach would be to the mutual advantage both of Cuba and of the United States and would not damage anybody's prestige. If, however, contrary to common sense, the imperalists in the United States embark on a new open adventure against the Cuban Republic, a situation fraught with serious consequences, above all for the United States itself, will be created. In our times, the adventures of the imperalist cannot be unpunished

(Khrushchev comments on Cuba in May 6, 1961 Yerevan speech.)

Moscow Would Respond to Cuban Appeal for Assistance Despite Lack of Treaty:

We recognize Cuba as an independent nation and she has the right to establish the internal system her people may choose. If she is attacked, she may count on the help of all peace-loving nations ready to fight against aggression. We have no treaties with Cuba, but if she appeals to us for help in case of aggression against her, we will of course not leave such an appeal unanswered.

(Khrushchev September 5, 1961 interview with *New York Times* correspondent C.L. Sulzsberger.)

U.S.S.R. Could Move Against Iran, Turkey, Greece:

In international affairs it is necessary to display self-control and patience. Takg Iran, for example. The United States has set up its military bases in that country with the agreement of the Shah. Americans actually hold sway in Iran's economy and in her army. Naturally enough, we do not like that because American actions in Iran are directed against our security. So what should we do? Of course we are strong and could attack Iran. It would be a simple matter because our might is incomparably greater. But if we were guided by the idea that the strong should beat the weak, it would mean the introduction of club rule in international relations instead of peaceful co-existence. Or see what is going on in Turkey. She is our neighbor, but you have stationed your bases there and threaten us from those bases. You have set up bases in Greece as well, and are threatening us and our ally Bulgaria from there. But we are displaying self-restraint and patience with regard to those countries. It would be reasonable if the United States were guided by the same principles in its relations with other countries.

(*Ibid*)

"Well Known" Soviet Warnings Repeated:

Cuba is not alone. It has many friends, not only in Latin America but throughout the world, and the Soviet Union is among them. The Republic of Cuba, as it was clearly declared by the head of the Soviet Government, N.S. Khrushchev, can always rely on the help and support of the Soviet people. The well-known warnings of the Soviet Government to the enemies of People's Cuba remain in force today, too.

(Soviet Government Statement of February 18, 1968, following OAS Punta del Este Conference on Cuba.)

And Again:

Our government and Comrade Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev personally have made repeated statements about the firm and resolute support of the Soviet Union to the just cause of the Cuban Republic, statements that the Soviet Government's warnings addressed to the enemies of People's Cuba remain in force today too.

(Soviet Deputy Premier Kozlov's June 25, 1962 speech at Cuban Embassy reception in connection with July 26 Movement festivities.)

Soviet Ambassador Promises Support:

Aleksandr Alekseyev, the new Soviet ambassador to Cuba, reiterated that the Soviet people will help the brotherly Cuban people to offset any misforture that may overtake them. "The Soviet Union will help the Cuban people under any circumstances."

(Havana Radio summary of Soviet Ambassador's remarks August 14, 1962.)

Moscow Asserts "Right" to Help Ensure Cuban Security:

During the stay of Comrades Guevara and Aragones, views were also exchanged in connection with the threats of aggressive imperialist quarters against Cuba. In view of these threats, the Cuban Government asked the Soviet Government to help it by delivering armaments and sending technical specialists to train Cuban servicemen. The Soviet Government attentively considered this request of the Cuban Government, and agreement was reached on this question. As long as the above-mentioned quarters continue to threaten Cuba, the Cuban Republic has every justification for taking the measures necessary to insure its security and safeguard its sovereignty and independence, while all Cuba's true friends have every right to respond to this legitimate request.

(Soviet-Cuban Communique September 2, 1962.)

Cuba Not a Warsaw Pact Member; No Soviet Base in Cuba:

It is necessary to recall that Cuba does not belong to the Warsaw Pact organization and not a single Soviet military base exists on its territory.

(Moscow Radio September 3, 1962 commentary on Soviet economic and military assistance to Cuba.)

US Invasion of Cuba Can Result in International Conflict:

The U.S. imperialist policy toward Cuba represents a dangerous sign against peace. A U.S. attempt to invade Cuba with its armed forces can result in an international conflict.

(*Ibid.*)

APPENDIX D. SITUATION IN SURINAM

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, September 14, 1962.

Hon. J.W. FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: When Secretary Rusk testified before the joint meeting of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees September 5, Senator Russell asked for verification concerning the rumor that officials in Surinam had stated within the last year that whether or not independence was desired depended in considerable measure on whether more or less foreign aid would be received as a result of such a move. A comprehensive memorandum on this subject has been prepared and is enclosed for the record.

If I may provide any additional material on this subject, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Frederick G. Dutton.

Enclosure.

SUBJECT: Surinam

At the present time, U.S. aid does not play a critical role in determining the political future of Surinam and there is no close connection between a Surinam move for independence and U.S. aid. The present U.S. aid program for Surinam is modest and in the last few years has not involved more than a few hundred thousand dollars annually. This program now consists of technical assistance rather than economic development financing.

There have been several indications that Surinam desires greater control over its foreign policy and this may lead to demands for a greater voice in foreign affairs if not in demand for independence. Surinam has strong financial ties with The Netherlands, however, and the question whether independence would lessen this support will undoubtedly be given serious consideration by the Surinam Government. Currently, two-thirds of the money costs of the Surinam 10-year plan for economic development (approximately $7.5 million annually) is furnished by the Government of The Netherlands in the form of loans and grants in equal amounts. Favorable action has also just been completed on Surinam's request for associate membership in the Common Market. Surinam has recently applied to the European Development Fund to take over Surinam's one-third contribution to the 1962 10-year plan budget. There is every indication that these ties with The Netherlands and the Common Market Surinam would be decisive factors in any decision Surinam, would make with regard to independence.

Only members of the OAS are eligible for loans from the Inter-American Development Bank. Membership in the OAS is limited to independent countries. Thus, Surinam's present political status prevents it from obtaining developmental capital from this source. Surinamers are aware of this and Senator Russell's question may derive from this situation.

In response to the specific question raised by Senator Russell, the Department has no record of any comments by Surinamese officials linking U.S. foreign aid to Surinam independence.

APPENDIX E. CUBA RESOLUTION

[CONFIDENTIAL COMMITTEE PRINT]

SEPTEMBER 19, 1962

Calendar No.

87TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. J. RES.

[Report No.]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER , 1962

Mr. ----------, from the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, sitting jointly pursuant to the unanimous consent agreement of September 13, 1962, reported the following original joint resolution; which was read twice and ordered to be placed on the calendar

---

JOINT RESOLUTION

Expressing the determination of the United States with respect to the situation in Cuba.

Whereas President James Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, declared that the United States would consider any attempt on the part of European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety"; and

Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that "an armed attack by any State against an American state shall be considered as an attack against all the American states, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-

defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations"; and

Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este in January 1962 unanimously declared: "The present Government of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine, and accepts military assistance from extracontinental Communist powers, including even the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet Union"; and

Whereas since 1958 the international Communist movement has increasingly extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States is determined—

(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere by force or the threat of force;

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported offensive military capability endangering the security of the United States; and

(c) to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for a return to self-determination.

APPEDIX F. BERLIN RESOLUTIONS

87TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. CON. RES. 97

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 3, 1962

Mr. JAVITS (for himself and Mr. MORSE) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas the primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations is and has been to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and

Whereas it is the purpose of the United States to encourage and support the establishment of a free, unified, and democratic Germany; and

Whereas in connection with the termination of hostilities in World War II the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union freely entered into binding agreements under which the four powers have the right to remain in Berlin, with the right of ingress and egress, until the conclusion of a final settlement with the Government of Germany; and

Whereas no such final settlement has been concluded by the four powers and the aforementioned agreements continue in force: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress—

(a) that the continued exercise of United States, British, and French rights in Berlin constitutes a fundamental political and moral ~~purpose~~ obligation;

(b) that the United States would regard as intolerable any violation by the Soviet Union directly or through others of those rights in Berlin, including the right of ingress and egress;

(c) that the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, any violation of those rights by the Soviet Union directly or through others, and to ~~fulfill our commitment~~ defend the rights and freedom of the people of Berlin to the people of Berlin with respect to their resolve for freedom.

87TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. CON. RES. 570

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 8, 1962

Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas the primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations is and has been to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and

Whereas it is the purpose of the United States to encourage and support the establishment of a free, unified, and democratic Germany; and

Whereas in connection with the termination of hostilities in World War II of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union freely entered into binding agreements under which the four powers have the right to remain in Berlin, with the right of ingress and egress, until the conclusion of a final settlement with the Government of Germany; and

Whereas no such final settlement has been concluded by the four powers and the aforementioned agreements continue in force: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress—

(a) that the continued exercise of United States,

British, and French rights in Berlin constitutes a fundamental political and moral determination;

(b) that the United States would regard as intolerable any violation by the Soviet Union directly or through others of those rights in Berlin, including the right of ingress and egress;

(c) that the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, any violation of those rights by the Soviet Union directly or through others, and to fulfill our commitment to the people of Berlin with respect to their resolve for freedom.

Passed the House of Representatives October 5, 1962.

Attest: RALPH R. ROBERTS,

Clerk.

APPENDIX G

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS PUBLICATIONS FOR 1962: HEARINGS, COMMITTEE PRINTS, SENATE DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS

HEARINGS PRINTED IN 1962

Feb. 6, 7, 9, and 19, 1962	Purchase of United Nations Bonds.
Mar. 8, 1962	Review of Operations of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Mar. 13 and 19, 1962	Peace Corps Act Amendments.
Mar. 20, 1962	Activities of the Development and Resources Corporation in Iran.
Mar. 30 and Apr. 3, 1962	Bretton Woods Agreement Act Amendments.
Apr. 5, 9, 19, 11, 12, 13, 16 and 18, 1962.	Foreign Assistance Act of 1962.
June 12 and 21, 1962	Philippine War Damage Claims.
July 25 and Aug. 2, 1962	Renewed Geneva Disarmament Negotiations.
Aug. 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9, 1962	Communications Satellite Act of 1962.
Aug. 2 and 21, 1962	Amendments to the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926.
July 12, 1962	United Nations Peace Bonds.
Sept. 14, 1962	Foreign Service Annuities.
Sept. 17, 1962	Situation in Cuba.

COMMITTEE PRINTS

Jan. 8, 1962	Seventh NATO Parliamentarian's Conference.
Jan. 14, 1962	Study Mission to Africa.
February 1962	Brazil and United States Policies.
February 1962	Legislation on Foreign Relations with Explanatory Notes.
Feb. 6, 1962	Information on Operations and Financing of the United Nations.
February 1962	Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Group.
March 1962	Punta del Este Conference, January 1962.
Undated	Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group—Sixth Meeting.
June 25, 1962	Information on the Operations and Financing of the United Nations: Supplement.
July 1962	Nondiplomatic activities of representatives of foreign governments: Preliminary study.
July 31, 1962	Additional Material on Administration of the Department of State.
Aug. 3, 1962	United States-Latin American relations: Some Observations on the Operation of the Alliance for Progress: the First Six Months: Study by Prof. Raymond Mikesell.
Dec. 26, 1962	Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Group: Report on the second meeting.
December 1962	Legislative History.

SENATE DOCUMENTS

S. Doc. 72, Feb. 22, 1962	Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Meeting, London, England, Sept. 25–30, 1961.
S. Doc. 77, Mar. 1, 1962	50th Conference on the Interparliamentary Union.
S. Doc. 112, Aug. 1, 1962	Implementation of the Humphrey Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

S. Doc. 132, Sept. 14, 1962 ..... Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership I: Some comments on the European Economic Community and NATO.

SENATE REPORTS

S. Rept. 1118, Jan. 15, 1962 ..... Study of Foreign Policy.
S. Rept. 1119, Jan. 15, 1962 ..... Interparliamentary Activities and Reception of Foreign Officials.
S. Rept. 1155, Jan. 25, 1962 ..... Highway Bridge Between Lubec, Maine, and Campobello Island, New Brunswick.
S. Rept. 1277, Mar. 13, 1962 ..... Purchase of United Nations Bonds.
S. Rept. 1325, Apr. 6, 1962 ..... Peace Corps Act Amendments.
S. Rept. 1344, Apr. 19, 1962 ..... Foreign Decorations.
S. Rept. 1477, May 9, 1962 ..... Amendments to the Bretton Woods Agreement Act.
S. Rept. 1535, May 28, 1962 ..... The Foreign Assistance Act of 1962.
S. Rept. 1668, June 28, 1962 ..... Bridges Across the Rio Grande in Texas.
S. Rept. 1678, July 9, 1962 ..... Ex Gratia Payment to New York.
S. Rept. 1679, July 9, 1962 ..... Study of Nondiplomatic Activities of Foreign Governments.
S. Rept. 1680, July 9, 1962 ..... Amendments to the Communications Act of 1934.
S. Rept. 1721, July 11, 1962 ..... Authorizing Acquisition of Specific Real Estate in the District of Columbia for the International Monetary Fund.
S. Rept. 1873, Aug. 10, 1962 ..... Communications Satellite Act of 1962.
S. Rept. 1882, Aug. 16, 1962 ..... Philippine War Damage Claims.
S. Rept. 1883, Aug. 16, 1962 ..... Films Recording Mrs. John F. Kennedy's Visit to India and Pakistan.
S. Rept. 1925, Aug. 27, 1962 ..... Amendments to the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926.
S. Rept. 1926, Aug. 27, 1962 ..... Attendance at Meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association.
S. Rept. 2111, Sept. 18, 1962 ..... Situation in Cuba.
S. Rept. 2263, Oct. 2, 1962 ..... World Food Congress.
S. Rept. 2272, Oct. 3, 1962 ..... Authorizing the Appointment of 1 Additional Assistant Secretary of State.
S. Rept. 2278, Oct. 4, 1962 ..... Authorizing the Construction, Maintenance, and Operation of Certain Toll Bridges across the Rio Grande.
S. Rept. 2288, Oct. 10, 1962 ..... Expressing the Sense of the Congress with Respect to the Situation in Berlin.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS

Ex. Rept. 1, Jan. 25, 1962 ..... Understanding to Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention.
Ex. Rept. 2, Jan. 25, 1962 ..... A Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
Ex. Rept. 3, Mar. 1, 1962 ..... Amendment to the Statue of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Ex. Rept. 4, Mar. 1, 1962 ..... Amendments to the World Meteorological Convention.
Ex. Rept. 5, Apr. 2, 1962 ..... Safety of Life at Sea Convention.
Ex. Rept. 6, July 5, 1962 ..... The International Wheat Agreement, 1962.
Ex. Rept. 7, Sept. 18, 1962 ..... Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation between the United States of America and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

APPENDIX H

VOLUMES PUBLISHED TO DATE IN THE HISTORICAL SERIES

Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine.
Foreign Relief Act: 1947.
Foreign Relief Assistance Act of 1948.
The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty.
Military Assistance Program: 1949.
Extension of European Recovery Program: 1949.
Economic Assistance to China and Korea: 1949–50.
Reviews of the World Situation: 1949–50.

Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

Volume I, Eightieth Congress, First and Second Sessions, 1947–48.
Volume II, Eighty-first Congress, First and Second Sessions, 1949–50.
Volume III, Parts 1 and 2, Eighty-second Congress, First Session, 1951.
Volume IV, Eighty-second Congress, Second Session, 1952.
Volume V, Eighty-third Congress, First Session, 1953.
Volume VI, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session, 1954.
Volume VII, Eighty-fourth Congress, First Session, 1955.
Volume VIII, Eighty-fourth Congress, Second Session, 1956.
Volume IX, Eighty-fifth Congress, First Session, 1957.
Volume X, Eighty-fifth Congress, Second Session, 1958.
Volume XI, Eighty-sixth Congress, First Session, 1959.
Volume XII, Eighty-sixth Congress, Second Session, 1960.
Volume XIII, Parts 1 and 2, Eighty-seventh Congress, First Session, 1961.
Volume XIV, Eighty-seventh Congress, Second Session, 1962.

○